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the people won't feel better if the stick
with which they are beaten
is called the people's stick
Mikhall Sakunin
[well..., it looks like we do...]
the soldier came knocking upon the queen's door
he said I am not fighting for you anymore
the queen knew she'd seen his face somewhere before
and slowly she let him inside
he said I've watched your palace up here on the hill
and I've wondered who's the woman for whom we all kill
but I'm leaving tomorrow and you can do what you will
only first I am asking you: why?
Suzanne Vega - The Queen and the Soldier
(from the album Suzanne Vega © 1985 A&M Records)
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[preface]
This text is the product of a piece of research that was rooted in many contradictory
factors, coincidence being an important, but not the only one. Let me highlight three
others that have been persistently present: curiosity, indignation and anger.
Perhaps this research took shape in quite a different way from what usually happens. I
did not decide to apply for a PhD and then choose to work in the former Yugoslav
states. Rather, I was making plans to work in that region—as an NGO activist—and
then, encouraged by Andy Dawson, I considered the possibility of carrying out
research. Hence, through an unpredictable string of choices and coincidences, PhD-
research became one of the vehicles, along with activism, through which I was able to
give shape to my interest in post-Yugoslav anti-nationalist alternatives. I am the first
and only person in my extended family to ever come near a university, and I consider
myself extremely lucky to have been able to go through this experience combining
academic and activist engagements. I am endlessly grateful to all those who have
made this possible for me and who have supported me throughout. In addition to my
supervisor Andy Dawson I would like to single out Jody Barrett, without whom this text
would have been many mistakes and at least fifty thousand entirely superfluous words
richer. Thanks also go out to mijn familie en vrienden in Belgie, prijateiji u Zagrebu i u
Beogradu, and friends and colleagues in England and elsewhere. They know who they
are and I see it as a privilege and a duty to thank them all in person.
As my friend Bartjes remarked, and as confirmed on more than one occasion by my
parents, wherever I go now, it is clear that a large lump of Balkan clay got stuck to my
boots (and for those who do not like the Balkan thing, please do not be offended and
read Chapter Eight). In fact, as I write this, I am preparing to leave for fieldwork in
Bosnia immediately after I finish this thesis.
Carrying out the research and writing this text has left me with fewer illusions and more
wrinkles. It provided fewer answers and more questions. But it hasn't soothed the
indignation, nor the anger. And certainly not the curiosity.
[introduction]
ethnography, theory, politics:
passionate detachment
revolution is great—it's fun
it makes for such good value television
freedom to kill, to die, and live like us
I can't wait for the next one
Alexander Balanescu Quartet - Revolution1
There's more than one answer to these questions
pointing me in crooked line
And the less I seek my soul for some definitive
The closer I am to fine
Indigo Girls - Closer to Fine2
1. a post-Yugoslav study: there's a world going on underground
Most people in the post-Yugoslav states will remember the last decade of the past
millennium as a painfully significant one. The end of the communist regime, and of
Yugoslavia itself, was brought about through the articulation of opposing nationalist
discourses and through violent campaigns on a scale which many had considered
impossible. One thread will certainly run through these memories: the experience of
war, whether as a direct victim or perpetrator of the violence or as a (former) inhabitant
of the states implicated in it.
Academic life goes on (who am Ito speak...) and the 1990s also witnessed a veritable
flood of publications on the rise of nationalism in the post-Yugoslav states - works that
have been located mainly in the field of history, political sociology, and journalism.
Foreign 'outsiders' have written extensively on this issue, and local academics have
produced a plethora of texts, many of which have so far remained inaccessible to a
foreign audience because of language and/or distribution limitations. In the academic
field of anthropology, foreign scholars have contributed mainly by way of journal
articles, many of which are largely library- and archive-based 3 . I have only come across
a few recent monographs based on long-term ethnographic research in the region.
Examples include Magid's transcription of Beograd life histories (1991) and Bringa's
Bosnian village study (1995), both published during the post-Yugoslav wars, but based
upon material collected long before the break-up. Call me a nationalist, but I know of
three anthropologists from the Netherlands who have contributed as well. Bax (1995)
deals with the religious and political struggle over a site of an alleged apparition by the
Holy Virgin in Bosnia. Van de Port's study (1998), researched before and during the
early months of the conflicts, addresses the role of Gypsy bacchanals amongst Serbs
in Novi Sad, gradually making way for insights into a much wider set of issues.
Duijzings (2000), finally, brings together a series of studies, mainly set in and around
Kosovo, researched through several periods of ethnographic fieldwork from the mid-
1980s onwards. His initial focus on religious dimensions proceeds to open up a far
more encompassing range of topics with the outbreak of war.
1 From the album Luminitza © 1994 Mute Records.
2 From the album Indigo Girls© 1989 Epic/CBS Records.
See for example Bowman 1994; Denich 1994; Hayden 1992, 1994, 1996a; 1996b; Sofas 1996; for an ethnographic
example see Duijzings 1996.
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The small number of ethnographically based writings by foreign scholars is surprising in
the light of the quantity of such publications on national identity in other postcommunist
states. The risks involved in doing fieldwork in a context of war or immediately after
might be a factor. This might also explain why recent ethnographic work that has been
done 'on former Yugoslavia', was often carried out amongst representatives of the
'international community' in Bosnia, or abroad with refugees or émigrés from the post-
Yugoslav states4 . To my knowledge, apart from the monographs mentioned above,
writing on issues of post-Yugoslav everyday life has been left mainly to scholars from
Serbia, and particularly to their colleagues from the Zagreb Institute of Ethnology and
Folklore Research in Croatia, who carried out their work 'between destruction and
deconstruction' (Prica 1995:7). Moreover, there has been an avalanche of post-
Yugoslav journalistic and/or literary works, such as background media reports, novels,
diaries and collections of refugee testimonies6.
Interestingly, while most scholarly work offers a rather homogenous picture of post-
Yugoslav nationalist dominance, it is mainly in the latter publications, from outside the
disciplinary boundaries of the social sciences, that we can catch a glimpse of the
existence of something different. Two sorts of ambiguities, usually glossed over in other
approaches, emerge. First, there is the strongly contradictory and ambiguous nature of
the dominant nationalist discourses themselves and of their seemingly unproblematic
hegemony. Second, and most importantly, we have the existence of alternative
discursive practices, and their actual and potential subversive power.
It is this flip side of the story that is explored in this text. On the basis of over twenty
months of ethnographic fieldwork amongst citizens of the capital cities of Serbia and
Croatia, this study explores post-Yugoslav anti-nationalism as a set of discursive
practices articulated in response to a number of phenomena that have had an
overwhelming influence on their lives in the 1990s. In doing so, I highlight the fact that,
despite nationalist efforts to represent the Serbian and the Croatian contexts as
internally homogenous, there was dissent, there was altéritO. Talking about 'the'
Serbian or 'the' Croatian point of view (e.g. Povrzanoviô 2000:153), necessarily robs a
whole range of people who might or might not feel a sense of belonging to those
categories from the possibility to represent their alternative perspectives.
I argue that these dissident forms should be seen primarily as responses to the post—
Yugoslav wars and the dominant nationalisms, and provide a source of material for
alternative narrations of self. Thus, the object of study is anti-nationalism as a set of
discursive practices, not the people who would then be called anti-nationalists. Different
post-Yugoslays deployed these discursive practices to different extents, in a variety of
ways, for a variety of reasons, and towards a variety of goals. Anti-nationalism, dare I
say it, was a discourse which provided subject-positions for contextually specific,
alternative narrations of self. In particular, this study explores narrative mechanisms,
patterns in the ways in which individuals established a non-dominant sense of
continuity within their biographies in order to cope with and position themselves in
relation to nationalism and war.
2. the unauthorised nutshell digest
Let me briefly spell out, in broad lines, the narrative flow underlying this text. After
sketching some contours of the theoretical framework that informs this study, I briefly
locate a number of central aspects of Serbian and Croatian nationalist discourses in the
See for example Chandler 1999; Kolar-Panov 1996; krbi 1999; Winland 1995.
See for example Feldman, Prica & Senjkoviô 1993; Jambreiô-Kirin & Povrzanoviô 1996; Povrzanoviô 1997; OoloviO
1994a, 1994b. For an overview of 'Croatian war ethnographies' and a commentary on its controversial
positions/positionings by an insider, see Povrzanoviã 2000. See also Prica 1995.
6 Too many to mention here. I shall refer to this work throughout this text.
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light of the former Titoist nationality policies. I then focus on the narrative break brought
about by a whole conglomeration of events, including the assertion of the different
nationalisms as dominant discourses of identification, the end of Titoism, and the wars
which shaped the break-up of Yugoslavia. Importantly, this includes an analysis of the
ways in which people experienced the rise of the different nationalisms. This is a study
of anti-nationalism, and I want to take seriously the long-standing anthropological idea
that national identity is socially constructed. In my view many previous studies have
taken this constructedness for granted—it is, after all, bon ton in the social sciences—
without taking up its implications for their actual approach. In an attempt to tackle this
problem head on, I include an analysis of people's stories of how national identities
became an issue in their everyday lives.
Analysing dissident post-Yugoslav narratives of self and society, this study critically
examines several themes within the anti-nationalist discursive field in more detail. I look
closely at the assertion of 'urbanity' and the role of the cultural construct 'the City' in the
critique of nationalism and war, which was often explained in terms of rurality and
'peasant culture'. Moving slightly more to the inter-republican level, I lay bare some
patterns in the symbolic geography of Balkan orientalism and its counterpart in pro–
European discourses. Both the 'Balkan'/'Europe' and the 'City'/'Village' dualisms are
ethnographically explored as essentialising discursive strategies of negative self-
definition. Given the fact that women, and feminists in particular, constituted the
backbone of anti-nationalist activism, I include a look at the significance of feminism
and its situated meanings within the post-Yugoslav context. I then turn to the
mechanisms that structure narratives of self in relation to contested memories of
everyday life and popular culture in former Yugoslavia. In relation to the above-
mentioned critical reinterpretation of the changing significance of national identities, this
analysis results in a re-appraisal of the controversial notion of Jugonostalg(/a. Finally, I
bring together different threads that run through this study, and highlight the centrality
of the tension between individualism and collectivism in anti-nationalist discursive
practice.
One might ask, why would someone want to study a largely silenced and marginalised
minority discourse in a context where the dominant nationalisms were producing such
dramatic and real consequences? I believe that the marginal case of post-Yugoslav
anti-nationalism can provide a contribution to several domains of strategically situated
knowledges (Haraway 1988:581). Ethnographically, as I have argued above, while the
former Yugoslav states have hardly been out of the news during the I 990s, an insight
into post-Yugoslav everyday practices of anti-nationalism puts the media information
overload into critical perspective.
Theoretically, in its own marginal and partial way, this text aims to take issue with some
debates in the social sciences from a rather unusual angle. I explore issues to do with
narrative, nation, and identity, engaging throughout with contemporary social theory -
particularly post-structuralist insights. However, rather than reproducing some of the
deterministic implications of those theories, I hope to fuse them with a strongly agency-
oriented approach. This in itself is hardly revolutionary, as it seems to be simply 'what
(good) anthropologists do anyway', but this text hopes to depart from well-trodden
paths by actually giving the discourse/subject or structure/agency format itself
ethnographic substance. Rather than discussing such debates in strictly theoretical
terms, I aim to demonstrate that, because of the peculiar context in which they found
themselves with its extreme pronunciations of the tensions between collectivity and
individuality, the persons I worked with were often aware of this problematic interplay—
and that they reflexively engaged with it as 'lived' discourse.
Politically, I critically engage with nationalist discourses of identity, thereby disclosing
and (re)constructing a number of actual and potential voices of post-Yugoslav
dissidence. If we take resistance seriously, without fetishising it, ethnographic research
allows for insights into submerged practices and alternatives, before they are silenced
by the hegemonic representations that constitute history (see Okely 1996:211-214).
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However, I hope to go beyond the mere deconstruction of nationalist symbolic and
material violence, and add a further twist to contemporary debates surrounding
resistance and multiculturalism. By providing a small contribution to an understanding
of anti-nationalist discursive practices under extreme circumstances, this study aims to
problematise a wider range of issues within globalised discourses of peace, tolerance,
and inter-ethnic co-existence (see i±ek 1990; 1992).
3. living just enough for the city - fieldwork in practice
Fieldwork for this study was carried out between December 1996 and the end of
September 1998: nine months in Serbia, and twelve in Croatia. However, as a result of
intensive travelling and NGO activism throughout different post-Yugoslav republics,
during, before, and after my 'official' research period, I include fragments of anti-
nationalism developed in Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia, and some
snapshots from diasporic contexts. My ethnographic research focused on Serbia and
Croatia, because the respective regimes based there were the two main players in the
violent break-up of Yugoslavia. Despite, or rather because of, strongly intertwined
historical-cultural patterns, the Serbo-Croatian conflict was a main fault line in the post-
Yugoslav wars. My interest in anti-nationalism led me to analyse two sides of this
frontline, exploring overarching post-Yugoslav patterns of dissidence, and the interplay
between the two main discourses of Serbian and Croatian nationalism. For research-
technical reasons, most of the fieldwork was carried out in Beograd and in Zagreb,
because that is where the main centres of organised dissidence in Serbia and Croatia
were located.
Avoiding wherever possible a narrow comparative framework, this study is a piece of
multi-sited ethnography (Marcus 1995). I would follow Marcus insisting that the term
'multi-sited' does not denote a strictly geographical characteristic. Rather, it refers to the
role of movement in what we study and how we study it, as it conveys a focus on 'the
circulation of cultural meanings, objects and identities in diffuse time-space' (Marcus
1995:96; see also Hannerz 1996). Central to this study, we have discursive practices
not strictly linked to any place; on the contrary, I look at deterritorialised sites developed
precisely in opposition to oppressive nationalist discourses of spatial fixity. The
contours of these sites were not preordained, but emerged from the fieldwork itself (see
Clifford 1992:99-101); and if most of the actual research was done in Beograd and
Zagreb, this only brings about a circumstantial spatial fixity, allowing for the detail of
intensive participant observation, while working towards an understanding of a non-
localised discursive practices.
Fieldwork included, first of all, living in those cities for a long time, riding their trams,
walking their streets, breathing their air, eating their food, drinking their drinks, smelling
their smells, hearing their sounds, watching their sights, and meeting their people. In
that respect, this text tells a partial story, that ofmy Beograd and Zagreb experiences.
Of course, I reconstruct other people's stories as well, the ones they wrote down and
the ones they told each other and me. The reconstructed and reconstructive character
of this study follows from an attempt to what Marcus termed 'experimental
ethnography', which explicitly 'depends on pre-existing, more conventional narrative
treatments, and is parasitic on them' (1998:197). On a more pro-active level I was
Two notes on the wring of this text. Firstly, for obvious reasons, all the names of the persons in this study have
been changed, and details about them, their families and friends, and about some of the organisations have been
withheld or deliberately kept vague. Secondly, I write in the past tense, rather than in the ethnographic present. I am
aware that the latter is a representational convention which conveys considerable authority to a text, and, as Hastrup
has argued, it is often the most appropriate form of representation in anthropological writing, because it places the
text on the level where it belongs: that of anthropological analysis (1992). However, I would argue that there are
sound reasons to make an exception to that rule in this study. In the first place, I am dealing with a situation of
ongoing dramatic change, familiar to the reader through extensive media coverage, and I believe that the use of the
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engaged on and off in a refugee organisation in Beograd, and I worked intensively in a
Zagreb-based dialogue project in a war-affected area. I read papers and magazines
(and kept a collection of press-cuttings, supplemented by the one that my father made
from Belgian sources—dankjewel papa!), listened to the radio, occasionally watched
TV, attended demonstrations, watched films, read books, and... simply hung out with
people and got on with life—as one does. I sought very little contact with the non-
Yugoslav abroad, but I had housemates and friends, as I couldn't live somewhere for
such a long time without having a number of people around me who cared about me
and whom I cared about. Finally, I had little money but more of a life than did in the
subsequent months during which I wrote this text.
As we shall see throughout, this study relies heavily on people's narratives. Different
people, amongst whom were NGO-workers, dissident academics, feminist activists,
artists, subcultural youths, anti-fascist activists, political militants, and so forth—most
belonging to several categories simultaneously. There was also a wide range of non-
activist individuals whose main common denominator in this study is the mere fact that
they graced my life with their, sometimes brief, presence. Some people would have
remained anonymous had they not become friends, others were acquaintances of
friends, and still others were representatives of organisations or public figures in their
own right. Although I did carry out a number of recorded interviews, this was mainly
limited to some of the latter: those who did not have the time to meet me on a more
regular and informal basis. I was interested in any discursive practice which struck me
as potentially subversive of nationalism—more about this at the end of Chapter One—
and I kept what could be called an 'anthropological diary' on a laptop. Even so, it
became increasingly clear to me, as it will hopefully do to the reader throughout this
study, that narration was only one part of the picture, and that non-narration, and
strategic uses of silence, were crucial as well.
One thing has to be clear: it was never my intention to construct a Post-Yugoslav
Encyclopaedia of Anti-Nationalist Identities. This would be an impossible task, requiring
oversimplification and botanical zeal for categorisation. Doing so would not only be a
futile exercise, but it would also replicate the discomfort with ambiguity and the struggle
against it so typical of discourses such as nationalism. What I would prefer to do is to
build some understanding of the mechanisms underlying post-Yugoslav anti-
nationalism. It is the 'how' that fascinates me. I am interested in the ways in which these
dissident discursive practices articulated alternatives, and how they revolved around
the dialectic between continuity and discontinuity. I hope to achieve a piece of work
which is interesting not so much as the perfect ethnographic study of an exotic group of
Others, but rather as an insighiful analysis of a set of politically relevant discursive
practices.
This text aims to construct a set of partial truths (Clifford 1986:18) which do not,
however, celebrate partiality for partiality's sake. Rather, my ethnographic strategies of
'mobile positioning' and 'passionate detachment' are partial because of 'the connections
and unexpected openings situated knowledges make possible' (Haraway 1988:585,
590). Although a large part of this study is dedicated to the deconstruction of nationalist
discourses (and, in particular, an analysis of post-Yugoslav examples of such
deconstruction), and although this implies an eye for the historical contingency of all
discursive practices (including my own), I am also committed to providing a 'good'
account of 'what really went on'.
ethnographic present would fail to convey such a sense of turbulence. Secondly, and most importantly, this study is
about how people deal with such drastic shifts, which, by definition, requires that I take the temporal and transitional
dimension of their practices into account. I found that the use of the past tense was part of such an exercise.
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4. (anti)nationalism and my mirror phase
A reflexive awareness of my own role in the construction of this text doesn't necessarily
carry much weight, apart from possibly clearing my conscience, if I don't recognise the
process of this positioning itself (Haraway 1988:585-587, see also Hastrup 1992:122).
Throughout this text it will be clear to the reader, as it was to my informants, colleagues,
friends and comrades during the fieldwork, that I am committed to a critique of
nationalist discourses in all its forms. This commitment is not just a 'bias' that I have to
mention here because I write after the 1980s; rather, although some of it was present
before, it is also a result of my involvement with people in the post-Yugoslav states.
Thus, by focusing on a subordinate and subversive phenomenon I do not just replicate
what is becoming one anthropological tradition, but I also explicitly wish to distance
myself from problems related to another one: super-relativism. While one of
anthropology's greatest historical contributions might have been to infuse academic
and political debates with a much-needed, healthy sense of relativism, it is increasingly
clear that overdoing it runs the risk of paralysing criticism. Certainly in the domain of
'cultures' and 'nations', this approach has resulted in a deeply problematic situation
whereby anthropological insights have been taken up, used and abused by exclusivist
discourses of oppression (Balibar 1991; Malkki 1994; Handler 1985; Okely 2000). With
Haraway, I would argue that 'relativism and totalisation are both "god tricks" promising
vision from everywhere and nowhere equally and fully...' (1988:584).
Now, this positioning does imply, of course, another risk: the danger of romanticising
and fetishising 'resistance' in whatever form it may come. Through critical
deconstruction of dissident strategies, this study hopes to avoid this risk as much as
possible, for I believe that the depiction of a marginalised group of people as right and
righteous by definition, only adds to their marginalisation on the wider scale. As
opposed to what I sometimes see as cramped political correctness in the 'West', I
would argue that it is only by taking marginalised discursive practices seriously, which
means they can also be criticised, that we show them respect beyond 'noble savage'
images (see Herzfeld 1996:164). In this way, some of the anti-nationalist narratives in
this study contain elements of, say, exclusivism, elitism and narcissism. Taking their
positionings seriously, and trying to learn from them, implies a critical engagement with
those elements, while at the same time locating them within a wider contextwhere they
were marginalised. In Haraway's words:
'The standpoints of the subjugated are not "innocent" positions. On the contrary, they are
preferred because in principle they are least likely to allow denial of the critical and
interpretive core of all knowledge. They are knowledgeable of modes of denial through
repression, forgetting and disappearance acts [...] "Subjugated" standpoints are preferred
because they seem to promise more adequate, sustained, objective, transforming
accounts of the world.'
(Haraway 1988:584)
In all of the above ways, this study aims to learn from the post-Yugoslav crisis by
ethnographically marking out certain patterns within anti-nationalism in terms of
contemporary social theoretical insights. And while we're at it, I am aware that there is
not one word in this study which is not part of a political exercise, and I wouldn't want it
any other way. After having been put on the spot so many times, in Serbia, in Croatia
and elsewhere, after having been grilled, time and again, about the national
background of my family, I am more at loss than ever for an answer when yet another
person probes me about my 'deeper' national loyalties...
So here we go for reflexivity and autobiography. In terms of the state-administrative
categories, my genetic make-up does consist of a complex mix of Dutch and Belgian
material; my mother was literally born on the border, in fact, in an enclave comprising a
couple of houses, so that when her mother looked out of the window with the new-born,
the field she saw (her field, that is) was in another state. It was only at university that I
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learned a name for the context of everyday life in that village: if ever there was a third
space, this is one (Bhabha 1990a). I grew up in a village near Antwerpen, in Flanders,
in Belgium, but spent the last seven years in a series of different places that belong to
Belgium's very large 'abroad'. I had Dutch citizenship until I was seven, when my father
changed his into Belgian for practical reasons, and therefore carried my brother and me
along with him. There was one point when I considered the legal possibility of undoing
this, when I thought it could save me from doing military service. However, I decided to
go instead for conscientious objection. In the end, this was neither necessary nor
possible anymore, as conscription was abolished just when it would have been my turn.
Which makes me wonder, as I am writing this, what is more important? I am not
convinced whether including autobiographical information such as this is simply,
necessarily, and only, clarifying and enriching a text of this kind. For me, the trouble
with the conventional author-related 'data' is that I have no way to know if these were
the factors that actually made me do what I did and write what I wrote.While it might be
relevant to the reader to know about my citizenship, my gender, my socio-economic
background, and so on, maybe s/he would derive more crucial information from
knowing how tall I am, how I met my first girlfriend, which novels I read, what I think
about freedom and loneliness, what my all-time favourite songs are, where I am going
to watch England-Portugal tomorrow... While the relatively new anthropological
conventions of autobiography certainly mark an improvement over their previous
absence (Okely & Callaway 1992), in some ways they might also represent a spill-over
of the desire to fix human experience into neat categories, so prevalent in anthropology
and in much of what it studies (Oliver, Jansen & Heller 2000).
What I am trying to get at is that maybe my conscientious objection that never
happened holds more information for the reader than my 'fit' into a range of, say, state-
imposed administrative categories. Of course, this text is not about me but about post-
Yugoslav anti-nationalism. However, it is very much about my post-Yugoslav anti-
nationalism. Rather than spelling out my personal-political perspectives any further, I
hope that this study and the very way in which it is written convey them as little as
possible where inappropriate, and as much as possible where needed. Also, I hope to
present a text that is good enough not to be judged on the basis of my parents' national
blood group.
Now this line of thought is such an educated-young-white-man-with-background-in-
West-European-country kind of thing (see 2i±ek 1992:42-43). But when I say that I
want to learn from post-Yugoslav anti-nationalism, I mean much more than that. As I
have argued before, I want to choose sides in this text, and although I don't know the
name for the positioning I aim for, I know what is on the other side: indifference and
conformism. This study is dedicated to citizens of the post-Yugoslav states who
resisted, not just the national Other, not just war, not just the regime, not even just
nationalism, but also the apathy of their co-citizens at what was being done to others in
their name. By focusing on discursive practices of anti-nationalist resistance and taking
into account Povrzanovié' warning that we should not ignore the 'lived experience of
war' (1997:153), I also hope to make clear that this resistance was always situated.
Clearly, the access to such alternatives was unequally spread amongst individuals,
and, as we shall see throughout, the context of Serbia and Croatia during my 1996-
1998 fieldwork was hardly one of complete freedom. However, resistance existed. I
would like to pay particular tribute to those people who had the courage to act against
the nationalist grain in situations that remained anonymous to outsiders like myself, to
the many who engaged in minute acts of resistance through care and solidarity, risking
their comfortable positions by defying compliance and conformism but never being
caught on camera, let alone in an ethnographic study.
If there is one question I have been forced to ask myself throughout this research, it
was: 'What would I have done?'. Not that I ever found an answer, but Ihad to ask this
question, because I strongly believe that exoticising xenophobia and nationalism as
pathological phenomena on the fringes of the New World Order is not only empirically
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incorrect but also ethically dishonest. Such cultural anaesthesia (Feldman 1994)
provides an easy way out for those who prefer not to deal with the multiple connections
and resonances of seemingly distant patterns of symbolic and other violence with the
situation in the regions of their background. Let me tell you: what I learned was just as
much about myself, about Belgium, about England, about the 'West', as it was about
the post-Yugoslav states and their citizens.
[chapter one]
(anti-)nationalism as discursive practice
All the nationalist sees in others is his own image:
the image of a nationalist.
Danilo Ki - The Gingerbread Heart, or Nationalism1
This chapter brings together a number of social theoretical insights which play a
prominent role in this study and function as a backdrop for the main endeavour of the
text: an analysis of anti-nationalism. In a first movement, the post-Yugoslav
nationalisms of the 1990s are approached as a set of discursive practices, as a
dominant articulatory process arriving at a partial fixation of meanings. The contested
nature of these nationalisms is laid bare in the second movement, by pointing to the
altérité of anti-nationalist discursive practices, patterns of differentiation which are to a
certain extent discursively exterior to the nationalist discourses. Finally, as coda, I
address some problematic epistemological and terminological issues, which run
through this ethnography.
1. discursive practice and articulation
This study develops an approach to post-Yugoslav nationalist and anti-nationalist
discursive practices which considers them in their broadest sense, thereby placing the
emphasis on 'practice' (see Jansen 1999a). The terms 'discourse' and 'discursive
practice' are used interchangeably, but I make more use of the latter precisely because
it draws attention to its constitutive, lived character, rather than putting forward a mainly
literary approach. For example, in a discursive-articulate approach to nationalism,
haircuts, dole queues and drinking games can be just as legitimate objects of study as
the canonised works of the so-called Great National Writers. Thus, in what follows, I
view discourses as an interplay of thought and action, reaching well outside the
linguistic realm.
Also, using the term 'discursive practices' rather than 'discourses' points to their
unstable, contested and contingent character—and to the unstable, contested and
contingent character of their objects. It allows us to avoid the frequent misconception of
discourses as monolithic, determining and stable, and it embeds the notion into the
realm of agency, of acts and intentions. Moreover, it reminds us that every discursive
practice again consists of a number of intertwined discursive practices and is part of a
wider universe of discursive practices, with some reinforcing it and others undermining
it. As Laclau and Mouffe would have it, 'a discursive structure is not a merely "cognitive"
or "contemplative" entity; it is an articulatory practice which constitutes and organises
social relations' (1985:96).
Laclau and Mouffe define 'articulation' as 'any practice establishing a relation among
elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice'
(1985:105). This implies that every social practice is somehow, in one of its
dimensions, a practice of articulation, or even that 'the social is articulation insofar as
society is possible' (ibid.:113-114). Two more clarifications need to be made here: the
authors call moments 'differential positions insofar as they appear articulated within a
discourse' and elements, 'any difference that is not discursively articulated' (ibid.).
How then can we conceptualise discourses within this theoretical framework? They are
structured sets of moments, articulated in a specific way. They constitute a partially
1 See Ki 1996:17.
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completed totality, which produces a systematic formation consisting of a number of
elements that have been articulated into a structured set of moments (Laclau &Mouffe
1985:125). Laclau and Mouffe speak here of nodal points (a term borrowed from
Freud), by which they refer to 'the privileged discursive points of partial fixation'
(1985:112). Even though partial, both in the sense of a residue of unarticulated
elements and in the sense that the level of closure depends on one's perspective,
these discursive structures can have systematic effects (Laclau &Mouffe 1985:112). In
the post-Yugoslav context of the 1990s, I argue, nationalist discursive practice was
such a privileged form of articulation, and nodal points such as 'national identity' and
'the nation' were central—in a variety of ways—to the partial fixation it achieved.
2. power, agency, and discursive practice
One widely held objection to discursive approaches to social reality, apart from the risks
of textualism, is the idea that they obliterate individual agency. It is true thatFoucault in
particular emphasised the constraining workings of discourse: discourse makes it
impossible to ask certain questions and argue certain cases and it authorises only
certain people under certain circumstances to participate in its formulation (see
1990:95). In Foucault's work, the 'positivity' of discourses is largely negative. This might
have to do of course with the nature of the discourses he was studying (penal system,
madness, sexuality, etc.)—in this way, a study of (anti-)nationalism in the former
Yugos!av republics runs the same risks. However, I highlight both the enabling and the
constraining character of discursive practices (Hajer 1995:48-49; Fairclough 1992:41-
45, 64-67). Conceptualised in this way, a discursive practice is always double-edged in
nature: on the one hand it provides for the possibility of constructing a topic (for
instance the nation), but on the other hand it limits the way in which this topic can be
constructed. A dialectic is at work here: a discursive practice can only be constituted
through acts by individuals or groups, and at the same time, no actor can establish
him/herself as actor of a discourse without reference to certain broader rules of
discourse (see Hall 1991:183).
It is possible, then, for a discursive approach to leave space for agency. Actors
operating in a world of regulated discursive formations can make use of what Foucault
calls the 'tactical polyvalence of discourses', or their multi-interpretability. This study
demonstrates that individuals may draw upon many different discourses at one and the
same time, strategically deploy them for different objectives in different contexts and
invest different meanings in them. Furthermore, through their practice, individuals might
undermine or modify existing discourses as well as create new ones. In this way a
variety of previously unrelated, or differently related, elements can be strategically
articulated into a new discourse (Foucault 1990:100).
This study, then, looks at the ways in which post-Yugoslav anti-nationalist discursive
practices relate to the dominant discourses on identity and to alternative discourses;
that is, how individuals (re)structure their own discursive practices for private and/or
public use. In this way, I take fully into account the 'practice' dimension of discursive
practices, incorporating both agency and structure—that is, the ways in which
structures are 'acted', and the ways in which agency is structured. With discursive
practices in the centre of the analysis, I aim to capture the advantages of both a
sensitivity to performative reconciliations of the individual and the collective (Herzfeld
1985:23), and an openness to the possibility of alternative processes of articulation (as
emphasised in Laclau and Mouffe 1985). I demonstrate how, even in oppressive
contexts such as the post-Yugoslav one, seemingly discursively sutured by
nationalisms, some people were engaged in the articulation of alternatives. A whole
variety of elements were taken up and articulated into moments of new, anti-nationalist
discursive practices. In this way, this anti-nationalist altérité relied on elements which
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were differently articulated into nationalisms as well as on other elements which had
remained discursively exterior to those nationalisms.
As a result, this study puts into a critical perspective the work of power in the context of
identification. The concept of power is to be taken on board with caution, for it
permeates every social texture. As Foucault would have it, 'power is everywhere; not
because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere.' (1990:93). I
combine this general attention to power, antagonism and conflict with a more specific
emphasis on the 'small' everyday practices of power and the regularity therein
(Foucault 1975; 1980; 1990; see also Smart 1986:161-164). Since there are many
competing discursive practices at work in every social field, this approach of course
highlights the contested nature of discourses. Bourdieu theorised struggles for
legitimacy and social definitions, and paraphrasing his work I would consider discursive
practices as the object and the product of a struggle about the social definition of the
thinkable2. Discursive practices can be reproduced but also modified, undermined,
questioned and contested. This struggle for hegemony involves different parties
attempting to establish a discursive practice as an implicit, presupposed body of
common and consensual knowledge, or in Bourdieu's terms, as doxa (Bourdieu
1984:115, 1982:154-156; Bourdieu and Eagleton 1994: 266-272). When a discourse
takes the form of doxa, the ways in which it articulates elements into moments of a
totality becomes 'common sense'.
3. the impossibility of discursive closure
However, even dominant discourses, seemingly reaching the status of doxa, carry a
wide variety of possible meanings (Scott 1990:102). Laclau and Mouffe argue that the
hegemony of a discourse is not a logical outcome of the superiority of this discourse,
but that it must be understood as an attempt to overcome contingency—an attempt that
is by definition in vain (1985:7). Thus, no articulation is ever completely successful:
'elements' never turn into perfect 'moments' which fully derive their meaning and
significance out of the discourse in which they are articulated (Laclau & Mouffe
1985:106; see Foucault 1990:102). This is necessarily so, because if a discourse
succeeded in articulating all elements into moments of one totality and no floating
signifiers were left, this discourse would constitute the impossible: a final suture
(1985:88). It would represent a closed symbolic order with fixed meanings, which would
imply that any further articulation and contingency would become impossible. In this
case, we would live in a world of fixed meanings and an unchangeable status quo, for a
discourse would have succeeded in establishing a complete articulation of all elements
into a totality. It is precisely around this impossibility of ultimate suture, that Laclau and
Mouffe build their argument. To quote the authors at length:
'If we accept that [...] a discursive totality never exists in the form of a simply given and
delimited positivity, the relational logic will be incomplete and pierced by contingency. The
transition from the 'elements' to the 'moments' is never entirely fulfilled. A no-man's-land
thus emerges, making the articulatory practice possible. In this case there is no social
identity fully protected from a discursive exterior that deforms it and prevents it becoming
fully sutured. [...] the relations are unable to absorb the identities; but as the identities are
purely relational, this is but another way of saying that there is no identity which can be
fully constituted.'
(Laclau & Mouffe 1985:110-111)
If every sense of identity is always deferred, never finally sutured, and if this initial lack
is precisely what competing discursive practices are attempting to overcome, then
discourses are involved in a never-ending struggle for hegemony.
2 Bourdieu 1982:135ff; 1984:115; 1991:242; 1992a; 1992b.
12
In this context, Laclau and Mouffe introduce the notion of antagonism which 'constitutes
the limits of society, the latter's impossibility of fully constituting itself (1 985:125). The
practice of articulation is therefore precisely about attempting to create such a partial
fixation of meaning—it is about attempting to construct a discourse as the final, the
ultimate and the true discourse on a topic. Although Laclau and Mouffe point out that
this drive for closure is a quality inherent in all articulatory practice, I would argue that
this is not to say that it is always the dimension that stands out most. The important
point here is the very fact that, even if this were the case, it is never successful.
Even if a number of diverging and opposing discourses are trying to establish a field of
fixed meanings, they never will in the end, for elements can never be completely
articulated in a discourse. They can always be articulated otherwise, and they can
always be articulated with other elements in another discursive structure (Bhabha
1990b:292; Hall 1991:175, 187). This brings us back to the ultimate instability of every
discourse: it is always undermined by contingency, by the existence of potentially
disruptive alternatives.
4. post-Yugoslav nationalist discursive practice
Foucault made a case for discourse analysis based on the notion of 'systems of
dispersion' (1990:37). If we conceptualise post-Yugoslav nationalist discourses of the
1990s from this perspective of regularity in dispersion, we can follow Laclau and Mouffe
in that a discourse is a set of positions which is 'not the expression of underlying
principle external to itself [...] but it constitutes a configuration which in certain contexts
of exteriority can be signified as a totality' (Laclau & Mouffe 1985:106). In the
terminology of the authors, a number of elements have been reduced to moments of
the (incomplete) totality in which they occupy a differential position. A number of
previously unarticulated elements were (partly) articulated into a systematic relation to
each other, and thereby became moments of a discourse. In the case of nationalism,
think for instance of a number of 'elements' such as native language, parental religion,
name, skin colour, etc. These were elements which of course featured in a number of
other discourses (and still do), but which have been articulated in a systematic way in
new discursive practices, nationalisms of the I 990s. In this way they were moulded into
moments of these discourses.
There were many elements which featured prominently in the discourses enforced by
powerful institutions in the post-Yugoslav context, for instance history, 'Balkan' and
'Europe', justice and injustice, communism, fascism, urbanity and rurality, education,
individualism and collectivism. Very often they incorporated issues of nationality and
were tied together by a nationalist prism, reflecting, not unfaithfully if somewhat crudely,
the widely endorsed worldview of humanity as a mosaic of discrete nations. One of the
insights in which the material of this study is embedded is a realisation of the many
ways in which the post-Yugoslav conflict was a reflection, and not simply an aberration,
of the nationalist cosmology of a 'family of nations' (Balibar & Wallerstein 1991; Malkki
1992; 1994; 1995a;1995b). There might have been some markedly vicious feuds in the
South-East European part of the family, but this does not necessarily refute the implicit
consensus on a wider worldview.
As we shall see in more detail in Chapter Four, nationalism was a particularly dominant
discourse of identity in the post-Yugoslav context and provided an enormous reservoir
of material to be used for constructing narratives of self, functioning as the implicit
consensus of discursive praxis on identification. When I say, then, that during my
fieldwork in the mid-to-late 1990s, nationalist discourses were dominant in the post-
Yugoslav states, this does not imply a stable, fixed situation in which nationalism had
established a closed symbolic order with a designated place for everyone and
everything. Rather, it means that I believe that in these specific socio-historical
contexts, nationalist discourses were more successful in their drive for hegemony than
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other discourses. And, importantly, they were keen on representing the situation in their
state as one of successful discursive closure whenever it served their hegemonic
ambitions.
Let me briefly illustrate some implications by analysing an event that took place in
Croatia in the early summer of 1998. I look at a conflict situation, because it sheds a
critical light on the above theoretical insights. Unlike so many other disputes, this event
did not involve any national differences. Dissatisfied with meagre wages and bad
working conditions, the teachers' union called for a strike, and in several instances,
large crowds of teachers took to the streets. Despite the fact that, to an outside
observer, the protest did not seem to challenge the confines of Croatian nationalism—
the teachers were even waving Croatian flags—official reactions depicted the strikers,
not as political opponents, but as enemies of the Croatian nation. They were accused
of breaking the instinctive solidarity amongst Croats for, by standing up for their rights,
they were perceived as agitating against the regime, hence against the ruling HDZ
party, hence against the Croatian state, hence, finally, against Croathood itself. In
Parliament, a hard-line politician compared this to 'Oetniks using children as shields
against Croatian defenders' (Feral Tribune 29/06/98:7). The police, supposedly
representing the state and the nation, intervened to prevent them from displaying
Croatian flags. The regime interpreted the events through an assertion of (aimed-for)
discursive closure. Antagonism within the nation was considered illegitimate, or even
unthinkable, and Croathood was constructed as a necessarily prepolitical seamless
whole3.
Importantly, however, discursive closure was never reached, but a struggle for fixity
took place in which, again, power has to be taken into account. If nationalism is defined
as a discursive practice, an interplay of thought and action, it is also a regime of
interpretation (see Foucault & Major-Poetzl 1983:22-25; Foucault 1971:19-20, Foucault
& Gordon 1980:109ff). Power, then, 'is always already there' and is to be defined
relationally not essentially; it is not the exclusive property of certain groups but it
permeates social configurations (Foucault & Gordon 1980:141). In the post-Yugoslav
context, it was very tempting to depict the social formation as one in which monolithic,
powerful administrative and mJlitary systems rJom)nated a shape) ess mass of power)ess
individuals. This portrayal was attractive in its immediacy and its popularity amongst
many post-Yugoslays themselves; it strongly reflected a widespread local discourse of
helpless victims and ruthless rulers4 . However, I think it relied on simplistic assumptions
and was very deceiving in its impression of explanatory strength. Even under regimes
which were often described as authoritarian, the play of power was much more
complicated. As Smith argues, and as suggested by Geertz in the case of Bali,
discourses are the space of self-production of society, they are modes of
representation, forms of power in themselves, not merely the reflection of a power
struggle (Smith 1992:495; Geertz 1980).
5. post-Yugoslav anti-nationalist altérité
So, post-Yugoslav nationalisms, powerful and dominant as they were, did not reach the
complete discursive closure they were attempting to establish. Always and everywhere,
I think it is possible to interpret certain aspects of the Beograd anti-regime demonstrations of 1996-1 997 through a
similar prism (see Jansen 1999b).
' This was the dominant representation in Serbia in the late 1990s, but it was also very common in Croatia—
especially towards the end of the Tudman regime (see for example PovrzanoviO 2000:153 note8). As in the rather
different case of Herzfeld's 'Glendiots (1986:20-21), this frequently implied moral superiority on the side of those
victimised, which in turn justified defiance and insubordination (ibid. :7, 37). In fact, there are particularly strong
parallels between the situation Herzfeld describes in Crete and certain patterns in Serbian/Montenegrin self-
perception (see Jansen 2000a for an analysis of the self-image of rebellion and anti-authoritarianism in Serbian
protests).
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some bubbles of resistance undermined the suturing capacity of the nationalist
discourses, sometimes loud and visible such as on peace demonstrations, more often
as a tiny murmur in the margins (Campbell 1998:210). Others have successfully
employed discursive-articulative approaches to the analysis of domination and
resistance in a host of different contexts around the globe (Norval 1996; for a collection
see Laclau 1994). However, they rely strongly on textual sources and 'established'
public discourses, whether of the ruling or the oppositional variety, and few, if any, have
integrated these theoretical insights into an ethnographically embedded approach
which allows for the complexity of everyday life processes. This study attempts just
that. I call these discursive practices forms of post-Yugoslav anti-nationalist altérité,
borrowing the term from Michel de Certeau. Altérité here means patterns of
differentiation, which are to a certain extent discursively exterior to the nationalist
discourses (de Certeau 1990; Norval 1994:136).
In L'invention du quotidien, de Certeau formulates a constructive critique of Foucault's
work on power. He takes up Foucault's fluid concept of 'a plurality of resistances'
(Foucault 1990:96) and develops it into an approach which allows us to take into
account processes of change from below (de Certeau 1990; Ahearne 1995:146). De
Certeau draws attention to the ways in which forms of altérité undermine, subvert and
modify established patterns (see also Routledge 1996:415). In anthropology,
conceptions of power have been influenced by Scott's analysis of everyday forms of
peasant resistance in a Malay village (1985; 1990). Looking at 'foot dragging,
dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage
and so forth' (1985:29), Scott highlights non-articulated patterns of resistance, which he
refers to in terms of 'weapons of the weak' and 'hidden transcripts'. In many cases,
these 'Brechtian forms of class struggle' (ibid.) represent spontaneous, individual, self-
interested actions, scrupulously avoiding any outright defiance on the collective level,
and therefore steering clear of any direct confrontation with dominant discourses.
Through their cautious strategies of risk-avoidance and anonymity, they leave the
public stage to those dominant discourses, and largely comply routinely with the rules
set by those more powerful than they (Scott 1985:280-289). The 'full transcript' of those
subordinate practices, Scott argues, usually remains behind closed doors (1985:284;
1990).
Taking up this thread of altérité, the focus of this study offers a bottom-up perspective
on discourses of identification: that is, on the ways in which people dealt with them,
used them, were determined by them and subverted them. A minority of post-
Yugoslays of all nationalities engaged in deviant articulations of identity, resisting and
undermining the dominant nationalist discourses. These acts of identification were
strongly marginalised, and a wide variety of people engaged in them to a lesser or a
greater extent. Some post-Yugosla ys deployed them alongside nationalist discursive
practices, whereas others, for different reasons, found the discourses of nationalism
inaccessible and/or unacceptable (which, of course, never excluded anyone from being
subjected to them by others). The focus of this study, then, is on those subversive acts
of identification which I call anti-nationalist discursive practices.
In doing so, I take up Herzfeld's suggestion that we 'probe behind the façades of
national unanimity in order to explore the possibilities and the limits of creative dissent'
(1996:1). By focusing on dissident discursive practices in the Serbian and Croatian
capitals, I aim to uncover aspects of post-Yugoslav everyday life which have escaped
the gaze of both foreign scholars and journalists. Throughout, I analyse patterns in the
ways in which these forms of aitérité worked, highlighting the tensions between the
dominant nationalist narrations of self and the everyday negotiations of more or less
alternative identification. This implies more than average attention to the mechanisms
of 'practical essentialism' (Herzfeld 1996:passim), little acts of essentialisation which
can be unintentionally but also strategically deployed. Much use will be made, then, of
generalising terms and often even plain stereotypes—however politically incorrect,
ignoring them will not make them go away. While anthropology is far from innocent of
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the sin of essentialising, recognising them allows for critical analysis (Herzfeld 1996:26)
in that looking at their mechanisms can help us understand their significance on various
levels. This seems particularly important in a study dealing with people's everyday
narratives of phenomena of a 'national' nature: 'the nation', after all, is either
essentialised (or imagined as essential) or it is simply does not exist. Through a wide
range of small, limited acts of essentialisation on the part oftheir own and other people,
'the Serbs' and 'the Croats' are continually consolidated as nations.
However, essentialising is not the privilege of the dominant. We have to recognisethe
at times equally essentialist nature of subversions of post-Yugoslav nationalisms (see
Herzfeld 1996:26-32). In this respect, I am aware of the fact that, ethnographically, the
terms 'post-Yugoslav' and 'anti-nationalism' are problematic. On the whole, I follow
Herzfeld's rejection of the 'artificial distinction between symbolic discourse and
objective data', and frequently employ 'indigenous abstractions about meaning', that is,
the wide reservoir of post-Yugoslav meta-discourses and local analytical insights
(1985:46). However, with regard to the terms 'post-Yugoslav' and 'anti-nationalism', it
should be said straight away that these are rarely, if ever, used by the individuals or
groups in question. Moreover, as was bitterly and poignantly pointed out to me by an
interviewee, this terminology lumps together a wide range of very different individuals
and individual narratives in a box, and then sticks a label on it. This is precisely the kind
of practice the persons in question sometimes feel oppressed by and often try to
escape.
'It will be very hard or even impossible for you to find something in common between
those people, apart from resistance to nationalism. [...] Now, we have very little, if
anything, like a new collective identity. There are only individuals, like myself, who try and
preserve their little microcosm, and who would do anything not to end up in a new
collective identity.'
While I took these objections to heart, after much pondering I have decided in favour of
employing these labels, despite the sensitivities and weaknesses attached to it. The
reasons are of a practical and of an epistemological nature. Practically, when writing a
text, I am simply obliged to rely on generalising terms which avoid summing up all the
individual perspectives that were involved in the research. More importantly,
epistemologically, I believe there are good enough reasons to employ both terms: 'post-
Yugoslav' and 'anti-nationalism'. I now briefly clarify their use in this text.
6. terminology, epistemology, and ethnography
6.1. nothing is simply post-: 'post-Yugoslav'
I use the label 'post-Yugoslav' because the persons I dealt with were all ex-citizens of
former Yugoslavia. This has been a difficult choice, carrying a risk of essentialism with
it. Would anybody call the Czech Republic 'post-Czechoslovakian', or Eritrea 'post-
Ethiopian'? Am I as a Belgian citizen 'post-Roman', 'post-Frankish', 'post-Spanish',
'post-Habsburg', 'post-French', and post-much more? Of course not. So is my use of
the term 'post-Yugoslav', then, an expression of orientalism on my part? Maybe. But,
rather than employing terms referring to Serbia and Croatia and ending up with a
strictly comparative exercise, I acknowledge a strongly diverging, but nevertheless,
common Yugoslav legacy. This does not mean that I believe this overarching
Yugoslavness to be a more important means of identification than other sources. In
ethno-national terms, some of those engaged in anti-nationalist discursive practices did
identify primarily as Serbs, some primarily as Croats, some as Yugosla ys, and some
resisted national classification altogether.
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For reasons of clarity, I refer to individuals with the national label 'Serbs' or 'Croats' only
when they did so themselves, or when describing situations in which their self-
proclaimed or presumed (by others) national identification was an important factor in
that particular context. The focus of this study is on anti-nationalist discursive practices,
which are by definition not structured around national boundaries. In order to reflect the
geographical limitations of the field research, however, I employ the term 'post-
Yugoslav', while widely using the terms 'Serbian' and 'Croatian' at other places. The
use of 'post-Yugoslav' also highlights the relation between anti-nationalist processes of
identity construction and the break-up of Yugoslavia, inasmuch as many people
constructed their anti-nationalism through a set of narratives of continuity.
The aim of all this terminological juggling is to balance the central role (or: rule) of
nationalist representations in experience, while at the same time to highlight their
problematic nature and accommodating hybridity (see Campbell 1998:258). In this
sense, the labels employed, such as 'Serbian', 'Croatian', and 'post-Yugoslav', should
always be read in between giant inverted commas5.
6.2. resistance and the 'anti' in 'anti-nationalism'
A more contentious issue is the term 'anti-nationalism'. It reflects a reality running
through this project, i.e. my efforts to reach an understanding of discursive practices
developed in response to Serbian and Croatian nationalisms, working up from
individual narratives. In this sense, the term anti-nationalism is meant to emphasise the
explicit nature of the processes of identity construction which are central to this text as
well as their relation to dominant discourses of nationalism. Very quickly, during
fieldwork, I realised that many of the critics of the war or the regimes recommended to
me by helpful friends were not what I was looking for. They engaged in anti-war and
anti-regime discursive practices, but they did not question the dominant nationalisms
themselves. In contrast to the work of Scott (1985, 1990) and de Certeau (1990), this
might seem a rather restrictive approach ignoring important wider, unarticulated forms
of everyday resistance to nationalism. Scott rightly attacks a false essentialising and
privileging of 'real resistance' leading to revolution as opposed to seemingly compliant
'token, incidental resistance' (1985:292ff).
However, through my emphasis on 'explicit' or 'articulated' post-Yugoslav anti-
nationalism, I am not suggesting that other forms of dissent were absent or
unimportant. In this text, I do write as much as possible about everyday forms of anti-
nationalist discursive practice. Given the state of nationalist paranoia during my stay in
Serbia and Croatia, though, it would have been extremely difficult ethnographically to
disclose those everyday practices amongst people who did not display them on a more
or less public level. Maybe anti-nationalism did exist on those more submerged levels,
but if this was the case, most people were not empowered to a sufficient degree to
make it count in a situation of war and oppression which denied them what was
perhaps necessary economic, social and cultural capital. Issues of nationality were
almost always already implicitly part of every discursive context, and nationalist modes
of representation pervaded a large part of post-Yugoslav realities, as doxa. I have
argued above that this can be understood as nationalism's incomplete but relatively
successful attempt to achieve discursive closure.
Moreover, there were some specific conditions in the post-Yugoslav context which set it
apart from, for example, that of Scott's Malay villagers, or de Certeau's factory workers.
The dominant post-Yugoslav nationalisms presented themselves as discourses of
5 There are a host of other, similarly problematic terms, but on the whole I have chosen to privilege clarity above
paranoia with regard to political sensitivities. Hence: Kosovo (not —a), because this is the way it is pronounced in the
context where it features in this study: Serbian nationalism. With regard to language, I employ the term 'Croatian'
when talking about Zagreb fieldwork, and 'Serbian' in Beograd cases. For an ethnographically rooted discussion, see
the section on language in Chapter Six.
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liberation from previous oppression: they were resistance. Nationalist discourses were
therefore not considered a discourse of oppression by most people. On the contrary,
most post-Yugoslays saw their 'own' nationalism as liberating and emancipatory,
whereas the national Others were seen as oppressive. To take this point even further,
in most cases, the concept of 'nationalism' simply did not enter the debate. Interpreting
the post-Yugoslav conflicts in terms of nationalist discourses was in itself a marginal
and critical endeavour. In such a context, most people actively engaged with
nationalism (without calling it by this name) by trying to get the most out of it, or, at
least, to minimise the damage. The goal was, then, in Hobsbawm's words, 'to work the
system to their minimum disadvantage' (quoted in Scott 1985:301).
Scott, himself, warns against over-romanticising the 'weapons of the weak' (1 985:29),
and argues instead that we should recognise that resistance can take many different
forms and that different contexts are likely to give rise to different forms of resistance.
He convincingly demonstrates that the style of everyday resistance is strongly
determined by the form and the style of the oppression itself (1985:299). In the post-
Yugoslav context, notions of 'non'-nationalism, a 'sideline' attitude, 'withdrawal' or
'silence as resistance' were certainly present and relevant. Many citizens of Serbia and
Croatia opted precisely for the tactical safety of anonymity (Scott 1985:36; de Certeau
1990:xix) and the secrecy which allows for avoidance of control from the centre
(Feldman 1991 :38). However, enthusiasm for the nationalist cause was overwhelming
on the public scene, where national identity played its main role. Of course, national
identity existed in the private sphere as well. But, on the pervasively multi-national
public scene, it was invested with degrees of power, often relying in turn on resonances
with symbols and patterns from the private sphere6.
Against the backdrop of ethnic cleansing and war, this meant that the above everyday
forms of 'non-' rather than 'anti-'nationalist resistance were often easily incorporated as
compliance, and thus functioned, regardless of their intentions, as tacit support for the
dominant discourses. As in Hitler's Germany, fear of retribution by one's own co-
nationals could be one element in explaining this. This factor is, however, unable to
account for the sheer horror of many acts of war and for the hostile exciusivism that
pervaded many patterns of everyday life away from the front-line (for the Nazi example,
see Browning 1992; Goldhagen 1996). Crucially, and very differently from Scott's Malay
villagers, those post-Yugosla ys who were engaged in the development of discursive
practices of resistance usually did not do so in the first place because it oppressed
them. For most of these individuals, this was at most a minor motivation, as they often
focused their energy on a critique of the nationalism of 'their own' national group, which
primarily victimised others.
My main interest is, therefore, in explicit dealings with nationalism and issues of
national identity: anti-nationalist counternarratives and dissident everyday practices. In
Serbia and Croatia, two discourses made issues of national identity explicit and to a
certain extent public (and therefore accessible to outsiders): outspoken nationalist ones
and outspoken anti-nationalist ones. Many have written about the former or, rather,
about leading representatives of the former; I set out to bring the latter into the story.
Within this framework, however, and working back from these explicit instances of anti-
nationalism, I focus as much as possible on the significance of minute everyday
practices and seemingly banal acts of defiance on a much wider scale.
Ironically, and significantly, the term anti-nationalism also reflects the centrality of
nationalist discourses in the identity formation of the persons in question. It indicates
that nationalism served as a focal counterpoint for these forms of altérité. Post-
Yugoslav anti-nationalism, then, is my, not their, label for a whole range of discursive
practices of identity, which a minority of ex-citizens of former Yugoslavia deployed in
response to the dominant nationalist discourses. I use it as a shortcut and sous-rature,
as it will never be more than second best.
6 An argument brought up, albeit rather differently, by Erikson 1999.
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[chapter two]
narratives of self, memory, big/small stories
Impossible stories, stories with No Entry signs on them, change our lives, and our
minds, as often as the authorised versions, the stories we are expected to trust,
upon which we are asked, or told, to build our judgements, and our lives.
Salman Rushdie - The Ground Beneath Her Feet1
You know what it is like when two people start a conversation. First one of them
does all the talking, the other breaks in with That's just like me, I... and goes on
talking about himself until his partner finds a chance to say That's just like me, I....
The That's just like me, I.. .'s may look like a form of agreement, ... but that is an
illusion. What they really are is a brute revolt against brute force... All man's life is
nothing more than a battle for the ears of others.
Milan Kundera - The Book of Laughter and Forgetting2
In this chapter I address the role of narrative in post-Yugoslav acts of identification.
Narrative was an important mechanism through which citizens of Serbia and Croatia
positioned themselves in relation to larger temporal frameworks and to influential
discourses on the public level. The post-Yugoslav context was characterised by an
intensification of narrativity, which played a central role in many people's strategies for
coping with the massive changes that affected their everyday lives, including discursive
shifts on the level of legitimate identification. Therefore, we are dealing with a situation
where the poetics of the self (Herzfeld 1985:8-19) took on a heightened acuteness.
Even many everyday practices that would in another context be rather unproblematic,
now carried contentious meanings. Throughout this chapter, I particularly consider
strategies of remembering and forgetting, and positionings in relation to the dominant
discourses of nationalism.
1. narratives of self in practice
1.1. narrative identity
Paul Ricoeur sees identity as a product of dialectic between selfhood and sameness,
two meanings of the word identity which overlap but are not the same, although they
are often confused (1990:140-143; 1991b:189-192). Selfhood refers to the experience
of self in time without always being the same, and is related to the concept of
subjectivity. The dialectic between selfhood and sameness, Ricoeur argues, takes
place through two phenomena: self-constancy (i.e. keeping one's word), and character
(i.e. different moments in which selfhood expresses itself) (1990:143-150). According
to Ricoeur, a crucial instrument in achieving this sense of self is narrative. People
negotiate identities through narration, telling stories, and identity is a story of yourself.
'Narratives make sense out of self-identity in the context of time' (Rasmussen
1996:165; see also Dawson & Rapport 1998). It is Ricoeur's central concept of
narrative identity that I attempt to use for an exploration of anti-nationalist identity
construction in the post-Yugoslav context. Narrative identity integrates a sense of self
within the context of a larger temporal framework, of 'history'. It allows an experience of
self as distinctive and unique within the constancy of time3.
1 Rushdie 1999:199.
2 Kundera 1996 (1978).
This recalls, to a certain extent, Giddens' work on self-identity (1991:52-56, 100).
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The individuals I worked with in the post-Yugoslav context were continually engaged in
the telling and re-telling of a narrative identity that was more or less consistentin their
eyes (or, better, not all too inconsistent). In a context of extreme confusion, they aimed
for a story of themselves that, even though it was multi-facetted, ambiguous and
potentially contradictory, made at least some sense. Narrative mediated their journey
through life, a journey of introspection in which they partially dissected their lives in
order to construct an intelligible narrative in retrospect (see Curtis and Pajaczkowska
1994:212). My exploration of the ways in which post-Yugosla ys did so through anti-
nationalist discursive practices suggests that in order for a story of self to work, it
needs to have some sense of continuity in it. Again, it might be better to say that it
shouldn't be all too discontinuous. This by no means implies that these people
invariably wished to avoid or eliminate inconsistencies, for selthood through narrative
does not necessarily imply a drive for disambiguation4 . However, no matter how
ambiguous and internally contradictory the individual stories were, there was a strong
tendency to narrate one's self as a unity which was not all too inconsistent, and not all
too discontinuous. This resonates with Ricoeur's insight that people are able to imagine
variations of their own ego and thereby construct a narrative understanding of
themselves. 'These narratives then provide a unity which is not substantial but
narrative' (Ricoeur 1991a:32-33).
1.2. narration, practices of coping, resistance
This study may strike the reader as strongly focused on stories, oei narrat'aa, on tad
sequences of events, in short, on words. The use of extensive quotes throughout this
text reinforces this, and deviates somewhat from the anthropological convention to
privilege direct observation of activities over listening. Importantly, silences played a
crucial role through implicit or explicit non-narration. This is hard to quote, but I hope it
becomes clear throughout the text that the discursive strategies of post-Yugoslav anti-
nationalism relied as much on a refusal to narrate as on narration itself. However, I am
aware that constructing selfhood through narrative does not always and everywhere
play a central role in human experience. I do not claim that people have no other ways
of experiencing selfhood than through narrative, but the post-Yugoslav setting provided
me with many reasons to follow Herzfeld in his emphasis on performative aspects of
identification (1985:16). In particular, the expression of a sense of belonging to a
nationally imagined community (Anderson 1983) often relies on a variety of
performative strategies. There is a further point here: after emphasising the practice-
dimension of discourse in the first chapter, I may now seem to embark on exactly the
opposite endeavour, by placing narrative at the centre of this study. This choice,
however, reflects a reality in the post-Yugoslav context. Both on the individual and the
collective level, this field was undergoing dramatic change during the 1990s, which
resulted in a condition of intense narrativity 5 . Narrative, I argue, was a common tool by
which people attempted to comprehend processes of change, or tried to keep them in
check (see Ricoeur 1990:167-193; Jansen 1998a).
This means that the post-Yugoslav narratives that gave shape to this study were
inextricably linked to relationships and to the lived reality of social worlds. Through
these narratives—and thus through dialogic engagements with each other and with
In some circumstances, inconsistencies could even come in handy, sometimes in the crudest of ways, for private
gain, as in the case of the Beograd academic who presented himself internationally as a committed civic activist, and
locally as a loyal Serbian believer. In other cases, inconsistencies simply proved too hard to deal with, such as for the
young Zagreb girl whose closest friends didn't even know that she identified herself as Serbian. Still in other
circumstances, certain inconsistencies seemed more acceptable because they were not just perceived as individual
ripples on the desired snooker table of national homogeneity, but they reflected something that existed on some
social level outside of the one person in question (hence, for example, the drive for counter-homogenisation amongst
many Serbs who decided to stay in Zagreb (see Chapter Six)).
Holy observed a similar phenomenon in the Czech Republic (1996:9-10).
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me—the individuals in question positioned themselves in a wider context. Importantly,
we have to take into account that narration is not purely textual, and that narratives are
an important part of discursive practice, especially in a situation like the post-Yugoslav
one, where the very act of narrating identities (national ones in particular) took on a
marked political significance. I demonstrate in this text that narratives of self and
society can be performative utterances depending on the context in which they exist.
They are, therefore, not simply expressions of a fixed underlying identity, but 'signifying
practices' which are being lived as 'strategies of survival under compulsory systems'
(Butler 1990:139; Hebdige 1979; Ferguson 1999:94-104). In the post-Yugoslav
situation, simply making a statement concerning one's identity or one's state could be
tantamount to securing one's life or death. In this sense, narrative formed an important
and always contested part of people's everyday strategies for coping and survival.
This study explores anti-nationalism as discursive practice through an analysis of how
certain moments were articulated into elements differently from the dominant
nationalisms. This also includes a look at anti-nationalist struggles to maintain the
unproblematised, non-articulated nature of certain moments, i.e. mainly to not
essentialise and politicise certain characteristics of somebody's national background. I
explore these patterns through a study of people's narrative coping-strategies with the
(dis)continuity represented by the nationalist wars and the break-up of Yugoslavia. At
this point, I would like to explain briefly that anti-nationalism also constituted an
embodied practice.
If this seems a cheap self-evidence, let me make clear that it is not an attempt to win
over adherents of recent developments in anthropology which argue that we should
give more place to the importance of embodiment in general (Csordas 1998). In fact, I
would prefer to remain rather unapologetic about the emphasis on stories and words in
this study, which is the result of an analytical choice. However, that shouldn't prevent us
from realising that, in the end, post-Yugoslav anti-nationalism came to life only through
its many embodied practices. Think for example of activists working with war victims of
all nationalities in the field, people attending meetings and public gatherings, individuals
writing articles, or somebody simpiy having coffee with a nai9hbovr of a differenf
nationality, despite the disapproval of others. Anti-nationalism, of course, existed in and
through these embodied practices, which are analysed in this study mainly in terms of
their narrative aspect, more specifically in relation to stories of self and society.
Here I would like to look at one specific example of embodied resistance to nationalism
primarily because it was a self-conscious form of embodiment. In Chapter Nine we shall
see how women's bodies played a crucial role in the nationalist violence in a variety of
ways. Specifically through war rapes and debates surrounding reproductive rights,
much controversy came to be located precisely in and over women's bodies. It is
against this background that we must understand the following example: a small-scale
but prominent feminist critique of war, nationalism and patriarchy in Beograd, known as
Women in Black. The individuals involved in this organisation staged weekly street
protests during and after the wars, in addition to a wide range of other activities.
Dressed in black, they silently stood on the city's central square, Trg republike, carrying
banners with a variety of slogans. Through the insertion of their bodies into such an
important public space, they self-consciously shaped their critique of the regime and of
the dominant discourses of nationalism, militarism and patriarchy through their female
bodies. In the nationalist climate, this implied a strong sense of vulnerability consciously
played out as a strategy. Reactions from passers-by ranged from rare expressions of
sympathy, to aggression to physical abuse, with 'betrayal' being a frequent accusation6.
As we have seen above, in many people's perceptions if these women were critical of
the war and of nationalism they therefore had to be either national Others or bad Serbs
(as internal Others).
6 See the yearly collections of Zene za mir, published by Women in Black for a selection of slogans and people's
reactions (e.g. 1996:10-12, 19).
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1.3. identity, narrative and memory
It is time now for memory to enter the argument. If identification is about experiencing a
sense of self through time, then memory and identity are inextricably related concepts.
As Gillis argues, 'the core meaning of any individual or group identity, namely a sense
of sameness over time and place, is sustained by remembering; and what is
remembered is defined by the assumed identity' (Gillis 1994:3). Memories play a
central role in processes of identity construction, in helping us make sense of the world
we live in and of ourselves. However, like identities, memories are contingent and
always partly negotiable. To quote Gulls again, 'We are constantly revising our
memories to suit our current identities. Memories help us make sense of the world we
live in; and "memory work" is, like any other kind of physical and mental labour,
embedded in complex class, gender and power relations that determine what is
remembered (or forgotten), by whom, and for what end' (Gillis 1994:3).
In this sense, Gillis is right to state that 'identities and memories are not things we think
about, but things we think with' (Gulls 1994:5). Hence, to put it in Ricoeur's words
again, through narrative identity, we become hero and narrator of our own story, but
not author (Ricoeur 1991 a:32-33). Numerous ethnographic studies have demonstrated
that this doesn't prevent us from engaging reflexively in identity narration. Rapport
refers to this as individual narratives and argues that 'such acts of self-narration do not
merely and innocently describe the self but are basic to its emergence and reality.
Narratives articulate acts, events, and event-sequences within a significant framing
context or history so as to provide a "primary embodiment of our understanding of the
world, of experience, and ultimately of ourselves" (Rapport 1 997b:46).
2. narratives of self and discursive shifts
2.1. crisis and acute identity renegotiation
The reflexive construction of identities becomes particularly acute in times of radical
change and dramatic discursive shifts. Numerous ethnographic studies have illustrated
this heightened urge to renegotiate memories and identities, for example in contexts of
migrancy and postcolonial displacement (Ganguly 1992), of the threat of cultural
discontinuity in old age (Hazan 1980; Myerhoff 1986), and of postcommunist transition
(Berdahl 1999; Wanner 1998). They all demonstrate how, in the interplay between
narratives of past and present, the two mutually constitute each other.
Similarly, the massive changes that took place in the post-Yugoslav states required
acute renegotiations of identitification on the collective as well as the individual level.
The discrediting of formerly self-evident sequences of events and old frameworks of
reference by nationalist discourses had brought both the grand narrative of Yugoslavia
and the narration of many people's individual identities to a breaking-point. New
canonised versions of reality were constructed and new criteria of legitimacy imposed,
which affected people's everyday lives dramatically. Ignoring these changes was
therefore not an option for most individuals in the post-Yugoslav states, as it might
have been in other situations. They were rather suddenly expected to position
themselves in relation to these new dominant discourses and the new nationalist
'truths'.
This is not to say that previously all individual narratives were smoothly in line with the
former 'truths'. Far from it, people permanently renegotiate their identities. This is not
an unusual situation in itself, in Minh-ha's words, 'identity lies at the intersection of
dwelling and travelling and is a claim of continuity within discontinuity, and vice-versa'
(Minh-ha 1994:14). However, the scale, the speed and the intensity of the processes
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discourses (and often evoking the different forms of power that come with them).
Sometimes these storylines are literally taken from those discourses, which still allows
wide variation because, in line with the emphasis on the impossibility of discursive
closure, storylines are characterised by a high degree of multi-interpretability. When
somebody uses a certain storyline, it is automatically expected that the others will
respond within a similar framework; but as a result of multi-interpretability, this does not
mean that consensus is needed. Evoking powerful discourses can impute authority to
the speaker; it can also set the rules for conversation on a supposedly 'generally
accepted' level without having to discuss specific details. Story lines offer us the
opportunity to talk and think about a topic without having to grasp the whole
problematic and often, thereby, to position the speaker in a wider context of
relationships. By calling on a storyline, complexity and conditionality is reduced and a
certain implicit underlying common ground, a more or less provisional doxa, is
presupposed.
An illustration of the use of storylines is provided by Portelli's work on memories of
Italian communists (1988). He found that the people he worked with relied heavily on
proverbs and quotations from folk songs. Also, he shows how storylines can be
authorised retrospectively as in the case of an activist who attributed a certain folk
saying to Lenin in order to invest it with the legitimacy of communist orthodoxy
(1988:49). In the post-Yugoslav states, it was easy to see how nationalist discourses
thrived on storylines, and how they were an ubiquitous feature of everyday life. While
throughout this study I explore the meanings and uses of a series of storylines,
particularly in anti-nationalist discourses, let us first look at some examples from
nationalism.
In Croatia, nationalism revolved around the sanctity of the national state, and this
authoritative discourse was permanently and abundantly reinforced through policies,
imagery, regime statements, and media messages. However, this discourse of
nationalism was never (and could never be) spelled out completely. Rather, on
billboards all around the country it was summarised in storylines such as 'We have
Croatia!'; in speeches and interviews, politicians relentlessly emphasised the need to
be 'on one's own [land]' 7 . The horrendous fate of the Croatian nation in the former state
was often captured in the assertion that 'we couldn't sing our own songs, or even
speak our own language'. Similar examples taken from Serbian nationalism could be
the reference to 'five hundred years under the Turks', the moral superiority implied in
'we ate with knife and fork long before anyone else', or the assertion that 'it is actually
Croats who are the nationalists, not Serbs'. Many people's accounts included the latter
as a warning for me. 'If you think this is bad', they said, 'wait till you get to Zagreb, now
there you'll see some nationalism!'. This reflects the dominant line of (self-denying)
Serbian nationalism, which holds that the Serbs are the eternally vicitimised, the ones
who only defended themselves against the nationalism of others in the post-Yugoslav
wars. These examples illustrate how powerful discourses, or 'big stories' strongly
influenced local 'small stories', which often even repeated certain storylines word by
word.
However, there was another side to it. People used storylines in order to evoke large,
complex and powerful discursive practices and thereby asserted control themselves. In
Portelli's words, 'By saying that history was "good", we claim that we have made
something out of ourselves' (1988:53). This could be in order to justify certain
behaviour or situations, or to avoid reflection about certain issues, or to deny
responsibility, or simply and perhaps most crucially, to survive and stay somehow sane
(sanity in the eye of the beholder, again). People evoked authoritative discourses
through the use of storylines, one way in which they positioned themselves in relation
to these larger discourses.
'Imamo Hrvatsku' was a cry of triumph. The second storyline, 'Bit! svoj na svome, literally means 'to be one's own
on one's own'.
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taking shape in the post-Yugoslav republics posed these challenges with greater
urgency. One had to come to terms with new states, new borders, new poverty, new
status relations, a new political system and new prescriptions for appropriate
behaviour. In a situation where many people experienced influential discourses of
state, war, nation and territory as largely objectified and out of their individual control,
and where feelings of powerlessness and confusion were overwhelming, many post-
Yugoslays struggled to find a more or less consistent way of relating to these
discourses. A whole range of reference points had slipped away from under their feet,
and previous narratives of self were often at odds with the new 'truths'. Active
negotiation was required to reach a workable balance.
2.2. big/small stories: coping and repositioning
I argue that most of the citizens of Serbia and Croatia aimed for a degree of
minimisation of incompatibility between their individual narratives ('small stories') and
certain authoritative discourses on the public level ('big stories'). When interpreting
their own and other people's life-events and emotions, they relied at least partly on pre-
existing discursive material, often of the more powerful and authoritative kind. These
narrative positionings involved multiple and contradictory public discourses, and,
arguably, they often took place on an unconscious level. However, due to the
increased narrativity of the moment, for many, ignoring the issue was not on the menu.
Whatever people's evaluation of these 'big stories', they were continually expected to
position themselves in relation to a number of large discourses (see Connerton
1989:21).
Again, this seems a simple truism. Often, people attempt to position themselves
favourably in relation to some authoritative discourse—favourably, of course, in the
eye of the beholder. In this sense, the post-Yugoslav crisis did not only bring
geopolitical, socio-economical and ideological shifts, but it also led many people to
gradually or suddenly re-write the story of themselves. Often, simply rewriting your own
ideological affinities and your own past in line with a set of nationalist truths opened the
way to considerable gains in status, power or money—or at least it would prevent
losses. However, I would argue that, for many, it was also a question of sanity; if
people's narratives of self were completely out of tune with every 'big story', they'd be
considered mad.
Narratives, according to Barthes, represent 'a tissue of quotations drawn from
innumerable cultural discourses which "hem in" what may be said' (Barthes, quoted in
Rapport 1997b:44). It is true that people's choice in narrating the story of themselves
can be strongly limited, but even in extreme situations of war and displacement actors
can deploy what Foucault calls the 'tactical polyvalence of discourses' (Foucault
1990:100). Thus, this study explores the dissident ways in which post-Yugoslays
related to the new dominant nationalist discourses on identity and to alternative
discourses, and how they (re)structured their own discursive practices of identity. This
brings us back to issues of identification. Identity, particularly in contexts of rapid
change, is very much about how we relate (or don't relate) our narratives of individual
experience to larger discourses. It is through this 'poetic of the self' that we reinforce or
deny our position in the broad field of belongings (Herzfeld 1985:21).
2.3. story lines: evoking authoritative discourses
Using the framework for discursive analysis developed by Hajer, we can use the
concept of 'story lines' to clarify one of the ways in which people connect their
narratives of self to authoritative discourses. The term 'story lines' refers to a
'generative sort of narrative that allows actors to draw upon various discursive
categories to give meaning to specific [...] phenomena' (1 995:56). In everyday life, we
continually reproduce certain phrases referring to, or better, evoking authoritative
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Having said that, storylines were not the exclusive property of the dominant
discourses. A whole variety circulated, often emerging out of everyday interaction
rather than purely 'borrowed' from powerful representations. For example, when asked
if they ever considered the possibility of emigration from Serbia, many people curtly
answered, independently of each other, 'And do what? Wash dishes?'. This reply
should be seen in context: hundreds of thousands had emigrated during the last
decade, leaving behind a situation in which the question of emigration had become
increasingly normal for people to ponder. But rather than going into the ins-and-outs of
their decision-making process, rather than providing me with a list of arguments why
they hadn't left (yet), people could rely on a storyline which would not require any
explanation. Going by the stories of many of those who stayed behind in Beograd,
washing dishes was the single most common activity amongst post-Yugoslav
émigrés—and giving this answer meant saying 'No', while at the same time evoking a
whole set of pressing financial, social and status problems that potential, maybe even
desired, emigration would entail.
Reproducing storylines was particularly common with regard to issues of national
identity, creating an oppressive sense of discursive homogeneity with regard to stories
of the wars and of nationality in general. Often, storylines seemed to be experienced
as the only, and certainly the most effective, forms of access to issues of a national-
political nature. As we shall see in Chapter Six, which discusses the changing
meanings of national identity in everyday life, this might be an indicator of the previous,
relatively unproblematic, taken-for-granted nature of national identity for large numbers
of post-Yugoslav citizens. Since many people saw themselves forced to develop a
discursive fluency in national terms quickly, when the matter was steadily rising to the
top of the political agenda, storylines were a welcome mechanism for repositioning.
Thus, despite its seemingly homogenous character, the post-Yugoslav discursive field
was not a one-dimensional, monolithic formation. Even the post-Yugoslav nationalist
discourses themselves were extremely polysemic: meaning different things to different
people, and approached and used in different ways by different people at different
times. Moreover, as always and everywhere, ambiguities ran through the whole picture
and alternative discursive practices were being developed. Here lies, of course, the
focus of this study: dissident narratives of self, and the ways in which they evoked
different authoritative discourses, such as urbanity, 'European-ness' or feminism
through different storylines.
3. remembering and forgetting
3.1. rewriting narratives
In contexts of drastic change, narratives of the past come to play a crucial role in
identity construction. Tonkin argues that 'individuals may be supported or threatened
by public representations of pastness that seem either to guarantee their identity or to
deny its significance' (Tonkin 1992:10). Thus, the status of memories shifts—some
might be discredited, others lifted to a new importance. Sudden displacement often
gives rise to an urge to disambiguate the past in order to make sense of a heavily
ruptured present (see Ganguly 1992:31). In this process, people sometimes bump up
against the limits of malleability of memories. In any case, there is bound to be plenty
of tension at work here, a sometimes fruitful, and often painful, interplay between
discontinuity and continuity, between remembering and forgetting, between amnesia
and nostalgia.
The evocation of authoritative discourses through the use of storylines can serve
people in their attempts to exert control over their own life narratives. Life experiences
can then be retroactively and strategically brought into tune with dominant narratives,
and in this way, paradoxically, can be reformulated as if belonging to the individual's
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'small story' rather than having been imposed by a larger outside force. These
repositioning strategies allow people to draw on 'big stories', while simultaneously
keeping the latter at a safe but compatible distance from their narratives of self.
Again, it is crucial to note that the processes by which people renegotiate narratives of
past and present and rewrite their stories of self are not always the same, nor are they
unambiguous. Ganguly's study of Indian migrants in the US, for instance, shows how
men and women constructed radically different narratives of past and present (Ganguly
1992). The men approached the past as an undesirable, slightly exotic other, in order
to consolidate respectability in the present. The women, on the other hand, tended to
glorify their Indian past and compared it favourably to the present without actually
criticising their current situation. This case illustrates how, even though in most
situations certain narratives are obviously dominant and others marginalised, there are
many different roads to follow and many different meanings to be explored.
3.2. the uses of misremembering
Memories, as referred to in narratives of the past and in stories of self, have an
ambiguous status with regard to truth. For example, in Ganguly's study, the women are
aware that their glorifications of the Indian past are imaginary constructions (Ganguly
1992:39-40). However, they work, they are 'symbolically effective' (Ganguly 1992:42).
Myerhoffs ethnography of Jewish retirees in Cailfornia points to a similar conclusion.
They know that their representations of identity are contradictory and internally
inconsistent but that doesn't stop them from believing and enacting them (Myerhoff
1986:264-265, 284). She shows how a parade and a set of murals were deployed as
self-conscious expressions of identity in their own terms, rich in references to the Old
Testament, the ocean crossing, life in the shetl, etc. Similar to Ganguly's case, these
evocations of a Jewish past are consciously taken out of context and used. Many
people who never actually lived in a shetl still referred to it in their recollections of life
histories. 'Whether or not experienced individually, the experience is "borrowed" as a
historical moment and regularly incorporated into accounts of personal histories'
(Myerhoff 1986:274; see also Ganguly 1992:29-31; Hazan 1980:89-97).
Another example is mentioned by Berdahl, who found that villagers in the German
borderland constructed memories of landmines on the previous intra-German border,
whereas, in fact, they were never there (1 999:21 7). The imagined minefield served to
add another layer to the discourse of victimisation developed after reunification. During
my own NGO work in a heavily war-affected area in Croatia, I was often struck by the
way in which discourses of victimisation dominated many of the abundant references
to the past. Even when addressing the most recent conflicts, vagueness and selective
amnesia allowed for generalised accusations and for protection against potentially
threatening questions about individual knowledge and responsibility. In highly
homogenised and nationally one-sided stories of the past, Serbian and Croatian
returnees in this now Croatian-dominated area represented recent events in
diametrically opposed ways. For example, in one and the same village, almost all
Serbs recalled and named a number of mixed marriages, thereby constructing the past
as one of peaceful co-existence, whereas most Croats initially denied and later
downplayed their existence, in this way reinforcing their bleak view of inter-ethnic
relations in the common Yugoslav past. Related to this, in a retrospective effort to
cleanse their own biographies of ambiguities, many villagers engaged in the
reinterpretation of their life stories and chose to forget their previous Party membership
(Jansen 2000b).
While this selective amnesia might have been driven to extremes in the above-
mentioned villages with their recent campaigns of ethnic cleansing and their WWII
histories of mutual massacres, it was certainly not absent from the relatively unscathed
capital cities. As we shall see, it was not even restricted to nationalist discourse. Anti-
nationalist narratives throughout this study illustrate the malleability of memory and the
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strategic uses people can make of this. Surely some misremembering is taking placeif
virtually all nationalist narratives reconstruct a Yugoslav past consisting almost
exclusively of national victimisation, while the bulk of anti-nationalist stories recollect a
time of harmony and peace. Hence, memories are just as much about the present as
they are about the past, and I see those narratives as political comments on the
desirable organisation of society at the time of speaking rather than as atrue depiction
of life in the former state. In nationalist discourse, the past had to be disambiguated
into discrete, opposed groups in order to legitimate the nationally restructured present,
while dissident versions struggled to inject the writings of the past with ambiguity, with
overlapping national patterns and with co-existence.
With regard to language, for example, the different nationalisms claimed age-old
discrete evolutions of their language and blamed similarities on pollution by other
elements. Anti-nationalist narratives did not so much deny differences as point out that
they had been much more ambiguous than could be represented through a discrete
nationalist perspective. In this way, a crucial aspect of anti-nationalism was the very
effort of re-ambiguating nationalist histories, the struggle to retain 'elements' as
'elements' and to resist their articulation as 'moments' in nationalist discourses (Laclau
& Mouffe 1985). Similarly, when discussing the notion of JugonostaIga in Chapter
Ten, I indicate how 'Yugoslavia' had functioned for a number of people as a common
cultural space - a self-evident discursive background for their everyday lives.
However, not all anti-nationalist discourse was articulated with Jugonosta!ga, and
some exponents were actually very critical of it. Now, if nationalist narratives never
mention such a notion of 'home' in Yugoslavia, does this necessarily mean that it was
never there? I would argue that this is not the point here—without denying the ways in
which it certainly is a point for many post-Yugosla ys. What I want to do is look at the
mechanisms of remembering and forgetting and at their roles in people's positionings
with regard to nationalist discourses. But more, much more about this later.
Of course, I am not suggesting that there is only strategy involved here. It is clear that
misremembering can be rooted in many different soils 8 . It may be the unconscious
product of trauma or a simple mistake. Alternatively, it might be the expression of
calculated self-interest in the above-mentioned, fairly innocent ways or, and sadly this
was often the case in the post-Yugoslav context, in a more ruthless manner. In
extreme instances, as suggested in Friedlander's study of German memories of the
Holocaust, the past can be too massive to be forgotten and too repellent to be
integrated into the 'normal' narrative of memory (Friedlander 1993:2). Usually the
reality lies somewhere in between because history is shaped always in the experience
of later events and often as a way of dealing with the present.
The latter aspect of amnesia is also illustrated by Collard's study of a Greek village
(quoted in Tonkin 1992:116). Collard found that there was little or no historical talk
about the civil war although it was a key event that had happened only thirty-five years
before, the effects of which were still remarkable. Ottoman times, though, a period long
before the villagers were born, were often discussed in detail, sometimes falsifiable
with reference to documentation. Collard argues that this provided 'a means to talk
about some aspect of the early 1940s [the civil war]. It may be that one historical 'story'
has come to stand in for another one, which, for a variety of reasons, cannot be
spoken of in any other way' (quoted in Tonkin 1992:116). Thus, importantly, rewritings
of the past can provide comments on the present without explicitly criticising the status-
quo to an extent which might pose risks to oneself or to others.
8 Some instances show that false memories can also be working against the interests of the people who hold them:
Tonkin, for example, describes how certain aborigines in Australia, despite postcolonial legislation, have blanked out
memories of the genocide perpetrated against them by whites in the beginning of this century (Tonkin 1992:115).
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3.3. someone's truth, the whole of someone's truth,
and nothing but someone's truth
In the post-Yugoslav context of crisis and displacement, the contradictory present was
experienced by many people as outside of one's control. The past, then, sometimes
came in as a (wo)man's best friend. One could refashion it into a disambiguated, fixed,
authoritative narrative to be relied upon. It was possible to disambiguate the past
because inconsistencies could be blanked out with hindsight to make it more directly
accessible. The past was fixable, because it could be seen as 'over' now. And because
it was often reified as objective and autonomous, it could be given an authoritative
stamp, particularly in a context where dominant political discourses relied heavily on
the authority of certain versions of the past. This narrative could then serve as a
positive example or as an undesirable counterpoint as long as it was constructed as a
solid, credible, and stable starting point from which to make sense of the present. In
this sense, people 'remake the past in terms that are accessible to the present'
(Ganguly 1992:45; see also Holy 1996:10).
Rev has written about the politics of collective and individual amnesia in the states of
the former Eastern Bloc, which erased all traces of everyday collaboration and
accommodation (quoted in Einhorn 1993:8; see also Holy 1996:16). He explains how
communism was often considered as an essentially foreign system, imposed from
outside (usually by the Soviet Union). Other East Europeans, Rev argues, were
portrayed as innocent 'by right of birth', since their very national identity testified to the
fact that they had always suffered under and resisted communism. In this way,
nationalist discourses represented a widespread attempt to deal with the legacy of the
former system.
So are these memories false? Yes, in the sense that they do not correlate to a factual
past. Some people who assured me they had never been in the Communist Party were
lying to my face. They knew it, I knew it, and maybe they knew that I knew. However,
as Tonkin reminds us, in some instances the incorrectness of histories can be
veracious in that they provide a true, timeless comment on past and present
(1992:114). Portelli elaborates on this theme by analysing what he calls 'uchronic
dreams', revealing how for many people it is too difficult or too painful to admit, or even
imagine, the 'real' course of history (1988:54). Uchronic tales, he argues, set the
existing world up against a desirable one that could have been in a parallel universe
(Portelli 1988:46). In these fables of the past, his informants, Italian communist
activists, tended to associate themselves closely with certain leaders and events, while
disassociating themselves from others (1988:48). The uchronic turn in their stories,
Portelli found, almost always emerged when relating an event in which the narrator
played a particularly significant role, so that, paradoxically, misremembering was most
prevalent in relation to the best-remembered times.
In the post-Yugoslav context, many narratives of the past, and especialy those
associated with violence, became particularly one-sided and inconsistent when dealing
with recent events that could not have been other than highly significant on a personal
level. Their main characteristic, however, seemed to be their vagueness. There rarely
was any mention of individual agency, as actors were usually collective and national
(Jansen 2000b). It was precisely one of the defining points of anti-nationalist narratives
that they attempted to relate events in terms of individual responsibility and 'who did
what'.
Historical truth in narrative is relative, as Ganguly warns, 'the reasons for the inventions
lie in a discursive field other than that dealing with history and truth' (Ganguly 1992:40).
Although valid in general terms, I think this view may appear cruel to many people in a
context such as the former Yugoslavia. When discursive battles are raging between
heavily disputed versions of past and present, and when these versions deal with
issues of life and death, justice and unjustice, war and peace, the idea of truth in
relation to memory takes on increased tension. This became particularly clear to me on
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an evening in Zagreb, when a Chilean human rights activist came to speak about the
traumas and problems surrounding the identification and exhumation of mass graves.
The speaker argued that lessons from the Chilean case could inform a sensitive
approach to recently located mass burial sites in Croatia. But when he attempted to
deconstruct 'hard' concepts of truth concerning war crimes and traumas, a woman
from the besieged and later destroyed town of Vukovar loudly and emotionally
protested by screaming 'The truth is what we want, the truth!'. Several of the men of
her family, including her husband, had been missing since the beginning of the war,
and only the truth about their fates, not someone's truth, could quench her thirst for
peace of mind.
3.4. alternative narratives, alternative memories
Post-Yugoslav anti-nationalist discourses displayed a similarly strong call for
recuperating notions of truth, particularly with regard to memories of the recent past.
Often, these narratives were constructed in opposition to the surrounding climate of
lies - with indignation, anger and disbelief as central elements. As we shall see, many
people reconstructed their anti-nationalist stories of self by relying on the continuity of
truth and the refusal of accepting non-truth, at least on an individual level. In doing so,
they articulated their memories and their versions of the past, which were often in
direct contradiction to the dominant nationalist ones.
In an article about people made redundant by IBM, Sennett argues that large modern
capitalist institutions encourage the idea of memory as private property. In their drive
for flexibility and mobility, they attempt to undo institutional memories of the days when
the company took care from the cradle to the grave. 'Given these realities,' Sennett
argues, 'it becomes indeed reasonable to see the domain of memory instead as a
private matter, an archive one wants to protect from the violations of the competitive
world' (1998:24). The post-Yugoslav situation is different: the dominant nationalisms
were engaged in a collective attempt to eradicate a whole range of personal memories
of the past fifty years, while promoting those that underwrote the general discourse of
national victimisation—often in terms of 'collective memory'.
In this sense, this study of post-Yugoslav anti-nationalism deals with a peculiar set of
subaltern memories, which find themselves in uneasy company with many other
counter-discourses centred upon 'alternative memories'. I would like to take this
opportunity to point to some differences between the approach proposed here, and
other analyses of such memories (see also Jansen 1999c). I will refer to two studies in
particular: Wanner's study of memory, history and Ukrainian postcommunist transition
(1998) and Connerton's work on 'how societies remember' (1989).
Wanner's book focuses on the formulation of historical counter-discourses and the role
of 'social memory' in the ways that people make sense of reality in opposition to official,
dominant accounts such as Soviet ideology. For Ukrainian nationalists, paralleled for
example by their Croatian counterparts, a crucial instrument for fostering popular
support was the reinterpretation of the experience of the Soviet regime through the
perspective of national victimisation. I believe Wanner's analysis makes an important
leap when she argues that these nationalist rewritings of history were successful
because they, 'far more so than official Soviet historiography, reflected individual
experience and memories' (1998:44). Nationalism, Wanner says, (re)constructed
Ukrainian historiography in categories and meanings compatible with individual
memories, and it was this 'overlap of historical narrative and individual experience
embedded in memories which led to mass support' (ibid.:197-198).
What Wanner leaves unclear, I believe, is the relation between those two posited fields
of memory: collective and individual. Furthermore, she applies a rigid distinction
between official Soviet historiography on the one hand and memories based on
individual experience on the other hand (ibid. :37-38). Given the extent of Soviet
manipulation of historiography, for example with regard to the Famine of 1932-1933,
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this is not so surprising. However, she refers to the blatant instrumentalisation of
representations of the past by nationalism (ibid. :38) as compatible with individual
memories. Still, Wanner herself warns that 'memories are not fixed entities but
constructions evolving over time within a field of power relations' (ibid.:166-167).
There is a problem with this approach, I believe. Wanner's argument unwittingly runs
the risk of retrospectively confirming, ratifying or even canonising the significance and
legitimacy of certain issues by embedding them in 'memory'. There is a danger of
reifying 'social memory', a risk which is also prevalent in some otherwise fascinating
studies of WWll memories in Croatia's Serbian communities (e.g. Hayden 1994;
Denich 1994). Of course I wouldn't deny the importance of the Ustaa genocide on
Serbs, amongst others, but I would argue that proclaiming certain issues significant
with hindsight, giving them the stamp of subaltern memory, also actively contributes to
the political significance of potential memories of these issues. The first incidents of
hate speech and bloodshed in the post-Yugoslav wars were loaded with references to
what were represented as subaltern, suppressed memories (the Ustaa genocide on
Serbs, the Bleiburg massacre on Croats, etc.). Scott writes about the crucial moment
when 'hidden transcripts' break through to the public level, and he illustrates this with
the powerful words of a Chilean opposition politician who first spoke openly against
Pinochet and who ended his daring speech with the words 'I speak for fifteen years of
silence' (1990:207). The post-Yugoslav nationalisms often presented themselves in
similar terms, arguing that it was they who finally freed subaltern memory. With
nationalism taking over, new versions of the past became dominant and they violently
pushed other memories into marginality.
Let us move on to another, similar approach to memory. Connerton describes how,
through oral histories, subordinate groups can gain a voice, as they are not
represented in elite historical reconstruction (1989). He explains that the idea of a
chronological narrative often does not relate to subordinate ways of remembering
because this reflects elite views of narration, whereby inserting your own story into
'objective institutional history' is the rule (Connerton 1989:18-19). Connerton argues
that people in subaltern positions lack the terms of reference for a linear trajectory and
instead follow a cyclical pattern, since the rhythm of their narratives is not structured
around 'the individual's intervention in the working of the dominant institutions'
(1989:19). Although an important insight for certain contexts, this seems a slightly
essentialist view of 'subordinates', which does not allow for the variations and
ambiguities which might exist. In the post-Yugoslav situation, I found, many people in
very weak positions did try to insert their life narratives into larger dominant versions of
history. Moreover, and crucial to my argument, the case of post-Yugoslav anti-
nationalist discursive practice demonstrates that narrative linearity can also serve as a
form of resistance. This converges with a general aversion to collectivist discourses in
post-Yugoslav anti-nationalism: one of the major critiques of nationalism was carried
out through a critique of collectivism in general (Deviá 1997). Linear patterns of
narration might be more consistent with beliefs in individual responsibility, and in the
post-Yugoslav states such beliefs were counterposed against what was perceived as a
society where blind collectivism reigned9.
3.5. modes of narration
A useful tool for understanding narratives of the past and misremembering can be
Portelli's concept of 'modes of narration' (quoted in Tonkin 1992:68). In a study of
narratives of social unrest amongst Italian workers in the post-war years, he found that
his informants tended to select one or more out of a range of modes to recount certain
events. Portelli distinguishes between the institutional, the collective and the personal
mode of narration and emphasises that they might coexist and overlap between and
Thanks to Caroline Oliver for bringing this to my attention.
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within narratives. He draws the attention to examples where general periodisation and
even detailed dates change according to this mode. For instance, even amongsteye
witnesses different dates were attributed to the killing of a worker, a key event in local
history. The differences were systematically related to the mode in which the speaker
inscribed him or herself when recounting this particular event.
Similarly, in the post-Yugoslav context, I found people speaking in different modes,
depending on their own position, the topic, the context, the addressee, and so on. It
seems important to me that we resist the temptation to study predominantlyone mode
of narration—a tendency not entirely absent from many studies of memory, which
focus strongly on a collective mode. This brings us back to the point made earlier on
individuality, linearity and anti-nationalism. In Serbia and Croatia, I found that people,
when involved in anti-nationalist practice, often spoke in the personal mode, providing
detailed accounts of their experiences including dates and chronologised events. This
provided a striking contrast to the dominant tendency of vague and selective, but
always collective, historicism.
Portelli's observations are crucial to ethnographic work in a context like the post-
Yugoslav one, where reference to long-gone history was abundant and ubiquitous in
many people's narratives and in everyday conversation. Western European and North
American media depictions eagerly took on this practice as a symptom of the Balkans'
cyclical history of blood and revenge and as an expression of the timelessness of its
people's social character (very prominently so during the Kosovo crisis in 1999). And it
has to be said that it was tempting to do so, with local people overwhelmingly bringing
up and relying on 'history'. In my own NGO work in Croatian war-affected villages, I
was continually confronted with local accounts of past events containing references to
authoritative discourses of history (Jansen 2000b). In this way, in a context of extreme
powerlessness and destruction, people exerted control over their own version of
history and, thereby, over their own 'small stories'. For instance, rather than simply
arguing that he didn't want Serbs to return, this man referred to an age-old historical
contract which stated that Serbs were out of place in this area:
'We [the Croats, sj] accepted them [the Serbs, sj] long ago. We accepted them on the
basis of a contract that they would stay until the Turks would leave. But they stayed on
after that. And not only that, they wanted to be the chiefs.'
Another villager, whose father was killed by Serbs in WWII in front of his own eyes,
also switched to a national-historical mode of narration, referring to the historical cause
of national freedom. Standing in front of a ruined house that he had partly done up with
his wife who was ill, he refused to deplore their predicament—so obvious to the eye of
any visitor. Asked about life in the former Yugoslavia and about the perspectives of
Serbs returning, the answer was a reformulation of history as one long Croatian
struggle for national freedom against Serbs. The man argued that Croats had always
been second class citizens who were not allowed to study, to wave their flag, or to sing
their own songs. He complained that they had not been allowed to speak Croatian and
that the language had been called Serbo-Croatian. For a thousand years, he claimed,
they had lived under the Serbs, until they had inally decided it was time to stand up for
their freedom. The first time they had done so in 1941, he argued, on the German side.
Everybody had thought Germany invincible, but with the defeat of Germany, the Croats
had lost as well. They were forced to live under the Serbs for another fifty years—this
time the Serbs were 'communists'. And again the Croats had prepared a revolt. Now,
he concluded, for once and forever they had settled the score and liberated
themselves. Forever. The reference to a thousand years under the Serbs is a storyline
taken from president Tuman's oft-cited idea of the thousand-year dream of the
Croatian people to have their own state. Note that the area that is now Croatia was
controlled by Hungarians and Austrians for centuries and only the last seventy-five
years of these ten centuries were 'Yugoslav' years.
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Reference to national history, then, was abundant, and it would be easy to interpret this
as a symptom of deeply embedded, collectively entrenched ethnic conflicts. However, I
believe this might be a case of people framing their narratives into a certain received
and authoritative form, i.e. of talking in a certainmode. And, parallel to the possibility of
switching between several powerful discourses, it seems that, for a variety of reasons,
different modes can be compelling at different times.
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[chapter three]
Yugoslavia—dealing with the national question
It's hardly likely that twentieth century man [sic] is called upon
to discover the truth that had never been discovered before.
E.F. Schumacher
Rabinovitch, a Jew in the Soviet Union, wants to emigrate. The emigration official
asks him why, and Rabinovitch answers: 'There are two reasons why. The first is
that I know that communism in Russia will last forever, nothing will really change
here, and this prospect is unbearable for me.' 'But', interrupts the bureaucrat, 'this
is pure nonsense. Communism is disintegrating all around! All those responsible
for the communist crimes will be severely punished!' 'That's my second reason!'
responds Rabinovitch.
(Soviet joke, reformulated by Slavoj 2i2ek (1991:1))
Numerous works have been written on the political history of Yugoslavia, and therefore,
in this chapter I attempt only to sketch concisely some aspects of the Yugoslav
background. In this brief outline of certain ideological and socio-political processes
which made the creation and consolidation of a united Yugoslavia politically thinkable
and historically possible, I focus on the politics of nationality and nationalism. In light of
the subject of this study, particular reference will be made to the relation between
Serbian and Croatian nationalism and to the ways in which the reconstruction of
histories is part of the endeavour to legitimate and support contemporary discourses. In
this way, the chapter does risk defeating its own object, as it necessarily favours certain
representations over others. However, although the post-Yugoslav wars and the anti-
nationalist discursive practices that are at the core of this study cannot be explained
exclusively with regard to previous events, a brief look at some background factors is
necessary for any understanding of the situation in the 1 990s. At various points later in
this study I shall come back to the contemporary role of contested narrations of the past
in more detail.
1. the glorious pasts of 'natural' homelands
The idea of a unified South-Slav state is relatively recent but it seeks its legitimation in
times long ago, when Slav tribes moved towards the Adriatic in the seventh century and
underwent both common and separate historical influences. Up to the nineteenth
century, social formations in the Balkans were by no means comparable to the modern
phenomenon of a centralised nation-state; therefore, historical arguments about
territory and political control are always ambiguous and based on uncertain
assumptions. An integral part of the nationalist endeavour, however, is the reviving of
the glorious past of the nation. In the post-Yugoslav context nationalist intellectuals of
all colours referred to a time in which its presumed ancestors ruled a territory much
larger than the present republic (Singleton 1976:29).
If we limit our analysis to Serbs and Croats, we can see how Croatian nationalism
found inspiration in the tenth century, when the Dalmatian chieftain Tomislav and his
successors bore the title of King of Croatia and ruled a considerable part of what later
became Yugoslavia. Serbian nationalist discourses refer to the fourteenth-century
empire of Stefan Duan, Czar of Serbs and Greeks. The fact that both monarchs ruled
large parts of present Bosnia-Herzegovina sheds a critical light on the claim by
nationalist politicians in the I 990s that these regions were part of the 'natural' homeland
of their respective peoples (Kri±an 1992:137-139). Arguably, those respective
nationalisms have good reasons to refer precisely to these periods in history, because
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nearly the entire area was later ruled by imperial powers. Recalling Banac (quoted in
Bennett 1995:16) it could be argued that 'the history of the Balkans is the history of
migrations, not just of peoples, but of lands' 1 . However, roughly two main patterns took
shape. In 1102 the predominantly Catholic Croatian lands became part of the Kingdom
of Hungary and, from 1526 onwards, it was controlled by the Habsburg Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy. The region now known as Serbia, mainly Orthodox, was
incorporated in the Ottoman empire after the defeat in the legendary battle of Kosovo
(1389), which came to occupy a central place in Serbian nationalism.
2. the emergence of the Yugoslav idea
According to most historians, and to the horror of contemporary Croatian nationalists,
the 'Illyrian idea', the notion of a united Yugoslavia [literally 'South-Slavia'], originated in
the 1830s-1840s amongst a relatively small circle of the Croatian upper class (Cohen
1995:4). Yugoslavism became a powerful political ideology only in the second half of
the 19th century, when, influenced by the eighteenth century Herderian concepts of
nationhood, and eager to embark on the train of modernity, intellectuals in various
South-East European regions developed the idea of a united Yugoslavia (Lampe
1994:73-76). Herder defined the nation by cultural-linguistic criteria, and this made it
possible to conceive of a nation-state comprising speakers of all South Slav dialects,
regardless of political and religious background. Interestingly, there was no single
Slavonic language which could boast a tradition of being the medium of a high
culture—linguistically, no fundamental distinctions could be made between the various
dialects that became Serbian, Croatian, and so on (Schopflin 1993:173). In their effort
to create the foundations for a Yugoslav state, these intellectuals and politicians
followed the classic adagio of nation-building and campaigned for a common South
Slav high culture. As argued in the works of Gellner (1983), Hobsbawm (1990) and
Anderson (1983), this was not a matter of reviving authentic languages of folk culture,
which would reflect the complex patchwork of local cultures. What these intellectuals
really did was to forge a new language for a new literate culture: the construction of a
national language was a conscious political effort, far from a neutral cultural process
(Banac 1992a:3-4; Detrez 1993:15). Ironically, in this respect, the first expressions of
Yugoslavism reflected more aspects of the classic scholarly accounts of nationalism
than the recent Croatian and Serbian discourses of identification.
Notwithstanding the enthusiasm of linguists and writers (Hobsbawm 1990:54; Schöpflin
1993:174; Garde 1992:131), the evolution of the Illyrian movement was not
unproblematic since centripetal and centrifugal forces were operating from the outset.
The aforementioned linguistic factor and the similarities in customs and lifestyles
constituted arguments in favour of a united Yugoslavia. However, there was less unity
on the religious level, as three major religious traditions (Orthodox, Catholic and
Muslim) had a long history in the region. Still, a number of observers argue that these
religious differences gained much of their importance only with the rise of nationalism in
the 19th century (Ramet 1984; Lampe 1994:72-73). A more crucially divisive factor,
according to some historians, consisted of the diverging histories of political
domination, which created deep divisions particularly between the political
establishments (Cohen 1995:5-7). Central to the debate between Serbian and Croatian
nationalisms was the definition of a South Slav identity. Moreover, within Croatian
political circles a division arose between those who favoured the Illyrian idea on the one
hand, and the supporters of outright Croatian independence on the other hand.
Denich argues that, historically, Serbian nationalism was conceptualised around the
1 For a wonderful literary account of the shifting boundaries of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires and the
effect those shifts had on the Bosnian towns of Viegrad and Travnik, see Ivo Andriós classics The Bridge over the
Drina and Bosnian Chronicle, both written in the I 940s.
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notion of hegemony, whereas the Croatian nationalist cause centred upon the concept
of negation (1994:372-373). Among Serbian nationalists, the idea of a united
Yugoslavia merged with the concept of a greater Serbia (Grmek et al 1993). During the
19th century a Serbian national state had been established as a political unit with a
relatively high degree of independence (Garde 1992:39-41), and with the rise of
Yugoslavism, the predominant notion of national hegemony was quite straightforwardly
expanded to all the territories where Serbs lived. In this way, the Yugoslav idea was not
always quite as Yugoslav as it looked since a range of Serbian nationalists came to
embrace it as necessary for the fulfilment of Serbian nationalist aspirations. This, of
course, did not please Croatian nationalists who were engaging in the construction of
Croatian discourses of identification, which were explicitly posited against the above.
Extreme Croatian nationalism even defined statehood as requiring the exclusion of
Serbs from the territory which it claimed, as exemplified by the fascist regime of the
Independent State of Croatia (NDH) during World War 112. This distinction between
incorporative Serbian nationalism and negationist Croatian nationalism constitutes an
important framework of understanding throughout this study.
Notwithstanding these patterns of conflict, the notion of a united Yugoslavia was more
influential in Croatia than in Serbia. Over time, a growing consensus including
moderate nationalist circles in Zagreb grew on the desire to establish a common South
Slav state—even if only as a necessary condition for a more autonomous Croatia,
which was at the time still ruled by the Habsburg empire. However, on the basis of the
previously mentioned diverging definitions of the Yugoslav idea, and particularly taking
into account conflicting Serbian and Croatian nationalist views, it was predictable that
any unitary South Slav state could only come into being with a heavy mortgage3.
3. the inter-war kingdom: Yugoslavia take one4
In 1914 during a visit to Sarajevo, Archduke Franz-Ferdinand, heir to the Habsburg
crown, was killed by Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian Serb. Princip declared at his trials that
he was 'a Yugoslav nationalist, aiming for the unification of all Yugosla ys'. He added
that he did 'not care about what form of a state [Yugoslavia would take], but it must be
free from Austria' (Malcolm 1994:155). Despite these Yugoslavist credentials, Princip
was also a Serbian nationalist. Whatever his real intentions, the thin line between
Serbian nationalism and Yugoslavism would prove a thorny issue in the following
years.
Despite the conflicting visions in Serbian and Croatian political circles, a first successful
attempt to create a united Yugoslavia took shape towards the end of the First World
War. Larger geopolitics were a crucial factor (Glenny 1999:361-366), but as a result of
specific political circumstances Serbian, Croatian and Slovene elites also came to
accept South Slav unity as a desirable and profitable objective—albeit for different and
often contradictory reasons. I have pointed out how, for Serbian nationalists, the
kingdom was a step in the process of hegemonic nation-building. Croatian nationalists
accepted the propagation of a South Slav state primarily as a political move in Croatia's
struggle for autonomy within the Habsburg empire (Lendvai 1991 :254). The hard-line
nationalist anti-Yugoslav movement in Croatia was outnumbered by its pro-Yugoslav
opponents, and on 1 December 1918 the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was
2 Please note that I am speaking of ideologies here. Recent events in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo have made
abundantly clear that, in practice, extreme Serbian nationalism is certainly not unwilling to engage in campaigns of
ethnic cleansing—to the say the least.
This is not to deny other tensions, for example with non-Slav populations such as the Albanians, However, in this
study the focus is on the Serbo-Croatian divide. See amongst numerous others: Schöpflin 1993:174-175; Banac
1 992a:3-4; 1 992b: 169-170; Garde 1 992:53-55.
' For a detailed overview, see Glenny 1999:402-412; Neeven 1993:21-28; see also Peiô 1993:40-44; Burg 1983:8-
18; Banac 1992a:11-15; Pavlowitch 1988:1-9; Singleton 1976:66-85; Garde 1992:52-61.
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proclaimed and the Serbian monarchy of the Karaoreviô dynasty was elevated to an
all-Yugoslav kingdom. Serbia's pre-war political power and its demographic dominance
made the first Yugoslavia a strongly Serbian-controlled unitary state. In 1921 on
Vidovdan, the anniversary of the 1389 Kosovo Battle, the new Constitution
consolidated this situation: it was virtually a copy of the 1903 Serbian Constitution (Voet
1993:8-9).
While the creation of the Kingdom was made possible by political pragmatism on all
sides, a lack of consensus about the nature of the Yugoslav state characterised the
1920s (Banac 1992b:170). Some scholars have highlighted indications of relative
successes of Yugoslavism (Cohen 1995:19; Bennett 1995:33), but the ongoing conflict
between (Croatian) federalism and (Serbian) unitarism escalated into instability and a
vicious circle of political violence. Serbian domination provided a basis for anti-Serbian
feelings among Croats, and the Usta.a ['Uprising'] terrorist organisation campaigned
for Croatian independence. At the same time, Stjepan RadiO's Croatian Peasant Party
sought political autonomy through more peaceful means. However, in 1928 RadiO was
killed by a Montenegrin of the ruling Radical Party and political turmoil followed. In
January 1929, King Aleksandar dissolved parliament and instituted a strongly unitarist
royal dictatorship, which consolidated Serbian hegemony. The monarch was killed in
1934 and, although his successor, Prince-Regent Pavle, moved towards greater
accommodation with Croatian demands, this evolution was quickly overtaken by the
outbreak of World War II (Detrez 1992; Pavlowitch 1988:6ff).
4. the second world war: contested narrations of horror
If no history is ever uncontested, post-Yugoslav narrations of the 1941-1945 period
have proven to be particularly sensitive to political manipulation5 . Moreover, during my
fieldwork, the (re)construction of such clashing memories played an important role on
the everyday level as well (see Jansen 2000b). Having said this, it still seems
mandatory to provide at least some general information about WWII in Yugoslavia -
however high some proponents of Croatian and Serbian nationalist representations
would jump at the use of the neutral word 'information' for this concise sketch.
4.1. Ustaa fascist rule in Greater Croatia
In 1941 the South Slav kingdom capitulated to the Nazis. During the following four
years Yugoslavia was the setting for a series of events which cannot even begin to be
described by terms such as bestiality or atrocity. More than half of the one million plus
people that died in the war were murdered by fellow Yugosla ys. The Nazis allowed the
Croatian separatists of the Ustaa movement to realise their dream of an Independent
State of Croatia [Nezavisna Dr2ava H,vatska, NDH], including large parts of the present
republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina and a bit of Serbia, but excluding some
coastal regions controlled by Italy. As Singleton argues, the NDH 'was not independent,
it was hardly a state, and it was only fifty per cent Croat' (Singleton 1976:88). The
leader of the new state was Ante PaveliO, who had spent the pre-war years in exile in
Mussolini's Italy, and who unsuccessfully offered the Croatian crown to an Italian prince
(Garde 1992:65).
Although now widely held to have been a fascist puppet state, in 1941 the NDH gained
considerable recognition by several powers, most controversially by members of the
hierarchy of the Catholic Church6. Following the lead of the Nazis, the NDH regime
For some overviews of the war years, see for instance Glenny 1999:485-506, 529-536; Singleton 1976:86-97;
Pavlowitch 1988:10-15; Neeven 1993:32-35; Cohen 1995:21-25.
6 Dedijer (1994) provides a very critical view of the role of the Catholic Church. A sympathetic account can be found
in Garde (1992:64ff).
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embarked on a campaign of ethnic cleansing against Serbs, Gypsies, Jews, and
others. The metaphors of a pure Croatian nation-state were actualised through
measures such as forced conversion to Catholicism, expulsion to Serbia and mass
murder (Denich 1994:374-375; Rusinow 1977:1; Neeven 1993:32-35). Croats with anti-
fascist sympathies were also victimised, as state ideology permitted only Catholic
Croats and Muslims (regarded by the regime as Islamicised Croats and awarded the
dubious title of honour 'flower of the nation') to live in the new fascist state (Garde
1992:66). The NDH was not only the Axis state which marked the largest proportion of
its population for extermination, but it also became known as the perpetrator of the
most brutal terror in WWll (Glenny 1999:501).
Some writers, Croatian and foreign, suggest that the NDH should be considered a
regime imposed on the Croats against their will by the Nazi occupiers (Grmek et al
1993:11; Garde 1992:64ff). Garde argues that 'the confusion of allegiance to the state
and approval of the regime and its policies has been maintained consciously under Tito'
(1 992:65), and he emphasises that we should distinguish between popular support for
an independent Croatia and enthusiasm for a fascist government. However, as Garde
himself admits further on, there is a problem with his emphasis on the state/regime
distinction, for 'the independent state appeared with the regime, and disappeared with
it' (1992:277).
An unknown, but widely disputed, number of Serbs, Jews, anti-fascist Croats, Gypsies
and others were transported to extermination sites such as Jasenovac. After the war,
during Tito's rule, any public discussion of the wartime massacres was strictly
controlled. However, in the 1980s independent research was carried out by an émigré
Serb (Koëoviá) and a Croat (2erjaviô) based on a computer analysis of census and
demographic indices. They reached similar results (Bennett 1995:45-46; Voet
1993:10): according to Koëoviá, 1,014,000 Yugoslays were killed in VVWII; whereas
erjaviô's estimate was 1,027,000, almost half of which were Serbs. I limit myself only
to these figures in order to indicate the scale of the horror. As we shall see in the sketch
of post-Yugoslav nationalist discourses, a sort of obscene statistical juggling has
characterised the period since the late 1980s, with opposing nationalists using the bone
count to their political advantage (Hayden 1994). For an outside observer, these
discussions can seem quite outrageous. For example, with regard to the extermination
camp of Jasenovac, the Serbian Orthodox Patriarch Pavle, in a statement in 1991,
talked of 700,000 victims (Grmek et al 1993:277), whereas Franjo TudThan, the first
postcommunist Croatian president, estimated that less than 60,000 people had been
killed (Silber & Little 1995:90).
4.2. Ôetniks and Partisans - from grave to grave...
Although political relations between Serbs and Croats had been troubled for a while,
most people living in the mixed territories of the NDH were taken by surprise by the
Ustaa genocide (Denich 1994:374-375). Soon, however, guerrilla resistance against
the Ustaa state and against its German and Italian allies was channelled along two
lines: Oetniks and Partisans (Pavlowitch 1989:11; Singleton 1976:90-97).
Let us first briefly look at the Oetniks. In German-occupied Serbia, administrated by a
Serbian Nazi puppet government, there was a direct, counter-movement of nationalist
paramilitary forces. These so-called Oetnik militias, created around remnants of the
pre-war Yugoslav army, favoured the restoration of the monarchy. Their leader Dra±a
Mihajloviá was officially recognised as the Army Minister of the London-based
government-in-exile, but on the ground the Oetniks were incapable of putting forward
an image which transcended their Serbian base of support (Banac 1992b:170-171).
Moreover, whereas many pre-war Serbian nationalists had believed in a hegemonic
strategy incorporating other nationalities, some Oetnik leaders increasingly strove for
an ethnically homogeneous Serbia (see Grmek et al 1993). These Oetnik leaders
effectively replicated the Ustaa ideology of a pure nation-state, but while they did
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engage in massacres themselves, their proposed solution was based mainly on
population exchanges and expulsion (Grmek 1993:200ff; Denich 1994:375).
The second, and eventually victorious, path of resistance was chosen by those who
joined the communist-led Partisan forces. They embarked on a struggle against all
three fascist armies, and against the Oetniks, aiming for a united Yugoslavia under
control of the Communist Party (Rusinow 1977:2-1 3). The Partisans were particularly
successful among Serbs in the territories controlled by the Ustaa government, but
they recruited people of all national backgrounds. As the war came to an end, the
Partisans succeeded in attracting considerable support based on a discourse which
portrayed them as the legitimate leaders of the Yugoslav people. According to
Schopflin, in this legitimating process the Partisans projected themselves in a threefold
manner: (1) as the real representatives of the indigenous resistance against the
occupying powers; (2) as the champions of inter-ethnic peace and co-operation; (3) as
the only force truly committed to the fate of the impoverished peasant masses
(Schäpflin 1993:179).
The military-strategic story of the Second World War in Yugoslavia is almost as
confusing as the country's national composition, so this text cannot go into the shifting
alliances and contradictory operations of all groups involved. In any case, the result
was that in 1945 the Partisans led by the communist leader Josip Broz Tito drove out
the occupying forces and defeated the Ustae and the Oetniks, thereby eliminating
huge numbers of their opponents. Hence, the attempts of the NDH to realise an
ethnically pure Croatia had failed and the Serbs returned to their villages. The political
climate had profoundly changed, however, as those who had fought in the Partisan
forces returned victoriously and took on important posts in the communist order
(Schopflin 1993:179; Lendvai 1991:255). Tito's popularity immediately after the war
was greatest amongst the Serbs of Croatia and Bosnia, but he also drew considerable
support from Croats, Montenegrins, and others (Banac 1992b:171).
During World War II people of all nationalities in Yugoslavia were victims of mass
murder, including both Serbs (particularly in 1941, by the Ustae) and Croats
(particularly in 1945, by the Partisans) (Voet 1993:11). These events moulded their
attitudes towards the events of the past as well as towards the new post-war order. The
situation was largely based on fear and distrust, and national lines were accentuated
through processes of victimisation and labelling. It is against this background that I now
undertake to sketch some patterns of the Titoist project of a modern, socialist and
united Yugoslav state.
5. post-war Titoism: Yugoslavia take two
Immediately after its victory in 1945, the new communist government embarked on a
campaign to build what was meant to be a radically new Yugoslavia under the banner
of Bratstvo I jedinstvo ['Brotherhood and Unity']. The 1946 constitution established a
federation of republics (with new frontiers), modelled on the Soviet scheme and
strongly centralised around the Beograd-based power monopoly of the Party. The
Titoist regime(s) that ruled Yugoslavia for more than 40 years caught the attention of
many observers around the globe for a number of reasons: its in-between position in
the capitalist/communist divide; its experimental economic system of self-management;
and its role in the Non-Aligned Movement. The scope of this study is directed at the
dimension of national identities—this is a limited perspective, which leaves un-
discussed several important related issues.
5.1. one formula for the national question: 'Brotherhood and Unity'
After the ravages of World War II, the new regime judged it necessary to establish a
federal system as an important instrument of symbolic inter-national reconciliation. This
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also acted as a powerful argument against charges that the Partisans wanted to
reconstruct the Serbian-dominated inter-war kingdom. The new communist authorities
were clearly in favour of a common South Slav state, but although the political
community was to be imagined on the supra-national Yugoslav level, it was argued that
this could only be realised gradually. Therefore, a federal system seemed the most
feasible construction (Garde 1992:88-91).
Yugoslavia institutionalised a twofold system of national rights organised around the
categories of 'nations of Yugoslavia' ['narodi'] and 'national minorities' ['nacionalne
manjine'] 7 . In the 1963 constitution, the latter term was abandoned for the more neutral
'nationalities' ['narodnosti']. While a precise criterion to distinguish nations from
nationalities was never officially formulated, implicitly it was clear that nationalities were
those groups who were assumed to have a homeland outside Yugoslavia 8 . Each of the
five Yugoslav narodi, who were recognised as having their habitat in Yugoslavia, was
attributed a republic: Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, and the two newly recognised nations,
the Macedonians and the Montenegrins. The sixth republic, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
contained the majority of Slavonic-speaking Muslims, who were recognised as a nation
in 1968. Two of the republics were officially plurinational: Bosnia (with three narodi as
constituent nations: Serbs, Muslims and Croats), and Croatia (with two constituent
narodi: Serbs and Croats).
The second category, narodnosti, included a host of nationalities living in Yugoslavia,
but considered a diaspora of another nation: Albanians, Magyars, Bulgarians, Czechs,
Gypsies, Italians, Romanians, Ruthenians, Slovaks and Turks. For the reasons stated
above, Kosovo, with an Albanian majority, was not granted the status of republic, but of
'autonomous province'; a similar policy was enacted in Vojvodina, with its large
Hungarian presence. The category of narodnosti also held other nationalities, such as
Vlachs, Gypsies, Jews, etc. The category of 'Yugosla ys' will be discussed later, but it is
important here to note that the choice of nationality was voluntary. Moreover, it
transpired from recollections during my fieldwork that it was popular amongst urban
Yugoslav citizens, particularly in later years, to write down fictitious nationalities.
'Eskimo' seems to have been a particularly attractive one. Nationality was registered in
voters' lists, birth and marriage certificates, employment cards, official educational and
military documents, etc., but passports were simply Yugoslav (Woodward 1995:36).
The 1946 constitution proclaimed the legal equality of all nations and nationalities and
affirmed the brotherhood and unity of all Yugosla ys. Furthermore, it spelled out the
equality of all citizens regardless of national or religious identity, the equal rights and
duties of the republics, and the 'presumption of equal contribution to the Partisan
resistance by all nations' (Lampe 1994:84). The text emphasised the voluntary
character of federal co-operation and even granted the republics the right of secession
in a preamble (this arrangement gave rise to quite some debate in the early 1990s)
(Singleton 1976:220; Hayden 1992). All nationalities, even small minorities, had the
right to speak their own language in educational, judicial and cultural affairs. In this
sense, culturally, the rights of all national groups were probably protected better than in
most other plurinational states. Nevertheless, strict concentration of security and
military matters in Beograd, strong pro-Yugoslav propaganda and a more general
emphasis on co-operative post-war recovery, indicated that the national question would
not be allowed to come to the forefront (Rusinow 1977:18-1 9).
Initially, the government of the new Yugoslavia adhered fully to the communist ideology
of proletarian internationalism. Of course, after the ravages of World War II, the national
question could not be denied, but class was declared a much more important factor
The discussion of the nationality system of communist Yugoslavia is based on Garde 1992:113-115.
8 But then again, this leaves out national groups such as the Vlachs or the Gypsies (or, in 1945, the Jews) who did
not have a 'homeland' in another state but still were not granted a republic. No official criteria were formulated, as the
communist government was always very cautious about not letting the national question come to the forefront. For a
good discussion of the policies of nationality, see Stallaerts 1992; 1994.
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than the bourgeois notion of national identity. Although the new regime formally
acknowledged the multi-national character of Yugoslavia, theoretically, the issue of
national identity was declared of minor political importance in the progressive evolution
towards communism, It was believed that other-than-cultural aspects of national identity
would slowly fade away because of the discrediting experience of nationalism in the
fascist Croatian state of WWll, and because of the solidarity-generating all-Yugoslav
Partisan victory against the Nazis (Lampe 1994:84-85; Cohen 1995:22; Banac
1992b:172-173). In this way, Titoist ideology represented a variant of the classical
modernisation thesis: the assimilating forces of industrialisation (be it capitalist or
Marxist) were believed to diminish and finally erase national(ist) affiliation.
5.2. the politics of nationality: the balance of Croats and Serbs
In 1948 the Yugoslav regime broke with Stalin and the Cominform. There followed an
increased display of official Yugoslav patriotism exemplified by the Partisan tradition
and personified in the charismatic figure of Tito. In order to secure Yugoslav unity, a
sophisticated network of power balances was deployed between the constituting
republics throughout the next thirty years (Topham 1993:38-39). Again, I limit the
description to the evolution of the paramount rivalry between Serbs and Croats.
It was assumed that a strong Yugoslavia could only come into being if the power of the
largest nation, Serbia, was restricted; so the communist regime put an end to
Montenegro's and Macedonia's status as de facto colonies of Serbia and created two
autonomous provinces within Serbia. On the other hand, Croatia, tainted by its history
of fascism, suffered a stronger repression of national culture than other republics, in all
but religious issues (SchOpflin 1993:180ff). Moreover, as a result of the defeat of the
Ustae, the Serbian minority in Croatia was proportionally over-represented in the
League of Communists and in the security forces. Thus, neither Serbian nor Croatian
nationalists could claim victory in the new Yugoslavia. Viewed against the background
of the Greater-Serbian dream, Oetnik aspirations were seriously restrained as 30% of
all Serbs lived outside the republic of Serbia (Topham 1993:37). Demands for Croatian
independence, on the other hand, seemed more unrealistic than ever before. On both
sides, mechanisms of victimisation re-entered the stage undermining the regime's
efforts to contain nationalist sentiments and, hence, to secure the peaceful coexistence
of its inhabitants.
In this context, we have to introduce the notion of a Yugoslav identity. From the 1950s
onwards people were allowed to opt for the category 'Yugoslav, nationally
undetermined', when answering census questions. This category was sometimes
subject to manipulation, but for a significant number of people it solved questionnaire
problems: children of mixed marriages, party officials, professional soldiers, amongst
many others (Schöpflin 1993:186-187). Nevertheless, it remained a rather marginal
phenomenon. In 1971, 'Yugoslays' accounted for 1.3% of the population and in 1981,
5.4% (Sekuliá et at 1994:95; Lendvai 1991 :253). Moreover, strong regional differences
existed. For instance, in the 1981 census 7.9% of the Bosnian population declared itself
Yugoslav, whereas only 1.3% did so in Slovenia (Garde 1992:116). It should be noted
that the Titoist authorities did not want to superimpose a Yugoslav national identity in
the sense that some in the first Yugoslavia had wanted. In the census, the category of
'Yugoslays' was thought of as 'no nationality' (Hodson et at 1994:1542). This Yugoslav
socialist patriotism, it was argued, was not a form of nationalism. The new regime
argued that, instead of an exclusivist discourse, negating the differences between the
constituting national groups, it was an all-embracing patriotism, which presumed the
component national identities (Ramet 1992:184).
In the chapter on Jugonostalg(ja I analyse memories of Yugoslav identification and go
deeper into its ambiguities. Here I would just like to mention that the regime made a
strong effort to promote the idea of Yugoslavism in the hearts and minds of all citizens,
for example through schoolbooks, educational excursions, the media, and a system of
40
conscription in a republic other than one's own (Bennett 1995:61-66). This was also
one of the ideas behind organising the European Championship Football 1976 and the
Winter Olympics in Sarajevo in 1984. The process of building Yugoslavism emphasised
that people could identify both with a specific nation and with Yugoslavia as a whole.
Tito, himself, was of mixed Croatian-Slovenian descent but invariably identified himself
with Yugoslavia (Schopflin 1993:180). However, as he expressed it during the war, 'The
term National Liberation Struggle would be a mere phrase and even a deception if it
were not invested with both an all-Yugoslav and national meaning for each people
individually' (quoted in Cohen, 1995:23).
5.3. the ambiguity of Titoism: unity and decentralisation
The whole history of the 'Yugoslav experiment', as Rusinow (1977) called it, has been a
chain of trial and error in order to find a successful recipe for the country's problems,
and, of course, for the self-preservation of the Titoist regime. It was the result of an
attempt to navigate between the numerous sensitivities, prejudices and utterances of
collective paranoia that characterised the post-war Balkans (Detrez 1992). Numerous
reforms led to considerable decentralisation from the 1950s onwards, partly as a
response to the growth of national tensions9 . Paradoxically, this decentralisation
process exacerbated inter-republic inequalities, and this in turn gave rise to renewed
centrifugal aspirations. As national dissent became intertwined with the debate between
liberals and conservatives, the federal structure, established as an administrative
formality for securing Yugoslav unity, came to serve as the central vehicle for
nationalist programmes (Ramet 1992; Topham 1993:44; Lendvai 1991:256; Banac
1992b:172-173; Jansen 1999a). Especially from 1962 onwards, increasing political
struggle and decentralisation gave rise to a competitive environment between
republican elites.
After a period of centralised federalism based on socialist patriotism a Ia Soviet Union,
the break with Stalin opened the way for a new, more independent course with the
1953 constitutional revision. Economic planning, cultural policy, education and media,
were handed over to the republican governments. The 1964 constitution went further
than this. The system of workers' self-management created a situation in which it
became increasingly viable to organise along republican, rather than federal, lines as
more power was attributed to the republican Leagues of Communists.
A number of concrete struggles took place. In 1968, serious riots broke out in the
Serbian autonomous province of Kosovo, where the local Albanian majority demanded
its own republic. Meanwhile, growing dissatisfaction with the perceived Serbian
dominance within Yugoslavia caused political turmoil in Croatia. One of the issues put
forward by students and intellectuals was the constitutional recognition of Croatian as a
separate language, instead of as a variant of Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian10.
Moreover, there was protest against the flows of foreign currency from export, migrant
workers and Croatian tourist resorts to the federal treasury.
The 'Croatian Spring' in 1971 was a reaction against perceived cultural and economic
deprivation 11 . It started off as a cultural movement, but it gradually moved towards
demands of economic reform in favour of Croatia. Also, it became increasingly anti-
Serbian towards the end, as evidenced in riots at football matches, media articles, and
so on. Croatian nationalists bemoaned what they believed was their republic's
For a brief schematic overview of Titoist policies on the national question, see Cohen's table (1995:27).
10 The 1954 Novi Sad agreement, signed by Croatian and Serbian intellectuals, stated that there was one Serbo-
Croatian or Croato-Serbian language, existing in two equally valid variants. However, discussions about the status of
certain words (dialect' or 'standard') gave rise to new debates, and a number of Croats embarked on a campaign to
develop a separate Croatian literary language (Schöpflin 1993:188-189). This seems a good example of what
Tishkov calls the politicisation of academic writings on ethnicity—or the ethnicisation of academic publications
(Tishkov 1992:41 -44). We come back to the language question in Chapter Six.
11 Topham 1993:44-45. Voet 1993:12; Singleton 1976:224-227; Garde 1992:99-1 03.
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secondary position within Yugoslavia and the cash flows towards the poorer regions. It
was argued that the federation put serious limits upon Croatian opportunities for
development. Opponents argued that Croatia's high economic development was also
made possible by investments by that same federation. High living standards and
relatively successful industrialisation created a fertile soil for demands for more
decentralisation, ranging from more cultural autonomy to outright independence.
The Croatian communist elite, who at first had reacted negatively, later attempted to
incorporate the movement in its power struggle against the central regime. Then, Tito
took control and ordered a purge of the Croatian Party, whom he accused of
nationalism. Many veterans from this era became leading figures in the post-Yugoslav
Croatia regime, but for more than a decade after the Croatian Spring the republic was
led by a conservative government and became known as the 'silent republic'.
But Tito understood that something had to be done, so in order to let off nationalist
steam, the Marshall increased the power of the republics and autonomous provinces.
The 1974 constitution was an attempt to settle the national question by establishing a
quasi-confederate system, aptly termed a 'conservative equilibrium' by Shoup
(1992:50). Economic self-management became a magic formula for solving the
national problem, and the commanding heights of the Parties of different republics were
expected to achieve a marriage-du-raison through economic interests. Moreover, the
autonomous provinces were given virtually equal status with the republics. Decisions
on the federal level could be vetoed by any of the units of the federation and there was
an emphasis on unanimity and consensus-seeking procedures. The 1974 constitution
'effectively created a semi confederative political structure in which powerful sectional
leaderships from the single Party competed for influence and support at the top level of
the system' (Cohen 1995:33).
For a while it seemed that the central regime had managed to contain the centrifugal
tendencies by increased decentralisation of economic and political matters and a re-
affirmation of the supremacy of the federal government in terms of ideology and
security. Yugoslavia remained under strongly authoritarian rule, a one-party state with a
tight security system and limited freedom. Moreover, the Yugoslav army 12
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became increasingly powerful as the armed wing of the League of Communists and as
a sort of praetorian guard of its Pharaoh, Tito (Pavlowitch 1988:26). The JNA was a
bastion of Yugoslavism and Titoist loyalism, the latter being very important since Tito's
example was a central element in the legitimising myths of the federal state. An ever-
growing cult of personality surrounded the Marshall, who, not unlike his colleagues on
the international scene, suffered from serious megalomania (Topham 1993:46;
Pavlowitch 1988:34-47).
5.4. the end of an era: Yugoslavia's swan song
In the 1980s, a number of events set in motion a process which would eventually lead
to the violent break-up of the federation. Grievances with the 1974 Constitution were
numerous. Nationalist Serbs, for instance, complained that the country (and particularly
Serbia itself) had been parcelled, whereas nationalist non-Serbs, especially in the
North-West, argued that Yugoslavia was still a centralised particracy with a
disproportionate share of power in Serbia (Banac 1992b:173ff; Bennett 1995:78-79).
After Tito's death in 1980 these conflicts were fuelled by renewed debates about WWII
and the status and the future of the Titoist regime.
Two other very important factors, which will only be touched upon briefly here, were the
structural economic crisis (inflation, foreign debt, unemployment), and decreasing
levels of legitimacy (socio-economic, ideological and nationalist protest). The economic
12 The JNA very much reflected the original composition of the Partisan forces: Serbs (60%) and Montenegrins
(6.2%) were seriously over-represented in the officer corps (they made up 36% and 2.6% resp. of the Yugoslav
population). This of course gave rise to protest by other national groups (Gow 1991:302).
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crisis was accompanied by economic disintegration as richer republics became
increasingly outward-looking as a result of dissatisfaction with the unequal economic
development (Waever 1993:95ff). The annual growth rate of the GDP fell from 8.8% in
the period 1956-1964, to 6.1% in 1973-1979, then to 0.4% in 1980-1984. More
informatively, the growth in real personal income fell from 6.3% in 1956-1 964, to 2.7%
in 1973-1979, to -2.0% in 1980-1984 (Cohen 1995:31). Simultaneously, there was a
sharply increasing inequality among republics.
Ironically, as we shall see in the chapter on Jugonostalg(ja, many anti-nationalist
narratives after the wars recalled the 1980s as the 'golden years', particularly evoked
through popular culture from this era. This again sheds a critical light on the work of
memory and the ways in which narrations of the past provide comments on the present
situation. There is less retrospective debate about whether the system of self-
management lived up to its promises on a political level or not, as citizens serving short
terms as part-time delegates were confronted with professionals, politicians of the
regional ruling parties (Cohen 1995:33). Therefore, the Yugoslav socialist system
underwent a twofold crisis: horizontally, through inter-republican competition and
conflict; and vertically, with citizens turning away from the Party (Cohen 1995:47; see
also Allcock, 1994). A sharp illustration can be found in the membership figures of the
League of Communists of Yugoslavia: in 1976, 30.8% of young people in Yugoslavia
were members, and in 1984 the percentage fell to 25.3%. Again, there were variations
along republican lines: in Slovenia, membership among youth fell from 27.7% (1976) to
16.6% (1984), whereas in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, the damage was limited-
36% in 1976, 33.6% in 1984 (Cohen 1995:48). Moreover, opinion polls pointed out how
more and more young people said they definitely did not want to join the Party (9% in
1974, 50% in 1986, again with strong republican differences) (Cohen 1995:48).
These problems of vertical legitimacy were exacerbated by the ever-growing conflicts
between the republican elites. The post-Tito debate on strategies of socialist political
and economic reform was channelled along republican lines, with Serbia and its allies
calling for majority control in a renewed federation and the rich Northern republics,
Slovenia and Croatia, arguing for a looser federalism and competitive pluralism. The
evolution of these conflicts will be analysed in another section.
Last but not least, major constitutional conflicts between the republics were put in a
new perspective by the worldwide demise of communism as a viable ideology in the
late 1980s. Despite official slogans such as 'After Tito—Tito!', the Marshall's death in
1980 was another important factor undermining Yugoslav unity. Continuing
decentralisation (with the presidency rotating among the republics and autonomous
provinces) could not prevent the escalation of nationalist conflicts such as in Kosovo
(1981). Eventually, the end of the I 980s saw the collapse of the Yugoslav project. As in
so many other parts of the world, it was nationalism that took over.
5.5. the ambivalent role of nationality in Titoist Yugoslavia
In a political climate encumbered by the mortgage of the Second World War, the
communist regime attempted to diffuse competing nationalisms by building a system in
which the national identity of all its inhabitants was recognised, but not politically
articulated. Particularly from the 1960s onwards, a wide range of opportunities for the
development of the different cultural communities was at hand 13 , and therefore the
bestial character of the war in former Yugoslavia took many observers by surprise. A
host of factors must be invoked: economics, international geopolitics, greed, prestige,
arms trade, hunger for power and so on. However, again, the scope of this study is
limited. I focus on the ways in which discourses on nationality and their entrenchment in
Yugoslavia's institutions have contributed to the escalation of antagonism. Against the
13 Voet points out how even a tiny ethnic group such as the 20000 Ruthenians had access to education, radio,
television and printed press in their own language (1993:14).
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nationalist explanations put forward by local regimes, I will argue that central to the
wars were not competing nations, but competing nationalisms in a postcommunist
political framework (Glenny 1993; Kaldor 1993:96-97; Silber & Little 1995).
Apart from the problems that vexed most socialist regimes, there seemed to be some
elements in the national policies of the Yugoslav project which prevented, rather than
increased, the possibility of a peaceful society. Tito's complex handling of the national
question had created a framework in which it was attractive to imagine a community
along national lines. In later days, Tito moved away from the orthodox proletarian
internationalism preached by the prophets of Marxism. But what was the nature of the
Yugoslav recipe? I will point to three problematic dimensions mentioned by Detrez
(1992).
In the first place, the increasing levels of decentralisation were justified ideologically
with reference ad nauseam to the vague concept of 'national identity'. The Yugoslav
state was based on the shaky foundations of a precarious balance between a number
of decentralised units whose very existence was legitimated by their 'national' identity.
In order to shed charges of centralism, the regime encouraged the respective national
groups to develop and display their national differences. In this manner the notion of
'national identity' was attributed an enormous significance (for a specific example, see
Duijzings 2000:132-1 56), while every form of political nationalism remained illegal and
could lead to severe suppression. While the republics and autonomous provinces, were
proclaimed administrative units, ultimately they derived their legitimacy from the
national level. Therefore, when they achieved growing political content, this could not
but raise the nationalist stakes.
Secondly, the ever-growing labyrinth of political and economic legal structures caused
major problems for governing the country. In its seif-preservationist urge, the central
regime instituted increasing decentralisation, so that, for example, in addition to the
federal constitution each republic had its own constitution, not always consistentwith its
federal counterpart. Moreover, in their eagerness to protect their privileges, the local
bureaucracies invoked the notion of 'national identity' as soon as plans for stricter co-
ordination were issued.
Thirdly, the Yugoslav federal order was still based on the territoriality of cultural rights.
Its handling of the national question consolidated, rather than undermined, the
underlying assumption of nationalist programs: the idea that a cultural community (a
nation) is anchored in a certain territory (homeland), where it can determine the rights
and duties of all inhabitants, whether they are members of that nation or not. The
Yugoslav state secured its own existence by reference to the right of self-
determination, which was ultimately defined on a territorial base, albeit with a large
margin for manoeuvre (Tishkov 1992:45). This line of thought was reflected in the
hierarchical categorisation of citizens as members of 'nations' or 'nationalities' with
different rights on different territories. As such, the Yugoslav republics ambiguously
reflected a national basis: the dominant nation had some sort of ambiguous hegemony
in its 'own' republic (Denich 1994:375).
Paradoxically, in a number of ways, the modern project of Yugoslav national policies
had the unintended consequence of encouraging nationalism, despite its proclaiming to
act against it. Now, this perspective seriously departs from the nationalist narratives in
1990s Serbia and Croatia, which reconstructed the Yugoslav past as an era of
darkness and oppression in an ambiguous and sometimes contradictory mixture of
reasonings. On the one hand, they portrayed the policies of the past as Marxist
internationalist suppression of the development all national identities, in the same vein
as many other postcommunist nationalisms. However, on the other hand, they argued
that Titoist multiculturalism was simply a question of rhetoric, which in fact thinly veiled
the underlying reality of domination by the national Other(s). One of the lines in Serbian
nationalism was the claim that Yugoslavia was an anti-Serb coalition led by a Croat,
whereas its Croatian counterpart portrayed the former regime as merely Greater-
Serbianist wolves in Yugoslav sheep's clothing. What was losing out in this
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retrospective quest for definition was the relevance of other critiques of the former
regime. These questioned its political authoritarianism, its militarism, its patriarchal
value system, its lack of democracy and so on, without legitimising these objections on
a national basis.
5.6. Yugoslav modernity: the horror of indetermination
For 45 years the Yugoslav regime pursued hegemony along the three lines of Titoism:
economic modernisation, communist hegemony, and policies of national equality. This
was meant to legitimise the regime and eventually lead to a fading away of the virulent
nationalisms that dominated the public discourse during World War Il—rational
solutions for temporary problems. In this chapter I have analysed how the Titoist
policies of organising multinational complexity took shape against a background of a
rational bureaucracy. Elsewhere I have argued that the Yugoslav state could be seen
as a truly modern project, exemplary for the age of modernity (Jansen 1999a).
Following Bauman, the communist regimes in Eastern Europe could be said to
represent a most modern form of universalist, rational and progress-oriented thinking, a
'quest for order' (Bauman 1991:1-17; 1992b:179) 14 . In this campaign to organise the
chaos, and thereby to make sense of a complex social world, national states, like other
social groupings, create friends and enemies; however, they also attempt to eliminate
strangers. 'The national state is designed primarily to deal with the problem of
strangers, not enemies' (Bauman 1991:153, italics in original; see also Bauman
1992a:687). Hence, everybody, as in every single body in Yugoslavia, needed to be
classified in the organisational scheme of society.
Since the federation, as I have shown, was paradoxically constructed around the notion
of national identities, everybody needed to know his or her place in this discourse. In
such a system (which has taken on global proportions), one cannot possibly have no
nationality15 . In this way, the 'Yugoslav' option in the censuses was also a nationality,
an instrument in the regime's attempts to reduce ambivalence. On a political level, the
element of national identity, even though rhetorically declared unimportant, was
strongly articulated into a moment of power struggles throughout the Yugoslav period16.
Now, interestingly, anti-nationalist narratives in the 1990s struggled to retain, or re-
establish its quality of a largely unarticulated moment in everyday life, and they did so
partly through the (re)construction of a multicultural past. The chapter onJugonostalg(ja
explores the resulting contradictions further.
Whatever the nature of the Titoist regime, the end of Yugoslavia gave an enormous
impetus to the endeavour to create national order out of what was perceived as
multinational disorder. Whereas the communist policies were fraught with
contradictions in their handling of the national question, the nationalist discourses that
defined Yugoslav reality since the collapse of the federation openly declared a real war
against the 'horror of indetermination' (Bauman 1991:146ff). If we accept that
nationalism is a specific form of political and cultural representation within modernity, it
is laden with destructive potential since the ideal type of a nation-state has no
equivalent in reality. This is not an exclusively Yugoslav problem: a nation's right to
self-determination is enshrined in the UN charter and in foreign policy programs
throughout the world, all based on a mosaic-like cosmology of discrete nations.
14 Bauman argued that: '[the emergence of modernity was] a process in the course of which the construction of
garden cultures re-evaluated the past, and those areas that stretched behind the newly erected fences, and the
obstacles encountered by the gardener inside his own cultivated plot, became the wilderness' (1987:51).
15 Gleason (1983) describes the links between the development of the notion of (official) identity and the rise of
bureaucratic states. For a discussion of passport controls as rites de passage, see Hoffmann-Axthelm 1992.
16 Chapter Six provides a detailed discussion of anti-nationalist narratives of the significance of national identity in
everyday life under the former regime.
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Hence, if we look at the various post-Yugoslav nationalisms and the wars that were
being waged in their names, it is possible to analyse them as crusades for purity. In the
next chapter I analyse two of those nationalist discourses (Croatian and Serbian) in a
little more depth, and the rest of this study is devoted to the counter-currents of post-
Yugoslav anti-nationalist altérité.
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[chapter four]
Croatian and Serbian nationalism:
articulating past and present
Franjo Tudman decides to go for a walk to see how his people live. He has a look
at a shop window and bursts into tears. A policeman comes running towards him
and, shocked by the sight of his president crying, asks him: 'But Mr President...
Why are you crying? What's happened? In between his hysterical sobs, Tudman
answers: 'I am looking in the shop window... I mean, you should see those prices.
How can our poor pensioners possibly survive with their little income! It's terrible!'
While the policeman tries to console the President, a pensioner approaches the
two and asks: 'Is that the President!? Why is he crying?' That does it for the
policeman; he gets out his truncheon and mercilessly beats the pensioner to pulp,
shouting: 'Because of you, you piece of shit! Because of you!'
(Feral Tribune competition 'The best 40 jokes about Franjo Tudman, 1999.
Joke sent in by Tomos from Opatija, finished on number 16. See www.feral.hr )
Let's block off the Danube. No to foreign mingling in our affairs!
Dear Citizens. Stop.
Hold out a bit longer. Stop.
I am arriving a bit late. Stop.
Problem with entry visa. Stop.
signed: Democracy
(slogans on the 1996-1 997 anti-Miloeviô demonstrations)
The Yugoslav federation went through several periods of turbulent political trouble
leading to adaptations in the federal framework. As we have seen, this was not merely
a result of pre-existing nationalist programs, but it can*also be partly attributed to the
unintended consequences of the communist policy on the nationalities question.
However, it was not until the 1980s that Yugoslavia began to fall apart rapidly. In this
process of disintegration, the formation of independent states out of federal units
coincided with the discursive project of the nationalisation of identities. Under Titoism,
national identities had served as vehicles for expressing regional conflicts and were
therefore subject to huge ambiguity: they were both encouraged (insofar as they were
thought to be necessary for the survival of Yugoslav unity) and discouraged (insofar as
they were incorporated into separatist discourses). In practice, on the whole, people
with different national affiliations lived peacefully as neighbours. However, with the
collapse of the legitimacy of the Yugoslav state in the late 1980s, national identities
occupied a central position in the process of a new definition of society—they were re-
articulated as crucial moments into a new discourse.
The events that took place in the late 1980s and in the 1990s brought about massive
changes for the people of former Yugoslavia. During those years, they tumbled from
peace into war and into peace again, some on several occasions. Through the bloody
politics of ethnic cleansing, new borders were drawn and they all became citizens of
new state formations. In every one of the newly created states, the so-called self-
management economy of Tito's Yugoslavia was at least nominally abandoned for some
kind of free market capitalism. The previous official ideology of internationalism,
epitomised by the slogan 'Brotherhood and Unity', was marginalised by different credos
of nationalism.
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1. 'transitions' to poverty
There seemed to be little disagreement on the changes that the end of Yugoslavia
brought in socio-economic terms. Certainly in poverty-stricken Serbia, but also in
relatively better-off Croatia, most people experienced a dramatic fall in living standards.
Lower spending power, towering unemployment and drastic cuts in welfare amongst
other things created a strong sense of having been better-off before. This is not to say
that everybody suffered the consequences of so-called transition and the wars to an
equal degree. Nepotistic privatisation and shameless war profiteering even propelled a
limited number of new and 'old-new' businessmen 1 to unseen heights in terms of
fortune. Also, the sense of a relative drop in living standards was not always
understood through the same prism. Reflecting the tendency to present virtually all
issues in terms of national differences, many people interpreted their dire socio-
economic situation as something inflicted upon them by the violence of one or more
national Others (other post-Yugosla ys, or the 'West'). Relative poverty was, then,
considered a transitional consequence of the wars, and many people expressed the
belief that 'things would be better', and that 'one should be patient and have confidence
in one's leaders'. Others, who were more critical of their respective regimes, blamed the
new leaders and their corrupt economic policies. Particularly in embargoed Serbia,
such views were often expressed in conjunction with a sneer to the 'West'.
A crucial trope for expressing dissatisfaction with the current socio-economic situation
was the dichotomy of before and after, which I explore in more depth in the next
chapter and which serves as a thread through this study. In narratives of past and
present, post-Yugoslav citizens told me that compared to people in other communist
states they had lived well, especially during the last decades. This was the case in
Croatia, but particularly in Serbia, where living standards had fallen most dramatically.
In fact, for many people in Beograd, the economic sanctions against the new Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and the deep crisis under Miloeviô were amongst the more
direct effects of the wars that, after all, had taken place in neighbouring republics.
During my fieldwork period in Serbia (after the signing of the Dayton agreements which
brought an end to the war operations in Bosnia and solidified its division, and before the
internationalisation of the Kosovo crisis and NATO-attacks on targets throughout the
new Yugoslavia), the catastrophic socio-economic situation was one of the major
themes dominating the public scene, as well as private conversation.
Sometimes, memories of relative affluence were accompanied by a sort of bitter-sweet
suspicion-with-hindsight that life before had actually been too good. Now, in retrospect,
many people added that they had been spoiled by a never-ending flood of foreign credit
as a result of Yugoslavia's in-between position in the Cold War. This, many people
argued, couldn't go on because it didn't have any basis in hard work.
Recalling the subject of this study, and rather than embarking on the gigantic task of
explaining the disintegration of Yugoslavia—which, doubtlessly, would be in vain—I
now focus on the articulation of nationalist discourses in Serbia and Croatia. Particular
attention is paid to the ways in which they (re)constructed versions of Yugoslav history
and incorporated them into their search for legitimacy, since the promotion of
'nationalist truths' often departed drastically from some 'givens' in the near past. In
order to render the present acceptable or even self-evident, in order to prove that the
post-Yugoslav situation was a result of necessary changes which were in fact
improvements, the different nationalist discourses engaged in a re-writing of the
Yugoslav past.
1 The expression 'old-new', widely used in the post-Yugoslav states, referred to those individuals and groups who
used to occupy influential positions in the former system and continued to do so in the new order of things, albeit on
the basis of a different legitimising discourse. Often, this implied a quite sudden conversion.
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This study focuses on Serbia and Croatia, and it should be pointed out immediately that
strong differences existed between them with regard to the break between before and
after. Notwithstanding the fact that nationalist discourses of identification enjoyed
overwhelming dominance in both states, they were articulated in different ways.
Reflecting previously mentioned patterns, Croatian nationalism centred strongly upon
the idea of a radical break with a Serbian-dominated Yugoslav past, whereas its
Serbian counterpart was often characterised by an extreme sense of ambiguity in this
respect. This was the case in domains of political rhetoric, state-building reality and
everyday life experiences: a permanent oscillation existed between discontinuity and
continuity with particular versions of the Yugoslav past.
2. clearing Serbian grounds: How The East Was Won
2.1. the beginning and the end: Serbian nationalism and Kosovo
The story starts in, and more recently returned to, Kosovo. In Titoist times, a large
Albanian majority in this region justified its status as an Autonomous Province within
Serbia. As we have seen, the self-rule of these Autonomous Provinces was greatly
enhanced by subsequent constitutional changes, and in 1974 they acquired quasi-
equal status with the republics. However, Albanian nationalist calls for recognition as a
republic came to a head in the beginning of the 1980s, when serious riots broke out.
Although these protests had a great deal to do with the grinding poverty of the region,
they also expressed dissatisfaction with the constitutional arrangements in Yugoslavia2.
The riots were suppressed by force, and at certain points, a third of the Yugoslav army
was stationed in Kosovo (Ramet 1991:179).
Meanwhile, the demographic profile of the Kosovo population became increasingly
dominated by Albanians due to a high birth rate and emigration of Serbs and
Montenegrins. Despite an official Serbian campaign to encourage the latter to live in
Kosovo, their relative numbers kept falling to some 13% in 1987. Nationalists on both
sides were quick to seize on this situation to further their causes. If we focus on the
Serbian side, we see that despite the enormous army presence in Kosovo, Serbian
complaints were accompanied by charges against the federal government for not
intervening. As the economic crisis grew deeper, poverty and unemployment rose, and
with the decay of the legitimacy of the Yugoslav framework, events in Kosovo served
as pretexts for accusations against Albanians of nationalism, irredentism, genocidal
plans, expulsion of Serbs and Montenegrins, systematic rape, conscious
overproduction of children and of intellectuals, and so forth (Banac 1992b:175;
BlagojeviO 1996; Maga 1993:3-76).
Ramet has coined the term 'traumatic nationalism' for the kind of nationalist discourse
that rose to dominance in Serbia: the battle of Kosovo and the persecution of Serbs
during WWll served as major points of reference in this discourse of suffering and
sacrifice (Ramet 1995b:103-105; see also Duijzings 2000:176-202; ZirojeviO 1996). In
this way, the Serbian nationalist argument on Kosovo was always a defensive one: it
was about defending homes and families and the cradle of Serbian civilisation,
epitomised by its numerous Serbian Orthodox monasteries. On several occasions
petitions were presented to the Serbian and the federal government by Kosovo Serbs,
supported by church leaders and, at first secretly, by some prominent intellectuals.
They demanded tough measures against perceived discrimination by the Albanian-
dominated authorities in Kosovo (Ramet 1991:182ff). However, despite a purge in the
Kosovo League of Communists, the judicial system and the university, the government
2 Moreover, Kosovan Albanians referred to a long history of resistance against Serbian domination. In the inter-war
Kingdom, uprisings were crushed by the Serbian army, and a campaign of forced assimilation through Serbian
colonisation was fiercely resisted (Ramet 1991:175; see also Vickers 1998).
49
was reluctant to see the troubles through any other than a Titoist prism. Up to 1987, the
Party line condemned every open form of nationalism, and Albanian demands for
republican status were rejected as indicative of irredentist aspirations supported by
Tirana. Tensions in the Province rose, and violent repression and an anti-Albanian
campaign by the Serbian authorities brought about a self-fulfilling prophecy.
It was in this heated climate that two key-events in Serbia took place which had a
tremendous influence on the political landscape in the Yugoslav federation as a whole.
First, there was the controversy stirred up by the Memorandum of the Serbian
Academy of Sciences and Arts in 1986, and second, there was the rise of Slobodan
Miloeviá to power and his dramatic discursive shift to incorporate nationalism. We
shall now turn to each of these elements.
2.2. Serbian intellectuals and the discursive shift: the Memorandum
If the Kosovo question had been a thorn in Yugoslavia's side for a number of years, in
the late 1980s it became one of the most important factors in its disintegration. As
mentioned above, numerous petitions and calls for action were put forward by Serbs
living in Kosovo and those who supported their cause. In January 1986, for instance,
212 prominent intellectuals set up a petition 'Against the persecutions of Serbs in
Kosovo' in which they accused Albanians in harsh terms of discrimination and even
genocide (Kri±an 1994:57; Ramet 1991:183; Pipa 1990:168-170). In this light, the now
infamous Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SAN U) was not
entirely new, but it would serve as a blueprint for Serbian politics in years to come.
Unofficially published in September 1986, the Memorandum Concerning Present Social
Issues in our Country3 consisted of two parts (Grmek et al 1993:229-269; Krian
1994:58-60). In the first part, 'The Crisis of the Yugoslav Economy and Society', the
authors deplored the disintegration of the Yugoslav economy as a result of far-reaching
decentralisation. They argued that this worked in favour of the North-Western republics
(Slovenia and Croatia) and pointed to the growing socio-economic imbalances between
the republics, Ironically, in this context they warned against nationalism and called for a
return to the original communist principles of Yugoslavia (Pavkovié 1994:445-447).
However, it is the second part that made history, cruel history: 'The position of Serbia
and the Serbian People'. In this part, the SANU argued that in the federal Yugoslav
framework, Serbia and the Serbs were discriminated against economically through the
pernicious influence of the Comintern and of the elites in the other republics (Grmek et
al 1993:238-239). Apart from being treated unfairly economically, it was claimed that
Serbia faced an inferior political position in Yugoslavia, particularly with the Constitution
of 1974 (ibid. :241-250). The authors of the Memorandum argued that their republic did
not even have equal status with other republics because it had no decisive say over its
autonomous provinces. Allegedly, this was due to the influence of an 'anti-Serb
coalition' which had put its stamp on Yugoslavia. The Memorandum went on to deplore
the allegedly discriminatory treatment of Serbian minorities living outside Serbia proper,
such as the Serbs in Croatia (ibid. :254ff). However, the major ammunition was brought
in for the Kosovo question, where 'the physical, political, judiciary and cultural genocide
of the Serbian population' was referred to as another great 'defeat of Serbia in the
liberation struggles it has waged' (ibid.:251).
More explicitly and systematically than ever before, the issue of Kosovo was taken up
in order to re-evaluate (i.e. condemn) the Titoist discourse of the national question in
Yugoslavia (ibid. :p250ff). A previously unthinkable discursive shift was realised in the
field of nationality politics: the Memorandum de-legitimised the Titoist line of
'Brotherhood and Unity', albeit without explicitly denouncing communism. It argued that
The only translation I know of in a West-European language is published in the French collection of Serbian
extreme nationalist texts compiled and edited by Grmek et al 1993. This volume only holds the second (and by far
the most influential) part of the Memorandum. All translations from the French are mine.
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Serbia should determine its own national interest, as 'the establishment of the full
national and cultural integrity of the Serbian people—in whichever republic or province
they live—[was] its historical and democratic right' (ibid. :265).
Although the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts protested officially against the
publication of the Memorandum, it never repudiated its contents or published a rectified
version (Kri±an 1994:59; Grmek et al 1993:234). Quickly, it became a not entirely
official, but politically decisive, document for a new era in Serbian and therefore also in
Yugoslav politics 4 . Of course, this development could only take place after overthrowing
the status-quo in the legitimacy question of political discourses, and within a very short
time a man at the top of the Serbian League of Communists decided he was going to
be the personification of this shift in legitimacy in Serbia. We are talking, of course,
about Slobodan Miloevió5.
2.3. the devil you know: comrade Sloba takes control
Slobodan Miloeviô, the person who by many is held primarily responsible for the
bloody wars in the post-Yugoslav states, was born in the Serbian town of Poarevac,
but he is of Montenegrin descent (apparently, his brother declares his nationality as
Montenegrin (Dilas 1993:83ff)). Miloevié had been a loyal Titoist apparatchik and a
successful businessman in the financial sector when, in 1984 his political mentor and
friend, Ivan Stamboliô, became president of the League of Communists of Serbia
(SKS). StamboliO appointed him head of the Beograd party committee, which was a
very important post because Beograd had long carried a reputation of being a centre of
democratic dissent in Yugoslavia (Dilas 1993:86). Also, together with Slovenia and
Vojvodina, it was the source of the most critical and professional media, widely read in
other republics (Bennett 1995:78-79). Miloevió strongly held the Titoist line,
condemning any form of economic liberalisation and nationalism, and, in 1986 when
Stambolió became president of the Republic of Serbia, Miloevié was appointed
president of the SKS6.
It has been argued that the political career of Slobodan Miloeviô can be divided in two
parts: before and after the night of 24-25 April 1987 (Silber & Little 1995:36-37). On that
night Stambolió was expected to visit Kosovo Polje for talks with local Serbian leaders,
but he sent MiIoeviô instead. While the talks were taking place, outside the building,
riots broke out between Serbs protesting against what they perceived as discrimination
and the police. The Albanian Party leadership, assuming that MiIoeviO had come in an
attempt to encourage reconciliation, offered him the microphone and the man held a
speech which represented a symbolic break in his career and in the history of Serbia
and Yugoslavia. It is worth quoting him at some length:
'You should stay here. This is your land. These are your houses. Your meadows and your
gardens. Your memories. You shouldn't abandon your land just because it is difficult to
live, because you are pressured by injustice and degradation. [...] You should stay here
for the sake of your ancestors and your descendants. Otherwise your ancestors would be
defiled and descendants disappointed. But I don't suggest that you stay, endure and
tolerate a situation you're not satisfied with. On the contrary, you should change it with the
rest of the progressive people here, in Serbia and in Yugoslavia.'
(Silber & Little 1995:37)
Note the mentioning of 'progressive people', which points to Miloeviá's attempt to
4 For detailed discussions of the role of intellectuals in the further legitimisation of Serbian nationalism see for
example Popov 1994; OoloviO and Mimica 1993; Pavkoviá 1995; Markotich 1994; Milosavljeviã 1996.
I have not come across any mentioning of Miloeviô actually referring to the Memorandum explicitly, but there is
little debate as to whether his policies were influenced by this document (see Garde 1993:254).
6 A very readable and comprehensive account of MiloeviO's rise to power, as well as the story of his Kosovo speech
can be found in Silber & Little 1995.
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combine the legitimising power of Titoism and nationalism. Later, this speech was
epitomised by what became a catch-phrase of new Serbian nationalism: 'No one
should dare to beat you'. Such terms of victimisation and defence soon developed into
powerful storylines uniting a large group of people with diverging interests and opinions
around Serbian nationalist discourse. This discourse included explicit historicisation of
the current struggle: finally, it was argued, the Serbian nation was standing up against
the injustice and the oppression that had been perpetrated against it for centuries. With
one of the most powerful people of Serbia inscribing himself into this discourse, the
road to a re-articulated politics of nationality was open.
2.4. the craft of re-articulation: Serbian nationalism, Yugoslavia, and the Party
After his widely televised speech in Kosovo, Miloeviá embarked on an extremely
ambitious and apparently unstoppable campaign to overturn the whole Serbian Party
policy from one that was based on Titoist federalism and Yugoslavism, to one that
included ardent Serbian nationalism. He declared his solidarity with the claims and
demands of Kosovo Serbs, supported permanent repression of Albanians in a region
where they constituted a very large majority and put into effect a metamorphosis of the
Serbian League of Communists and public life in Serbia in general.
The definitive breakdown of the legitimacy of the Yugoslav federal system in the late
1980s did not destroy the existing power structures on the republican level. On the
contrary, as might be expected from the sketch in Chapter Three, the Serbian
republican administrative apparatus became the primary vehicle for the shift to
nationalism (Moënik 1993). This had important implications, for in a one-party state it
meant that official and state-controlled institutions, such as media and cultural
institutions, became carriers of nationalist discourses 7 . In Dilas' words: 'The opponent,
Serbian nationalism, was devoured and its spirit permeated the eater. Miloevió
reinvigorated the party by forcing it to embrace nationalism.' (Dilas 1993:87). Further
on, I shall refer to this as the 'Yugo-vampire phenomenon'. The discourse shifted
dramatically, but the instruments, the logistics and even most of the people ensured a
strong continuity with previous times. Whereas in Croatia a number of dissidents and
non-(or former) Party members took control of the institutions (albeit with significant
support from a great number of former officials), in Serbia it was Miloeviô himself, at
the top of the Party, who took power through the existing institutions. His success was
based on a re-articulation of certain moments of Titoism into a nationalist discourse, but
it never let go of the discourse of Yugoslavism in its struggle for power.
By September 1987, Miloeviá and his supporters had purged the ranks of the Serbian
League of Communists of Titoist federalists such as his mentor StamboliO—all this with
invaluable support from powerful Beograd media (Silber & Little 1995:38-47). But he did
not stop at the borders of Serbia proper. A 'Committee for the Organisation of Protest
Meetings of Kosovan Serbs and Montenegrins' was set up to organise mass rallies in
Serbia and Kosovo, but also in Vojvodina and Montenegro where they brought down
the Titoist leaderships (Banac 1992b:178; Ramet 1991:188). In May 1989, Miloeviô
was elected president of Serbia by his parliament and had his men in leading positions
in four out of eight federal Yugoslav units. A dubious crowning moment for his work
came in the form of an address he made on 28 June 1989 to a meeting of one million
Serbs in Kosovo Polje, gathered for the 600th anniversary of the mythical Battle—a
battle which presumably symbolised the beginning of it all.
The way in which Miloeviá and his supporters took power in Serbia, Vojvodina,
Kosovo and Montenegro was closely linked with his call for a so-called anti-
bureaucratic revolution. An articulation was established between two discourses: the
reassertion of the Serbian national interest; and a populist anti-elite discourse with
leftist resonances. The anti-bureaucratic revolution brought forward a call for the
See Banac 1992b:177; Kri±an 1992:130-1 33; 1994:57-58; Ramet 1996a.
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abolishment of privileges for the Party elite, political corruption and expensive but
unpopular projects. These demands were raised in an increasingly populist framework
of organised mass-rallies and heated speeches, all under the name 'meetings' rather
than traditional communist terms 8 . Paul Garde has compared Miloevié's anti-
bureaucratic revolution with a cultural revolution such as that in Maoist China.The latter
is defined as a 'phenomenon whereby a communist leader succeeds in bringing about
the political changes he desires, the elimination of his opponents, and the consolidation
of his own power, by stirring up the enthusiasm of a substantial group of people who
then, apparently, impose these measures from below' (1992:252).
This should be seen in the light of Miloeviá's attitude towards Yugoslavism, consisting
of a curious mixture of rejection and embracing. Arguing that the Communist Party line
until then had been empty rhetoric, Miloevió set out to restructure the status of the
relationship between Serbia and its autonomous provinces and thereby claimed to
actually create a better and more just Yugoslavia (Ramet 1991:188). With his
supporters occupying most influential positions in society, and with strong support from
his anti-bureaucratic foot soldiers, it did not take him long: the new Serbian constitution
of 1990 abolished the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina (Voet 1993:15).
Ironically, given the wider context of 1990 Eastern Europe, all these coups were
accompanied by a rhetoric that increasingly borrowed from the 'Western' liberal-
democratic discourse. It is worth noting here that, unlike the Croatian or the Slovene
constitutions, the new Serbian constitution explicitly defined the Republic of Serbia in
non-national terms, referring to 'citizens of the state' and only mentioning 'the Serbian
people' in the preamble. However, Kosovo was put permanently under siege and
suffered an enormous military presence, a thorough purge of the Party cadres,
unashamedly pro-Serbian and anti-Albanian population, education and employment
policies and the instalment of Serbo-Croatian as the only official language9.
Meanwhile, resistance against Miloeviô's policies in Serbia proper (which by then had
become a defunct term) was swamped by massive media manipulation and by frequent
appeals to the nationalist fervour of 'the people'. Mass demonstrations and desertion
proved impotent in the face of the New Order, particularly as the majority of the
traditionally fairly critical Serbian press, along with radio and T'J, quickly became
mouthpieces of the new nationalist leadership (Bennett 1995:90-101). It is interesting to
note that during my fieldwork in the late 1990s, very few references were made to the
years of Miloeviô's rise to power. Whereas the anti-nationalist narratives that lie at the
basis of this study paid ample attention to remembered Yugoslav times and to the war
years, very few of them actually mentioned the ways in which the Serbian leader had
ridden to power on waves of popularity. As we shall see later, this is related to the
widespread view that MiIoevió's success was mainly the success of media
manipulation amongst poorly educated, rural populations.
3. meanwhile - disintegration, elections and war
While Miloevió was turning Serbia into a bastion of fervent nationalism and at the
same time declaring his loyalty to the Yugoslav federation, other republics underwent
dramatic changes as well. Apart from the rapid escalation of national conflicts and the
dramatic economic situation, the demise of the communist systems all over Eastern
Europe created a climate of intense crisis. In this section I briefly sketch some patterns
that took shape in the period leading to the war.
8 For an intriguing account of the antibureaucratic revolution' with astonishing examples and anecdotes illustrating
the importance of the media in particular, see Silber & Little 1995:60-73.
9 Vickers 1998; Ramet 1991:190; Garde 1992:251-261; Banac 1992b:177ff; Detrez 1992.
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3.1. Slovenia, Serbia and the last Yugoslav supper
The leadership of the tiny republic of Slovenia, by far the richest in the Yugoslav
federation, had chosen the road to pluralism in the mid-1980s. Particularly since 1986,
with Milan Kuëan as President of the Slovene Communists and under the growing
influence of a broad non-governmental 'alternative movement', Slovene society
underwent increasing liberalisation. This period became known as the 'Slovene Spring'
and Ljubljana became a centre of cultural and political creativity10 . If at the outset
responses to Miloeviá's rise to power had been weak in other republics, with time,
opposition grew—first in the alternative movement, but later, increasingly, in the
Slovene League of Communists. Strong criticism of the situation inKosovo and even of
the hitherto sacrosanct Yugoslav Army (JNA)—by then an extremely conservative and
corporatist bastion—became acceptable in the Slovene political climate.
This infuriated the Serbian leadership and the JNA, and meetings at the federal level
became increasingly polarised, with the Serbian Communists bitterly attacking their
Slovene colleagues for anti-Yugoslavism. In fact, the Serbian leadership broke off
relations with Slovenia and banned Slovene goods from their market, while still forming
part of the same state (Banac 1992b:179). The conflict covered about every domain
from the Yugoslav economy, to the restructuring of the federation, to the discrediting of
communism and the idea of a multiparty system (Silber & Little 1995:49-59). It was in
the same period that the hierarchy of the JNA increasingly showed its support for the
status quo, i.e. for Miloeviô who never ceased to emphasise his Yugoslav federalist
credentials (Cohen 1995:85-88). In this tense climate, very shortly after the fall of the
Berlin Wall, the Yugoslav League of Communists decided to hold its Fourteenth
Extraordinary Congress in January 1990. With Miloeviô in control of four out of eight
federal votes, and the Slovene-Serbian conflict reaching the boiling point, it promised to
become a historical Congress. And it was—if only because it was the last one with the
Slovene leadership walking out and their Croatian colleagues following them. It was
only a matter of months before the first post-war multiparty elections would herald a
new era in the region's politics, and indeed in European history.
3.2. following the postcommunist tide—a wave of elections
In an ultimate attempt to reinvigorate the enthusiasm for Yugoslav federalism, the last
federal prime minister Ante Markovió founded an all-Yugoslav party, the Alliance of
Reform Forces. He did so on 29 July 1990, which meant it was too late to take part in
the Slovene and Croatian elections (Woodward 1995:121). The question is whether it
would have made much difference, because although at first Markoviô attracted some
support in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia, all the republican
elections of 1990 were won by parties who committed themselves to the 'national
interest' 11 . Note that these elections were organised on a republican level, not on the
Yugoslav level.
So, what was the nature of the new governments? In most cases, the people in power
could be called 'renewed' rather than 'new'. Of course, many ex-communist officials
stayed on, but also many of the previously oppositional intellectuals and professionals
were actually former Party members who had become critics of that regime at some
point. Demographically, the elections saw a sharp drop in the participation of young
10 There is plenty of literature on the Slovene Spring and its political and cultural dimensions, sometimes by Slovene
scholars who themselves attempted to bridge the gap between theory and practice by engaging in the 'alternative
movement'. This cross-fertilisation of cultural theory and the building of political/artistic alternatives was a typical
feature of the Slovene Spring. A tiny selection: Kovaö 1988; Mastnak 1992, 1994; BibiO 1993; Moãnik 1984, 1992;
2iek 1990; 1992; 2iek & SalecI 1991.
1 With Montenegro being an ambiguous exception, but only because the victorious reformed Communists were
controlled by Miloeviô, who of course adhered to another nationalism.
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people in politics, with the average age of representatives much higher than during the
last years of communism (Cohen 1995:164-172). Even more outspoken was the
dramatic drop in the female share of political representation. As we shall see in the
chapter on feminism and anti-nationalism, this evolution was accompanied by a
reassertion of patriarchal discourses throughout all republics.
After the elections held throughout 1990, nationalist parties participated in the all
republican governments of Yugoslavia. As in so many East/Central European
countries, the leading figures in most republics were almost religiously devoted to the
European Union but held diverging opinions on the status of the Yugoslav federation.
The meaning of their nationalisms varied widely, and, at that stage, no party which
demanded immediate independence could rely on a majority in the (coalition)
governments. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to assess the degree to which the
people in the various Yugoslav republics were voting for an independent state
(Woodward 1995:123). Opinion surveys suggest that even in Slovenia only a minority
demanded outright secession, which might indicate lower levels of support for
independence in other republics (Cohen 1995:88-94). But, then again, it doesn't mean
that a majority was against it either...
Moreover, for decades, the Yugoslav regime had emphasised the possibility of
simultaneous identification with the national and the supranational level, so that for
many there was no clear division line between the two. It was simply unnecessary to
opt for one exclusive sense of belonging on the societal scale. However, an opinion
survey carried out as late as mid-1990 suggests that identification varied quite strongly
according to nationality 12 . Although one could have strong reservations about the value
of standardised questionnaires for researching matters of identification and belonging in
general, and even more so in a crisis situation such as that of Yugoslavia in 1990, the
figures can be indicative of broad tendencies. It seems that, apart from widely and
strongly held senses of local identification (i.e. with village, town, city, region),
adherence to Yugoslavia was very strong amongst Bosniacs and Montenegrins, for
instance, whereas it was very weak amongst Slovenes. Moreover, the category of
'Yugoslays' in the census became less attractive: the 5.4% who called themselves
Yugoslays in 1981, decreased to 3% in 1991, with the numbers going down most
dramatically in Slovenia and Croatia, but also in the other republics.
(a) the first elections in Croatia
The Croatian League of Communists had been known as conservative bastion for more
than 15 years, after a Titoist purge had made an end to the nationalist Croatian Spring
in the beginning of the 1 970s. According to most commentators, it was only in 1989 that
the 'silent republic' caught up with the events that shook Yugoslavia to its foundations
(Banac 1995:47; Pusié 1994:391; Silber & Little 1995:87). Opposition to the communist
government grew, and within a short period it became clear thatname-changing would
not save the League of Communists. The best chances were for an organisation that
could present itself as a radical departure from the communist past and as the carrier of
a self-conscious assertion of Croatian national interests (Cohen 1995:95). From the
outset, the Hi'vatska Demokratska Zajednica ( HDZ—Croatian Democratic Community)
was particularly effective in putting forward this image and, therefore, took the lead in
the emerging multiparty climate.
Chief founder and virtually undisputed frontman of the HDZ was Franjo Tudman. During
World War II Tudman joined the Partisans, and later, he rose to the rank of general in
the JNA. In Tito's Yugoslavia he became a historian 13 ; but in the 1970s, he fell into
12 Pantiô quoted in Cohen 1995:172-176. 4230 respondents in all republics were asked to what extent they adhered
to the local, the republican/provincial, and the Yugoslav level (non-exclusive categories).
13 As Melëiô put it, Tudjman was 'by profession a military historian and by passion a historical metaphysician'
(1994:337).
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disfavour with the Communist Party because of his increasingly nationalist profile.
Tuman was convicted of offences 'against the people and state', and was
subsequently imprisoned. After being released, he criticised the official representation
of the Ustaa genocide in interviews with foreign journalists, and, in 1981, he was jailed
again, albeit with privileged treatment as a consequence of his Partisan record (Little &
Silber 1995:89).
The HDZ was organised through 116 branches in Croatia and amongst Croats in
Vojvodina and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1987, during a visit of North America, Tuman
had been able to raise vast financial means among the Croatian diaspora 14 . The
Croatian émigré communities invested in what they perceived as the liberation of the
Croatian nation, which allowed Tuman to organise his nationalist movement along
very professional lines from its first public meeting in February 1989 onwards15.
Supported by such a public relations campaign, the HDZ, the 'Party of all Croats in the
World', developed a very strong grass-root base, a characteristic reflected in its
successful mass rallies for the 1990 elections. Moreover, despite its strongly anti-
Communist ticket, the HDZ attracted a veritable flood of ex-communists, such asStipe
Mesiô, the last federal president of Yugoslavia and the first post-Tudman president in
200016
With all the parties in the elections supporting a free market economy and a 'Western'-
style liberal democracy, the major differences in opinion concerned the status of the
Croatian republic and the intensity of questions regarding national and moral issues.As
in other republics, the party platform of the anti-Communist coalition was not a
consistent, clear-cut policy plan, but rather, '[it was organised] around talismanic
pronouncements that if the party running was elected it would transform the state into
something that expressed the real will of the real people and would expunge from the
nation all those agents and agencies which had in the past perverted that will' (Bowman
1994:137). Slogans, such as 'We will decide our fate by ourselves', carried a strong
message with regard to who was not to make the decisions (Silber & Little 1995:96;
Denich 1994:379).
Although it only received 42% of the vote (1.2 million, against 994,000 for the reformed
Communists), the first-past-the-post system gave the HDZ the absolute majority in both
Chambers of the Sabor (Croatian parliament) in 1990. Ironically, this electoral system
had been installed by the League of Communists probably hoping it would turn out to
their advantage (Melãiá 1994:359; Pletina 1995:138-139; Cohen 1995:99-101).
(b) the first elections in Serbia
Name-changing did work in Serbia, where, in December 1990, the example of the other
republics was followed and the first post-war multiparty elections were held. Based on a
strongly nationalist rhetoric and arguing for democracy, a free market, a restructured
federation and social and economic conservatism, Miloeviá and his reformed
Communists (Socialist Party of Serbia, SPS) rallied under a slogan of continuity: 'With
Us There Is No Uncertainty'. Unless one prefers the dubious certainty of generalised
suffering, it seems hard to think of a situation of more uncertainty than the one that was
to come: that of war.
The electoral results were predictable, even more so after the Albanian leadership in
Kosovo called a boycott of the polls. The SPS secured 77.6% of the seats (with 65% of
14 At the end of the Second World War thousands of Croats had escaped their country fearing Partisan reprisals, and
large parts of the emigrant community had always held strong anti-Yugoslav views. Another wave of emigration
followed around the Croatian Spring of 1971. Moreover, throughout the post-war years, a large number of Yugoslav
Gas tarbeiter, particularly in Germany, came from Croatia. Bennett points to the fact that also in the war, the most
extremist elements in the Croatian militias were often emigrants (1995:164-165).
15 Silber & Little 1995:90; Koch 1992:193.
16 Mesiô had left the HDZ during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and founded a new party.
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the vote) with two anti-communist and nationalist (!) opposition parties following:
DrakoviO's Serbian Renewal Movement (SF0) with 7.6% and the Democratic Party
(DS) with 2.8%. Opinion polls on the background patterns of the Serbian electorate
suggest that in comparison with the other important parties, MiloeviO's SPS actually
attracted voters with more moderate nationalist attitudes. In 1990, it was the writerVuk
DrakoviO in particular who carried the hard-line nationalist torch, and later, the self-
proclaimed Oetnik, Vojislav eelj, overtook everyone else with his extreme right-wing
radicalism. Whereas MiloeviO's Socialists demanded self-determination for Serbs
outside Serbia (but within a Yugoslav framework), eelj would settle for no less than
one united Serbia incorporating Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and
parts of Croatia. Initially, Drakoviô also argued for bringing large parts of Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Croatia under Serbian control; but when the war broke out, he opted
for a pacifist stand (PavkoviO 1995:127). Throughout the 1990s he switched allegiances
so many times that, during my fieldwork, even his own followers did not seem to
remember what he claimed to represent apart from, of course, 'Serbia'.
3.3. and the winner is ... war
It is clear that the Yugoslav federation went through a crisis and a period of utter
confusion when the elections took place. With nationalism taking an ever more
prominent position in politics, nationality issues and the future of the Yugoslav
federation became extremely pressing questions. Special rounds of the expanded
collective state presidency in the first months of 1991 failed and can now be considered
as a prelude to the war (Cohen 1995:197-225). Issues such as the nature of the inter-
republican relations, the right to secession, the role of the JNA, economic transfers and
inequality, the Kosovo question and the problem of the Krajina Serbs in Croatia 17 were
approached from fixed positions which did not allow for compromise. The incapability or
unwillingness of the leading politicians to reach peaceful solutions paved the way to
war.
This text does not present an analysis of the wars in Yugoslavia. Factual overviews of
the violent events are numerous, exist in many formats and sizes, and reflect the
different perspectives of the authors 18 . However, the picture of Croatian and Serbian
nationalist discourses is simultaneously a picture of war. Therefore, in a desperate
attempt to restore a sense of continuity in my story, I now sketch a rough chronological
story of the wars that made an end to Yugoslavia and to the lives and livelihoods of
many of its inhabitants.
Against the backdrop of the failed special rounds of the federal presidency in 1991,
Croatian and Slovene officials held a meeting in Ljubljana to co-ordinate plans to
proclaim independence, which they did on 25 June 1991. After a ten-day war in
Slovenia, the Yugoslav army retreated in order to focus its attention on Croatia. In
Croatian areas with large Serbian populations (but not in Zagreb), conflicts broke out
between Croatian (para)military forces and local Serbian militias supported by the JNA.
In December 1991, the hard-line leaders of Bosnian and Krajina Serbs proclaimed the
independence of their regions from their respective republics. Krajina was ethnically
cleansed of its Croatian population. In March of the next year, however, Bosnian Croats
and Bosniacs voted for an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina (boycotted by the Bosnian
Serbs). This vote was very quickly endorsed by the EU which had already recognised
the independence of Croatia and Slovenia on 15 January 1992. In the meantime,
17 Krajina (a term which was, on principle, not used by the HDZ regime) designated a region comprising two sides of
a long stretch of the Bosnian-Croatian inter-republican boundary. In this study, I use it mainly to refer to the Serbian
Republic of Krajina, which seceded from the Croatian republic and was ethnically cleansed from almost all its
Croatian inhabitants in 1991.
15 Three foreign journalistic accounts that stand out in my view are Glenny 1993; Thompson 1992; and particularly
Silber & Little 1995.
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thousands of UN soldiers and negotiators arrived in former Yugoslavia.
Shortly after the declaration of independence, the Bosnian Serbs, supported by Serbian
politicians and the JNA, took up arms against the Bosnian government. The situation
became ever more complex with members of the three main national groups in Bosnia
and their allies from outside alternately fighting each other, and with precarious
alliances perpetually breaking down. In May 1992, the UN issued sanctions against the
new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for its support of the
Bosnian Serbs. In the next three years, Serbian forces conquered one UN-protected
'safe zone' after another. Journalistic reports of mass-executions, detention camps and
large-scale ethnic cleansing campaigns by different sides established this war's sad
reputation as the ultimate cataclysm of post-holocaust twentieth-century optimism in
Europe.
In August 1995, Croatian forces launched an offensive with the help of the US against
Serbian Krajina, and within a few days they incorporated the whole area into Croatia.
With a combination of NATO air strikes, international sanctions and embargoes as
stick, and God only knows what else as carrot, the presidents of Bosnia, Serbia and
Croatia met for peace talks in Dayton. By then, it had become clear that any peace
treaty would reward military 'successes' and consolidate the results of ethnic cleansing,
at least on the short term. On 21 November 1995, a peace agreement was signed and
a process started to convince all post-Yugoslav citizens of two things: that the hundreds
of thousands of murders and the millions of refugees were all to blame on national
Others; and that these sacrifices had, after all, been worth it (Koch 1996:30-35). In
Serbia, moreover, the public was slowly being prepared for the escalation of yet
another conflict—that over sovereignty in Kosovo, which had smouldered for years and
would explode in 1999.
4. Serbian nationalism as discursive øractice
4.1. Serbian nationalism and the articulation of old and new suffering
With war raging in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, large parts of the Serbian
population became increasingly radicalised. A discourse had grown dominant in which
the mythologised victimisation of the Serbian people served to justify militarism, war
and the atrocities committed by many Serbian soldiers. One of the most prominent
insignia of Serbian soldiers in the war became a cross with four letters 'S' (which in
Cyrillic looks like four Latin C's). This symbol of Serbian unity goes back to a medieval
kingdom but was elaborated upon particularly in the 19th century by Serbian
intellectuals and politicians (Gow 1994:457-458; Pavkoviô 1994:443). The four S's
stand for Samo Sloga Srbina Spaava ('Only Unity Saves the Serbs'), and this theme
was to dominate the Serbian intellectual and political scene from the late 1980s
onwards (Pavkovié 1995:128). In this context, the concept of a storyline seems
relevant, because, as we have seen, within the Serbian discursive landscape, there
were many diverging opinions on the exact meaning of the four S's. Again, it is
precisely this multi-interpretability which was the main source of strength of 'SSSS'. The
four letters carried a highly condensed message and thereby reduced the complexity of
social reality—in its simplicity and polysemy, it was an ideal storyline for a broad
discourse coalition.
This discursive hegemony, however, was never complete. Even though sometimes
swamped by nationalist euphoria, resistance existed throughout, and the rest of this
study focuses precisely on that anti-nationalist altérité. The 1993 elections saw a
decline in support for Miloeviô's party, as did every election since, so that coalition
governments became the rule. Here I would just like to mention that, more than any
other republic, Serbia experienced mass anti-regime demonstrations during the wars
(Thomas 1999). Initially silenced by the state media, they were later violently crushed
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by the regime, a pattern that MiIoeviO followed on several occasions during his reign.
For the sake of argument, I have so far presented an overly coherent and unified
picture of Serbian nationalism. Perhaps it is necessary to emphasise here that this
tendency to homogenise an object of study is a consequence of the nature of the
analysis, rather than a reflection of the character of that object. In a way, of course,
Serbian nationalism did not exist—that is, only Serbian nationalisms existed. Although,
much more so even than the social sciences, nationalisms have a tendency to posit the
homogeneity of their object (the nation), they do not in themselves constitute monolithic
discourses. Not only was it possible to distinguish diverging factions in the broader
spectrum of Serbian nationalist politics, it is also clear that the discourse of Slobodan
Miloeviá, himself, was permeated with contradictions, imbalances and incongruencies.
SalecI describes Miloevió's political discourse as a mixture of traditional Stalinism,
proto-fascist right-wing populism, étatism, mythologising nationalism and bourgeois
liberalism (Salecl 1994b:214-217). Again, far from being a weakness, this heterogeneity
was part of its strength: through his autocratic approach, Miloeviô succeeded in
discursively uniting different elements that were hitherto regarded as incompatible. In
this process of articulation, they changed meaning and content. Let us take the
example of the Second World War. The official version of this war, with the Partisan
victory over all 'foreign occupiers and domestic traitors', served as the foundational
myth of Titoism. It is on this discursive basis that the idea of 'Brotherhood and Unity'
and its federal implementation in post-war Yugoslavia were built. With the collapse of
Yugoslavia, however, the war events took on an entirely different meaning in the
different republics. In Serbia, rather than reinforcing the need for a peaceful and
fraternal Yugoslav federation, WWII came to symbolise yet another stage in the eternal
suffering of the Serbian people. In this way, it also provided justification for the war
against Croatia, a war that was presumably needed to save the Serbs in that republic
from a new genocide by an allegedly fascist HDZ regime. Hence, whereas the Second
World War was an important moment in the discourse of Serbian nationalism as well as
in Titoism, its meaning changed completely because of the different ways in which it
was articulated into the discourses.
But, to come back to my point, if Serbian nationalism did not exist—that is, if there was
not one monolithic discourse—it is important to highlight how it articulated a number of
possibly contradictory elements into moments. I referred already to the powerful myth
of the Kosovo battle and its significance as the symbol of national Serbian martyrdom.
Related to the Kosovo cataclysm, a nationalist understanding could be constructed of
centuries of Ottoman domination, and more recently, of the expulsion and execution of
Serbs in the World War II Croatian Ustaa state. Serbian nationalists, then, added the
alleged discrimination against the Serbs in Titoist Yugoslavia to this long list of national
suffering (Pavkovió 1994:440). Later, their views of the proclamation of independence
in Croatia, Bosnia (and Kosovo) were structured through this prism.
Despite their internal contradictions, however, Serbian nationalist discourses
established far-going fixations and, thereby, represented the Serbian nation as highly
coherent and unitary. The new Serbian nationalist discourses also rested upon a range
of articulations with other, related discourses, such as moral traditionalism, orthodox
Christianity and rural romanticism. Lack of space prevents me from going into these
themes here, although I come back to them later in this study. Let me just emphasise
that every one of these articulations was highly contradictory. Not only did the
nationalist discourse coalition comprise self-proclaimed progressive Yugoslavists,
conservative Christian royalists and extreme right Greater-Serbianists—but even within
every strand, tensions were high. The discourse articulated by the Miloevió regime
and the way it was lived in everyday life patterns throughout Serbia were particularly
ambiguous with regard to Yugoslav past. We'll have a closer look at this now.
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4.2. (dis)continuity and the vampire: versions of the Yugoslav past
Even before the disintegration of the former state, there was an ambiguous relation
between Serbian nationalist discourses and Titoism (i±ek & Salecl 1991 :29). As we
have seen, although opinions on this issue varied widely, most Serbian nationalists
favoured some kind of federation, albeit one that would not be dominated by the anti-
Serbian coalition that allegedly led to their inferior position. Serbian politicians and the
Serbian-dominated JNA have always claimed to be defending the Yugoslav federation.
Moreover, one should not forget that after the break-up of Yugoslavia, the federation of
Serbia and Montenegro was called the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and in many
ways portrayed itself as the defender and successor state of (Titoist) Yugoslavia. While
the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, fought in great part by the JNA, delegitimised
Yugoslavism to a large extent, towards the late 199OsMiloeviá increasingly dug up his
so-called progressive Yugoslav credentials. This was particularly the case during the
1996-1 997 anti-regime demonstrations and during the NATO air strikes in 1999 (see
Jansen 2000a:305-306).
On the one hand, the regime narrated its legitimacy along lines of continuity with regard
to Yugoslav 'progressive politics'. Some kind of leftist discourse articulated the legacy
of anti-fascism, multiculturalism, equal rights and non-alignment in international affairs.
A strong emphasis was then put on patriotism and the uniqueness of the old and the
new Yugoslavia as a country, as a political system and as a social formation of
solidarity and affluence. Regardless of the grinding poverty and repression that
constituted everyday reality in Serbia, the regime prided itself on its dedication to
improving the lives of ordinary people. Its failures were put down increasingly to the
embargo, and thus to the 'West'. This was not just regime rhetoric: being perceived as
the unofficial High Representative of All Western Governments, I was reminded
numerous times of how we were responsible for the misery of the Serbs.
On the other hand, Serbian nationalist discourses articulated a sense of discontinuity
with the Yugoslav past—a trend that was present in most versions and dominant in
non-regime nationalism. Before and during the wars, there was an urge towards an
active break with Titoist times; the Serbian nation, it was argued, was finally vindicating
its inferior place in Yugoslavia. The lies and passivity were over and done with, and
militant Serbs were finally asserting the real story of, say, theUstaa genocide of WWII.
In later years, this sense of discontinuity became more reactive and often contradicted
the above. The new experience of war, socio-economic deterioration, the influx of
refugees and so on were represented as a break with the good life of this past. Of
course, all varieties of Serbian nationalism blamed the current situation on others: post-
Yugoslav national Others, the 'West', and, increasingly by the end of the 1990s, the
communist kleptomaniac, Miloevió (Jansen 2000a:292). This, of course, implied
continuity on the level of the grand historical narrative of Serbian national suffering.
Different discourses of Serbian nationalism articulated these contradictory elements
into ambiguous blends, and merged them into contested but extremely effective
discursive complexes in several ways: through an extreme level of media manipulation
and lies; through direct and indirect oppression and limitations on dissenting
information; and through an arbitrary approach making floating references to certain
elements of Serbian nationalism and certain elements of Yugoslavlitoism. We could
call this a form of Yugo-vampirisation. MiloeviO arguably was one of the main killers of
Yugoslavia, but he sucked its blood—its discursive practices of legitimacy—and used it
to sustain his own life. As we shall see in the chapter on Jugonostalga, this created
great unease and difficulty for those who wished to articulate what they saw as positive
aspects of the Yugoslav past into a dissident discourse.
However, on an everyday level, these Yugo-vampire articulations were symbolically
effective for many people because of their polysemy and the space they left for
bricolage. People could tap into them and argue entirely different things without
contradicting each other. For example, in one and the same conversation, people could
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evoke the Yugoslav discourse of solidarity and equality as something that proved their
superiority over non-Yugoslays, and tell tales of discrimination and oppression which
supported the claim that Yugoslavia was an anti-Serbian conspiracy. Because the
notion 'Yugoslav' meant so many different things, such paradoxical statements did not
necessarily cause any debate or consternation—often, it functioned as a blanket term,
covering potential conflicts with its veil of polysemy. As there was simply no level where
the different statements would meet, endless variations seemed possible, and
unneeded or potentially annoyingly inconsistent elements were blanked out or ignored.
As we shall see throughout this study, many people engaged in the rewriting of the past
on all levels, repositioning themselves in relation to the crisis surrounding them (see
also Jansen 2000b). During my fieldwork in the late 1990s, the general atmosphere
was characterised much more by indifference and passive conformity than by active
identification and fanatic support. On the whole, people simply worried about other
things—mainly about their attempts to keep their heads above water in the daily
struggle for survival. Through vagueness, silence and the reproduction of storylines,
their attitudes towards 'politics' were usually summarised in brief evocations of a
generalised state of Serbian suffering.
In everyday life in Serbia, a strong sense of continuity was embodied in people's
surroundings. Despite changes in outlook (mainly the tangible deterioration), many
consumer products remained the same: Yugo cars still filled the streets, and old state
shops looked similar to before. The TV showed the same old faces of the regime and
the country was still officially called Yugoslavia. In retrospect, even hard-line Serbian
nationalist narratives increasingly relied on patterns of continuity. Many people argued
that they had actually always wanted to continue living in a Yugoslav state together with
others on an equal basis, but that they (that is, the national Others) didn't want this
anymore. During my fieldwork, one NGO activist called this 'the story of abandoned
lovers'. This again reflects the theme of the hegemonic, incorporative nature of Serbian
nationalist discourses, which allow to a certain extent for ambiguity and hybridity with
other post-Yugoslav nations—always, however, with the Serbs as the dominant group,
incorporating differences. The Dalmatian Coast, many Serbs would argue, was also
ours; Sarajevo was also ours, only they wanted everything for themselves. We would
live together, as we have always done, if they'd let us and if they wouldn't kill us –but,
since they attacked us, we had to protect ourselves.
5. Croatian nationalism as discursive practice
Space is being created for a new (and this time, really new), bright (and this time
truly bright) future (and this time really a future). The terror of memory has its
counterpart in the terror of forgetting. Both processes are indispensable for the
creation of a new state of events and a new truth. The terror of memory is a
strategy which restores the (apparently uninterrupted) continuity of national identity,
whereas the terror of forgetting is a strategy to wipe out Yugoslav identity and the
possibility to restore it –afterwards.
(Ugreio 1995:113).
5.1. a thousand-year dream - nationalist discourse and polarisation in Croatia
When, in 1990, Franjo Tuman was installed as the president of Croatia, a Serbian
politician became vice-president. However, shortly after the elections, the nationalist
Serbian Democratic Party retreated from the parliament, which they viewed as a strictly
Croatian institution. On the ground, the strongly mixed areas around Knin were
increasingly dominated by nationalist militias (Glenny 1993:24-30; Van Dartel
1991:209; Voet 1993:18-19). The Miloevió-controlled media operating from Beograd
took every opportunity to depict the new Croatian government as a fascist dictatorship,
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a re-run of the Ustaa regime, aiming for the extermination or at least the expulsion of
all Serbs (Glenny 1993:14ff; Banac 1992b:180).
It must be said that the HDZ government, and Tudman in particular, did everything
within their power to make matters worse 19. The new regime referred ad nauseam to
the thousand-year dream of the Croatian nation for their own state. An important role
was played by Catholic Church leaders. Moreover, even in a country accustomed to
Tito's megalomania, the symbolism of the new state protocol seemed excessive to
most and recalled the emblems of the Ustaa regime. Against a heavily loaded
historical background, hard-liners of both Serbian and Croatian sides imposed a
definition of the situation through the prism of exclusivist nationalism. A polarisation of
discourses took place in which extremists claimed that the collective existence of their
nation was threatened by the very presence of national Others. When local police units
run by Serbian hard-liners refused to implement certain changes, an attempt by
Croatian government officials to undo their stand met with fierce resistance from the
local policemen and from newly created paramilitary groups—the war in Croatia had
started2° (Denich 1994:380). In no time, more than a third of the republic was Serbian-
controlled and ethnically cleansed of its Croatian inhabitants.
Tudman's personal role was crucial in post-Yugoslav Croatia. His HDZ emerged as the
dominant party in every election for a decade, and even when electoral engineering
and strategic timing (just after the Krajina victory) became increasingly important to
secure this dominance, his personal popularity was very high. According to a poll
during the 1992 elections the HDZ enjoyed most support amongst pensioners, people
working in the administration, the unemployed, housewives, and church-goers. The
oppositional Croatian Social-Liberal Party (HSLS), a more moderately nationalist party
with a liberal economic programme, attracted a younger, better educated, more
employed, urban and less religious share of the electorate (survey by GrdesiO, quoted
in Pletina 1995:140). In 1995, HDZ lost its majority in some cities, and both domestic
and international opposition grew to Tudman's authoritarian leadership. Critics attacked
HDZ policies towards the electoral system, the media, privatisation programs and
nepotism.
5.2. who are the people? narrating difference
As in other republics, the political discourse of the new Croatian rulers was democratic:
they were to represent the people21 . But this had equally been the case under the
communist regime. Hence, the central question became 'who are the people'? The
HDZ's answer was not different from that of most winning parties in other republics: the
real people, they argued, were the members of the dominant nation (Bowman
1994:138). The Tudman government developed a discourse in which the essence of
the Croatian nation was constituted in opposition to Others who were held responsible
for the suppression of the real development of that nation. The power of the HDZ was
underpinned by and implemented through a discourse which re-articulated the Titoist
discourse on national identity, legitimacy and territoriality. Hence, the transition from a
communist order to a liberal democracy was understood through the prism of
nationalism, and other options were excluded22.
By referring to imagined communities such as 'the Serbian nation' and 'the Croatian
nation', the new leaders defined the situation along national lines. As every regime
19 Pusiô 1994:395; Hayden 1992:657; Bowman 1994; Denich 1994:380; Kaldor 1993:101-102; Schöpflin 1993:201;
Garde 1993:275-281.
20 For an overview of pre-war events in Krajina, see Glenny 1993; Denich 1994:380ff; Detrez 1992; Voet 1993:17-21;
Garde 1993:177, 275-281; Silber& Little 1995:98-112.
21 Serbian/Croatian uses one word for both 'people' and 'nation': narod.
22 As discussed above, despite his Partisan past, Franjo Tudman established nationalist credibility from the 1970s
onwards. He also wrote a number of books on the subject of nationalism.
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defining its authority on a more or less national basis, the Croatian government was
confronted with the anomalies of reality. In Serbia only some 66% of the population had
a Serbian background, and, when the HDZ came to power, only 75% of the inhabitants
of Croatia identified as Croats and 12% as Serbs (Garde 1992:117, 172). A small but
substantial amount of the population declared themselves as Yugoslays. Also, large
Croatian minorities lived outside the republic, in Vojvodina, Canada and Australia
(krbi 2000). Particularly, the HDZ enjoyed vast support in neighbouring Western
Herzegovina. Croatian Herzegovinians were granted dual citizenship in 1990 and
received the right to vote in Croatian elections, which had a strongly radicalising impact
on Zagreb politics (see Chapter Seven). Moreover, the local authorities made use of a
whole range of Croatian materials and symbols: currency, flag, coat of arms, police
uniforms and so on (Woodward 1995:230-231).
Hence, in order to construct the basis for its power, nothing less than the Croatian
nation, the Tucman government had to rework the official Yugoslav discourse on
identity. It was here that the nationalist leaders of the different republics found a
common ground 23: the public had to be persuaded that there was no alternative to
increased national self-determination. This, of course, had serious territorial
implications. Apart from more political and economic autonomy, the HDZ electoral
platform mentioned 'Croatia's ethnic and historical borders', which could be interpreted
as meaning anything, including the annexation of regions in Bosnia-Herzegovina with a
Croatian majority, or even the re-instalment of the NDH-borders (Denich 1994:377;
Garde 1992:363). Moreover, Tuman often failed to make clear his position on the
Bosniacs, who were seen by many hard-line Croatian nationalists as Islamicised Croats
(and by extreme Serb nationalists as Islamicised Serbs). Several times, the Croatian
president expressed his preference for a division of Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia
(Silber & Little 1995:92).
Like their Serbian counterparts, Croatian nationalist themes were often articulated with
Catholicism, since most Croats had a predominantly Roman Catholic cultural
background. Similarly, romantic ruralist themes were taken up, albeit always in a
contradictory way because Croatian nationalism presented itself simultaneously as a
modern, 'Western' discourse. Throughout history, the regions that are now post-
Yugoslav republics have often occupied a very specific position in the symbolic
geography of 'East' and 'West'. Many Croats and Slovenes retrospectively viewed the
Yugoslav project and the war through an orientalist discourse, which I come back to in
Chapter Eight. Often, this discourse provided an implicit, underlying consensus on the
prism through which Yugoslavia should be seen and talked about. The South-Eastern
Balkans were then depicted as the home of lazy peasants—primitive, intolerant and
aggressive free riders in the Yugoslav federation (krbi 1995:165-1 66). This discourse
had severe implications, for it re-evaluated once more Titoist discourses on the
assumed 'Brotherhood and Unity' of the Yugoslav peoples. Yugoslavia was
represented as an uneasy, imposed and impossible combination of clashing cultures.
Croatian nationalism asserted that Croats had never felt at home in this 'Balkan'
federation, because they had always essentially been part of (Central) Europe24 (BakiO-
Hayden & Hayden 1992:9-1 2; see also Silber & Little 1995:88).
In order to understand such a discourse, which attempted to reconcile a 'modern',
'European', liberal-democratic system based on citizenship on the one hand, and a
23 Of course this common ground was bound to be explosive. It also explains how both the seceding regimes and the
Miloeviô/JNA coalition could refer to the Yugoslav constitution: one side justified secession with reference to the
right of self-determination of the republic, whereas the others justified their violence on the basis of the constitutional
right of self-determination of the nation (Gow 1994:465). In Bosnia, the situation became even more complex...
24 As we shall see in Chapter Eight, Balkan orientalism took on a number of different forms in the post-Yugoslav
context, and, although it was stronger in Zagreb than in Beograd, it was by no means the sole property of the North-
Western republics. Serbian nationalists, for example, would refer to the Bosnian war as yet another occasion of
Serbs defending Europe and its Judeo-Christian heritage against Muslim fundamentalist domination.
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nationalist appeal to the dominant ethnic group on the other hand, Hayden coined the
term 'constitutional nationalism' (Hayden 1992). The situation in post-communist
Croatia was symptomatic of this tension inherent in discourses which articulate
democratic constitutionalism and national self-determination. Hayden defines
constitutional nationalism as 'a constitutional and legal structure that privileges the
members of one ethnically defined nation over other residents in a particular state'
(1992:655). In what seems to be a similar discussion of Croatian and Serbian
contemporary politics, Cohen proposed the term 'ethnic democracy', whereby 'a de
facto privileged status [is] accorded by the state to one or more ethnic groups'
(1995:359-365). Policies emerging from such a framework are likely to evoke majority
support, but at the same time they are bound to alienate minorities.
Although this study points out that Croatian nationalist discourses were not
homogenous and monolithic, I do believe that there was less evidence of the rather
extreme polysemy that characterised its Serbian counterpart. This was a historical trait
of Croatian nationalism, as explained in Chapter Three, but it also has to be seen in the
context of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. By the late 1980s, Miloeviô had
consolidated his position and his assertions of Yugoslav/Serbian power politics made
clear that the threat of war was a real one. And, although all sides in the post-Yugoslav
wars claimed to be engaged in defensive operations, in 1991 Serbian paramilitaries
and the JNA were overwhelmingly dominant in the violence, which, let us not forget,
took place on disputed territory in the Croatian Republic. Therefore, the lower level of
polysemy is not so surprising, as Croatian nationalist discourses relied much more
straightforwardly on representations of Serbian/Yugoslav aggression and a Croatian
closing of ranks in the face of the enemy (Povrzanoviô 1997).
5.3. constructing unity: the homogenisation of the nation
5.3.1. correcting history gone wrong: (re)naming and the power of definition
Immediately after taking over power, the HDZ started to correct what it viewed as a
situation which was historically out of line. This had been one of the major strands in
the electoral campaign, which had taken shape during a Party Conference in 1990,
where an influential leader of the HDZ argued:
'There won't be any improvement for Croatia until a Croatian rifle is on a Croatian
shoulder, and a Croatian wallet in a Croatian pocket.'
(quoted in Silber & Little 1995:92)
In the purge of the nomenklatura, hundreds of Serbs were removed from influential
positions and a range of overtly and covertly discriminating measures were installed,
particularly targeting Serbs25 . In Yugoslav times, reflecting the composition of Partisan
support, the Serbian minority had traditionally been over-represented in the Croatian
administration and police. HDZ politicians had repeatedly expressed their
dissatisfaction with this situation. Serbian personnel was now sacked on the spot, and
despite constitutional guarantees for the Serbian minority, a climate of retaliation took
shape.
Of course, we have to see this against the background of the previously described
events in Serbia, where Miloevié was riding the waves of an increasingly aggressive
nationalist euphoria. The year 1991 saw atrocious violence as radical Krajina Serbs
seceded from the newly independent Croatian state and ethnically cleansed the region
of most Croatian inhabitants. Obviously, throughout the war years, the nationalist
discourse did not always remain the same. Through the lived experience of war,
storylines were reformulated and new events and themes were articulated into the
25 For examples, see Woodward 1995:229; Voet 1993:17; Tromp-Vrkiô 1993:8; Kaldor 1993:101; Hayden 1992:667.
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developing discourse. Moënik puts it as follows: 'First, the story was about centennial
dreams, obstructed by various "others"; then came the "we are in danger" motive; now,
it is the "we must avenge the defeat" rallying cry' (Moënik 1992:1). In this way, the idea
that the wars were defensive operations was widespread both in Serbia and Croatia
(Garde 1992:169). Nationalist discourses defined the situation as if the fate of each and
every individual member of the nation depended on the fate of his/her nation.
The redressing of the national balance in favour of 'the Croatian national interest' was
accompanied by a flood of symbolic re-assertions of Croatian nationhood26. Towns,
villages, streets and institutes were renamed, erasing the undesired tainting with
Yugoslav times and (re)constructing a link with older, and supposedly more Croatian
ones. A campaign of purification took place, cleaning the Croatian language of alleged
Serbianisms through the coining of new words with 'indigenous' derivation and through
the revival of archaic words (see Chapter Six). Moreover, the HDZ installed Croatian
national celebrations that had not been officially recognised under Titoism and, of
course, abolished the official Yugoslav alternatives (Roskandiá 1995). The arduous
efforts of the HDZ government to present the new Croatian state as a homogeneous
formation was further accentuated by discouraging the historically strong regional
identification among Croats in favour of a firmly unitarist national consciousness 27 . The
policies of the new Croatian leaders were designed to compensate for what they had
long perceived as the suppression of Croatian national identity inTitoist Yugoslavia. In
Tuman's words:
'Croatian sovereignty means above all that we restore Croatian legitimacy. In the last 45
years Croatism has not only been exposed to pressure but also to persecution [...].
Streets and squares named after Croatian kings were changed. Croatian children were
not allowed to sing innocent Croatian songs.'
(quoted in Cohen 1995:97)
This is not to say that the desire to start with a clean sheet was a unique characteristic
of the Croatian nationalist regime. As Laclau (1990) has pointed out, this is a common
phenomenon when power changes hands, and, in fact, the Titoist take-over in 1945
had engaged in similar strategies of renaming landmarks and redressing balances.
What made the Croatian balance tip, and what made the regime an easy target for
Beograd propaganda, was its ambiguity over the WWII past. Pusió later called this
revolution of symbols a 'double error', because for many Croats it put into perspective
the lack of real change beyond the symbolic level, whereas amongst the Serbian
minority it created unrest and support for radical nationalists (1 994:394). In this sense,
Tu5man's policies caused a serious move away from previous practices of similarity
and sameness on the local level (Glenny 1993:22). Let us now have a closer look at the
new regime's narrations of (dis)continuity with the events of WWII.
5.3.2. raising the bone count: the ambiguity of (dis) continuity
In its attempts to realise the political implications of the discursive shift in terms of
identity and community, the new Croatian government articulated a whole set of
emblems of earlier collective struggles into its new discourse (Bowman 1994:147;
Denich 1994:379ff). In May 1990, the new government decided to reinstall the historical
Croatian coat of arms: a red and white checkerboard ['ahovnica'] (Silber & Little
1995:87). Immediately, a fierce controversy broke out, for the ahovnica had also
served as the major icon of the fascist Ustaa state in WWII. A compromise was
reached in the December 1990 Constitution: the checkerboard was preserved as the
26 See for instance Glenny 1993; Silber and Little 1995; Thompson 1992; Ramet 1995a; ZaniC 1995; Pletina 1995;
Denich 1994; Bowman 1994; Ugreiá 1995.
27 Tromp-Vrkiã 1993:11-12; see also Thompson 1992:89, 252; Garde 1992:166-167.
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national coat of arms, but the top-left corner was to be a red square instead of a white
one. However, in conjunction with a deliberately provocative propaganda campaign by
the Beograd media, the radicalisation of the Serbian minority in Croatia had already
reached its boiling-point. This symbolic break with the Croatian fascist experience again
came too late.
As we have seen, another dimension of ambiguous (dis)continuity was the question of
Croatia's historical borders, as radical Croatian nationalist milieus circulated maps on
which the country enveloped large parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia 28 . Still
another sensitive issue was the new Croatian currency called 'Kuna' after a medieval
coin. Again, it was also the name used for the currency of the fascist NDH. When
asked for a reaction on the worries and the sensitivities of the Krajina Serbs, Tudman
argued:
'They must understand that they are a minority here, and they must recognise Croatia as
their homeland. They can take an equal part in it ... but they cannot, as they did in the
past, impose solutions on state policies, and least of all, on the name of the Croatian
national currency.'
(quoted in Cohen 1995:344-345)
These are only some examples of a whole range of decisions with wide symbolic
resonance reaching well into WWII times (see Denich 1994; Bowman 1994; Pletina
1995:132; Hayden 1992:657; Pusiô 1994:395). When viewing these measures against
the background of Tuman's continuous efforts to relativise the Croatian culpability in
the NDH, it is clear that they were bound to provoke a vehement response. In the views
of many Serbs—blurred by Beograd propaganda, their own radical nationalism and
local polarisation—the new leaders affirmed continuity with this black episode of
Yugoslavia's history (Glenny 1993:87). With the fascist NDH providing the only
reference of statehood in modern Croatian history, Tuman was always extremely
reluctant to denounce it as merely a fascist puppet-state. Several of his closest
advisers were well-known apologetics of the WWII regime (Kri±an 1993:68; Denich
1994:377). While admitting Ustaa crimes, the president insisted that the NDH was also
an expression of the historic aspirations of the Croatian people for an independent state
(Silber & Little 1995:91). Tudman also wanted to rebury Ante Paveliá, leader of the
Ustaa regime, in Croatia and repeatedly called to change the monument for the
victims of fascism in the Jasenovac camp into a monument for all people who died in
the war.
With the discursive shift that took place in postcommunist Yugoslavia, we enter the
twilight zone of Titoism: the taboo of World War II. Building on the ashes of genocide,
the Partisans had created a Yugoslav state, which united the very people who had
been slaughtering each other some time before. In order to preserve its power, the
Titoist system exercised ideological control over the representation of the past and
strictly suppressed contested memories of the war years. The communist discourse
structured the ways in which to think of the events of the war. The collective, non-ethnic
categories 'victims of fascism' on the one side, and 'foreign occupiers and domestic
traitors' on the other side were the only legitimate discursive means for representing the
war (Denich 1994:370). Hayden describes how in the 1980s a cross-republican flood of
scholarly, journalistic and literary texts opened up the taboo subject of WWII (1994).
The authors of these writings challenged the official regime of history by the Yugoslav
government and ultimately brought about a redefinition of this history. At least two
foundational myths of the Yugoslav state were undermined in this way: the moral
28 As Vulliamy points out, usually these maps were produced abroad, for instance by emigrants in South America
(Vulliamy 1994:6-10). krbi found out that many Croatian clubs in Australia have maps entitled 'Croatia in its
historical borders', which for moderate emigrants were just descriptions of how things used to be, but for extreme
nationalists they were the expression of expansionist dreams (1995:162). This was mirrored by Greater-Serbianist
ambitions on the other side.
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superiority of the Partisans in WWII; and the moral inferiority of the Ustaa regime and
the NDH.
Although these interventions were initially directed against the Communist regime
without necessarily being part of a political program of nationalism, it was clear that
they provided gefundenes Fressen for those aiming for the construction of a new
nationalist political consciousness. When Croatian and Serbian nationalists engaged in
the discursive construction of distinct imagined communities, they had at their disposal
the powerful mechanism of the symbolic revival of genocide29.
5.4. Croatian nationalism and narrations of the Yugoslav past
It must be clear by now that, on the whole, Croatian nationalist discourses represented
a more radical and more homogenous break with regard to Yugoslav times than their
Serbian counterparts. An important factor in this phenomenon is the fact that much of
the violence took place within the Croatian republic. Also, it developed partly in
response to the rise of Miloevió and reflected the previously mentioned historical
negationist nature of Croatian nationalism. The nationalist representation of the newly
independent Croatia, then, was articulated around a radical, absolute departure from
the Yugoslav past. This discontinuity was embedded in the wider continuity of the
historical 'will' of the Croats, who had been, so it was argued, forced into Yugoslavia
and hated every moment of it. Therefore, the war, officially called the 'Motherland War'
['Domovinski Rat], was a necessary evil imposed by Serbs (and later, ambiguously, by
Bosniacs) to realise the thousand-year dream of the Croatian nation to have its own
state.
These explicit references to the historical dimension of the new Croatian state were
reinforced by daily media-reports and political decision-making in postcommunist
Croatia. In a speech before the UN, Tuman put it this way:
'From the 10th to the 12th century, the Croats had their own independent kingdom
governed by national rulers. [...] However, [...] the Croatian people preserved its
autonomy [...] The highest aim, the realisation of which is wished for by every national
being from the moment it reaches the level of separate national, political and cultural self-
awareness, and when the international circumstances allow it, has now been achieved by
the Croatian people [...] Humanity strives towards a unique world community as an
organised international system of independent sovereign states, based on the generally
accepted principles of the right of the peoples to self-determination and freedom.'
If we place this narrative in the context of 1990s Croatia, it is clear that there were a
number of contradictions since many Croats had actually contributed to the Yugoslav
system in some way or other, and most others had at the very least accommodated to
it. Croatian nationalist discourses dealt with this in two ways. On the one hand, there
was the virulent denunciation of some Croats who were known to have supported the
idea and practice of a common Yugoslav state (this was staple ammunition in the
campaigns against the then-second party, the reformed communists (SDP)). Those
Croats were simply proclaimed un-Croatian. On the other hand, however, nationalist
discourses had to face up to the fact that many of the men now hailed as saviours had
themselves been active in official Yugoslav institutions. Franjo Tuman himself was the
prime example. Here it was argued that those people had truly believed that Yugoslavia
could be a step in the right direction (independence); but they had soon realised that
that was unrealistic and that Yugoslavia was a Serbo-communist creation imposed on
the Croatian people. This theme of conversion allowed many people to reformulate
their own life stories in tune with the new versions of past and present (Buden 1996:77;
Feral Tribune 05/10/98:38-39).
291 would see this process in strongly politically-instrumentalist terms, rather than representing it as a freeing of
suppressed collective memory. For a post-war case study, see Jansen 2000b.
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In this way, Croatian nationalist narratives of the past did contain strong ambiguities,
and they seemed to be growing as the war moved further away in time. During my
fieldwork, there were even attempts to actually incorporate a sense of continuity
between the Croatian nationalist discourses of the I 990s and the anti-fascist struggle of
the Titoist army in WWll. This led to a bizarre situation on Anti-Fascist Day in 1998 (22
June), the first time that some leading hard-liners of the regime had attended the
commemoration, as well as the first time that it was reported extensively in the pro-
government media (Gruden 1998:16). Until then, most nationalist circles had
considered anti-fascism a dirty word referring to a compromising and anti-Croatian
phenomenon. However, in 1998, state officials used the ceremony to argue that the
Croats were the anti-fascists in the WWII Yugoslav context—and the most numerous
ones at that (Jutarnji List 23106198a). They reformulated the war against fascism in
Croatia into a struggle that was primarily a Croatian struggle, and, therefore, a fight
against the enemies of the Croats. Now, in Croatian nationalist discourses it was
obvious who the most important enemies of the Croatian people were; the Serbs, of
course. This discursive operation transferred the legitimacy of the anti-fascist struggle
of WWII to the 1991-1 995 war.
Meanwhile, at other moments and in other places but sometimes involving the very
same people, Croatian nationalist discourses continued to narrate WWII primarily in
terms of a Yugo-communist attack on the Croatian nation (Jutarnji List 23106198b).
However, in a surprising move by the HDZ-run state TV, even this was reformulated
when deemed necessary (see Jutarnji List 23/06/98c). The main news report on the
eve of the Day of the Anti-Fascist Uprising did of course pay its daily honours toFranjo
Tuman, but also elaborated a bit on the positive role in Croatian state-building played
by—Tito! While embedded in a staunchly anti-Serbian discourse, the news editor thus
located Tuman, a close friend of his, in a series of 'great men'. The Croatian president
often showed concern about his personal place in history (most infamously by
comparing himself with Franco), and he had never really attacked Tito very strongly as
a person. Quite the contrary, he obviously admired Tito's status as an internationally
acclaimed statesman and a mythically popular president. Numerous commentators
have pointed out how Tuman's personal style showed many signs of imitating Tito: he
lived in Tito's villa; spent his holidays on the former leader's private island; and
displayed a similar type of dated megalomania and fascination with symbolism in his
suits, speeches, and entourage (Pletina 1995:143-147; Silber & Little 1995:90).
Tuman's experience fighting alongside the Yugoslav leader in WWII was now being
incorporated into the narrative of his leadership and vision. He had, after all, been on
the 'right' side in WWII, the victorious side, the side that protected Croatia and the world
against fascism. The Croatian president thus shared in Tito's fame, which he regularly
attempted to use in order to create credibility in international relations. In this context,
flirting with a fascist past was not very popular anymore and Tuman's vision of an all-
Croat reconciliation between fascists and communists was considered a dirty game.
This was also an important element of the domestic opposition against him, as related
to me by Ankica, an eighty-year old lady who was involved in the organisation of
remembrance ceremonies of the Partisan cause. After having joined the Dalmatian
Partisans as a young girl, Ankica had remained employed on a high level in the Anti-
Fascist Women's Front (AF2). This had earned her the right of residence in the
comfortable central Zagreb flat where I occasionally went to sample the combined
delights of her home-made biscuits and her marathon WWII stories. The flat issue is an
interesting one: the HDZ regime also ran a policy of residence distribution amongst its
cadres, some of whom had family backgrounds on the opponents' side in WWII. While
Ankica hated to watch returnees from the Ustaa emigration occupy positions of power,
she was even more upset by Tuman's explicit support for them. This, she argued, was
humiliation and betrayal by a former war comrade, by a man who had once, like her,
been prepared to make sacrifices in order to fight fascism.
And there, of course, was the problem: Tito had been a communist and a Yugoslav,
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whereas Tudman and all 'true Croats' in the Partisan struggle, so the narrative now
went, had fought for Croatia. However, Tito still scored high in popularity polls, and he
could be incorporated into the narrative by arguing that while, yes, he was a
communist, yes, he was a Yugosla y ... he did create the necessary foundations for a
Croatian state! In this way, Tuman represented himself as the personified apotheosis
of a long series of Croatian leaders who had all done their best, but had never quite
gotten their act together like him (see for example Novi List 27/10/97:4). So the circle
was round. Not only was Tudman the one who had finished the job until the end, he
was also the true heir of Tito because he had made the final step in Croatian anti-
fascism: he beat the Serbs!
Through repression and manipulation of information, the above narratives of the past
were imposed on the general population, leaving many citizens of Croatia baffled at
their ambiguities. However, as in the Serbian case, these ambiguities made it possible
for many people to rewrite their individual narratives of past and present in specific
ways. Through amnesia and selective remembering on an everyday personal level,
their stories included a mixture of discontinuity with the Yugoslav past as well as a
sense of continuity of one's dedication to the Croatian cause.
7. constructing discrete national cultures: versions of past and present
The above rewritings of the past served a purpose in the I 990s post-Yugoslav context.
They allowed for a redesigning of the situation, which, in the field of national identity,
primarily meant the creation of discrete national cultures. Both Croatian and Serbian
nationalist discourses engaged in such an endeavour, albeit in different ways and to
different extents. They converged on the idea that, ultimately, 'Serbian' culture and
'Croatian' culture were and always had been essentially different from each other. As
we shall see in Chapter Six, many anti-nationalist narratives countered this by
reconstructing an age when the boundaries were not that important or were even
entirely non-existent. They then argued that the wars were so bloody, precisely
because people were so similar and had so much in common (see Harrison 1999).
The regime campaigns of constructing national cultures as discrete and maximally
different from each other involved a host of policies. The act of removing Others from
the territory considered the national homeland was only the most extreme one. Ethnic
cleansing means exactly that; and most of these operations were carried out with such
brutal violence that it not only facilitated similar campaigns in other areas, but also
guaranteed a reluctance to return. However, (para)military war crimes on national
Others were necessarily accompanied by the infliction of symbolic violence within the
sphere of one's own nation through a campaign of homogenisation. The process of
national homogenisation was tangibly present in education, language reforms,
renaming policies, popular music and other domains of society.
This was, of course, represented as part of a legitimate defensive operation to redress
a situation that had historically grown out of balance and to close ranks in the face of an
enemy attack. I would like to stress here that I am not just talking about hard-line
nationalists and regime figures, nor was the discourse of discrete national cultures
necessarily always embedded in an aggressive xenophobic stance towards national
Others. Rather, through an emphasis on similarities within and differences outside of
the nation, the previously mentioned cosmology of a 'family of nations' pervaded
everyday life and constituted a part of Croatian and Serbiandoxa, thereby reflecting the
wider discourse of humanity as a mosaic of discrete nations (Malkki 1994). Or in the
words of the leader of the HDZ Youth 30 : 'Only someone who is first a true Croat, can be
a true internationalist and cosmopolitan'.
30 In Croatian: 'Pravi infernacionalist I kozmopolit mole biti samo onaj koji je najprije pravi Hivaf (Mario Kapulica,
president of HDZ Youth, in his speech on the 7th birthday of the organisation, Novi List 27/10/97).
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[chapter five]
before and after:
clashing narratives of self, society and war
C'est Ihistoire d'une société qui tombe et qui au fur et a mesure de sa
chute se répète sans cesse pour se rassurer 'Jusqu'ici, tout va bien,
jusqu'ici, tout va bien, jusqu'ici, tout va bien'. L'important, c'est pas Ia
chute. C'est I'atterissage.
[It's the story of a society that falls, and that, in order to reassure itself,
during its fall, keeps repeating to itself, 'So far so good, so far so good,
so far so good.' The important thing is not the fall. It's the landing.]
(taken from La Ha/ne, a film by Matthieu Kassowitz1)
a soldier's things
his rifle, his boots full of rocks
oh and this one's for bravery
and this one's for me
and everything's a dollar
in this box
Tom Waits - Sold/er's Things2
In this chapter, I sketch some backgrounds with regard to contested representations of
the recent post-Yugoslav wars. This is, of course, a risky endeavour and I am not
aiming to provide an authoritative account of the events. That would not only be
impossible in the context of this study, but it would also fail to reflect the meta-struggle
that surrounded the status of the violence. For example, disagreements over whether
the fighting should be seen as a civil war or as a war of aggression depended upon
whether the problem was defined as secession or expansionism. In what follows, I limit
myself to a brief outline of some aspects of that conflict over definition. I then address
one of the central elements of this study: the experience of a defining, collective
narrative break in post-Yugoslav lives and the subsequent ontological distinction
between before and after. This allows me to take on issues of loss and liminality as well
as to introduce the themes of memory and continuity which will structure the rest of this
study.
1. ethnic cleansing as a war objective and a war strategy
If the late 1980s and the early 1990s brought nationalism to the forefront as the
legitimate public discourse on identity in all Yugoslav republics, this was quickly
translated onto a party-political level. Elections brought victory for parties with
nationalist programs in all republics, with the results in heavily mixed Bosnia resembling
those of a population count on the basis of national affinity. As we have seen, in a
euphoric climate legitimised by referenda, Croatia, Slovenia and, later, Bosnia declared
independence and the Yugoslav federation fell apart at the seams. War, once more,
seemed to be the continuation of politics by other means. The 'war in former
Yugoslavia', as it is often referred to, actually consisted of a series of different armed
1 La Haine © 1995 Productions Lazennec.
2 Tom Waits, from the album Swordfishtrombones © 1983 Island Records.
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conflicts: a 10 day war in Slovenia; a long war for territory in Croatia; a gruesome and
exhausting war in Bosnia (itself consisting of several conflicts); and, finally (?), a war
over Kosovan sovereignty.
Since others have written extensively on these wars, I will only mention one aspect of
the post-Yugoslav violence, referred to in the phrase it added to many people's
vocabulary: 'ethnic cleansing' (Ahmed 1995). This term is, of course, a euphemism for
campaigns of expulsion, deportation, rape, killing, burning and looting. It is often
represented as a result of the war operations in former Yugoslavia and, therefore, as a
consequence of a struggle over other issues. I would argue that ethnic cleansing was at
the root of the post-Yugoslav wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. Evidence suggests
that these wars were, amongst other things, organised attempts to create more or less
ethnically homogenous territories (as argued convincingly by Glenny 1993; Silber and
Little 1995; Duijzings 2000:59-60). This view could be supported by the fact that the
fighting stopped only when massive displacement [had] resulted in more or less
discrete territories with largely homogenous populations in national terms.
On the ground, ethnic cleansing took many different forms—from relatively 'silent',
individual movements to outright terror—but it always aimed at creating such
homogenous ethnic islands 3 . This might also help us to explain in part why many of the
war operations were so deliberately gruesome 4 : the more horrific the violence, the less
likely that the displaced would return afterwards (Sofos 1996:86). In this way, we can
detect two important characteristics of the post-Yugoslav wars: first, that these were
mainly wars involving (para)military forces against civilians; and, second, that they were
led by men with maps and statistics in their heads. Ethnic cleansing, then, was
simultaneously a war objective and a war strategy.
2. stru qciles for definition: what was it all about?
Even if few post-Yugoslays would deny that ethnic cleansing was part of the wars that
brought an end to the federation, there was very little agreement on the actual nature of
those wars. There was little consensus concerning what was at stake in the conflicts,
what kind of wars they were, what were the actual events, who was the aggressor and
who the victim. An interesting way of looking at this meta-conflict is offered in
Bourdieu's theorisation of legitimacy (1984:255-258). He argues that every struggle
contains a debate about the terms on which the conflict is waged, which terminology is
used, what is considered a legitimate cause and so on. This is a struggle to define what
the conflict is about. In everyday life, people often reach some sort of agreement on
this, what Bourdieu calls an implicit consensus on the rules of the game, a common
ground on how to wage the conflict.
In the case of the post-Yugoslav wars, there were elements of such an implicit
consensus, superbly parodied in Figure One by the ferociously critical Croatian weekly,
Feral Tribune. When it became clear that the Serbian and Croatian regimes were
conducting secret meetings in order to strike a deal over the division of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the paper published a frontpage photo montage of Miloeviá and Tudman
naked in bed. The caption read: 'Is this what we've been fighting for'? Note that this was
published at a time when a large part of what is now Croatia was controlled and
ethnically cleansed by Serbian (para)military forces, and when a multi-faceted war was
raging in neighbouring Bosnia.
For an ethnographic example of the former see Duijzings (2000:45-52), and for a retrospective ethnography of the
latter see Jansen (2000b).
A related reason often put forward in local anti-nationalist narratives explains the extent of the horror with reference
to the lack of strong differences and the prevalence of similarities amongst the fighting 'nations (contrary to common
Western European and North American beliefs). This seems to converge, at least on the level of resulting
explanations, with Harisson's interesting insights on identity as a scarce resource (1999).
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JESL :oLIsE
ZATO BORILI?
:'
Figure One (Feral Tribune 432, 28/12/93:1)
If all the regimes involved in the post-
Yugoslav conflict relied primarily on a
nationalist programme normatively linking
territory and nation (Gellner 1983:53-58),
there was little agreement on the nature of
the wars. This is important, because the
representation of the conflicts was part of an
effort to galvanise mass support at home and
moral, diplomatic and material recognition
and legitimacy in international relations.
Therefore, although the post-Yugoslav wars
were obviously about power, influence,
money and so on, they were also about the
power to name things, about definition, itself.
With substantial differences between the
warring 'nations' being few and far between,
the struggle for definition of the conflict
became a central feature of the post-
Yugoslav wars (Campbell 1998; Kaldor
1993; Koch 1992). The importance of this
struggle, I believe, is underestimated in
many analyses of the break-up of
Yugoslavia. In what follows, I shall mention
some patterns of definition in order to pave
the way for the ensuing analysis of anti
-nationalist discursive practices.
First of all, there were deep divisions between dominant definitions of the wars of the
different national groups. Representations were strongly embedded in the different
discourses of nationalism, and the regimes went to lengths to ensure that this remained
the case with regard to facts as well as to naming. In terms of actual events, in Serbia it
was not uncommon to hear people argue that Sarajevo was never under any Serbian
siege, and in Croatia many people denied the existence of Croatian prisoner camps for
Bosniacs in Bosnia. As for naming, dominant Croatian representations would include at
least some of the following terms: Greater Serbia, expansionism, self-determination,
defence, cultural differences, a clash of civilisations, Islamic Fundamentalism, 'Europe'
and 'Balkan'. Serbian nationalist representations would centre upon at least some of
the following key words: secession, fascism, Islamic Fundamentalism, defence,
federation, cultural similarities, clash of civilisations, 'Europe', Croatian expansionism
and civil war. Clearly, there were overlaps between the opposing dominant nationalist
representations of the wars as well as diametrically opposed definitions. Hence, the two
sides could, at times, employ an identical terminology by attaching different meanings
to the same words.
Importantly, the terms in which the wars were defined had thorough implications for
attributing blame. The importance of the actual words was illustrated, for example, by
the fact that the very use of the term 'civil war' was considered betrayal in the Croatian
context because it implied a potential delegitimation of Croatian nationalism. Framing
the conflict in terms of civil war, it was argued, meant failing to make the crucial
distinction between the aggressor-Serbs and the victims-Croats. This was extremely
common, also amongst those critical of nationalism. Not a day went by during my time
in Croatia without some public denunciation of somebody who had 'equated the
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aggressor and the victim' (e.g. Lovriô 1997b; Ese 1997). Even the Supreme Judge of
Croatia flatly denied the possibility of Croats committing war crimes because they only
defended themselves. There was widespread protest against extraditing indicted war
criminals because that would entail 'judging the whole Croatian nation'. In Serbia, there
was less fuss about this: co-operation with the Den Haag Tribunal was even further off,
and the official line on the wars was a blatant denial of any involvement by 'Serbia'.
The struggle for definition also took place on a second level: there were contradictions
between representations of the wars within the two national groups as well. First of all,
some limited debate took place on the public level, mainly between the diverging
nationalisms of government and opposition. Secondly, in most people's
representations, the conflicts took on a different nature in different places and at
different points in time. For example, some oppositional Croats saw the Croatian war as
a legitimate defensive operation against Serbian aggression, while they condemned
Croatian involvement in the Bosnian wars. Thirdly, it should be noted that many citizens
simultaneously held very divergent views, which were not necessarily logically
consistent. Finally, and most importantly, when addressing the war, many people
remained vague and general or simply reproduced some powerful storylines.
At least three notions seemed to play a central role in these storylines: defence,
righteousness, and misunderstanding. The large majority in both Serbia and Croatia
emphasised the defensive nature of their cause: they argued that fear left 'them' (i.e.
their nation) no choice but to protect themselves and their families. Another important
common denominator was a belief in the righteousness of their cause: most people in
all republics claim that they (i.e. again, their nation) only wanted their fair share and
nothing more. Finally, it was common practice to lament an alleged lack of
understanding and unfair treatment by the outside world. As a corollary of these
assertions, the post-Yugoslav wars were almost always defined as an attack by
national Others, who were after more than their fair share and who were favoured by
the international community. Years of authoritarian policies, war and nationalist
propaganda reinforced these representations and had the homogenising effect of a
high level of discursive closure. A variety of elements were articulated into moments of
pervasive discourses, elevating them in different versions to a certain level of doxa
(Bourdieu and Eagleton 1994:266-272).
3. anti-nationalist narratives of the wars
One of the crucial characteristics of what I call anti-nationalist discursive practice was
its deviant definition of the wars—resisting the discursive closure aimed for by
nationalism and subverting its doxa. A key concept in anti-nationalist representations of
the post-Yugoslav wars was nationalism and its role in the competition for power. In a
post-Cold War context, it was then argued, hunger for power led a number of ruthless
politicians of different nationalities, first Serbian, then Croatian, then Bosnian and so on,
to deploy nationalism as an instrument to mobilise mass support. Nationalism was
driven to its extremes and it resulted in a strategic program of creating ethnically clean
states. In dominant representations, employing the notion of nationalism in defining the
wars was not uncommon in itself, but, ironically, in most cases the charge of
nationalism was only hurled at the national Others. However, there were dissident
variations emphasising that the aggressors were nationalists of all sides, whereas the
victims were non- and anti-nationalist civilians who were affected by these policies, with
special attention to refugees, people in mixed marriages and, to a certain extent,
minorities.
The centrality of the concept of nationalism in representations of the post-Yugoslav
On the difficulties of writing ethnography in such a situation, see Feldman, Prica and Senkoviô (eds) 1993;
JambreiO-Kirin & Povrzanoviô (eds) 1996; see Povrzanovió 2000.
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wars was fairly widespread amongst many critical and well-informed foreign observers;
of course, often in conjunction with other lines of explanation. Apart from avoiding the
trap of attributing blame in an exclusively national manner, it conveniently resonated
with received anthropological insights into the essentialising practices of nationalism,
always by Others, of course. However, in the post-Yugoslav states, applying the notion
of nationalism to one's own group was a strongly marginalised view which was often
considered a form of betrayal. As we have seen, a wide variety of definitions of the
wars were put forward, and most people relied on different versions at any one time. In
doing so, putting all the blame on politicians was a very widespread phenomenon, but it
was much less common to address the success of nationalist discourses amongst
one's own wider population.
In such a context, defining the wars in terms of conflicting nationalisms (and not just
that of the national Others) was in itself a dissident practice. Such a critical approach
was held only by a small number of dissidents and it was rarely publicly stated. In this
way, taking up this mode of representing the post-Yugoslav wars constituted a form of
anti-nationalist altérité, subverting the legitimacy of dominant definitions. This, again,
illustrates the point made throughout this study, that marginal discursive practices of
anti-nationalism can only be understood in light of their focal counterpoints, the
discourses of nationalism.
During and after the post-Yugosla ys wars, then, a number of dissident discursive
practices were developed in response to both Croatian and Serbian nationalism 6. They
articulated a whole range of elements into an alternative discourse of identity; some of
those elements were differently incorporated as moments into nationalism as well, and
some were not. We shall see how gender differences, for example, had been
articulated into nationalism through essentialised notions of masculinity and femininity,
and how a number of women reformulated them differently into a subversive discursive
practice. In this way, both in Serbia and Croatia, a critique of patriarchy and notions of
women's solidarity provided a whole feminist reservoir of material which was articulated
into anti-nationalist discursive practices.
In the capitals of these two republics in particular, citizens engaged in a range of Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) dedicated to peace protest, dialogue projects,
humanitarian work with refugees and so on. Through their work, many NGOs, although
by no means all of them, tried to develop solutions different from the prevalent
nationalist policies. On the level of identification, the very act of working in certain
organisations provided alternative routes of narrating one's story of self, as well as
publicly locating oneself in opposition to nationalism in the eyes of others. This links in
with the strategies of identification developed by some intellectuals and artists, who,
regardless of their nationality, engaged in public fora, associations of independent
intellectuals, and artistic centres, all of which were positioned as anti-nationalist. In
these cases, the very notion of dissidence, with its connotations of anti-authoritarianism
and critical thinking, was often elevated to a resource for anti-nationalist discourses.
More straightforwardly engaging in identity bricolage were younger people in Beograd
and Zagreb, who turned to the rich reservoir of (mostly 'Western') youth subcultures.
For some of them, those subcultural (life)styles and politics served as an alternative
form of identification, associated with opposition and rebellion to the dominant
nationalisms. A current theme here was anti-fascism, which was also evoked by older
people who retained an attachment to the tradition of Yugoslav anti-fascism. Despite
deep ambiguities in the ways they were deployed in the post-Yugoslav context, both
youth subcultures and Partisan anti-fascism could therefore provide certain people with
material for anti-nationalist identification.
This is by no means an exhaustive list of anti-nationalist identification in Serbia and
Croatia (another example that springs to mind is regional attachments and localism,
especially in the Croatian peninsula of Istra). Many unarticulated evocations of anti-
6 For an overview of anti-nationalist oppositional groups in Croatia, see Jansen 1 998b.
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nationalism existed, and their impact in the long term should not be underestimated.
Moreover, it is important to understand that every one of the elements constituting
these alternatives could be articulated into entirely different discourses, some
supporting the nationalist causes and others functioning on another level altogether,
possibly having little or nothing to do with processes of identification.
Another point should be made here: ultimately, individuals engaged in acts of
identification and narrated their stories of selves. I have given this sketchy overview of
some anti-nationalists, rather than anti-nationalist discourses, in order to give the
reader an idea about what kind of individuals we are dealing with. This might create the
wrong impression that this study posits a rigid categorisation of post-Yugoslays into
nationalists and anti-nationalists. To argue that would mean scoring an own-goal in
many ways: ethnographically, it would be a denial of the complexity of the whole post-
Yugoslav situation; theoretically, it would entail misunderstanding the endless series of
ambiguities running through the discursive field ranging from nationalism to anti-
nationalism; and politically, it would miss the point of a critical look at anti-nationalist
discursive practice entirely. The explicit focus of this study is on the reservoir of
dissident discursive practices which were available, and on the myriad ways in which
they could be approached, deployed, modified and even subverted. Most of the
protagonists in this study alternately or simultaneously tapped into a whole set of
discourses, and their narratives of self articulated those elements into hybrids which
were unique, individual and theirs.
4. broken narratives: before and after
What is past is not dead; it is not even past.
We cut ourselves off from it; we pretend to be strangers.
Christa Wolf- A Model Childhood
The dramatic changes in what was once Yugoslavia were experienced most severely
by people who were directly and physically affected by the wars that turned the
federation into independent states. Regardless of debates on just how harmonious
inter-national relations in Yugoslavia were, it is clear that there was at least a relative
absence of violence between people of different nationalities. The wars of the 1990s,
which included extreme brutality on a national basis, saw hundreds of thousands,
mainly civilians, murdered, driven out of their homes, raped, tortured, imprisoned,
sacked from their jobs or otherwise abused. Many 'ordinary men' engaged in killing,
raping, and looting for the first time in their lives (see Browning 1992).
These unspeakable horrors, although often co-ordinated in the Serbian and Croatian
capitals were, of course, concentrated in certain geographical areas in Croatia and
Bosnia, outside of these capitals. However, the violence resulted in massive
displacement for many post-Yugoslays in a wide range of ways, and the millions who
lost their homes7 were followed by millions of others who found themselves
metaphorically homeless (Jansen 1998a). This experience of a defining narrative break
was exceptionally strong amongst those who mounted opposition to the dominant
nationalist discourses. This became particularly clear in the stories of people who had
spent some time abroad and returned home. A typical comment, at the start of my
fieldwork, came from Maja, a Serbian woman who had spent a number of the war years
in Scandinavia as an au-pair and as a student and who had recently returned. Highly
educated and multilingual, Maja was now unemployed and living with her parents in
Central Serbia. We met socially, sometimes in her village and sometimes in the city,
when she would be there for business. Like so many other people, Maja made a little
Almost two million in Bosnia-Herzegovina alone (2unec 1997:33; Kasapoviô 1996; see also Praso 1996; PetretiO
1995).
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money through postsocialist, nylon-bag capitalism, in her case a minor textile trade
venture on the Istanbul-Beograd line. It was one of those days when Beograd really
looked like the poverty-stricken city it often succeeded in disguising under a stylish
promenade. The weather was miserable with brown heaps of melting snow everywhere
and money-changers, cigarette vendors and beggars shivering in the cold. While
guiding me through the crowds at one of the bus terminals, Maja disapprovingly pointed
around her and told me that when she had first returned to Serbia, she had been 'like
me', 'like a foreigner'. She had looked around in disbelief, for this was not how she
remembered the country she had left.
Even when not physically displaced or otherwise directly affected by military violence,
many people felt dislocated by the symbolic violence of nationalism. Of course, the
transition towards independent successor states also relied on elements of continuity.
But even these bridging links often emphasised rather than undermined a strong sense
of before and after—a break which, in this case, was incorporated into narratives as a
defining moment. In Serbia, we had the declared Yugoslavism of MiloeviO's regime
and the widespread feeling amongst the Serbian population that some things hadn't
changed at all ('communists' in power, corruption, nepotism, etc.); similar opinions
about the ruling elite were voiced by Croatian citizens. In both cases these feelings
went side-by-side with experiences of a near-total break.
Not surprisingly, certainly amongst those critical of nationalism, there was a sense of
too little change, of missed opportunities. These people often thought change was
desirable, but not the kind of change that was forced upon them. When experienced
through an anti-nationalist perspective, most of the breaks with the Yugoslav past were
either catastrophic (nationalist homogenisation, xenophobia, violence, isolation etc.), or
completely beside the point (ceremonial national euphoria, self-congratulating rhetoric
by the elite, cosmetic changes, etc.). However, the debate about whether the recent
changes were seen as a positive or a negative evolution was second only to a
widespread feeling of confusion and disorientation. I have mentioned before that, apart
from in intentionally analytical comments, people rarely, if ever, referred to the wider
picture of the post-Yugoslav wars in anything more detailed than general, vague terms.
Everyday conversations both in Serbia and in Croatia mentioned them simply as 'the
war' ('rat, or even more commonly, one avoided the word altogether and spoke about
'all this' ('sve ovo), or 'this shit' ('otto sranje.
This sweeping vagueness doesn't imply that the post-Yugoslav wars were insignificant
in people's lives. Quite the contrary, throughout my fieldwork I was struck by the extent
to which 'this shit' took centre stage in many people's experiences of self. Invirtually all
spheres of post-Yugoslav life, from the dizzy heights of presidential power to the nitty-
gritty of everyday life, narratives were structured around, or better, by this defining
break. The idea of before and after did not just serve as a chronological narrative
mechanism—it was a defining element in the construction of meaning within different
contexts. Despite its divergent, contested interpretations and the absence of discursive
closure, the omnipresence of that narrative break had profound implications.
How did this come about in the case of post-Yugoslav anti-nationalist discursive
practice? Through narrative, people can divide time into periods and structure it around
key events which give meaning to that narrative. As Portelli argues, a narrator chooses
a unit of time in order to structure a story, and these units can be related to different
spheres of life, such as individual health, employment, family, politics and so on (Portelli
1981). Of course, the identity narratives of post-Yugoslav citizens did contain reference
to breaks of an individual or family nature, such as births, deaths, moving house,
beginnings and endings of love affairs, studies and jobs. However, these largely private
narrative ruptures were often overshadowed by the grand events of the last decade.
When experienced through nationalist discursive practice, this provided an opportunity
to reinterpret individual narratives and insert them into larger contexts of, for example,
National History. However, in the realm of anti-nationalist discourses, it implied at least
some sense of loss, of being stripped of one's individuality and normality. Branka was a
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young woman whose parents, like many of their generation in Croatia, had felt
themselves to be 'Yugoslays' only to be now, willy-nilly, thrown back on their Serbian
background. She complained about many things: she didn't like her studies, nor her job
in a feminist campaigning group, nor her colleagues—in short, she didn't like her life in
Zagreb. She achingly longed for what she called 'a normal life'.
Despite enormously different interpretations, in order to come to any kind of
understanding of post-Yugoslav realities, I had to come to grips with this pervasive
experience of a division into before and after. The power of this narrative break was
underlined by its often implicit omnipresence and by the fact that 'before' was almost
never specified as 'before the war', but simply 'before' (pre/prije). As I shall argue in the
next chapter, only with the advent of nationalism and war most (post-)Yugoslays were
called upon to empathically position themselves in relation to 'the national question'.
And precisely because it was only then that nationalism, as it were, 'interpellated' them,
I believe we have to focus on discursive practices of identity rather than on deeply
ingrained beliefs of belonging. To put it bluntly, my schematic continuum between
nationalist and anti-nationalist discursive practice only makes sense when seen in the
light of this defining break: war and the very rise of the nationalism.
5. coping with experiences of loss
In post-Yugoslav everyday narratives of before and after, the break was usually
understood as something that overcame a person, that happened to people. Many
spoke of the feeling that nothing was the same as before and that, around them,
everything had changed. In anti-nationalist narratives, the emphasis was plainly on
loss. Especially in Beograd, where the socio-economic state was disastrous, few
conversations about the current situation would go by without a reference to the fact
that one was better-off before. An extreme but not exceptional example was provided
by Biljana, a Serbian refugee from Zagreb who lived in Beograd. Her losses throughout
the war included socio-economic security (both parents lost their jobs), housing, all
material possessions apart from two suitcases, her country (she identified as
Yugoslav), her freedom to travel (she had no papers) and much more. Strikingly,
however, throughout our conversations, Biljana rarely complained about that. Rather,
she said she missed her friends in Zagreb, and she regretted the fact that her brother
had started speaking as an ardent Serbian nationalist. But more than anything else,
even after six years, she mourned the loss of 'her' Zagreb, which she continued to refer
to as 'my city' because 'they can't take that away from me'.
Biljana also mourned the loss of her photographs—those visual embodiments of her
past, records of her life course. The loss of 'her' Zagreb illustrates how many post-
Yugoslays felt robbed of more than just their material and social security. They also had
to cope with the disappearance of certain points of reference which had been implicitly
central to their lives and which had provided a sense of existential or ontological
security (Giddens 199147ff). In the words of the writer Slavenka Drakuliô:
'I feel robbed of my past, my childhood, my education, my memories and sentiments, as if
my whole life has been wrong, one big mistake, a lie and nothing else. I'm a loser, indeed
we are all losers at the moment.'
(Drakuliô 1993a:57-58)
The outburst of nationalism was often explained as a thoroughly destabilising
phenomenon which took people by surprise. The extent to which the wars could take
people by surprise was illustrated by the following story: in 1991, a whole group of
Beograd friends had planned a boat holiday off the Croatian coast. They booked a boat
and had paid in advance when trouble was rising in Croatia. But even then, in 1991,
they did not cancel the holiday but tried to postpone it for a year. What I am arguing
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here is that, on top of the enormous losses of lives and livelihoods, the wars that put an
end to Yugoslavia also brought a sudden sense of mental disorientation for many
people. In the words of dissident writer Ugreiá: 'Suddenly the environment that was
yours, isn't yours anymore' (Feral Tribune 05/10/98:38). In the cities away from the
frontlines, for many people who had constructed their experiences in varying degrees
through anti-nationalist discursive practice, actual measurable losses were often less
important than the symbolic and emotional losses to do with friendships, memories,
identities, beliefs, hopes and ideals 8 . The fact that photos were often presented as key
objects puts this in context since they can be seen as material records, evocative of
what was lost.
6. 'everything went mad': the liminality of life during wartime
It is important here to note that in many cases people saw a whole set of the changes
that took place in their lives during the last decade as very positive: a national state of
their own, a market economy, multi-party elections, etc. However, not surprisingly, anti-
nationalist discourses paint an overwhelmingly negative final balance. Even if they
pointed to certain improvements on ten years earlier, they would often emphasise the
fact that all these things would have also been possible without war, destruction and
hatred. In post-Yugoslav anti-nationalist narratives, the period of the wars, 'this shit',
occupied a place of liminality of sorts (Turner 1969:81). The 1990s constituted a period
when all rules of normal human behaviour, of civilisation and of everyday life were
disregarded and madness ruled. In this approach, through the frequent use of terms
such as 'normality' and 'sanity', it was made clear that the war was simply beyond
understanding (Jansen 1998a:102-105).
This reminded me of a scene in Aleksandar Tima's powerful novel The Use of Man,
where Sep Lenart, who worked as an executioner in the Nazi camps, talks to his
Jewish brother-in-law Kroner. Drunk and hysterical, Lenart recounts how he executed
large groups of Jews like an automaton, but Kroner obstinately refuses to believe him
and clings to the idea that Lenart must be mad because 'if he is not insane, if anything
at all in his whole story was true, then the world would be insane, and that was
something Kroner could not accept, because he still felt part of the world' (Tima
1990:76). Similarly, in anti-nationalist discursive practice, one could grasp the war's
geopolitical scheming, its ideological underpinnings, its resonances with patriarchy and
ethnocentrism, even the power hunger of its protagonists; but one could never
understand the war itself nor the fact that hatred and cruelty had been elevated to the
level of normality. Zorica, for example, a middle-aged NGO worker with a Croatian
background who lived and worked in Beograd, found herself estranged from the very
logic of nationalism. In the blistering heat of a Beograd Spring, she agreed to meet me
for a chat about my work, and over lunch on a tree-shaded terrace, she warned me
straight away that national identity didn't mean anything to her. She simply didn't
understand it. For her, Zorica argued, there were just different people: good people and
bad people, unconnected with nationality.
Similarly, the 1992 Beograd film Geto, by Miaden Matiëeviá and Ivana Marka, a
documentary testifying to the despair of the city's alternative art scene, echoes Zorica in
one of its main lines of thought:
'This is Beograd. The city in which they live. And so do we. They have no dilemmas about
what to do, but we are undecided. We don't know what to do.'
There were some strong differences between Serbia and Croatia in this respect. In
8 In later sections we shall see how anti-nationalist narratives often centre upon representations of loss and recovery
of personhood, of the city, of 'Europe' and so on.
78
Croatia, the dominant discourses increasingly incorporated what were called 'generally
accepted', 'European', or 'world standard' rules of behaviour. Through Croatian
nationalism a concerted effort was made to construct the war as a founding moment
and a clear break with 'Balkan' oppression: it was a liminal period after which a new
Croatian identity was to be integrated within what was seen as accepted 'Western'
codes, at least on the rhetorical level. In Serbia this was much less the case, and I
found a pervasive sense of ongoing experiences of liminality, which was later
reinforced by the Kosovo crisis and NATO air strikes (Jansen and Spasiá 2000). It
seemed that normality had been suspended for an indefinite period of time, and people
often indicated that they didn't foresee an end anytime in the near future.
In this liminal state of affairs, I was often assured,nothing remained the same. Reality
was ruled by different codes, and therefore it would be very difficult for someone who
hadn't been there to understand anything about the war (see van de Port 1999). Both in
Serbia and in Croatia, I was often reminded that retrospective judgement was
impossible because the situation was out of touch with 'normal' ideas of right or wrong,
of possible or impossible. This pervasive experience of liminality was a serious problem
for post-Yugoslays who worked towards a better understanding of the war and towards
dialogue and peace. Their interventions were more often than not discarded; it was as if
anything they could possibly refer to which was not part of war and nationalist rhetoric
was always already boxed and labelled: N/A.
However, often even those who were involved in anti-nationalist activism referred to the
suspension of normality when explaining certain issues regarding the war. This was
illustrated sharply on the occasion where Jadranka, a girl who had lived abroad for
twelve years, joined the Zagreb NGO dialogue project in which I also participated.
Jadranka, highly educated and well travelled, was clearly from a privileged family
background. Her parents had bought her a flat in Zagreb which we, as her colleagues
in the NGO project, helped to decorate. Afterwards, covered in paint and dust from the
furniture, the whole gang sat down and chatted over a couple of beers. Jadranka was
keen to talk about issues of war and nationalism—in itself an unusual move, but not for
a recent returnee. She spoke in very general terms, detached from the specific
experience of war in Croatia. One of the men present had a Bosniac background and
we discussed his troubles with the Croatian administration and its mechanisms of
bureaucratic ethnic cleansing. Jadranka, wanting only the best for him, reproached him
for being unassertive and crudely made clear that he should have stood up for his
rights. In a context of increasing embarrassment due to our hostess' behaviour, our
colleague Suzana, herself from a mixed family in the war zone, intervened. Even
though visibly furious, she attempted to defuse the situation by telling Jadranka that
assertivity and standing up for one's rights might have worked in a normal situation, but
that at that time nothing had been normal anymore. Tactfully she reminded Jadranka
that she had left the country long ago. During the war everything was crazy, Suzana
said, and previous codes of normality did not count anymore. One simply had to live
with madness as if it were normal.
Importantly, Turner's analysis of the ritual process highlights the liminal experience of
'communitas', of 'intense comradeship and egalitarianism' (1969:81). In the post-
Yugoslav context, life during wartime was certainly not a complete suspension of
hierarchical rank and status, but there was a sense of chaos and people found it hard
to make sense of anything at all. Turner's insights on communitas shed light on this
situation in many ways, both with regard to nationalist and anti-nationalist practice. The
dominant discourses represented post-Yugoslav nations as discrete collectivities of
equals united by pervasive solidarity, but also by submissiveness and silence (Turner
1969:89). However, this was only partly reflected in everyday lives, and often even
overturned as soon as the national Others were out of the picture. During my fieldwork
in Serbia, for example, some people laughingly apologised for subjecting me to a
never-ending series of stories about life during wartime, especially 'inflation stories',
characterised by underdog solidarity, sarcastic humour and jokes about the Serbian
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regime itself (see Jansen 2000a). The latter phenomenon was also prominent in wider
post-Yugoslav anti-nationalist narratives of life during wartime, which centred upon
memories of small-group feelings of communitas. This was illustrated in the stories of
many NGO-activists, who recalled isolation and confusion but also solidarity amongst
their immediate colleagues and friends, stories complemented by memories of surreal
parties and self-deprecating humour.
Because of its marginal status in the post-Yugoslav context, anti-nationalist discursive
practice itself was to a certain extent structured as a liminal engagement in liminal
spaces. Myerhoff has pointed out that in these situations, people often construct
contrasting discourses of moral superiority and structural inferiority (Myerhoff
1986:272). Such discourses frequently rely on a claim of validity and applicability to a
wider context than the dominant discourse and, possibly, even to the whole of humanity
(Turner 1969:98). In later sections I show how this was the case in post-Yugoslav anti-
nationalist discourses, conveying supranational ideas of feminism, urbanism, anti-
fascism etc.
7. memory and continuity in anti-nationalist discursive strategies
We have seen how Croatian and Serbian nationalisms articulated their versions of the
Yugoslav past through different degrees of official amnesia. That in itself was not a new
phenomenon. Official Titoist representations of history were also based on a selective
reading of previous events, which is why the (re)construction of certain WWII memories
played an important part in the nationalist upsurge that led to their demise. However,
the deployment of memory as a strategy of resistance was also incorporated into anti-
nationalist discursive practices of subverting the post-Yugoslav amnesia.
In that way, memories informed both public discourses of anti-nationalism and
alternative everyday life narratives. In the Bosnian town of Tuzia, for example, an anti-
nationalist poster campaign remembered one of the most important holidays of the
former Yugoslavia. The poster simply contained the date of Tito's birthday, known as
the 'Day of Youth', and the words 'It is human to remember'. But also on a personal
level, many people expressed their disgust at what they considered to be the overnight
mass-conversion of large parts of the population to nationalism. For example, in the
early 1990s, the successful actress Mira Furlan was subjected to a media witch-hunt,
relying on a vicious combination of nationalism and sexism. She left Croatia and talked
about her experiences in an interview with a dissident Croatian newspaper. She
deserves quoting at length:
'It is amazing to see how people forget with indescribable speed. Memories are being
erased and nothing is important anymore. Who did what, who said what, who wrote what,
it all becomes completely irrelevant. Everything will in the end be levelled, nobody will
remember anything"
As for me, I had to chose between a range of possibilities that were all equally
unacceptable to me, that were completely out of touch with my life and my thinking. I had
no real choice [...] In fact, I have in the end decided to remain myself.
[. .
And now, the people who haven't calculated in this war, those who didn't try to please the
new regimes, those who are the last ones to stay themselves for themselves, precisely
those people are proclaimed whores and betrayers, and others are patriots and heroes.'
(Feral Tribune 14/12/98:4-7)
This quote illustrates how the notion of large numbers of people turning their coats so
drastically and so easily constituted an important counterpoint for representations of
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self9 . Another example can be found in the words of singer-songwriter Dore Balaeviô,
a prominent critic of the nationalisms that made an end of Yugoslavia:
'You can be beaten in the elections, you can lose out in a lot of things... [...] but there will
always remain normal people.'
(Globus 15/01/93:21)
In most anti-nationalist narratives, people would stress that they stayed the same
despite changes in the context and the people around them, thereby emphasising
continuity in their personal stories. This was made clear in the following extract from an
interview with a prominent Beograd-based dissident intellectual. We first attended a
book launch in one of Beograd's more fashionable theatres, and then moved on to a
terrace nearby, where we spoke for several hours.
Stef: 'You mentioned earlier that you have a lot of contact with people in other republics.
How did that evolve? Did it ever pose a problem?'
Slavko: 'It never really was a problem. From the very beginning I have been very critical of
what was going on here. I have publicly spoken up against it, I have written about it,
here, in other republics, and abroad. I think that was important. My friends and the
people I know there saw that I spoke up against it. We are experiencing very dark
times. But even in those times there are moral patterns, principles,... So in that
way, my friends in other republics knew ... I haven't changed. Many people have
changed, for many different reasons. But I don't think that I have changed. Of
course it has been hard sometimes. I lost my job, I was unemployed for two years, I
have a family... But I did not get any bombs on my head like my friends in Croatia
or in Bosnia, so ... In times like these, it becomes clear who is who. Some people
who seemed cowards turned out to be courageous, and some people who seemed
courageous turned out to be cowards.'
This strategy of narrative continuity on the personal level was often reinforced by an
attempted assertion of everyday life normality as a way of coping with the suspension
of normality on the public level. Time routines, hobbies, work habits as well as a more
general disbelief in the surrounding events could serve as such strategies. In Serbia,
especially, this resulted in widespread scepticism about anything public ('all lies') and
often plain withdrawal. In a climate of extreme media manipulation, many people prided
themselves on never reading newspapers or watching TV news reports. Often, as a
result of disorientation and war-tiredness this attitude translated itself into apathy, as
illustrated in this typical e-mail extract from Mira, a Montenegrin lawyer whom I'd met on
a human rights course in Beograd:
Stef: 'What's going on in the Montenegrin elections?'
Mira: 'It's a beautiful day today. Let's not spoil it by talking about that shit.'
This withdrawal, then, allows for certain highly individual strategies of mental survival,
based on narrative continuity. In the previously mentioned documentary Geto, the
protagonist-cum-narrator's very last line is:
'The only wish I still have is to keep my soul in this madness.'
At this point, I would like to point out a paradox of post-Yugoslav anti-nationalism. One
could wonder why, unlike in many lines of dissent within alternative or, dare I say,
progressive politics elsewhere, we don't find the same predominance of discourses of
change and renewal here. Of course, on the level of societal discourses, post-Yugoslav
anti-nationalism did argue very explicitly for change and a 'fresh start', but throughout
this study it is clear that on the individual level they played a smaller role. In post-
More examples, including many from Beograd, will be given in the Chapter Ten.
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Yugoslav anti-nationalist discursive practice, I argue, narratives of self focused on the
opposite pole of continuity. A variety of reasons existed for this, but I believe that,
again, it was mainly a consequence of anti-nationalism's reactive nature, i.e. the fact
that it was conditioned strongly by its counterpoint and its raison d'être: Serbian and
Croatian nationalism. While asserting continuity on a grand level of history, these
dominant nationalisms relied strongly on the above-mentioned narrative break with
regard to everyday life—to the extent that they almost colonised the discursive material
concerning change. Dissident discursive practice, then, often focused on its opposite,
continuity, so that mundane memories of personal experience and everyday practices
of all sorts became crucial instruments of resistance10.
10 This will be discussed in detail when addressing the notion of JugonostaIga.
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[chapter six]
national identity before and after:
anti-nationalist everyday perspectives
Bosnia, 1980s. The census man comes knocking on the door of a Gypsy man. 'What
nationality are you, comrade?' he asks. 'I'm a Gypsy', says the man. 'I see,' probes
the official, 'But what sort of a Gypsy? A Serbian Gypsy? A Muslim Gypsy? Or a
Croatian Gypsy?' 'Hey', the man retorts angrily 'I am not that much of a Gypsy!'
At this point in the text I want to step back, look at the work done so far and ask myself:
why does this study seem so preoccupied with changes? Changes in themselves are a
completely normal and banal part of social reality, and if all I end up saying is that they
had a more extreme character in my fieldwork setting than in many other places, that
seems a thin argument. In this chapter, I ethnographically explore one crucial aspect of
post-Yugos!av dynamics: recent everyday life changes with regard to national
identification.
Much has been written about national identities in Yugoslavia, but even most critical
observers who have focused on their constructedness either assumed that they were
always an issue already, or conversely, argued that national identities were virtually
absent from Yugoslav everyday life. I find both approaches problematic for they seem
to share an implicit focus on the fixity of national identification—the debate revolves
around the question whether or not national identities existed before. Even in the
recent ethnographic work that has been done in the region (Oale-Feldman et al. 1993;
Jambreió-Kirin & PovrzanoviO 1996; Povrzanoviô 1997), what seems to be missing is
an answer to two crucial questions. First, what was the relative importance of
nationality in relation to a whole series of other distinctions in the former state? And,
secondly, how did national identities become so important that people went to war for
them? Far from claiming to provide definite answers to these questions, I hope to add
to the debate a focus on the changing significance attached to issues of national
identification on an everyday level. The specific case of anti-nationalist discursive
practice sheds a critical light on this question, as does the timing of the research: the
fieldwork was not carried out during Yugoslavia's disintegration, but in the relatively
peaceful years of 1997 (Serbia) and 1998 (Croatia). We are talking about retrospective
narratives here.
In this chapter, I explore the ways in which the anti-nationalist narratives I engaged
with in my fieldwork (re)constructed the changing significance of national identification
on a mundane level. First, working back from individual narratives and locating them
within large-scale developments, I explain how the issue of national identitybecame an
issue in the everyday lives of the people in question. Secondly, I demonstrate how
these narratives are related to representations of life in the former state, both locally
and abroad. Thirdly, I present some detailed examples of the minute ways in which
national identity became an issue in some of the most intimate spheres of life, and I
analyse some mundane anti-nationalist strategies of coping and resistance. Finally, the
ethnographic material feeds into the beginning of a critique of citizenship and political
subjectivity under the former regime.
1. situatinci a story: some Deculiarities of nationality before and after
The extent to which issues of nationality came to dominate large parts of everyday life
was made strikingly clear to me in a long conversation between Suzana and Gordana,
two old schoolmates. Again, the terror of blood-group-thinking enters the story here: it's
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important to know that Suzana had a mixed Serbian-Croatian background and
Gordana was ethnically a Serb. This is my report of that conversation:
We met by coincidence in Zagreb station, waiting for a train—not just any train, but one of
the first post-war trains to Beograd. Suzana and Gordana had grown up in the same town
in a heavily mixed area in Southern Croatia but they hadn't seen each other in 12 years.
Both of them had moved to Zagreb long ago for reasons of study, while their parents
were forced to leave their hometown in 1991. At that time, local Serbian civilians were
being terrorised by radical Croatian militias led by a returned émigré, while the opposite
was taking place in some surrounding villages. Only Suzana's mother, a woman with a
complex national background who identified as a Croat, stayed on and kept her job, even
during the ensuing war when the town was under fire from heavy Serbian artillery.
Gordana broke off her studies and tried her luck in Germany, but she had recently
decided to come back to Zagreb. However, without a degree, being a Serb, she saw no
future there. She had few friends, no prospects, and she wanted to leave—anywhere in
the West would do.
Here I was, sitting in a train compartment with two women from the same town. They
spent their entire youth there. Now, for eight years, they had hardly been there at all and
if they did go, it was reluctantly: Gordana went to pick up some official documents, and
Suzana sometimes visited her mom. As the train crossed Slavonia and we were moving
slowly between the two centres where the post-Yugoslav wars were co-ordinated, the two
women talked—as old schoolmates do—about schoolteachers and friends, about fun at
school, and about subjects they liked or hated. They moved on to who got married and
who got a good job. As it goes.
On the surface, it could have been a conversation between any ex-classmates in the
world on any train. Only it was not. Below the gently flowing small talk there was an
undercurrent of surrealism. Their town had been heavily destroyed during the war, and
furthermore, it had changed dramatically in their minds as well—it had become a
powerful icon of the terror of war and nationalist violence. For every common friend or
acquaintance they mentioned, there were a number of open questions; sometimes they
explicitly asked them, and sometimes they left them hanging in the air, casting their
shadow over their childhood memories. Who lived, who died? Who killed? Who left and
who stayed behind? Of those who left, who left for Zagreb and who left for Beograd? Who
returned and who didn't? As the conversation followed its course, I realised that every
single one of these questions was intimately tied up with the nationality of the people in
question—which left the two women sometimes wondering if some person was a Serb or
a Croat. In most cases they knew, but, in the town of their memories, it was an issue of
minor importance for schoolgirls.
Let us locate this extract within the wider post-Yugoslav developments. We have seen
how both Serbia and Croatia, each in its own way, experienced a dramatic discursive
shift to nationalist representations of identity. For the nationalisms of the 1990s this
represented a change only on the public level—according to them, in the private
sphere national identities had been of enduring importance under the Titoist regime.
Post-Yugoslav nationalisms explained this with contradictory reference to primordial
glorification and to national victimisation. On the one hand, they argued that the
Yugoslav regime attempted to suppress the development of national identities, but that
it failed because those national identities were simply primordial and indelible. On the
other hand, although suppressed, it was argued that nationality was still the basis for
discrimination in and by the former state. In this way, post-Yugoslav nationalist
discourses centred upon opposing national claims of privilege and disadvantage in
Yugoslavia—ultimately, even Yugoslav communism itself was blamed upon national
Others by both Serbian and Croatian nationalists. In other words, the official nationalist
versions of the Yugoslav past claimed that national identities had always been
important, but that 'ours' had been temporarily suppressed by national Others.
When in the late 1980s nationalist leaders articulated exclusionary political discourses
built around the concept of nationality, large parts of the respective populations
welcomed this discursive shift in identification. They deplored the alleged discrimination
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against their nation in the former state, representing the situation before as ruthless
oppression of their identity by communists (who were depicted as national Others, or at
least as controlled by national Others). Reference to this oppression was often
embedded in a wider claim, not uncommon in other postcommunist states, that their
nation suffered from an underdeveloped national consciousness. I was told many times
that, before, most people sadly didn't know anything about their national culture and
history. 'With the end of Yugoslavia', it was often argued, 'we were finally free to find
out about our roots'. The importance of doing this was repeated over and again by
'nationally conscious' people in both Croatia and Serbia, and it often functioned within a
mosaic representation of the world as a 'family of nations' (compare Malkki 1994). For
example, on our visit to a music festival in Central Serbia, Beograd musician Katarina
argued that all people should be more interested in their traditions in order to
understand themselves. She considered the global diversity in 'roots' something to
celebrate. Even five hundred years of Turkish rule and fifty years of communism, she
said, had not erased Serbian traditions! Very much a product of 1980s rock subculture,
Katarina had only recently become fascinated by 'traditional' Serbian music, and she
had since become a well-known figure on the Beograd 'ethno-music' scene. By singing
her 'own' songs, she felt she created a visceral link between herself and the place she
was from, the place that created her.
Interestingly, Katarina saw this attitude as an expression of cosmopolitanism. Through
her engagement in the global 'world music' scene, she had compiled a large record
collection as well as a wide network of contacts and a whole reservoir of knowledge
about different musical traditions spanning all continents. In fact she was the only
singer in South East Europe who commanded the art of diphonic singing—a technique
that had orginated in far-away, Central Asian Tuva. Katarina often juxtaposed her
approach to my views, arguing that one can only respect and love other traditions if
one knows one's own roots. I know where I come from, Katarina argued, and therefore
I know who I am. This point about true cosmopolitanism was a real storyline, which
figured even in extreme nationalist narratives. On an everyday level, many, like
Katarina, explicitly made time to re-educate themselves and learn about their own
national culture without thereby necessarily developing negative attitudes towards
others.
2. understandina evocations of nationalist discourse
2.1. belief, tradition and trauma
This spiritual hunger for 'national tradition' is one of the key factors in the massive
popularity growth of the church in the post-Yugoslav states. Despite great differences
in recent and distant history, the boost in the appeal of the church, particularly amongst
young people, seemed to go hand in hand with a clearly secular lifestyle, both in
largely Catholic Croatia and in largely (Serbian) Orthodox Serbia. The case of Dore
and Milica, a Beograd couple in their late twenties who were heavily into youth
subculture, illustrated this. In a smoky room, with the British cult band Joy Division,
who could hardly be accused of religious conservatism, on the turntable and a pile of
empty bottles on the floor, they subjected me to a speech on the unique role of the
Serbian Orthodox Church in preserving and uniting the Serbian nation under Turkish
and Communist brutality. Allegedly, Tito had wanted to destroy everything Serbian, and
'the Turk' had had only one goal: to make the Serbs into Turks. Thanks only to the
church, they argued, Beograd had not become a Turkish city where women have to
wear veils like in Istanbul.
Of course Dorde and Milica had never been to Istanbul and despite their present
clerical fervour, they could not boast a long history of religious allegiance. Like so many
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other young people, they had only turned to the church very recently 1 . A certain pattern
emerged: young people, whose parents were atheists and whose knowledge of the
bible and of doctrine was minimal, embedded their frequent references to the church
systematically in a national, not religious discourse. Interestingly, this sometimes
brought them closer to their grandparents, who had memories of pre-communist times.
This was also the case with twenty-seven year old Jovan, my language teacher's
partner, who kept a watchful eye on me during the classes I took in their flat in a
Beograd suburb. Jovan was an unemployed Beograclanin with no apparent political or
religious interests. Once, when I sat back over coffee after an exhausting series of
declensions, he told me out of the blue that he'd been baptised the day before.
Startled, I asked him why. He stated that he reckoned it had been time for it. Not the
one to take this for an explanation, I stared at him in wonderment. Jovan then argued
that the Serbs had been under communism for a long time, and that they had
neglected and eventually lost many traditions. In this way, he located his baptism in a
desire to preserve Serbian culture.
Across the border there existed a similar belief that the (Catholic) church had been
historically crucial in preserving cultural continuity in the face of anti-Croatian
oppression. An example was provided in a speech by president Tuman at a
ceremony with high state officials, the archbishop and other top figures of the Catholic
church. Rather than addressing strictly religious affairs, the president emphasised the
role of the church in the historical survival of the Croatian nation, adding, in a speech
some days later before military officials, that the church had a responsibility with regard
to the morale of the Army (see Novi List 01/10/97:2-3; 03/10/97:20-21). Such
clericalism was matched by both church hierarchies, who collapsed the national and
the religious2 in their drive towards discursively closing the equations Serb/Orthodox
and Croat/Catholic. In both Serbia and Croatia, these articulations of nationhood and
religion were widely reproduced through storylines.
Very much in tandem with these evocations of religious worth, the sudden freedom of
expression of the late 1980s saw an upsurge of attention to WWII trauma, both in
public discourse and in the private sphere. I have mentioned above that I feel uneasy
with certain accounts of this period because, while critical, they sometimes unwittingly
verge on essentialising, retrospective ratifications of trauma (Hayden 1994; Denich
1994; see Jansen 2000b). The role of WWII trauma in the post-Yugoslav context was
just as complex as that war itself, as exemplified in a discussion amongst my two
flatmates in Beograd. A couple of around thirty, Vesna hailed from Central Serbia and
Goran from the Northern province of Vojvodina. Both with Serbian national
backgrounds, one set of Goran's grandparents had come from Bosnia after WWII. In
one of our many nightly discussions over coffee and cigarettes, Vesna emphasised the
role played by memories of WWII massacres in the Krajina secession. Such traumas,
she argued, provided political manipulators with a particularly explosive reservoir of
Serbian readiness to go to war. Goran did not agree. By way of example, he said that
1 This did not stop them from responding to my amazement by referring to a deeply ingrained cultural otherness: I
could never understand because I didn't know their history, and, more importantly, I hadn't lived it (see also van de
Port 1999).
2 The Serbian Orthodox Church rarely if ever addresses 'believers, but almost always 'the Serbian people'.
Examples of the ultra-nationalist positions of the Orthodox hierarchy include the issuing of the 1997 Declaration
against Genocide on the Serbian people and, in the same year, the blessing of the Declaration demanding that the
Hague Tribunal criminal charges brought against Dr. Radovan KaradZiO, President of Republika Sprska be repealed,
because of, amongst other things, 'his exceptional contribution to the peace process'. Many Serbs would feel rather
uneasy with the assertion that the charges against the Bosnian Serb leader were charges 'against the whole Serbian
people'. For more discussion of the articulation of the national-religious, see for instance Radio 1996; Ramet 1995b,
1996a; and the regular contributions of Mirko DordeviO to the Beograd weekly Republika. For detailed discussions of
the Catholic church and Croatian nationalism, see for example Buden 1996; Kristo 1995; and the articles of Luka
VincetiO (t) in the Split weekly Feral Tribune.
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his own great-granddad had actually been killed by the Ustae but that, for him, this
had nothing to do with the Croats of today.
In this case I hadn't actually brought up the issue, but my presence did often provide
an opportunity for people to address certain questions related to the recent wars and
their historical background. A similar tension to the one above had been present in the
story of Marina, a human rights activist, with whom I talked at the very beginning of my
stay in Beograd. She invited me to the office of her organisation, where she was on
duty with a legal helpline, so that our conversation was repeatedly interrupted by her
advising people on all kinds of problems to do with citizenship, refugee status,
discrimination and so on. Marina told me that her father's family had suffered heavily
under the Ustae, but that this had never affected his dealings with Croats in any
particular way. She had been brought up as a Yugoslav and laughingly admitted to still
feeling like one. It was only recently, she said, that her father had started to talk in
negative and generalising terms about Croats.
Obviously, religion and WWll trauma were only two of many issues at stake in the rise
of the post-Yugoslav nationalisms, although I would argue they were central ones. But
rather than going into this further, I now turn to the question of intensity of the attitudes
in question.
2.2. storylines: how deep is your love?
The conceptual framework developed by Laclau and Mouffe is instructive again (1985).
At some points in Yugoslav history, but only explicitly and successfully so in the late
1980s, nationalist leaders articulated 'national identity' into a crucial moment of a
political discourse of opposition. Of course, as I have argued in Chapter Four, we must
understand that 'national identity' was differentially articulated into a moment of the
Titoist discourse as well, an articulation deeply contradictory on at least two levels.
First, whereas (perceived) political assertions of nationalism were strongly suppressed,
to a large extent, the republican elites of the communist party still constructed national
power bases themselves. Second, although nationalism was taboo, Yugoslav
legitimacy was based upon a celebration of the co-existence of discrete cultures—a
'family of nations'. These contradictions were made possible through the privatisation
of explicit assertions of national identity. They were contained in the private sphere and
in the realm of folklore and encyclopaedic ethnology.
Apart from during some specific periods under the former regime, it was only in the late
1980s that exclusive and politicised nationalism took centre stage. As Godina argues,
this did not imply the construction of entirely new identities, but rather a reorganisation
within a matrix of identification (1998:410). The Yugoslav regime relied on nationalism
as an internal enemy and dealt with it accordingly. However, despite recent allegations,
its concept of Yugoslav identity was never intended to exclude national identification,
and those two levels were not in conflict for the majority of the population (1 998:416).
In the late 1980s, a drastic reshuffling of the discursive landscape destabilised the
position of Yugoslavness and radically enhanced the impact of national identities in all
spheres of life3.
As an illustration, let me refer to Sabina, a young woman who did administrative work
in the Beograd refugee organisation where I occasionally did translations. During our
coffee breaks Sabina often reminisced about the past, emphasising that she had never
really made decisions in national terms before. She was a Serb who had remained in
Knin during the war and, as such, had seen her plans for university education
changed. Rather than studying in Split, Zagreb (Croatia) or Sarajevo (Bosnia) as
In contrast to this Habermasian picture of systemic colonisation of the lifeworld (Habermas 1984), one could follow
Bauman's argument that the private actually colonised the public (Bauman 2000). Applied to the post-Yugoslav case,
one could argue that a private issue such as one's ancestry and, particularly, the national background of one's
parents had come to dominate the political. I would argue that these two perspectives are not mutually exclusive.
87
anticipated, Sabina ended up at a Serbian institution, far away from her hometown. In
1995, she fled to Beograd.
We have seen how, for many post-Yugosla ys, one of the primary ways of relating to
the new dominant discourses of identity was through a wide variety of storylines. This
allowed them to evoke the power of nationalist discourses and reposition themselves. I
am aware that I am moving onto slippery ice now, but I would like to add a critical twist
to the story for I believe that this important role of storylines could indicate the relative
shallowness of the roots of post-Yugoslav political assertions of nationalism amongst
the wider population. Yes, I did come across an overwhelmingly widespread
commitment to ardent nationalism, often through storyline evocations of the power of
nationalist discourse (for example, 'every Serb would die for Kosovo!' or 'in Yugoslavia,
we Croats were always second-class citizens!'). And, of course, this was often
embedded in an unquestioned framework of historical continuity both on the national
and on the personal level ('Deep down, I've always been like that, only I couldn't show
it in public, because I'd go to jail'). But, despite these performative narratives, it was
never clear to me how deep these beliefs were or to what extent they were rooted in
the current context rather than in previous experience4 . During an interview in his flat, a
Beograd academic explained things as follows:
'My cleaning lady is a Kosovo Serb. She sort of thinks I am an important person because
I have money to pay for a cleaning lady. She regularly moans in general terms about
.iptari [abusive term for Albanians, sj]. But when I ask her how it was to live with
Albanians in Kosovo, she says: "Oh, but the Albanians in my neighbourhood were lovely
people, I got along better with them than with the Serbs". So you see, her moaning
seems to be a strategy, used by many people, to deal with persons who they perceive as
powerful or important. They say certain things because that's what you say.'
We can conclude that opinions could be very shallow. Sometimes I even knew that the
very same person who now preached national revival had proclaimed him/herself a
committed Yugoslav communist less than 10 years before. While I would argue that
this was often the result of blatant opportunism, I think it could sometimes be an
unlikely, but possible, combination over time of two cases of intense, deep
commitment. Maybe some nationalist 'beliefs' were really overwhelmingly deep, while
at the same time historically shallow to the point of having been brought about, for
example, by recent media manipulation.
How else can we understand some of the electoral results and public opinion polls in
the area? For example, in a 1996 large-scale survey on Bosnian attitudes towards the
possibility of post-war co-existence with other nationals in one state, people had a
choice between two answers: 'yes, we can live together in peace again' or 'no, we can't
live together in peace again because the war has done too much damage' (2unec
1997:32). The results were stunning in their simplicity: almost 90% of Bosnian Serbs
and Croats answered negatively, whereas 80% of Bosniacs chose the positive answer.
Many reasons could be posited for this systematic national division, but I refuse to
believe that Bosniacs are somehow 'naturally' more prone towards multiculturalism
than others. Moreover, let's not forget that they were the weakest side in the Bosnian
war and arguably suffered the greatest 'damage'. A more important key, I believe, lies
in the discourses of the three main (nationalist) political parties: the Serbian SDS and
the Croatian HDZ, at that time enjoying an overwhelming majority of support amongst
their nationals, were openly anti-Dayton and systematically argued that co-existence
was unthinkable because of the scale of the wounds of war; the SDA, mainly
representing itself as the protector of Bosniac interests, always relied on a rhetoric
which supported a unitary, undivided Bosnia.
One could, of course, argue that the three main nationalist Bosnian parties were truly
democratic in that they represented the public mood perfectly. An alternative
' See OoloviO (1994b:61) for other examples.
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explanation of the poll results sees them as a reflection of the popular urge to evoke
the power of the dominant discourses of these nationalist parties. This would also shed
a critical light on the widespread use of storylines from the nationalist discourses in
Serbia and Croatia. National issues had come to dominate the public scene to such an
extent that most people, when asked about it, simply resorted to the 'default' practice:
reformulating storylines which evoked a dominant discourse.
3. nationalism and the struaale aciainst ambivalence
Despite the overwhelming dominance of nationalist discourses in the public sphere and
their increasing significance in the private realm, the closure (or suture) desired by the
new regimes did not come about. In a very general sense, these attempts were often
swamped by confusion and disorientation, as illustrated during a meeting of refugee
organisations in a small town north of Beograd. We sat around a large table in a
dilapidated school building, surrounded, ironically, by old maps of Yugoslavia.
Suddenly, Peki, an elderly refugee, said that he had had enough of having to declare
himself on official and unofficial forms. He threw his arms up in the air, moved back his
chair and sighed that he didn't know anymore to which category he belonged: was he
in Serbia, or in Republika Srpska, or in Bosnia, or in Yugoslavia or in this new
Yugoslavia?
The struggle against ambivalence, so prominent in nationalist programs (Bauman
1991; 1992a), was therefore never completely successful. In an interview on a
Beograd terrace, the writer Slavko argued:
Slavko: 'It's ironic in a way, Slavenka DrakuliO writes somewhere that all her life she has
been trying to be a citizen and in the end she finds herself to be a Croat. That is
true for a lot of us. We all worked on being citizens, and now there are only Croats
and Serbs and so on. But there are many people who feel they don't fit in that
system. At the census for instance a lot of people declared as Eskimos or as
Chinese. Really a lot. They don't accept it.'
Stef: 'What did you write?'
Slavko: 'I wrote "Jew". It was my way to escape... It doesn't mean much either. Because,
of course, I am a Yugoslav Serb, I am not a citizen of Israel, I don't have double
nationality. So what does it mean to write that I am a Jew? It is just a form of
protest against manipulation. Okay, I am a Jew in the diaspora, but it means
nothing really. I don't speak Hebrew; I grew up here; my wife is Serbian... My
children don't know what they are and they don't care at all. We have to learn that.
It is not so important. Being a citizen of Serbia is enough said. It doesn't mean
anything about being good or bad. If you really want to talk about what my identity
is, you would have to take into account many more things: I am born here, I am a
writer, I am a professor, I am a member of this and this organisation, I am a Serb
and a Jew at the same time, and so on... all this together, and many more things,
for instance that I am a social democrat, that is also a part of me, all these things
make up my identity, my personality, my view of the world.'
This extract highlights an important aspect of anti-nationalist narratives. In many cases
people did not necessarily opt for an a-national identification, aiming to do away with
national identity. Rather, many of them argued for a more fluid, ambiguous sense of
national belonging. Some people who identified in national terms beforehand felt
increasingly disenfranchised by what they perceived as something that had become an
oppressive, uneasy and shameful straightjacket. When I met up with my friend Tanja, a
Beograd academic, in the Slovenian capital Ljubljana, we went for coffee in a bar
called Nostalg(ja. Talking about the beginning of MiIoevió's reign, she told me that her
initial reaction had been to say: 'Those primitives are not Serbs,! am a Serb.' Tanja
had always thought of herself as a Serbian Yugoslav but, with the war, she did not
want that Serbian identity to be part of her anymore. This had been a painful process.
Now, she argued, she was not a Serb anymore.
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In the late 1990, the kind of national identification in alternative terms that Tanja had
previously subscribed to was more prevalent in Croatian anti-nationalism. In Zagreb,
more so than in Beograd, it was considered a feasible option to identify as a national
without being tainted by nationalism. One reason for this difference was the fact that,
whereas Beograd anti-nationalist narratives considered a Yugoslav sense of belonging
as an alternative to nationalism, this was less common in Zagreb. Yugoslav
identification existed amongst Croatian dissidents, but many of them simply saw it as
another, compatible level of identification. For example, Silvija, a Zagreb historian in
her thirties, did feel a sense of belonging to the former country, but she always thought
of herself as 'a Croat in Yugoslavia'. She had agreed to be interviewed by me on the
condition of anonymity, because she didn't want any trouble at the institute where she
worked—in fact, she had recently seen her research subject changed dramatically to a
topic of higher national(ist) urgency as part of a top-down restructuration of the
institute's program. Silvija enjoyed chatting over coffee in a café near her workplace,
but she repeatedly expressed her doubts on it being of any interest to my work. She
warned me that, for her, national identity had always been a private matter and that
she had never had the need nor the will to shout it out in public. How could it be
suppressed as they all said, she wondered, if it was just a private thing?
The assertion that nationality was something private was omnipresent in anti-
nationalist narratives in Beograd as well. On the benches of the theatre where she
worked, I had a long interview with Dubravka, a middle-aged artist who was very active
in the domain of cultural politics. Hardly allowing me time for any questions, she talked
for two hours.
'We considered that to be a completely private issue. Not one hair on my head would
think about who was of which religion or nationality, and which colleague or friend was
what. There has never been such a feeling. Probably, there were people for whom it was
important, you understand, but more as a question of a political system... [...] And then
you got a political system, which as part of its program took that question. [...1 Social
arrangements and state systems determine in some way a more global disposition. That
means, for instance, that before, in Bosnia, when a neighbour stole your cow, then that
was a bit inconvenient ... But now you give people the possibility to see the
disappearance of a cow as a case of national repression—you say: he stole my cow
because he is Musliman.'
Many people now narrated the past in terms that matched the contradictions of the
Yugoslav regime discourse on nationality and argued that it had always belonged to
the private sphere. However, this could imply very different interpretations. In cases
like Dubravka's, the importance of nationality was downplayed by its irrelevance to
anything other than the private, and it was asserted that this was the way in which it
was actually experienced. In nationalist narratives, however, people resented the
containment of their (and not the Other) national identity in the private sphere, as
imposed by state oppression (organised by that Other). In both cases, the political
implications of the status of nationality under the former regime were narrated almost
always in terms removed from everyday life. Even nationalist narratives rarely included
actual stories of national discrimination on the small-scale level; stories of oppression
were almost always told in terms of the public sphere of politics.
It is not surprising then that some anti-nationalist narratives explained their dissident,
low profile forms of identification as contingent on current state policies. This transpired
in a rather unusual confession, particularly to a relatively unknown person like myself,
by Josip, a middle-aged accountant from Zagreb: 'I have never been much of a Croat.
You know, it was Yugoslavia at the time...'. Hence, Josip recalled how his relation to
notions of Croatian-ness in former times was not really an issue because, at that time,
he lived in a state called Yugoslavia. The logic underlying this kind of statement led
many anti-nationalist narratives to blame regime policies for the sudden rise of
nationality to a position of importance in post-Yugoslav life. Zorica, a Beograd NGO
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worker with a Croatian background, met me in a restaurant for lunch and, unsolicited,
informed me that nationalism had really been orchestrated from above. First in Serbia
and then, as a response, in Croatia, systematic and long-term propaganda campaigns
had spread stereotypes and the idea that national identity was crucial.
Such a rather exclusive attribution of blame to 'politicians' was very common in both
Beograd and Zagreb as well as in a wider post-Yugoslav discourse which pitted
'ordinary people' against 'the regimes' (Jansen 2000b). Although few observers would
deny the role of manipulation, such discourse might also contain an element of
strategic remembering and forgetting in anti-nationalist narratives. If 'little people' were
simply victims of nationalist indoctrination, and if they had been more or less
unaffected by nationalism before the end of Yugoslavia, then that implied that their
current nationalist sentiments were not something primordial, thereby undermining the
legitimacy of the present dominant discourses. In the chapter on JugonostalgUa I
elaborate on these ideas and later in this chapter I go into some specific narrations of
how nationalist campaigns impacted upon everyday lives, but for now it should be clear
that the systematic simplifications of nationalist discourses were undermined and
questioned by a myriad of contradictory stories on the everyday level. This was most
certainly the case amongst individuals who were politically or otherwise active in the
struggle against nationalism, but it was also present amongst a much wider circle of
people, including supporters of the nationalist regimes.
4. narrations of nationality: how it became an issue
4.1. 'that went without saying': stories of elements not moments
In the previous paragraph, we saw a glimpse of how the role of national identity in
Yugoslavia was constructed in alternative representations. A common thread running
through them held that, before, national identity was a much less important issue on
the everyday level. Certainly when compared to the current situation, it was often
argued that it was simply not important. A small anthology from interviews with very
different individuals:
'Before, it wasn't like this at all. Beograd was a very cosmopolitan city and people didn't
care about nationality at all.'
(Sonja, a chic, thirty year old human rights activist, Beograd - in the office)
'It was never important for me to identify with a state. [...] And I don't feel the need to
belong as a national—but when I have to, like, situate myself, I say: "I am a citizen of
Croatia". Or "I am from Zagreb"—like, different things depending on the context.'
(Monika, a well-known middle-aged feminist intellectual, Zagreb - in the classroom)
'For me and for many other people of my generation, national identity wasn't important at
all. When were students, for instance, nobody even knew, nor was it important, who was
from where. [...] That was simply not a thing we were thinking about. Only when it had to
do with the topic, somebody would maybe say something about it. But it was simply not
important. Probably because we didn't feel it was under such a codification into a
program, a political program.'
(Dubravka, a famous, alternative middle-aged artist, Beograd - in the theatre)
'To be honest, I really don't know how it was before for other people. In my family it really
wasn't an issue. I only... I think that my mother declared as a Croat in the census, I think
so... I never wrote anything at all. Not Yugoslav, not Croat. It was only in 1971, when I
saw what nationalism in its aggressive form is - only then I learned that 'nation' existed.
Before, I must admit, I wasn't aware of that. I was aware of some local belonging [...] and
of other local identities, like I knew that Dalmatinci got on my nerves [laughs]... But
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Croatia is so diverse, I mean ... I don't believe there is something like a Croatian identity.
[...] So... anyway, we wrote things like Eskimo, or Gypsy or whatever. Just provocations.'
(Vera, a fifty year old feminist activist and ex-journalist, Zagreb - in her flat)
'Before, national identity didn't play such an important role at all. There were always
some people of course.... But mainly, people just got on with their lives. Maybe in some
parts of Yugoslavia, yes, like in Krajina... Maybe there.'
(Dra2en, an ambitious, thirty year old journalist, Zagreb - in the bar)
Hence, many anti-nationalist narratives of the past were characterised by a pervasive
sense of the previous irrelevance of nationality. Once, a young couple in Beograd, who
had heard about my research through a relative, offered to talk to me because they
thought I'd be interested in their quite unusual story. Tereza, a Croatian woman in her
twenties, had followed her Serbian husband to Beograd during the war. I went over to
their house, and after lunch and a long interview, Tereza sat back and sighed:
'So is that it then? Pfff, all these things about nationality, and about Serbs and Croats and
all... Now is the first time I think about them. To be honest, really, never before did I know
about them. I never even thought about it.'
It must be emphasised that I found an imbalance here between Beograd and Zagreb.
In the former, people spoke a lot more about nationality not being an issue, whereas in
the Croatian capital, people were much more likely to say that while national identity
was simply a private issue for them, it was a more important factor to many others. I
say 'people' because this distinction was between inhabitants of Zagreb and Beograd,
not between Serbs and Croats.
Anyway, I was confronted with a massive paradox: here I was, in a region bloodily torn
apart along lines which only some years ago, according to many individual narratives,
were not even issues. Let us not ignore the problem inherent in these examples. If
someone asserted that national identity was not important before, did this mean that it
was not a factor in interaction? Or, did it mean that it was a factor which didn't play an
important role? For the bulk of the Yugoslav population, I argue, the second
interpretation carried most validity with regard to the mundane. Representations of
Yugoslav society as a multicultural melting-pot in which people didn't even know each
other's nationality were only marginally relevant with regard to the past—they tell us,
however, a lot about the present (see section 5). From the individual narratives, it
transpired that national identities were simply taken for granted on the everyday level,
an often acknowledged, but not a vital, factor. So, even if language, looks, style and, in
a secularising society, religion were not defining markers of national difference, people
did usually know 'who was what'. They could know for a variety of reasons, such as
one's name, one's parents' names or one's place of birth—although none of these
criteria was ever entirely decisive. Still, people simply knew other people's nationality
most of the time, particularly in smaller towns and villages.
Thus for many, national identity was neither important nor unimportant but was simply
there, one out of many rather unproblematic parts of a mundane context. This
representation relied on narratives of a Yugoslav past in which the person in question
experienced national identity as an element, as a line of differentiation which was
present but left largely unarticulated for discursive practice. Later in this chapter we
shall see how its impact was contingent on the context in which it figured, explaining
why the above assertions do not necessarily contradict accounts of how nationality did
play a role in certain realms of everyday life. However, in anti-nationalist narratives its
non-articulation was emphasised, and I think it is fair to say that before it was at least
less articulated into a moment than it was after. In one interview, in the office of a
Zagreb NGO, a middle-aged human rights activist expressed this as follows:
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Stef: 'Before, was your identity as a Croat something important in your family or in your
life in general?'
Vladimir: 'Bah... not really'
Lucija, his wife: [shouts from the back of the room] 'That was implicitly understood5'
Not surprisingly, many anti-nationalist narratives were constructed around this low
intensity of feelings about national identity. We have seen already how nationalism and
anti-nationalism were played out in terms of public and private spheres. This suggests
that we are dealing here with different modes of narration: the way to address
nationality issues was through a story on a collective-historical level, whereas playing
them down was done through individual narratives of the recent past.
4.2. remembering your first time: narrating how nationality entered everyday life
Anti-nationalist discourse converged on a depiction of the last decade as one in which
the rise of nationalism and the wars had changed everything dramatically for
everybody. Many people rather suddenly discovered a long-buried sense of national
pride and patriotism—national identity became a badge to wear in public, and it was
imposed on virtually all spheres of society as a significant factor. Nela, a Zagreb
journalist whom I met several times for long conversations in her office, argued that
national identity had never been an important issue at all. She spoke with derision
about the many who had recently become Great Croats, the ones who said: 'I am a
Croat, so I should get this job, or that house'. Nela had no time for people who thought
that their Croatness was the most important thing in the world.
Many narratives spoke of being taken by surprise, like Vesna, a young woman who
always had a sense of belonging to the Serbian nation but still remembered with horror
the first time she realised nationality had become something you had to take into
account.
'My friend Staa was walking around in town with one of her friends, a guy from Croatia.
The thing is that he was a Serb from Croatia, but, before, that didn't matter. You know,
you would never ask something like that, like "Are you a Serb?". It didn't matter, it wasn't
a relevant question to ask. He was from Croatia, so he spoke like they speak there and of
course you couldn't see it. They met Bogdan, another friend of hers and they started
talking. Staa told me that Bogdan was watching, and she knew what he was thinking.
And, for the first time, ... and it was really terrible, ... this was suddenly important. She felt
that she had to tell Bogdan that, although her friend was from Croatia—I mean, of course
he could hear that anyway—that he was a Serb. That was the first time that you knew
that it really began.'
The case of refugees is telling here, for they had to cope with drastic losses after
leaving their homes precisely because of their nationality. Darko was the teenage son
of a Yugoslav Army officer who had served in Zagreb until 1991. Then his family had
exchanged that comfortable life for refuge in Beograd, where Darko went to school and
was an active member of an anti-nationalist youth organisation. In a double-interview
with him and his friend, Darko stated that his nationality hadn't meant anything to him.
Nevertheless, he explained, it had become an issue:
'When the war started it was really horrible. But even before, it was... you know, we
experienced some little provocations. Then... in class, in your diary, you know, you had to
write down what nationality you were. You know... terrible. I wrote, really as a statement,
"Serb". So imagine, the teacher turns round your diary and sees: "Aha, Serb!" It was
horror, ... fucking hell. I think I was the only one who wrote down "Serb" ... I think. One
girl whose name was Sne±ana [a typical Serbian name, sj], wrote that she was a Croat,
5 In Croatian: 'To so podrazumijevalo'. Other ways to translate this include: 'that was taken for granted', or 'that went
without saying'.
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can you fucking believe it? I did it really on purpose... you know what, not out of some...
not because I wanted to revolt because I was a Serb, but because it was really pointless
to me. I mean why would I hide that... really pointless.'
A similar expression of disbelief came from Biljana, also a Zagreb Serb who had fled to
Beograd. Biljana was a student and she was active in the youth section of a refugee
organisation. We met up regularly, usually in the student hall of residence where she
shared a room with two others. After a long saga of bureaucratic trouble, she had
finally succeeded in sorting out some of her citizenship problems in Vukovar, Croatia.
Nevertheless, she rang me up in a rage and told me that when asked to declare her
nationality, she had of course written 'Serbian'. Then she had met an acquaintance, a
Serbian refugee girl from Knin who had told her that she had written 'Croatian'. After
having been forced to leave her beloved Zagreb, Biljana cried, after having her whole
life changed because of that, after having lost everything, she met this girl who had
written 'Croatian'. If only people in Knin would have thought about these things before,
if only they had realised that it doesn't really matter what you write down... But now,
after all that, she had ended up being the one who said 'Serbian', and the Knin girl had
said 'Croatian'.
Biljana's despair didn't change the fact that, in almost no time, nationality had become
a crucial factor in everyday life, whether people liked it or not. I would even argue that
in the post-Yugoslav context, through the sheer obliteration of alternatives and through
articulation with other differences, nationality had almost eaten the whole notion of
identity. The meanings with which the post-Yugoslav nationalisms subsequently filled
up these nationality labels were highly polarised—as we have witnessed on our TV
screens for many years. But it also affected the personal development of those who
worked against nationalism and the war. My flatmate Vesna, a feminist NGO activist,
told me about her disgust with herself when she realised on some occasions that
xenophobia had invaded her own mind as well. She recalled that, especially during the
wars, she had been very angry and had felt hostility towards anything foreign. The
whole situation, she told me, had made her think things she would never have thought
before.
Nationalism had been extremely successful in evacuating the space of identification
processes and colonising them with one-dimensional discursive practice. During my
fieldwork, the question '.ta je on/a?' ['What is s/he?'] referred almost always, and
almost always exclusively, to nationality.
5. the golden age: reconstructing the irrelevance of nationality
5.1. stories of innocence
It is clear now that the pervasive recognition of national identity as the issue had
unsettling effects, also for anti-nationalist discursive practice. Even unintentionally, for
purely circumstantial reasons (as in this text), descriptions of a person very frequently
included their nationality, but there would often be immediate apologies for mentioning
this issue. I was often told that, regrettably, such things had become important in
recent times. And it has to be said, in many cases obtaining information about
somebody's nationality was really necessary to assess the situation regarding that
person—sadly, this truly was often the only thing that made a difference. In some
cases it even determined whether a person was alive at all; it was an important key to
whether s/he was able to live at home or had to flee, and it greatly affected his/her
chances of getting or keeping a job.
One frequent way to deal with this contradiction in anti-nationalist discursive practice,
that is to say with the unease and slight embarrassment at the frequent mentioning of
nationality, was to tell soothing anecdotes illustrating the irrelevance of national identity
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before. Take, for example, the stories told (independently of each other) by Biljana and
Darko, the two young people with a Serbian background who grew up in 'Yugoslav'
families in the Croatian capital. Both had fled Zagreb with their families and now lived in
Beograd, where they experienced not only the general deterioration but also the stigma
of being a refugee. When she was little, Biljana told me, she simply didn't know about
nationality. She remembered the first time her brother and she had been asked what
nationality they were, and the confusion they had felt, not understanding what was
meant. Her brother had answered that he was 'male' ['muki], but Biljana had
immediately corrected him and said: 'No, stupid, we are Croats!' Darko had a similar
story:
'We were completely, you know, my brother and me, we really didn't have a clue what
nationality we were. For instance, in the second year of secondary school, they asked my
brother what nationality he was. And he really didn't have a clue, you know, he just said...
"Well, I think I am a Croat, because my parents are from Croatia", you know. And they
asked me as well, in the sixth year of primary school. A schoolfriend asked me what
nationality I was, and I said... "Well, I don't know...", and then I first said "Yugoslav", and
then, because I was born in Bosnia, "maybe I am a Muslim ['musliman]". (...) So I wanted
to find out, and asked my parents, and they told us that we are Serbs. I was very
surprised. How could I be a Serb if my parents were from Croatia... So it didn't mean
anything to us.'
Such stories of innocence, of some golden age before nationalism—almost in the
biblical sense of 'before the fall'—were frequent and very similar to each other. They
were usually told in a bittersweet way which seemed to offer a moment of light relief.
People with urban Bosnian backgrounds were particularly keen on such narratives
(see for example Lesiô 1995), as illustrated by Veljko's case. Veljko was a Beograd
academic with an outspoken, public anti-nationalist profile. In a long interview in his
office, he told me:
'I grew up in Sarajevo. That was an outspoken, multicultural milieu. I mean ... never,
between us, my generation, my friends, never have we had any national or other
divisions. I always identified as a Yugoslav, and I'll tell you how that came about. At
school, next to me in the school desk, sat my dear friend with whom I shared a desk
for years, not just a class, but a desk [...] a Musliman. And then there was some
census or something, and our teacher, a wonderful woman, asked us, "Right, children,
who is a Serb?". And I stood up, but next to me, my friend, who is a Musliman, also
stood up. Eh, when she asked "Who is Musliman', he stood up and I stood up as well,
because we were completely identical. Between us there were no differences at all.
And now, if you think it was just us who were in such good relations to each other in
our class, ... our dear teacher, when she counted in the end how many of us there
were of every nationality, it turned out that in a class of 30 pupils, there were actually
52 pupils. And she grabbed her head because we messed up her statistics...'
The frequency of these anecdotes within anti-nationalist narratives and the delight with
which they were told posed a sharp contrast to the general post-Yugoslav
environment. Their emphasis on the light-hearted and ultimately irrelevant character of
nationality in Yugoslavia shed a critical light on the surrounding obsession with national
identities. However, quite often I felt that these stories were slightly exaggerated and
that they served as oppositional statements about the present context rather than as
realistic descriptions of a past that had gone for good. This issue will be addressed
further in Chapter Ten. Here, I take up another dimension of the anecdotes. Apart from
voicing a critique of the current situation, I felt that many of these idealised stories were
designed to dispel what post-Yugosla ys involved in anti-nationalism quite correctly saw
as a common Western misconception about their plight. On numerous occasions I was
informed about these two interrelated issues. First, I was told that the recent bloodshed
could not possibly be explained as century-old hatreds or 'Balkan' national obsessions.
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Secondly, I was informed that Yugoslavia had had a communist regime, but not quite
so communist that the war could be explained with reference to crude suppression of
national identities by Tito.
5.2. implications for the foreign gaze
There seem to be good reasons for the anti-nationalist rejection of depictions of
Yugoslavia as a land of age-old tribal hatreds and of claims that it was a mismatch of
national communities oppressed by Stalinist internationalism. However, I would argue
that the anti-nationalist narrative strategy of representing the former state in terms
approaching a humanist-leftist, multicultural paradise also had dubious effects on
foreign observations. The ensuing pictures of the former country as one in which
national differences all blended into a Yugoslav melting-pot, epitomised by the Western
love affair with Sarajevo 6, completely misses the point and cannot account for the past
conflicts. The permanent downplaying of differences within Yugoslavia, popular
amongst critics of nationalism, strikes me as theoretically contradictory and politically
counterproductive. I, myself, as a scholar and as an activist, certainly struggled with
this throughout my fieldwork—and it took me a long time to come to grips with the
contradictions of such views. It meant building some understanding of life in
Yugoslavia, which was characterised by the very existence of national differences
within. And we are talking here not just about the sphere of government, but about
mundane experiences of Yugoslavia; for example, long before the war, the most
popular jokes were at the expense of certain national groups, including one's own7.
It seems contradictory that the same people who, in the name of multiculturalism,
celebrate the diversity of their Western home countries, should disregard similar
patterns in Yugoslavia. It is clear that Tito's state was riddled with contrasts—also in
the private sphere. Of course, as we have seen, national differences were blown out of
proportion, they were being falsely represented as discrete and natural, and they were
being elevated to manic heights by the recent nationalisms, It is an important part of
anti-nationalist critique to point out that they were only relative, and that, often, they
were simply forcible boundary-drawings in a hybrid Yugoslav context. It could be
argued that the many close similarities between Serbian, Bosniac and Croatian
national identities actually contributed to the horrific character of the wars (see
Harrison 1999). All this needs to said; but I would argue for a positioning which tries to
avoid the pitfalls of both essentialising representations: one which depicts national
identity in former Yugoslavia as a crucial and deeply ingrained factor in all spheres of
life (the 'Balkan' tribes version); and the other which says that nationality was an utterly
unimportant factor in everyday lives (the Yugo-melting-pot version).
As we have seen, in large parts of the public sphere, nationality was certainly
articulated into a moment of political discourses. However, I argue that for most people
national identities existed, that they were acknowledged and reproduced, but that, in a
wide range of contexts, they constituted an element rather than a moment within
everyday lives—a largely unarticulated difference in mundane discursive practice. If we
want to subvert the legitimacy of post-Yugoslav nationalisms, we cannot simply discard
these differences. This is not to say that we should 'naturalise' them, for, paraphrasing
Malkki, it is clear that a depiction of Yugoslavia as a 'family of nations' cannot account
for its complex character because it relies on the presumption that nations are discrete
entities (1994:58; see also 1992). However, we have to take on board the fact that
6 This pattern had existed before, with a range of leftist scholars from the 'West' coming very close to simply
legitimising rather than critically studying the Yugoslav system (Allcock 1993), During the recent wars, the new
Sarajevo romance blossomed in particular amongst French and American intellectuals and artists (see for example
Douailler, Poulain and Vermeren 1993; see also Rushdie 1994).
As epitomised by the popular pre-war episodes of the Sarajevo TV series Top Lista Nadrealista. See also, for
example, Dorde BalaeviO song 'Soliter' in which he describes Yugoslavia as an apartment block, with a different
republic on every floor—all characterised through strongly stereotyped mockery (Balaeviá 1998:87-88).
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dominant representations of the former state, both negative and positive, are based
precisely on this image of Yugoslavia as a group of separate nations. So rather than
glossing over these lines of division, I think, we can undercut their significance: we can
point out that, as in every country, national dividing lines were only one type amongst a
whole range of differences. And as we saw, for many people, in many spheres of life,
national hnes of differentiation were not the most important ones on an everyday level,
and even if they sometimes were, they certainly weren't always 8 (Duijzings 2000:12,
19).
Therefore, rather than obliterating mundane national differences in Yugoslavia, I think
we should highlight their relative importance in relation to a whole series of other
distinctions. Only in this way, 1 believe, can we start to understand the hybrid nature of
everyday life in the former state without ending up implicitly underwriting an
incorporative brand of Yugoslav supra-nationalism, which after all can become a
specific kind of, yes, nationalism. Moreover, it critically undermines the smug
positioning of many Western observers 9, based on the representation of Yugoslavia as
a society entirely different from their own home countries. Only by refraining from this
process of absolute othering, whether through negative 'Balkan' stereotyping or
through positive Yugo-melting-pot depictions, can we foreigners develop an
appropriately modest and self-conscious stance towards the post-Yugoslav conflict.
6. nationality colonising the mundane: language and love
It should be clear that, in the post-Yugoslav context, there was no consensus
whatsoever on the status of national identity in the former state. Even within strategies
of anti-nationalist opposition, this was subject to debate, as illustrated in a conversation
with two activists from a small Beograd-based political party with a platform that was
explicitly critical of nationalism. We were sitting in the small backroom of their offices
having coffee and looking at the newspaper reports of the anti-regime mass
demonstrations that were going on outside. I told them about my research interest in
anti-nationalism, and a conversation unfolded. Young activist Toni stated plainly that to
him nationalism was the biggest problem Serbia faced, but his elder colleague Mara
argued for a more nuanced view. Former Yugoslavia, she said, was not a democratic
system, and the only space for dissent was in private. So people would get together,
ta'k politics and sing Oetnik songs. Here, Toni interrupted her to say that, more
importantly, they got drunk and threw up. Mara continued that the opposition had been
mainly nationalist and its particular shape was a product of an undemocratic system.
Despite these disputes, there was little debate about the overwhelming significance of
national identity during and after the break-up of the former state. The ubiquitous gaze
of the national could be felt in a million different ways, but in this section I focus on its
workings in relation to two specific themes: language and love. The rationale for this
choice goes beyond the alliteration: these are two particularly powerful examples of
how, even in the most intimate spheres of everyday life, national differences were
articulated into defining 'moments'. As throughout this study, there is a specific interest
in mundane strategies of coping and resistance.
6.1. language before and after (and how to deal with it)
As we have seen, both in Serbia and in Croatia, albeit in different ways and to different
extents, the nationalist regimes engaged in the creation of discrete national cultures.
An important part of the endeavour was the canonisation of a Serbian and a Croatian
Later we shell see that these other lines of distinction, e.g. village/city, or man/woman, played a central role in a
variety of anti- ationalist dsciursive practices.
Foir a bUstenng crftique of liberal analyses of postcommunist nationalism, see 2i±ek 1992.
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language, separate from each other. This ran counter to the previous official line that
there was one language, Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian, existing in different
variants. In practice, during my fieldwork, most people referred to their mother tongue
as 'Serbian' (in Serbia), or 'Croatian' (in Croatia). The internationally more frequently
used label 'Serbo-Croatian' (or 'Croato-Serbian') was used much less frequently,
particularly in Croatia. In many anti-nationalist narratives this was explained simply in
terms of habit or brevity, but there were people who used the 'double' terms with the
explicit intention of going against the grain of nationalist discourses, a practice which
was certainly more common in Serbia than in Croatia. An ironic example was provided
by my friend Goran, who in the 1990s explicitly started referring to his native tongue as
'Serbo-Croatian' precisely for this reason—before, he had always said 'Serbian'. In a
final twist of irony, my colleague-activists in a Zagreb NGO project referred jokingly to
the language, not as 'hrvatsk,', nor as 'srpskohi'vatsk? or 'hivatosrpski', but as 'nak?
['ours', 'our language'] 10 . In this way they self-consciously avoided the traps of the
name game and its potentially contentious political associations.
It should be clear by now that quite strong differences existed between the Serbian and
the Croatian situation. In line with the ambiguous character of the Serbian dominant
discourses of identity, the regime only made a number of half-hearted moves with
regard to language. For example, although 'ekavian' was considered the standard
Serbian variant of the language, it was common in Beograd for 'ijekavian', the variant
spoken in large parts of Bosnia and Croatia, to be heard in public and written in the
press. Quotations were usually verbatim, and on the whole ekavian and ijekavian
seemed to be considered simply two variants of the same language. Moreover, in
contrast to what was often said in Croatia and abroad, both Latinic and Cyrillic scripts
were widely used in Serbia. With the rise of nationalism, Cyrillic script was promoted as
the truly Serbian way of writing, but, in Beograd, the effects of this campaign were
limited mainly to the realms of official use and nationalist media. Of course, it was
hardly a coincidence that, with Serbian nationalist writings systematically employing
Cyrillic, dissident texts were almost always set in Latinic.
However, for many in Serbia little had changed in this respect: for personal purposes,
many people used both Latinic and Cyrillic script, and I was unable to detect any
significant meaning behind the choice. People simply alternated between the two
without paying attention to it—often, they use Cyrillic for ordinary writing and Latinic for
print capitals. I asked some people why they did so, but they were just startled by my
question and unable to answer. An illustration of the perfect interchangeability of the
two scripts, emerged in the anti-regime demonstrations of 1996-1997, where banners
were both in Cyrillic and Latinic. A young man wrote the Serbian word for 'strike' on the
iced-up windscreen of an abandoned bus 11 , and just when he wanted to move on he
realised that he had mixed up his letters (which is possible because of the one-to-one
equivalence between the two scripts). The first character was in Cyrillic, but he had
completed the word in Latinic. Unimpressed, he corrected it out and walked on.
In Croatia, such a light-hearted approach to the language question was unthinkable.
We have seen how Serbian nationalism tended to incorporate differences, whereas
Croatian nationalist approaches usually emphasised those differences and opposed
incorporation. This became clear in the language issue as well, particularly, but not
exclusively, on the higher political and cultural echelons. As part of the endeavour to
radically separate Croatian identity from the SerbianlYugoslav 'cancer', the nationalist
Tucman regime set out to prove the existence of a completely discrete national
language. In practice, this meant that a new, unique and above all exclusive variant of
Croatian was consciously created. Through changes and shifting emphases in
vocabulary and syntax, the national language was constructed as differently from
10 'Na.k? literally doesn't mean anything. 'Nat' is a possessive pronoun [ours'], and by adding the suffix -(s)ki it
resonates with other names of languages (i.e. adjectives): Engleski, Francuski, Rusk Hivatsk Srpsk etc.
11 The word is actually a borrowing from English: .trajk.
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Serbian or Serbo-Croatian as possible. This implied cleansing the language from
elements which were culturally or ideologically undesirable. Not surprisingly, in the
Croatian nationalist discourse, those two aspects were inextricably linked. Any word
that sounded vaguely 'oriental' or 'communist' had to go. For example, the greeting
'zdravo? literally refers to health, but it was now tainted by its Yugoslav connotations
and, therefore, its alleged Serbian and communist character. 'Bok?, another pre-
existing word used exclusively in certain parts of Croatia, was deemed more
acceptable as a greeting.
In this context, it was possible for Sran Dragojeviá's Rane, the first post-1991 Serbian
film to be officially shown in Croatian cinemas, to be screened with Croatian subtitles.
Note that there wasn't a single soul in the audience who could not follow the spoken
words and that there had been a long tradition of co-operation amongst actors and
directors from Beograd, Zagreb and Sarajevo, so that films with a 'Yugoslav' cast were
common. Rane subtitled in Zagreb was, therefore, somewhat akin to subtitling a
Spielberg film in British cinemas, or maybe even The Full Monty in Brighton. However,
the language issue also worked the other way around: the explicitly anti-nationalist
Zagreb publication Arkzin made a political statement simply by quoting ekavian
speakers literally. This wouldn't go down well with people like the Dean of Mostar
University in Bosnia, himself a linguist. In an interview with a Croatian regime paper, he
argued for the recognition of 'Herzegovinian Croatian' as an integral part of the
Croatian language because its 'orientalisms and Serbisms', he stated, did not deny its
Croatian character12 . If we take this point to its logical conclusions, pre-war Mostar
must have been at least a trilingual city with local Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs each
speaking their own language, not to mention others, such as Jews and Yugosla ys-
who presumably spoke 'Jewish' and Yugoslay.
Such views are very problematic when we take into account that the urge to prove the
separateness of the Croatian language was not just an academic question. Although
many people obviously did not think these questions of language were of vital
importance to their lives, they were very likely to be confronted with them at some
point. On many occasions, for example in job applications, proof of knowledge of
Croatian (not Serbo-Croatian) was required. Moreover, the language question had
become part of people's everyday life strategies as well. This was illustrated by the
following event, which took place during a conversation I had with a family who
occupied a house owned by Serbian refugees in a war-affected area in Croatia. The
present residents were from Gradiá, now a Bosniac-controlled town just across the
border in Bosnia. When explaining their reluctance to return to their Bosnian home, the
parents justified this with reference to language rights and argued that 'they didn't want
their children to go to school in GradiO, where they couldn't study in their own
language'. Both parents were born in Gradió, and spent all their lives in that town,
where they had always spoken the same dialect as their neighbours of other
nationalities. Like most Bosnian Croats, they were seen as 'Bosnians' by the locals—
their accent being precisely the way in which others established this identity.
Again, it is crucial to point out that people in Zagreb did talk differently from those in
Beograd, regardless of nationality. The question whether Serbian and Croatian are
distinct languages is better left to linguists, but I can personally say that I did not feel
like I learned two languages during my fieldwork 13 . Moreover, intensive travel within the
post-Yugoslav states brought me in touch with many different accents, and a wide
variety of typical words and syntactic peculiarities, but this reflected largely regional,
12 Interview in Veãernji List 02/05/98.
13 Norris argues that Serbian and Croatian relate to each other like Northern and Southern English (1999:60-61), and
I have heard others compare it to American and British English. For a crystal-clear discussion of the language issue,
see Detrez 1996:35ff. The author, a linguist, concludes the section on language by saying: 'With the material
provided one could equally "naturally" or "legitimately" construct a Serbo-Croatian standard language, as a Bosnian,
Croatian, Montenegrin, or Serbian standard language. [...] What eventually happens has nothing to do with
linguistics, and everything with politics." (1996:40, my translation from Dutch)
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not national patterns. During my fieldwork in Zagreb, I paid two or three long visits to a
couple (wife and husband) of prominent dissident writers, whom I met in their book-
packed flat. Although I best remember the quality of their Scottish whisky, I also recall
the man, a well-known literary critic, saying that Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs really
speak the same language, with regional differences. Any linguist, he argued, would
have to recognize that, like it or not.
Often, in the case of writers, this was accompanied by a quotation of some famous
literary figure, which usually came down to the assertion that language is what
constitutes the homeland. Although the above statement is from a Zagreb Croat, there
was a fairly systematic difference here between the situation in Zagreb and in Beograd:
people in the latter city would usually be relaxed about the lack of a clear distinction,
which is not surprising given the nature of Serbian nationalism. However, predictably,
this Beograd attitude was vehemently denied by most Croats, as illustrated by the
young journalist Velimir. He had heard about my work through a friend and asked me
out for a drink on one of my first days in Zagreb. Velimir stated that there had always
been two different languages: Serbian and Croatian. Because of recent history, he
argued, they were mixed and they had become increasingly similar. However, Velimir
did admit that people understand almost everything from the 'other' language. Still, he
maintained, there were quite a large number of different words because, after all, they
were and had always been two separate languages.
What was clear was that Serbian and Croatian literary languages were becoming more
separate every day as a result of explicit linguistic policies, through the ideologisation
of everyday life and as a consequence of physical and cultural separation. What had
changed, according to anti-nationalist narratives, was the significance attributed to
differences between 'Serbian' and 'Croatian'. This led to the weird situation whereby
one of my Zagreb housemates, speaking his mother tongue, apologised for his word
use. I had only just arrived from Beograd, and he warned me that many of the words
they (the Croats) used were in fact Serbian words. Before, he argued, they had never
really thought about that, but he assured me that for every Serbian word, there was a
Croatian one as well.
With the language question being so prominent on the public level in Croatia, it was
bound to seep into everyday life in many ways. However, this didn't mean it had an
unambiguously hegemonic effect. The same people who vigorously asserted the
separateness of Croatian at some occasions, mercilessly mocked their president's
archaic word use or the latest neologisms at other times 14 . When certain newly
invented nationally correct words were used on TV, a salvo of laughter would often be
followed by discussion about what it might mean. In many matters confusion reigned.
When I visited Biserka and Branislav, an elderly Serbian couple in Zagreb with some
presents from their relative in Beograd, they spontaneously reassured me about my
language. At the time, I had just arrived from Serbia and I spoke with a thick Beograd
accent on top of my obvious foreign one 15 . Sitting round the kitchen table, they fed me
and explicitly wanted to inform me about a number of things that 'I should know'. With
regard to language, Branislav said that there had always been some differences, like
for example, they would say 'hiijada' 16 . Before, nobody had ever made a problem about
that, but now one really had to pay attention. Laughingly, Branislav added that he and
Biserka couldn't really tell me about it because they didn't know the rules themselves.
The Croats, themselves, had to learn it, he added, as they were recuperating words
14 See, for example, Uvrtnjak iii zrakomlat?' Globus 04/12/92.
15 It would be a 'Dutch' or 'Flemish' accent, I assume, but I intentionally use the word 'foreign' here. I have never
heard anybody in any of the post-Yugoslav states refer to other former Yugosla ys as 'foreigners'. The term 'strand
was reserved strictly for non-Yugoslays like myself. Even the term 'nag' ['ours'], was often used interchangeably for
one's own nation and for other post-Yugoslays.
16 
'Thousand'. This word, used by millions of Bosniacs and Croats, had by then been disqualified as a Serbism. The
nationalistically correct term was 'tisuôa' , previously used in certain parts of Croatia, but not outside of it. Still, 'hi/jada'
was still very frequently used by many Croats.
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from centuries ago. Branislav told me that, while you could still hear the other words
everywhere on the street, you wouldn't see them on TV or in the newspapers anymore.
There it was a matter of reading the rest of the sentence and trying to get the point.
Biserka, whose work in a kiosk required talking money and numbers, had previously
used the word 'hi/jada' but now tried to stick to 'tisuCa'. Still, she often mixed things up
and simply resorted to avoiding the use of those numbers in general.
A similar case was presented to me by Andèlka, a middle-aged woman with a Croatian
background, who worked in the archives of a strongly nationalist magazine in Zagreb.
Although rather hostile at first, she grew more friendly when she found out about my
research interest, and we sat talking a lot, even if only when her colleagues were not
there. Andelka ridiculed the language reforms and the Croatian nationalist urge to
exorcise alleged SerbianlYugoslav/'Balkan' elements, and demonstrated how she dealt
with the changes in an easygoing, sort of underhand way. For example, she told me
that, before, in Croatia two sets of names were commonly used side-by-side for the
twelve months of the year. In some parts of Croatia it was common to hearSUeoanj,
Veljaöa, O2ujak, etc., whereas in other regions, as in Bosnia and Serbia, the Latin-
based calendar was in use: Januar, Februar, Mart, etc. Many people had used both
sets of terms, but the militant 'nationally correct' Croatian rhetoric now denounced the
Latin-based words as Serbisms. In the ensuing confusion, Andèlka said, she and many
of her friends chose to avoid trouble altogether by relying on a third possibility, which
had also existed previously: they referred to months simply as 'the first', 'the second',
'the third', etc.
A similar strategy was prevalent in explicitly dissident circles, albeit often with a much
sharper angle to it. Both in Beograd and in Zagreb, I found that for anti-nationalist
discursive practice the language question was almost always a completely irrelevant
issue on the personal level. Strategies based on mockery, light-heartedness and
avoidance were widespread in post-Yugoslav everyday life and not limited to the
language issue. In the wider society, this often led to an uneasy cohabitation of ardent
nationalist absolutism and a relativising approach based on self-deprecating humour,
with attitudes varying not only from person to person, but also from occasion to
occasion and from issue to issue. In the case of language, even within one and the
same everyday conversation the ambiguities were piled up to a level that would leave
the most militant zealot of nationalist order speechless.
6.2. love and nationality (and how to deal with it)
Let us now look at narratives about a second sphere of everyday life: that of love and
romance. As we shall see, the situation here was different, even though the narratives
were strikingly similar to those above in their emphasis on the colonisation of the
mundane by nationalist exclusivism. In a letter to her daughter, written in April 1992,
the Croatian writer Slavenka Drakulié recalls what it meant to her to marry a man of a
Serbian background:
'I was aware of the fact that he was from a Serbian family while I was from a Croatian
one, but it didn't mean anything to me, one way or the other. World War II was long over
when the two of us were born and throughout my life it seemed to me that everyone was
trying to escape its shadow, to forget and just live their lives. Your father and I never even
discussed the different nationality of our families. Not because it was forbidden, but
because it was unimportant to the majority of our generation. It wasn't an issue.'
(Drakuliô, 1993a:129)
We have, of course, no statistical data on inter-national romance. What we do know is
that Yugoslav percentages of mixed marriages were a small minority when considered
on the federal, or even republican level. Smits and Ultee state that, in 1981, 7.8% of all
existing marriages in Yugoslavia were mixed (1 996:15; see Petrovió 1985 for a more
detailed discussion). Botev analysed official statistical data and came to these results
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for the late 1980s: 13.1% of all marriages registered in Yugoslavia between 1987 and
1989 were exogamous (1994:469). This can be broken down to 17.4% for Croatia, and
12.9% for Serbia (with internal variation from 4.7% in Kosovo to 28.4% in Vojvodina).
These rates certainly underestimate the real proportions: for methodological reasons,
Botev chose not to include people who filled out 'Yugoslav-undeclared' on the census.
This means ignoring 8.2% of the Croatian population and 4.7% in Serbia (ranging from
0.2% in Kosovo to 8.2% in Vojvodina), if we take the 1981 census as a guideline17.
With many of these 'undeclareds/Yugoslavs' living precisely in 'mixed' families, the
proportion of exogamous marriages must have been much higher than the above
figures indicate. Moreover, in the context of this study, it is important to note that there
were large differences within republics as well, with Zagreb and Beograd having a
much larger proportion than certain rural areas. For most people, particularly in the
towns and cities, having friends or relatives in mixed marriages was, therefore, a
common feature of everyday life.
With hindsight, we have to note here that the term 'mixed marriage' contains a
misleading tendency to postulate two partners with distinct pre-existing national
identities. As we have seen in this chapter, this was frequently the way it was actually
experienced by the persons in question and by others, but the above story by DrakuliC
demonstrates its relativity. While she and her husband did acknowledge their different
nationalities, it was an irrelevance to them. Moreover, for couples where the two
partners identified as 'undeclared/Yugoslav' the term 'mixed marriage' seems
inadequate, even if their families were of different national backgrounds. Still, this is the
term used, yet another category imposed by a system designed to eradicate
ambivalence 18 . It is clear that the rise of nationalism and its drive to create discrete
cultures also affected the significance of nationality in these contexts. With 'Yugoslav'
identity becoming a publicly undesirable and often privately unacceptable label, the
ambivalence was forcibly cleared up, and in many people's narratives the fact that they
lived in a mixed relationship—now really mixed—became a relevant factor in everyday
life.
In what follows, I focus on one particular set of mixed relationships, namely those in
Zagreb between partners with Serbian and Croatian national backgrounds. Due to the
diverging, if interdependent mechanisms of Serbian and Croatian nationalism, and as a
result of Serbian nationalist flirtations with 'Yugoslavness', the issue of mixed
marriages was much more problematic in Croatia than in Serbia. Although extreme
Serbian nationalists did place mixed families on their ever-growing list of enemies of
the nation, on the whole they seemed less troubled by them than their ideological
counterparts in Croatia. With the Croatian president Tuman publicly proclaiming
himself happy that his wife was not a Serb nor a Jew (Silber & Little 1995:92), it was
not surprising that mixed families often found themselves in uncomfortable situations in
Croatia 19 . The HDZ regime, in particular the President himself, also regularly attacked
critics of the regime under the heading 'Yugo-nostalgics, children of Yugoslav army
officers, and children of mixed marriages'. Similarly, one of the 'charges' in a widely
reported media attack 2° on five dissident women intellectuals was the fact that some of
them were married, or had been married, to Serbs (Globus 11/12/1992:41-2).
In such a situation, anti-nationalist narratives systematically (re)constructed the past in
terms of the irrelevance of nationality with regard to love relationships. This was
embedded in a wider depiction of co-existence on local and large-scale levels as
normal, self-evident, simply there. Moreover, even when involving people from different
17 St at isticki godinjak SFRJ, 1983, 439.
18 This idea grew from a discussion with Sophie Francis, on the basis of her assignment for the module 'The rise of
ethnic nationalism in Central/East Europe: Post-Yugoslav identities', at Hull University. See also Bauman 1991.
19 In an ironic twist of fate, the next First Lady of Croatia turned the tables. Tudman's successor Stipe Mesiô, elected
in January 2000, is married to a woman from a Serbian background. Franjo Tudman didn't live to see it happen.
20 I have written about this public lynch party, waged under the title 'Croatian feminists rape Croatia', in Jansen
1998a.
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regions, romance was something that occurred between individuals, so it was argued,
and national identity was not something that was articulated into such everyday life
decisions. For example, during an interview in his office, a Zagreb academic who had
been married to a Beograd woman for many years, explained:
'I have always thought of myself as a Groat, but that didn't... I mean, like I myself have
been married to a Beogradanka. A Serb. It never crossed my mind that that was
something problematic. I mean ... you went to the coast, and you met people from Serbia
all the time. When I was younger, particularly during summers, we always used to hang
out with girls from Beograd.'
Anti-nationalist narratives then proceeded to explain that nationality, sadly, had
become a crucial issue in people's everyday lives, even in the intimate sphere of love
and romance. Those who had not previously looked at relationships in this way
experienced it as a form of intrusion, as an imposition of nationalist ways from above.
This was illustrated by the following story, told to me in an interview by Ivana, a young
Serbian student from Zagreb:
'My first love.., his father died in the war. The etniks killed him. Then he went to fight in
the war as well. He was under age, but at that time anyone could go if they wanted to. He
was there for a year... We got to know each other, but we never talked about this. We just
never talked about these things. Then, one night, he got drunk and he told me everything.
And when I told him that I was Serbian... we broke that relationship off... Since then I tell
it straight away. When I meet someone I like, I tell them. So they can decide if they think
it is worth it or not.'
Such situations were often contrasted with descriptions of how it was before, when
people simply related to each other 'as individuals' and their national background was
not articulated into a decisive moment (see Chapter Eleven). In this sense, anti-
nationalist narratives depart strongly from the statistical data available, as well as from
other versions of the past. Glenny, for example, argues that, even after thorough
secularisation, it was precisely in the context of kinship that tradition didnot fade away
(Glenny 1999:11-11). In Yugoslavia, he argues, the key repository for a national sense
of belonging and exclusivist practice was the extended family, sustained through
widespread endogamy (see also Erikson 1999; Bringa 1995:149-153). When
confronted with such contrasting, alternative representations, anti-nationalist narratives
were usually quick to denounce them as 'maybe true for some rural areas'. And it must
be said that there were marked differences between patterns of kinship in the cities
and in the countryside—particularly involving people with an Islamic cultural
background (Bringa 1995:150). However, even if it cannot be my intention here to
research the validity of such claims, it seems fair to say that they were usually
denounced too quickly in anti-nationalism. In their general urge to defend a perspective
on social reality which was opposed to xenophobia, anti-nationalist narrations of the
past often glossed over real, existing articulations of national identity in everyday life in
the past. As we shall see in the chapter on Jugonostalgija, I argue that we should see
the relevance of such narratives of the past more in terms of their providing political
commentary on the present than in terms of their actual historical accuracy.
In any case, the post-Yugoslav situation was less contested as it became increasingly
undesirable, even in urban areas, to engage in love relationships (or indeed in any
relationships) with national Others. Jasna, a young Serbian woman from Zagreb who
did not feel very strongly about her Serbian identity at all, told me on several occasions
about her reluctance to get involved with a Croatian man. In a long interview she
confided:
'My worst nightmare is that I would fall in love with a Groat. Let alone that I would want to
marry one. I mean, it's terrible, but you know, when I meet a bloke that I like, I'm quite
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afraid. You know, I don't want to cause trouble... For myself, or for my parents... and,
ultimately, for my children. So no Croats, no thank you.
Similarly, Ivana, apart from feeling obliged to inform potential boyfriends in advance of
her Serbian nationality, explained that her love life had taken on nationalised
dimensions in other ways as well:
'Soon, a Croatian guy I know is going to marry a Serbian girl. And already there's trouble.
The two families are having a huge row before they even get married! [...] I hate to admit
it, but when I think that I would marry someone in a couple of years, I think not only "He
should be nice and kind and good-looking", and so on, but I think it would be nice if he
was Serbian... I wish I didn't have that in me, but, you know, ... I suppose it is some kind
of protection. Of course, I wouldn't not marry someone because he was a Croat. ... I think
particularly of this, you know, ... if I would have children. It's terrible that you have to think
about these things, but it's like that... So I think, okay, for me it might be okay to have
children with a Croatian man. But... what about these children themselves? What if this
happens again in twenty years!?'
The whole story becomes even more interesting if we know that Ivana, who explicitly
identifies as Serbian, is herself the daughter of a mixed marriage, and her father is a
Croat. Also, note that both girls claimed that, despite their self-protective attitudes
towards Croatian men, they did not necessarily look for a Serb. In fact, they argued,
they would happily go out with any other foreigner.
With the war in Croatia, love relationships between Croats and Serbs came to be seen
in a negative light by most people. This sometimes led to extreme situations, such as in
a Croatian village where I worked with an NGO dialogue project: the first people to be
threatened and finally chased out were a mixed family (Jansen 2000b). They
represented too much of a reminder of the ambivalences questioning the conflicting
nationalisms, and they were expelled even before the campaigns of ethnic cleansing
started. Military operations as well as tendencies towards ethnic homogenisation and
physical separation were important here, but it is clear from the stories above that even
for those who stayed behind in multinational environments, there were important social
barriers. Most mixed couples that I knew were together from before. Still, this didn't
mean that romance between people from different nationalities didn't occur. Particularly
in anti-nationalist narratives, it was even quite commonly mentioned. It was generally
assumed that, for obvious reasons, people from mixed families were over-represented
in anti-nationalist initiatives. This was explained as a normal thing by Nela, a middle-
aged journalist, who was herself born from an extremely unusual marriage. Her mother
was a Serb from Croatia, who, in WWII, escaped death when her entire village was
massacred by an Ustaa formation. She later married Nela's father, a Croat, which
would not be quite so unusual were it not that he was himself a soldier in an Ustaa
unit. In the polarised situation of the 1990s, Nela said, she was sometimes called a
Oetnik when speaking up against 'primitivism'. Her answer was always that she was
not a Oetnik, but a mixed person [mjesanac], and that she was proud of that. In Nela's
view, people in mixed marriages were the most 'normal' ones left.
So, of course, love between people from different national backgrounds was still
possible. Every year, hundreds of former Yugosla ys, particularly young people, took
part in one of the numerous foreign-sponsored summer camps, seminars, conferences
and workshops dealing with post-Yugoslav issues. On these programmes, holiday
romances were the order of the day, and, afterwards, the participants often revelled in
the fact that national dividing lines hadn't mattered there. Still, it seems to me that these
occasions were exceptional and even liminal in nature. They were events where the
new nationalist rules of normality were suspended and where a sort of multinational
communitas reigned (Turner 1969:81). This was reflected in one of the main difficulties
of these initiatives, often mentioned by the organisers: how to ensure that the spirit and
practice of co-operation of the event spills over into normal life, when people return to
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their, usually nationally homogenous, old or new homes? A friend of mine who worked
in an international Bosnian NGO told me how, on the way home from a conference,
two young girls in the bus were talking (read: crying) about the boys they fell in love
with during the event. The conference had just ended, and immediately, the perverted
normality of divided post-war Bosnia pressed its stamp on their conversation, as one of
them remarked: 'But you are lucky... at least yours is from the same Entity!'21.
7. anti-nationalist narratives of city minorities
In the cities where I did my fieldwork, the most radical changes brought about by the
elevation of nationality to a crucial touchstone in social life were experienced by those
belonging to a minority group. There were strong differences here between the Serbian
and the Croatian capital. Zorica was an NGO activist who had lived in Beograd for
twenty-odd years. Although she was born and raised in a Croatian family in the
Dalmatian town of Split, she saw Beograd very much as her city. In an interview, Zorica
argued:
'I have never had any trouble here in Beograd because of my background. It wasn't a
problem here for Croats. Of course, there were individual cases, but it wasn't like in
Croatia. There, it was a different story... but of course, they had a war there and we
didn't...'
Although there were cases of harassment, on the whole, Croats in Beograd felt much
less threatened than Serbs in Zagreb. This had to do with the fact that the Serbo-
Croatian conflict was fought on Croatian territory, but also with the different natures of
the opposing nationalist discourses. We have seen that, whereas Croatian nationalism
strongly centred upon anti-Serbian negation, Serbian nationalism had more
incorporating tendencies, as expressed through its uneasy but continuing flirtation with
some kind of prolonged Yugoslavism.
During the war, therefore, Zagreb Serbs in particular felt caught in-between as large
parts of the country they lived in were being destroyed by 'their' co-nationals. Before
the break-up, there were actually more Serbs in Zagreb than in the whole of Krajina,
and overall, the Serbian vote in the first Croatian elections is estimated to have been
70% for the reformed communist Party of Democratic Change, not for Serbian
nationalists (Thompson 1992:283). Even though, at that time, they themselves might
not have perceived their Serbian background as an important factor, it became
impossible to avoid the issue when people were being killed because of their
nationality. Of course, the reaction of the Serbs in Croatia to the outbreak of Croatian
nationalism varied widely, and many of them were strongly engaged in formulating their
own exclusionary discourse. However, in this section I look at some specific cases:
anti-nationalist narratives formulated by Zagrepöanke who identified as Serbs.
Again, Ivana's interview is an interesting one to start from. Born and raised in Zagreb,
she kept a low profile with regard to the fact that she identified as Serbian. She was
determined to get on with her life and she was aware of the disadvantage she might
face because of her national affiliation. Even now, after the war, she argued:
'I have the impression that things are not changing so strongly. On the outside, yes. but
the same pressures are there. Only now it is official policy that there's no discrimination.
So it seems like everybody is equal, but under the surface the same climate exists. Say
for instance, it would be very hard to get a job. Nobody will say it in your face that that is
why, but you won't get it. Or simply..., you won't get any privileges. Like, if someone does
21 In the Dayton Agreements of 1995, the military and demographic results of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina were
consolidated in a state form based on two Entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosniac- and
Croatian-controlled), and Republika Srpska (Serbian-controlled).
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something wrong at school, everybody will get a second chance, but they will throw you
out immediately... Sometimes I think it is even worse than some years ago, because at
least then it was explicit. Now it looks like nothing is going on... but really...'
Before the war, Ivana never actually visited Serbia. Apart from some distant relatives,
she knew nobody there. Throughout the war, her Serbian identity, and Serbian
Orthodox religion in particular, had become important to her, and as an indirect result
of the war, she got to know people in Serbia through NGO-meetings, through her
ecumenical work and through members of her family who have fled there. This points
to a perverted kind of cross-frontline national homogenisation through the backdoor of
the war: many inter-republican contacts (mainly inter-national) were broken off
completely, but many others (mainly intra-national) were actually established as a
result of the war... In this way, Ivana, very much a Zagreb girl, said:
'I remember the first phone call I made to Serbia. It was after the war. I was in tears of
course. It was very special.'
On an interpersonal level, Ivana, who spent the war years in the relatively safe, albeit
hostile environment of Zagreb, responded to distrust and aggression from Croatian
former friends by withdrawing into a rather small group of close loved ones—both
Serbs and Croats—'who knew' (that she was Serbian). Outside of that group she never
identified as Serbian, even when put on the spot. This was made possible by her
neutral sounding name. This was, of course, a widespread strategy of coping with
hostility. Tamara, another Serbian Zagreb-girl, drove this exercise of dividing public
and private, and the ensuing paranoia, to the extreme: virtually nobody, including some
close friends, knew about her Serbian background. Nevertheless, she did insist that
her Serbian identity had become important to her during the past decade.
However, these extreme situations should not prevent us from seeing the subtle
ambiguities that can be wrapped up in strategies of (partial) secrecy. For example,
before, Ivana never considered her identity as a Serb an important issue—nothing to
be proud about, nothing to be ashamed about. Now, whether she liked it or not, it had
become crucial: her social environment was divided into those who knew and those
who didn't, a divide grounded in, amongst other things, the above-mentioned
experience with a former boyfriend-Croat. In Ivana's case, it should be clear that she
resented and regretted the fact that her nationality exercised control over so many
aspects of life and that she experienced it as imposed upon her. In this way, although
she was very young when the war started and had therefore lived almost as long in
independent Croatia as in former Yugoslavia, when I talked to her, she thought back to
before as a time in which nationality was irrelevant. As so often, however, this nostalgic
view blended with a longing for an alternative reality in the present.
'I just wished that... I wished that you could go somewhere and that they would ask you:
what kind of music do you listen to? That kind of questions.., and nothing about
nationality at all. [...] When I was in Italy, where I worked as a baby-sitter, it was really
great. You just walked out and bought a newspaper and read it and nobody, but nobody
was asking any questions about "&a si ti?' ["What are you?"] or "Ciji Si ti?" ["Whose are
you?"]'
While thus far I have focused mainly on individual coping strategies, national
homogenisation by the majority group can also provoke collective counterstrategies by
minorities. Once again, this was much more obvious in Zagreb than in Beograd.
Certain groups of moderate Serbs who stayed behind in Zagreb had organised
themselves in order to demand equal political rights and full respect for their national
identity. This sometimes amounted to celebrations of Serbian culture and traditions,
which pointed to a certain reification of what it meant to be Serbian in response to
Croatian nationalism. Ivana told me how this came about:
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'Many Serbs, particularly young men, isolate themselves. At some point, some time ago,
that was really necessary. I am not saying it is good, but we had to, really. You would be
confronted all the time with distrust and aggression and threats, and there you found
some kind of a safe place. A place where you didn't have to be careful or watch your
words. You know, there, people would believe you if you told them what happened to
you. They would understand because they went through it themselves. But now, some of
them really exaggerate. There is this radical current... they isolate themselves
completely. There are people I know, who never, but never, would want to go out with a
Croatian girl. They take pride in the fact that they never had Croatian friends or
girlfriends. And then there is... like Miroslav for instance, he prides himself on the fact
that in their family they are I don't know how many generations pure Serbs. Jesus Christ!
That's not normal I think. Imagine that! [...] And when they meet, they listen to turbo folk,
and then they tell me: "Ivana, you should listen to this". And I say: "Why?" And they go:
"Because this is ours!". But I think it is crap music, why should I listen to it because it
comes from Serbia... I hate it, I think it is horrible.'
So in a further twist to the story, here we have a case of national counter-
homogenisation, which in turn exercised pressure on individuals who did not wish to
participate in any kind of national homogenisation. The extent to which the emphasis
on discrete national cultures was affecting people's everyday realities became clear in
trivialities like the following one, where Ivana explains the importance of proper kissing
in those groups. Note that in Serbia, it is common to kiss three times, whereas it is
considered 'Croatian' to kiss twice.
'They insist on kissing three times, rather than two. So they would say: "But we have to
do this, we have to make clear we are different". [laughs] There was a time when we
kissed like this [acts out one kiss on one cheek, and then two quickly succeeding kisses
on the othel'
The interplay of majority homogenisation and minority counter-homogenisation led to a
catch-22 situation for many supposed members of that minority who were reluctant to
close ranks. Ivana, again:
'It is a really difficult situation ... I find I constantly have to defend myself. And I always
have to prove myself. To one side I am not Serbian enough, and I have to show them that
I am a really true Serb... To the others I am of course too Serbian, and I have to prove
that I am not too great a Serb to live here...'
Jasna, another Zagrebian with a Serbian background, told me about a visit to Beograd.
She was delighted about it, but at the same time she expressed unease about her
position in between two fires. She told me how she attended a party in Beograd where
someone jokingly referred to her as a foreigner. She got furious and said: 'I am a
foreigner there [in Zagreb] already, and I am not going to be a foreigner here as well!'.
Note that Jasna, although Serbian by nationality, grew up in Zagreb and hardly knew
Serbia at all. In a later comment in the interview, she said that she sometimes thought
of emigrating,
'...but not to Serbia. I would not want to live there. If I want to live somewhere else, then it
must be really abroad, really somewhere where I am a foreigner, where I speak a foreign
language, and where I know I am a foreigner.'
As mentioned by Ivana in a previous quote, gender and generational differences often
crosscut these patterns. This became clear in the following exchange with a previously
mentioned, Serbian family in Zagreb:
Branislav (father): 'I have to tell you something that you should know when you write
about this. Because it stands, it is the truth. Yugoslavia was a socialist country and
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when in 1990 socialism fell all around, some countries dissolved, but in a peaceful
way, like Czechoslovakia. Here, Croatia and Slovenia wanted to separate, and the
Americans supported this because they wanted to get rid of socialism as soon as
possible. Then some people came to power here who were in favour of that. Now
they say things like "Serbia was occupying Croatia" and that kind of nonsense. But
at the time, in Yugoslavia, everybody lived together. You know, even after WWII—
when particularly Serbs suffered terribly, and also Jews and Roma, and also
Croats, but those who were against—even after WWII people still lived together.
And now, again, they say that we can never live together again. And the Croats
now want a country where only Croats live... Can you imagine that? But they will
live together again. You'll see. They will live together again...'
Goga (daughter):'No they won't. Too many things have happened. They won't.'
Branislav: 'Oh yes, they will, you'll see.'
Goga: 'I am so incredibly sick of these stupid politics. I don't care about who is who and
why you should treat people of different nationality in different ways.'
Vanja (Goga's friend): 'I don't understand what gets into people. I never learned to hate
somebody because he is a Muslim or so.'
[al/loudly agree]
Biserka (mother): 'Of course that is nonsense. What matters is if you are a good person
or not. Not which nationality you are.'
Branislav: 'There are differences though. It must be said that the Serbs on the whole are
more hospitable than the Croats.'
Biserka: 'Oh please don't, that's not an issue.'
Bran slav: 'Oh yes, it is really true.'
Biserka: 'No, no, I don't want to hear any of that.'
It is clear that, even within anti-nationalist narratives, there were many different ways to
relate to the new dominant discourses of nationalism. One pattern seems to run
through these stories, and through this whole study for that matter: people
reconstructed how they were taken by surprise, and how they found themselves
obliged to react in a situation where different nationalisms suddenly affected their
everyday lives.
8. half-subjects: identity and non-politics in Yugoslavia
So far, I have shown how many anti-nationalist narratives, in contrast to the official
versions, reconstructed the Yugoslav past in terms of the relatively irrelevant nature of
nationality in everyday lives. Although I believe these stories provided a welcome
alternative to nationalist claims of discrimination and selective suppression, in many
cases, such alternative representations ran the risk of glossing over certain differences
that did play a role in the past as well. In other words, by emphasising the shock they
experienced when nationalism established itself as the new 'truth', they sometimes
disregarded the fact that, in some areas of everyday life, certain elements had a/ready
been articulated into moments of exclusionary discursive practice. Whereas on the
everyday level, national differences seemed to have been largely unarticulated with
language, this was probably not the case with regard to love relationships. Surely there
were examples of the previous importance of nationality in other people's love lives, if
not sometimes in one's own.
In this last section I want to weave what might strike the reader as an ambitious story,
tying in some lines from this chapter with the previous sketch of Yugoslav politics and
elaborating on what I have written elsewhere with regard to the biographical writings of
three dissident women-writers (Jansen 1998a). In addition to providing a background
against which to view the narratives above, this section also aims to throw a critical
light on the absolutist divide between politicians and citizens that was prominent in
much anti-nationalist discourse.
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8.1. living the Yugoslav dream?
Let me start off with mentioning one element of the self-perception of most post-
Yugoslays, regardless of their national or ideological affiliation: their unique position in-
between communist and capitalist Europe. The Yugoslav regime was authoritarian in
nature, but its citizens were keen on setting their lives apart from those in the'really'
communist states: they had the right to travel freely, there was a wide range of
domestic and Western imported consumer goods and they enjoyed a large degree of
cultural freedom albeit it with a taboo on nationalist statements (Ugreiá 1995:48-51).
The protagonist in the documentary Geto sums it up nicely:
'Beograd was my city. There were days when I wished it was Amsterdam, but there were
more days when I was happy it wasn't East Berlin.'
Emphasising the not-quite-as-communist nature of the Yugoslav situation was
common, and it sometimes involved a sense of hurt pride at the sight of the current
comparison with neighbouring states, particularly in Serbia. However, as explained to
me in an interview by Predrag, an outspoken critic of the regime in Beograd:
'We certainly lived better than people in other real, socialist countries; we were a lot freer.
But I was a dissident before as well—and I was attacked for that by the regime. I lost my
job, for example. So saying that we lived better, doesn't mean it was good, it just means
better than some others. Maybe it corrupted citizens into an inability to have a critical look
at that regime..
This last remark suggests that the Titoist regime, apart from its authoritarian policies,
also affected public opinion in a more underhanded way. By representing the past and
the present in simplistic categories, any sense of a future in political terms was
seriously impeded. Tightly interwoven with the communist narrative of a bright future
was the assertion of the primacy of the Party, in its conflicting range of republican
elites. As a result, large layers of the Yugoslav population did not relate to the level of
political decision-making in any way—for them, politics took place in another universe.
This, of course, is not an exclusively Yugoslav pattern at all, but it might help explain
why a strong, collective and organised alternative to the nationalist violence did not
come about. Many people did not necessarily like the former system, but they were
lulled into persistent apathy by 'the good life'. Drakulió, for example, invokes the notion
of a 'contract with the government'. Individuals on the urban-intellectual scene, in
particular, were prepared to abstain from claiming political freedom because they were
'doing okay', they felt 'at home' in Yugoslavia (Drakulió 1993a:135). With the private
sphere largely isolated from politics, it was possible to nurture a generation of what
IvekoviO calls 'adult minors and pseudo-subjective individualism':
"We" (I was born in 1945, in the second Yugoslavia) should have been a generation
without political destiny, the embodiment of their happiness and their political project
("they", the generation of Partisan parents). Through us, they would enjoy the fruits of
their creation in advance, by projection, but it meant that we had to be a generation made
historically irresponsible, a political epi-subject where they were the political subject.'
(lvekovió 1997:101)
Large parts of the Yugoslav population did not engage with politics at all, but they got
on with their lives and forgot about it—consolidating the status of half-subjects granted
to them by the regime (Ivekoviô 1994; 1997). Martina, a middle-aged intellectual who
used to live 'on the relation between Zagreb and Beograd', told me over drinks in a
trendy Beograd bar that sometimes she wondered whether 'it had all been a purely
generational thing'. The generation of her parents had seen Yugoslavia as their toy:
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they played with it and blew it. Martina's generation grew up in a prosperous time, but,
she added, perhaps they were living their fathers' dreams.
In an interview in the office space of her Beograd human rights organisation, Jasmina,
an outspoken NGO activist of the same age as Martina, argued along similar lines:
'My generation, they're very angry. I know them all too well, I deal with them every day.
And what do you do then? You work in an NGO or so... because, before, we didn't really
do anything about it at all. My generation never did anything.'
This did not necessarily imply passivity since a wide variety of cultural initiatives
emerged, particularly in the republican capital cities. In contrast to the increasing drive
towards republican autonomy, and contrary to the thinly veiled nationalist programs of
the ruling republican elites, this scene often included a pan-Yugoslav aspect,
embedded in a staunchly individualist ethos (Devié 1997:145).
In the context of the economic crisis in the last decade of Yugoslavia,Deviô scathingly
describes a pan-Yugoslav layer of 'semi-employed and unemployed urban youth [...]
often with degrees in social sciences, journalism, law, literature and the arts, [who]
were able to maintain their cosmopolitan lifestyles in the 1980s because of the social
benefits and their parents' savings' (1997:145). Both in Zagreb and in Beograd, the
1980s were often described to me as the 'golden years'. On a trip to the Dalmatian
coast, Lidija, a highly educated Zagreb NGO activist in her thirties, repeatedly
compared things to how they had been before. Over a plate of fresh fish and a couple
of drinks on a sunlit terrace, she recalled times gone by, and she explained:
'There were times when I used to go to the cinema almost every day. The best films
always came from Beograd. And we listened to music. People here liked to listen very
much to music in their own language. The words were always the most important, you
know. We would know all the words to the songs. In those times, that is what we did. We
went to see films, listened to music, read books. That was what we talked about. That
was everything. We didn't talk about politics at all. Never. It was like "You can't do
anything about it", so we kept ourselves busy with other things: films, music, books... Of
course I am talking about before the war now. It is completely different now. Zagreb is a
completely different city now. You know, I live in Novi Zagreb, and that used to be such
an alternative place. There was always something going on. But now... pfff... it's a really
boring place. Zagreb has changed completely. People are all extremely boring now.
They're all the same. Nobody is original, nothing original happens...'
Less than two months later, Lidija had arranged for emigration to the US. In the late
1980s, while communism was increasingly delegitimised and ridiculed in the press,
there was very little political articulation of alternatives from within these highly
educated, self-proclaimed cosmopolitan layers of the populations in Zagreb and
Beograd, unlike the situation in the Slovenian capital Ljubljana (see for example Kovaë
1988; Mastnak 1990). Therefore, I would argue, the political field was left open to the
increasingly autarkic republican elites of the Communist Party and to hard-line
nationalists at home and abroad. As we have seen in this chapter, these combined
forces of nationalism proved entirely incompatible with the everyday lives of many
people in Zagreb and Beograd. With nationality being an unproblematised element in
mundane discursive practice for them, they were simply not prepared for the shock.
8.2. too late now for alternatives...
Even on the brink of war, there was only limited reaction because people who saw no
links between their everyday life narratives and the rising nationalisms often didn't take
it very seriously until it was too late (with notable exceptions of course). Their a- or anti-
political habitus, nurtured in the former state, prevented them from estimating the true
contours of the changes (Devió 1997:147). Many of those who lived according to a
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'Beograd' or 'Zagreb' ethos only realised when it was too late that their life-styles,
based on individualism, cosmopolitanism and sometimes Yugoslavism, had become
entirely irrelevant. Only when the war had started did they understand that 'the rhetoric
of ethnonationalism was not (just) a pitiful rambling of the provincial arrives, but an
avant-garde of draft notices' (Deviá 1997:148). For some people, this resulted in strong
feelings of guilt, and of having been deceived, as illustrated in this extract from an
interview with the actress Mira Furlan:
'My greatest mistake and what I feel most guilty about is that I was overcome by the
events. They surprised me—I was completely unprepared. When I look now at the
development of pre-war events, I see how we have been deaf and blind, as if we didn't
want to see the whole horror and the seriousness of the situation. [...] I consider myself
guilty for that naïve optimism and blindness. I should have known, I should have seen.
[...] I lived in an illusion, in lies, as we have seen afterwards.'
(Feral Tribune, 14/12/98:6-7)
Sometimes, these guilt feelings were explained within a context of rising pressure and
intolerance towards diverging opinions, but often it was also part of a general reflection
on responsibility. Two extracts from interviews illustrate this:
'If there is something that I regret, then it is that I did not speak up more in public. I did so
in the work environment, in meetings, and in private, but I did not become a public
advocate. Maybe I should have done so. But I did not, out of fear, particularly because of
the children. I would be afraid for them.'
(Nela, a middle-aged journalist in Zagreb)
'I don't feel that anyone can be... not happy, we can't be happy because, eh... this war, all
this that happened in the former Yugoslavia makes my generation responsible, and
maybe more than other ones... because we are biologically responsible. We are the
generation which should have filled up this vacuum.., and taken the responsibility for the
country. [...]. We lived in a beautiful country and it had, you know, some atmosphere, and
now, we all, we are all scattered throughout the world with our former lives and it is very
difficult to start a new life. The only thing that we can do is to sit and reflect on it and, you
know, sum up our own lives [
... 1 . My generation is a lost generation. [...] One has
doubts... one feels isolated, there are few friends, you know, and you can see the
process of collapse.., not only of society, but of the integrity of individuals... You see how
difficult it is to take this daily deterioration? [...} It is eh... the generation which has really
paid the price. In my view, many of my friends get angry when I say this, but we are
responsible... We just didn't try enough [laughs]. [...] I just say, when I had this general
reflection, that we are responsible because... because we didn't take our responsibility
earlier. In time, not only now, but during the war. Or much earlier...'
(Jasmina, a middle-aged NGO activist in Beograd)
In conclusion, let me take this opportunity to return briefly to the introductory remarks I
made about resistance and the term 'anti-nationalism'. If Yugoslavia was far from a
harmonious paradise, it is still fair to say that many people's everyday lives contained a
sense of non-politicised, unproblematic co-existence. From the narratives analysed in
this chapter, it transpires that their mundane discursive practice did not articulate
nationality into a moment. They perceived nationality issues as functioning on the level
of politics, which was far removed from their everyday experience. Thus, the discursive
practices on which this study focuses are articulated only in response to the relatively
recent drive to closure effected by the different post-Yugoslav nationalisms. Therefore,
although those discourses often relied on narratives of continuity, they can only be
understood as reactive practices, as anti-nationalist discursive practices.
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[chapter seven]
anti-nationalist constructions of
'the city' and 'the village'
Zoran: 'There are so many Hercegovci in the Croatian government. They are really
primitive. They are very different from the other Croats.'
Tereza: 'Yes, much more different than the Serbs in Zagreb.'
Zoran: 'I think it also has to do with the land they come from. Herzegovina is very
stony, rocky. These people are taught from when they are small that they
have to defend themselves, to fight against nature. It is ingrained in them
when they are kids. And it is these people who now have the power in
Zagreb.'
Tereza: 'They all stick together. They are like a big lobby and they are all arranging
things for each other. It's like the Montenegrins in Serbia!'
(Zagreb Serb Zoran and his Croatian wife Tereza, now living in Beograd, both
unemployed)
At several points, I have emphasised that post-Yugoslav anti-nationalist discourses
were articulated as responses to dominant nationalisms, and in more than a strictly
chronological sense. This is not to say that there was no pre-existing basis to rely on,
but the character of anti-nationalism and the ways in which it functioned can only be
understood if we see it as a set of reactive strategies that drew a large part of their
meaning from their relation to the discourses they opposed. In contrast to dominant
tendencies in the post-Yugoslav context, anti-nationalist discursive practices resisted
the drive to treat national identity as a crucial factor for the evaluation of social reality.
They formulated an alternative definition of the situation—a subaltern explanation of
how things were, why they were like that and where the reasons could be found. This
means that there was little or no sense of solidarity with co-nationals for the sake of
nationality. However, interestingly, some of the most powerful articulations of anti-
nationalism could be found precisely amongst people who worked in solidarity with
survivors of the nationalist violence in refugee centres and rape victim shelters—a
different discursive practice of solidarity, which did not articulate the national identity of
victims and perpetrators into a moment.
Like any other discourse of identity, anti-nationalism was partly defined and defined
itself through a construction of categories of Others, of an 'outside'. As a logical
consequence of the dynamics of anti-nationalism, these Others were not the same
ones as in nationalist discourses, where enemy nations and 'internal collaborators'
functioned as such. Instead of national Others, anti-nationalist discursive practices
located themselves in opposition to nationalist Others, such as dominant politicians,
war criminals, media personalities and to everything those people stood for, regardless
of national background.
In this chapter, I argue how these processes of self-positioning frequently articulated
fragments of discourses employing the concepts of urbanity and rurality 1 . Through an
analysis of stories from Zagreb and Beograd, I show how very specifically defined
discursive constructs of 'the city' and 'the village' functioned as central metaphors in the
experience of discontinuity. Moreover, I demonstrate how urbanity was articulated into
alternative discursive practices relating everyday life narratives to 'big stories' on a
cross- and supra-national level. This means that, after a brief sketch of some patterns
1 Despite semantic tensions between 'urban' and 'urbane' in English, I have chosen to follow my informants and only
use the term 'urban'. Not only does this reflect usage in Serbia and Croatia, but it also emphasises the perceived link
between civilised manners and city life, which is at the heart of the analysis in this Chapter.
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in (post-)Yugoslav urbanity in its geographical sense, the analysis quickly moves to
another level, that of the deterritorialised discursive spaces of urbanity and rurality
(Silverman 1975:ix).
Throughout this chapter, it will be clear not only that there were great differences
between Zagreb and Beograd anti-nationalist discourses, but also that these
differences were interrelated and, in turn, conditioned by and conditioning a discursive
formation that I call Balkan orientalism. For analytical reasons, I have attempted to
disentangle those two issues, but, importantly, the analysis presented in this chapter
should be read in relation to that in the next chapter.
1. the village and the city in the (post-)Yugoslav context
1.1. post-Yugoslav nationalism as a rural phenomenon?
The establishment of the different post-Yugoslav nationalisms as the legitimate
discourses on identity in the late 1980s involved the re-articulation of pre-existing
discourses of urbanity and rurality. Critics have often described these nationalisms as
containing strongly romantic views of rurality (Ramet 1 996b; Popov 1994; Buden 1996).
It is true that intellectuals glorified what they saw as 'rural ways', particularly in Serbia
where nationalism gained political legitimacy first. A significant role was played by
writers of what I would call national-realist works, urban-based intellectuals who
promoted a revival of epic traditions through novels and poems focusing on rural
themes. For example, several Serbs who became politically prominent in the 1990s,
such as Dobrica Oosiô, Vuk Drakoviô and Matija Beákoviô, represented 'the Serbian
peasant' as a pure expression of Serbdom (Popov 1994; DoreviO 1996). The writer
Ivan Aralica was often mentioned as their Croatian counterpart (Buden 1996:40-45),
although, in Croatia, nationalist evocations of rural purity were permanently crosscut by
images of a modern, Central-European Croatian identity.
In both the Serbian and the Croatian case, the rural affinities of nationalism were
reinforced by the articulation of nationalist discourses with a religious revival, since the
church and religious traditions were more prominent in the countryside. Culturally, then,
discourses of rurality were important to the rise of post-Yugoslav nationalisms, and
many critics of the regimes converged on the depiction of the post-Yugoslav nationalist
regimes of Miloevió and Tudman as profoundly rural phenomena. In the Serbian case,
some people went as far as saying that the nationalist revival meant a 'victory of the
countryside over the city' (Ramet 1996b:76).
Post-Yugoslav nationalist discourses were not only laden with images of rurality, but
they were also strongly rural-based with regard to electoral support. The very
campaigns leading to the rise of MiloeviO and Tudman relied heavily on rural symbols
and style. This was certainly the case in Serbia, where Kosovo Serbs served as the
foot soldiers of Miloeviô's so-called anti-bureaucratic revolution, but also in Croatia the
nationalist revival gained momentum through similar mass rallies with a predominantly
rural character. Electorally, both Miloevió and Tudman rode to power largely on their
success in the countryside, and articulated opposition against the regimes was strongly
concentrated in the cities, few of which were still controlled by the ruling parties during
my fieldwork (Glasnik 07/02/97; Tjednik 25/04/97:28; Peraziá & Beliô 1997:7-8). I would
like to add immediately that, since most opposition parties were strongly nationalist
themselves, this didn't mean that nationalist votes were only to be found in the villages;
rather, nationalist parties got their votes everywhere, whereas the (very small) non- or
anti-nationalist vote was overwhelmingly urban2.
2 With the important exceptions of the Croatian region of Istra and the Serbian province of Vojvodina. But those are
interesting stories in themselves. Also, we should take into account recent developments, both in Croatia, where
Tudman has died and HDZ has lost power, and in Serbia, where opposition increasingly appears to come from
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It is interesting to see how this contradicts classic accounts, which refer to education, a
literary language and standardised printed press as crucial elements in the rise of
nationalism (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983). In the post-Yugoslav context, and maybe
in other cases of postcommunist nationalism as well, these relations seemed to be
inverted. A large-scale survey in 1993, in the then embargoed FR Yugoslavia, pointed
to a strong correlation between illiteracy or low levels of schooling and attachment to
nationalist values (Golubovió 1995:447). Authoritarianism and traditionalism, as well as
nationalism and xenophobia, scored particularly highly amongst the lowly educated, the
elderly and the peasantry, and the opposing values were much more prevalent
amongst the young, the educated and the urban. However, the question is to what
extent this data can be seen as a measure of largely verbal conformism. In fact, this
conformism constitutes an interesting phenomenon in itself, one that might reinforce
other elements of modernist explanations of nationalism such as the crucial role of the
people sometimes condescendingly referred to as 'semi-intellectuals': teachers, social
workers and clergymen. In any case, in this chapter, my focus is on the ways in which
discourses about such patterns of rurality and urbanity were incorporated in (anti-
)nationalist narratives.
1.2. the place of rurality/urbanity in Yugoslavia
A striking number of people in Zagreb and Beograd spontaneously emphasised the
importance of the rural/urban divide when explaining their views on the violent end of
Yugoslavia. Before we move on to discuss this point and the effects of the wars on the
discursive construction of 'the village' and 'the city', let us briefly look at some
background factors in the urban/rural configuration of the former state.
1.2.1. the slow rise of the city in Yugoslavia - or not?
Considered within a European context, the lands that comprised Yugoslavia long
retained a remarkably rural character. Urbanisation took off very late, and industry and
education developed very slowly (Ramet 1996b:74-75). It was only with the post-WWII
Titoist regime that a real program of industrialisation was launched. However, despite
its program of socialist modernisation, the nature of theTitoist attitude towards the city
remained a matter of debate, with at least two perspectives. On the one hand there
were those, like the US scholar Ramet, who argued that Yugoslav communism was a
strongly urban-based ideology, aimed at eradicating what it saw as backward or
traditional cultural patterns and replacing them with egalitarian and modern social
relations (Ramet 1996b:72-73, 76). On the other hand, a number of post-Yugoslav
urban intellectuals argued that the Partisan victory in WWII and theTitoist regime that
followed had a strongly rural character (especially in Serbia, see for example Velikiô
1992a:33, 36ff; Vujovió 1992:61; Bogdanovió, 1993:38). These people blamed the
Communists for waging a traditionalist, authoritarian campaign against the city veiled by
a thin rhetoric of urbanisation and modernisation. In reality, it was argued, Titoist
urbanisation was plainly anti-modern (Vujovió in BoIëiO 1995:112-115).
What nobody denied was that post-war Yugoslav times were characterised by a wave
of urbanisation: in the period 1948-1981, some 6.5 million Yugoslays migrated from
rural areas to cities (Vujoviô 1992:61). Even so, not until the mid-I 980s did more than
half of the population live in urban areas 3 . Strong inter-republican differences existed,
with Serbia simultaneously having both the highest proportion of farmers (27.6% in
smaller towns (for some indications of the latter, see the contribution of 2ariô in 'Belgrade after the bombing'
(iNtergraph, 2, May 2000).
In 1981, 53.5% of all Yugosla ys lived in villages, and one fifth was engaged in agriculture (Vujovió 1992:61; Ramet
1996b:75). At the outbreak of war, in 1991, 53.5% of the population was living in urban areas (Vujoviá in Bolöiô
1995:112).
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1981), and the largest city—also the capital—of Yugoslavia. Croatia, with the second
city, Zagreb, counted 15.2% farmers in 1981 (Statistiöki Ijetopis RH 1997:87).
1.2.2. everyday experiences of urbanity and rurality: mind the gap
Both in the former country and in the post-Yugoslav states, the gap between the urban
and the rural represented more than a mere statistical phenomenon or an item of
exclusively academic debate. It featured prominently in people's everyday lives as a
popular topic for conversation, with few disputing that the village and the city were
worlds apart. This was reflected in the fact that many city-born people had only rarely
visited the countryside (not counting the coast) and had a very limited knowledge of
relatively nearby rural areas. Others did move between the two locations, but this often
reinforced the perception of a strong divide. I met up with Maja, a young woman who'd
lived abroad for many years, in a cinema bar in the centre of Beograd. While the anti-
regime demonstrations were in full swing outside, she explained that she felt like she
lived two lives: one in the city and one in the village. After having lived in a large city
abroad for years, she now found herself in her small, native village again. While she
loved the peace and beauty there, Maja explained, she needed to escape every now
and then, if only to see what was happening in the world.
The gap between village and city life was continually discursively reinforced through a
juxtaposition of representations of past and present. For example, Emin, a young man
from a provincial town in Bosnia who worked for a Zagreb NGO, told me that before the
war nobody had ever asked 'what' you were. He argued that national differences had
not been important and people had never talked about them; often they hadn't even
known. The real difference, Emin said, had always been between people from the town
['öars7ja] and those from the village. Lifestyle and popular culture played an important
role here. At a party shortly after my arrival, Dragan, a Beogradanin of just over thirty,
told me about his military service in the former Yugoslav army. The conscious policy of
the Titoist regime to create nationally heterogeneous groups of recruits was reflected in
the stories of several generations of men for whom this was their primary experience of
inter-republican contact. In his army days, Dragan said, the Beograclani always had
more in common with Zagrepöani than with Serbs from some small village. The urban
kids had grown up in similar contexts, developing similar lifestyles—they were, in
Dragan's words, the rock and roll generation.
It is not a coincidence that, in order to explain the cohesion of urban recruits of different
nationalities and the gap between 'ruralites' and the 'urbanites' within one republic,
Dragan referred to youth subculture. The role of Yugoslav rock music was especially
pertinent in the construction of some level of common Yugoslav belonging within his
generation (see the chapter on Jugonostaig(ja).
1.2.3. straddling the gap: the ruralisation of the cities
The perception of a wide gap between urban and rural experiences in former
Yugoslavia seemed contradictory in relation to another phenomenon, the massive
migration to the cities after 1945. As a result of this recent growth, cities were often
seen as urban only in part. Slavenka Drakulió wrote that as a result of the relatively
short tradition of urban life for most citizens, 'cities retain the flavour of villages'
(1996:196). This, she argued, was especially the case in the suburban outskirts, where
most recent 'immigrants' settled in apartment blocks. Drakuliá is ambivalent about this
process of ruralisation of the city. She rightly points out how the situation reflects a
pattern in most former-communist countries whereby the city retained strong links with
the village because of its status as an asset in the struggle for survival (food,
networks...). On the other hand, she mentions the mud in the city streets as a 'ghost of
your peasant origins', a permanent reminder of your rural roots that haunt you
throughout your city life (1996:199).
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The title of Drakulió' essay, Still stuck in the mud, is paradigmatic for the image that
many urbanites had towards their more recent co-citizens. Whereas the backwardness
of the village was always taken for granted, the absence of a strict dividing line between
urban and rural was seen as a symptom of a more worrying underdevelopment
(Bogdanoviô 1993:16-17). This was illustrated by a conversation with a colleague from
Zagreb during a conference in Slovenia. At first, she approvingly described the centrally
located place where a festive dinner had been served as a typical 'citizen's' or
'bourgeois' flat ['graclanski stan']. Later in the evening, she did not hide her lack of
enthusiasm for the hotel we were staying in. She stated that, despite its location in the
capital, it was not really a gradanski hotel. It had preserved some typical Balkan
features, she said, a typical mix of urban and rural.
I would argue that such views could partly be explained by the fact that the critics
themselves were often only first- or second-generation citizens and, therefore, strongly
felt the need to establish their urban identity. As we shall see, many deplored the
perceived ruralisation of the city in much cruder terms, an attitude that had intensified
enormously with the recent wars.
1.2.4. national heterogeneity and the city
The urban/rural gap in former Yugoslavia, although destabilised by the influx of rural
migrants, certainly retained its relevance in relation to issues of nationality and
multicultural co-existence. In the Yugoslav federation, a pattern existed whereby many
cities and towns were strongly nationally heterogeneous and contained relatively higher
numbers of mixed marriages than villages (VujoviO 1996:149; Bringa 1995:149-153;
Smits & Ultee 1996; Petrovió 1985). This was certainly the case for the capitals of
Serbia, Croatia and, of course, Bosnia. Moreover, in multinational areas, a common
pattern included a nationally heterogeneous town surrounded by similarly mixed
municipalities (Duijzings 2000:10). However, within those municipalities, there was
often a tendency towards more national homogeneity on a smaller scale: villages,
hamlets or even streets were more likely to be nationally homogenous. Mixed
marriages were less prominent in such rural settings. Having said that, it should be
clear that this did not mean segregation: public life, centred around institutions such as
school, work, shopping, officialdom, administration and medical care, was often town-
oriented and thus more mixed. Needless to say, with the ruthless ethnic cleansing
campaigns of the recent wars, a tendency towards national homogeneity became the
rule in most areas.
1.3. urbicide: destroying the city and 'the city'
It is a sad fact that many towns and cities in Croatia and Bosnia suffered irreparable
damage during the post-Yugoslav wars. In post-Yugoslav anti-nationalist narratives, it
is often argued that attacks on cities were not just a part of the military strategies of
conquest, but also constituted a conscious effort to destroy multicultural communities.
This would explain why, apart from destruction caused by fighting, there were
systematic campaigns to eliminate structures with strongly symbolic value, such as the
Great Mosque in Banja Luka or the Old Bridge in Mostar. Some cities derived a whole
new set of meanings from these campaigns of destruction, as in the case ofVukovar
which, through its complete annihilation by Serbian forces, gained the epithet of 'hero
city' in Croatian nationalism. Similarly, the relentless Serbian and Montenegrin bombing
of Dubrovnik, a Unesco heritage city on the Croatian coast, was presented as the
ultimate proof that Serbs were violent barbarians aiming for the elimination of
civilisation tout court. Mostar, once a multicultural Bosnian city, saw its meaning
condensed into its Old Bridge—that is, in the idea of its Old Bridge, for it was destroyed
by Croatian forces.
116
To finish this incomplete list, we should, of course, mention Sarajevo, the Bosnian
capital turned into worldwide symbol of multiculturalism and urban resistance during its
merciless siege by Serbian forces. Significantly, this view was shared by many Serbian
Sarajevans and by dissident Serbs in general. It was in the latter circle that urban
intellectuals often employed the term urbicide, a neologism developed for what they
saw as one of the main issues at stake in the post-Yugoslav conflicts, the conscious
destruction of cities. Urbicide, then, did not only refer to the physical destruction of
cities, but also, and maybe even more importantly, to the killing of urbanity.
1.4. suffering and ambiguous city discourses of rurality
With the wars and with nationalist discourses of identity rising to dominance, the
attitudes in the cities towards 'the rural' took on a very ambiguous character (see also
Rennie Short 1991). On the one hand, the idea of rurality as somehow purer, more real
than the urban experience pervaded much of the city talk about the village. In this
sense, I was reminded of the specificity of my urban-based research on many
occasions: 'The city is quite different, It's not representative', manyBeogradani told me,
'You should go to the villages and see the real Serbia.' It is clear thatthis discourse was
reinforced by the experience of war and the increasing influence of nationalism. The
Croatian and Bosnian countryside was where the real thing happened in the war, and
consequently, rural folk were often represented as the epitome of victims. Above all, it
was their land and livelihoods that had been sacrificed—they knew what suffering was,
and they took the heaviest blows while defending the nation.
Even when framed within a less explicitly nationalist discourse, some images of rurality
made a defining impact on city populations. A particularly strong example is the
Beograd experience in the summer of 1995, when, after the fall of Krajina, a stream of
refugees entered the city within days. Beogradani of different backgrounds and
persuasions had vivid memories of the endless colonna of tractors entering the city on
the motorway from Croatia, previously called 'Motorway of Brotherhood and Unity'. Of
course, images of 'peasant' suffering were not reserved for Beograd audiences. TV
reports showing burning villages in Eastern Slavonia and the influx of displaced Croats
from rural areas in Bosnia and Croatia struck a similar chord in Zag reb4.
Also, apart from images of rural suffering in both Serbia and Croatia, the wars seemed
to have brought about a stronger economic interdependence between city and village.
With drastically falling living standards, the urban population increasingly relied on food
from their networks in rural areas (DrakuliO 1996:199). This was particularly striking in
Beograd, where the socio-economic situation was disastrous. The luggage
compartments of buses heading for the capital from all over the country were always
packed with large bags full of food. They were usually unaccompanied, and, especially
during weekends, Beograd bus station buzzed with people waiting for food packages
delivered to them by a co-operative bus driver.
Alongside this interdependence and the images of rural suffering, many everyday
narratives in Beograd and in Zagreb incorporated a host of negative elements of
rurality. While even in mundane nationalist discourses it was not unusual to ridicule
peasants and their alleged primitivism, the war only seemed to strengthen this practice.
Again, 1 have to highlight a pervasive ambiguity within nationalist narratives in Croatia.
Often, even when Zagrepãani derided the alleged primitivism of peasants, the stigma of
ultimate backwardness was still reserved for Serbs, those Balkan barbarians who
constituted the most important Other of Croatian nationalism.
4 Media representaons rarely showed urban, professional, rich refugees. This resonates with Malkki's discussion of
the essenaIised images of refugees (1995a:8-1 1).
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2. the place of frontline ruralites in the post-Yugoslav context
Let us now have a brief look at certain specific groups of people whom, for lack of a
better term, I call 'frontline ruralites'. In this section I focus onHerzegovinians (in this
case, Croats from Southern and Western Bosnia 5) and on Bosnian and Krajina Serbs.
Arguably, a number of similar points could be made about Croats from other 'frontline'
areas including Lika, Kordun and maybe Slavonia, and for some Southern Serbs and
Kosovo Serbs. In the Beograd imagination, Montenegrins in particular play a role that
resonates with that played by the Herzegovinians in Zagreb. However, with regard to
national identity, Montenegrins represent a very specific case with many ambiguities,
and they can certainly not just be seen as 'super-Serbs', although a number of them do
feel that way6 . Therefore, I mention Montenegrins when appropriate in this section,
without including them in the general analysis.
Focusing on Herzegovinians or Bosnian and Krajina Serbs as groups is not to
disregard enormous variations within these populations, nor contested representations
of them. I simply highlight some patterns in the way the discursive constructs
'Herzegovinians' and 'Krajina and Bosnian Serbs' functioned within both nationalist and
anti-nationalist discourses. In the former state, the Bosnian and Krajina Serbs, as well
as the Herzegovinians, were situated rather centrally in geographical terms; but with
the shifting of borders, they came to be represented (again) as frontier populations. As
in WWII, and given that the post-Yugoslav wars involved conflicting campaigns of
ethnic cleansing, it is not surprising that these groups played a crucial role in the
violence, both as victims and as perpetrators.
2.1. frontline nationalist self-perception: more national than thou
By using the term 'frontline ruralites' I hope to capture the tension that these
populations represent in the cities where I was based during my fieldwork. The rural
areas from which they hailed could be considered peripheral from a city perspective—
urban folk rarely went there—but, as we shall see, they occupied a central place in
nationalist discourses of blood and soil and, by inverted extension, in anti-nationalism.
The dominant discourses of self-perception amongst these populations displayed
striking parallels, built as they were around notions of the nation, purity, and sacrifice7.
Recently, the dominant discourse of self-perception amongst Bosnian and Krajina
Serbs represented them plainly as Serbs, referring to their orthodox background and to
the cultural traditions they shared with other Serbs. Similarly, the dominant discourse
on identity in Herzegovina saw Herzegovinians as nothing but Croats. In both cases
nationalist discourses of self-perception left no stone unturned to prove their belonging
to the 'mother nation', and any specifically local aspect of identity was played down,
ignored, or denied, unless it furthered the idea that they were more typical than those in
the motherland 8 . As in Herzfeld's study of a Cretan mountain village, many liked to
portray themselves as an ideal type of 'how their nation should really be' (1985). The
politician Biljana Plavió, for instance, 'noting that it had always been said in her family
that Serbs in Bosnia were better Serbs than those in Serbia, added that as with all living
It is important to note that I employ the term Hercegovci for Herzegovinian Croats, reflecting use in Zagreb,
although Herzegovina was inhabited by other national groups as well.
6 At the time of writing, about half of the Montenegrin population, mainly in the mountainous hinterland, supported a
political faction which strongly identified Montenegrins as a specific kind of Serbs. Unsurprisingly, they perceived
themselves as more Serbian than the Srbijanci, the Serbs in Serbia.
I didn't carry out systematic fieldwork amongst Herzegovinians or Bosnian and Krajina Serbs. Therefore, when I say
'dominant discourses', I rely on information available in the public sphere. There is little doubt that, on the political
level, nationalist discourses were overwhelmingly dominant amongst those populations. For a study of the ways in
which people in small villages positioned themselves in relation to nationalist discourses, see Jansen 2000b.
8 In the case of the Serbs, this is entrenched in language: 'Srb? means 'Serbs', whereas 'Srbijanc? specifically refers
to Serbs from Serbia.
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organisms, those species that live near and are threatened by others are best able to
adapt and survive' (Mostov 1995:211). In their nationalist discourses, therefore, these
populations presented themselves as more national than their 'brethren' in the
motherland, 'unspoilt', 'pure' or 'real' Serbs or Croats. With their leaders describing
themselves as defenders of a truer form of nationhood, they would also argue that they
had made the largest sacrifice on the altar of national freedom.
Amongst Bosnian and Krajina Serbs were some of the most enthusiastic fighters for a
Greater Serbia; and they experienced the fall of Krajina and the ensuing exodus as one
of the greatest losses in the history of the Serbian suffering. For many, Republika
Srpska, the ethnically cleansed Serbian-controlled part of Bosnia, was simply one of
the Serbian lands temporary locked up in another state. Similarly, at least until
Tudman's death, the self-proclaimed republic Herceg-Bosna, the part of Bosnia
controlled by the Croatian Bosnian army, was de facto almost part of Croatia. The
Croatian Kuna was common currency, schools used Croatian textbooks, and nationalist
discourses represented the Bosnian state simply as a prison imposed by the 'West'. In
terms of elections, both populations gave the vast majority of their vote to ultra-
nationalist parties.
2.2. unspoilt frontlines in 'motherland' nationalism
The construction of these frontline rural groups as 'unspoilt' versions of their respective
'mother' peoples was not an exclusive matter of self-perception. Rather, it was part of a
wider discourse on boundaries within nationalism 9 . Post-Yugoslav nationalisms were
underpinned by, amongst other things, discourses of rurality which articulated notions
of naturalness, purity, reality, sacrifice and the danger of contamination and ambiguity.
Living on the fringes of the presumed ethnic territory of their 'mother' nation and with
neighbours who more often than not were of a different nationality, these populations
were glorified in nationalist representations as 'spearhead' populations in potentially
threatened territory (Herzfeld 1985:8, 33-35). Both Serbian and Croatian nationalist
discourses constructed an image of frontline rural groups as national archetypes
through popular imagery and philosophical musings.
The case of Herzegovinians in particular, illustrates how the representation of frontline
rural groups as somehow more 'typical' than their blood brothers in the 'mother' state
was reinforced by a popular image related to their geographical position. In ethnological
representations, unsurprisingly a smash hit in post-Yugoslav popular-academic
discourse, Herzegovinians were identified as belonging to the 'Dinaric' type 1 ° (this
included all Herzegovinians, regardless of their national background). They were, so it
was argued, mountain people who were engaged in a timeless struggle for survival
against the elements, 'men of stone' heroically making their stand in the face of a
rough, rocky, dry and hostile natural environment. And, of course, it wasn't just nature
they were fighting. By bringing in notions of frontier, history, authenticity, suffering,
threat and sacrifice, the opposing post-Yugoslav nationalisms found a fertile ground on
which to develop this image of robust, weathered hero-warriors on the fringes of the
motherland. In short, frontline ruralites were represented as super-rurals and super-
nationals.
2.3. extreme visions of purity: hatred of the city
The generally vague, pro-rural stance of post-Yugoslav nationalisms was often
reinforced, and sometimes overtaken, by a resolutely anti-urban discourse. Cities and
Brunnbauer and Pichier have demonstrated that a similar pattern can be found in Bulgarian and Albanian
nationalism (2000).
10 This also became clear in an upsurge of interest in older ethnology such as, for example, the work by Jovan Cvijiô
and Dinko Tomasiô. On Herzegovinian Serbs, see for example Velikiô 1992a:33, 38,
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towns were represented as promiscuous, impure and degenerate. In extreme versions,
they were seen as a sign of the entartete times, and it was argued that only a return to
rural purity could save the national essence. Ooloviá draws attention to the metaphors
of health and illness that pervade this kind of discourse: the city was represented as a
cancer and only radical healing was possible (1994b:33-39). This motif was popular
amongst some Bosnian Serb warlords; for example, when Bo±idar Vuëurevió, a poet
turned warrior, threatened to destroy Dubrovnik, this caused indignation at home and
abroad. He dryly replied: 'If necessary we'll build an even prettier and older Dubrovnik'
(Vujoviô 1996:144). In such extreme nationalist discourses amongst frontline rural
populations, cities were depicted as disgusting melting-pots where traditions were
abandoned and once pure cultural communities contaminated. Frontline ruralites, it was
argued, should pride themselves on being faithful to their tradition—their national
tradition, that is—and on the supposedly unpolluted character of their human and
natural environments.
This type of discourse resulted in very ambiguous discourses of the 'mother' nation
amongst the rural frontline populations, especially when the former was represented by
the capital. On the one hand, the idea of the mother nation was everything. It was, after
all, what they were fighting and suffering for. On the other hand, more often than not,
that sacrifice seemed to be met with indifference and even ingratitude. From this we
can understand why that same Vuöureviã directed his primary hatred towards the
capital of his own supposed motherland: 'Beograd', he argued, 'is Tito's whore. It
considers itself Yugoslav, cosmopolitan, democratic. But it doesn't want to be what it is:
Serbian' (ibid.:150). This attitude towards the capital was often accompanied by similar
attacks on its alleged intellectualism, its armchair politics, its arty flair and, most of all,
its indifference in the face of the ongoing suffering of the cream of its own people. In
sum, Vuëurevié argued: 'Beograd is an anti-Serbian container' (Oolovió 1994b:39).
2.4. rural invasions: 'hordes from the hills'
As we have seen, the population movement from rural areas to the city that
characterised the Tito era underwent a dramatic increase during the post-Yugoslav
wars. Both Zagreb and Beograd experienced enormous influxes of people from rural
areas, many of whom were directly or indirectly seeking refuge from the violence. Since
the conflict showed its most horrific face in some of the previously mentioned frontline
territories, the inhabitants of these regions were heavily represented in the new move
towards the cities. This resulted in acute housing problems in the capitals and in
increased tensions between those who considered themselves urbanites and the
newcomers. For example, whereas Beograd counted only 15,000 inhabitants in 1850
and 100,000 in 1914, estimates in the late 1990s hovered around at least one and a
half million (Ramet 1996b:74). In 1992, two-thirds of the Beograd population consisted
of people who had moved in from rural areas during their lifetime (VujoviO 1992:62).
I explained before how post-Yugoslav nationalisms relied partly on a discourse of rural
purity and sacrificial heroism. However, in the cities where I worked, these discourses
were often destabilised by others, based on the pre-existing view of a wide urban/rural
gap and reinforced by the experience of mass migration to the capital from the
periphery. The periphery, and the frontline zones in particular, were typically depicted
as chaotic, rather exotic and completely lawless places where nothing worked but
everything was possible. In short, they were, as one of my Zagreb housemates put it,
'the Wild West'.
As a result, in contrast to the nationalist discourse of frontline heroism and purity, many
people in Zagreb and Beograd distanced themselves patently from their 'national
brethren' who hailed from what they considered the periphery. This was increasingly
the case as the war experience, already relatively remote for many in the city, moved
further away into memory. In Beograd, the nationalist regime itself actually failed to
deliver on its rhetoric of heroism and sacrifice in a most blatant way in 1999, when
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Miloevió had the roads to the capital blocked in order to prevent the influx of Kosovo
refugees. Unsurprisingly, many refugees, displaced persons and other frontline
migrants found this lack of gratitude, or at least sympathy, hard to cope with. The story
of Sabina, a Serbian refugee from Krajina who now lived in Beograd, was illustrative.
Sabina, the 25-year-old administrative worker from the Beograd NGO I occasionally
worked in, argued during another of our many coffeebreaks that in Krajina they had felt
at first that they were defending the Serbs. She said that people had been terribly
manipulated by Miloeviá's men and that when they escaped to Serbia in 1995, they
expected help. Sabina was very bitter about this whole experience: her family had
owned two houses in Knin and now shared a small flat with many others in Beograd.
She was sick of being recognised on the street as a refugee, of being blamed for
Serbia's problems and of being treated as more akin to Croats than Serbs.
The influx of what they perceived as 'peasants', and of frontline ruralites in particular,
was a source of resentment for many citizens of Beograd and Zagreb. The popular
image of an invasion by 'hordes from the hills' pervading conversations in dining rooms,
trams and cafés alike also featured prominently in the urban opposition press. Its
depiction of people from the rural periphery as an undesirable occupation force rested
on several observations, an issue we shall come back to later. For now, I briefly look at
the way city-dwellers saw themselves politically and socio-economically victimised by
the more recent arrivals.
2.5. chaos and mafia: blaming (frontline) ruralites politically
Many citizens of Zagreb and Beograd perceived their regimes as being controlled by
ruralites. The now defunct oppositional Zagreb weekly, Tjednik, labelled the Croatian
government 'a village government', as 15 out of 22 ministers and 65% of MP5 were
born in a village (02/01/98:27-29). In the cabinet, 3 out of 22 ministers were born in
Bosnia-Herzegovina as were 20 of the 195 parliamentarians (most of them from
Western Herzegovina). Strikingly, the same number of MPs were born in the capital
Zagreb, which by then housed more than a quarter of all Croats. The Herzegovinian
lobby, as it was called, occupied a large number of government posts. It was
epitomised by two hardliners who became extremely powerful during the rule of
president Tudman: Gojko uak (t) minister of defence, and lviá Paaliá, presidential
advisor.
Also, and maybe even more importantly, prominent Herzegovinian HDZ members were
the primary beneficiaries of Tudman's privatisation scams, and there were strong
indications of high-level involvement in illicit business. In combination with large (mainly
military) subsidies for the para-state Herceg-Bosna, this led many Zagrepöani to
portray the HDZ regime as being pro-Herzegovinian at the expense of Croats in
Croatia. It can hardly be called a coincidence that the promise to deal with this situation
was one of the main elements of Stipe Mesié' successful campaign to succeed Tudman
as president of Croatia. In Beograd, the emphasis was not so much on Bosnian or
Krajina Serbs, as on people from rural areas in general. However, at least at the time of
my fieldwork, it was bon-ton to point out the Montenegrin background of well-known
figures such as president Miloeviá, Bosnian Serb leader Karad±iá, and war criminal
Arkan. Similarly, Montenegrins were said to occupy leading positions in all sorts of
business, particularly those of the shady kind.
What we have here, then, is a story of ruralites, frontline ones in particular, invading the
city through its centres of power. This image was widespread and it pervaded not only
everyday conversation, jokes and anecdotes in the two capitals, but also much of the
popular press. In a condensed illustration, the independent Beograd weekly Vreme
published two pictures: one of a large limousine-style Audi with exclusive politicians'
number plates; and one of a crowd of people struggling to climb on an already packed
city transport bus (Figure Two). The large print title said: 'They hate Beograd'. The
accompanying text left nothing to the imagination:
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'They travel to and from their Po2arevac, Kolaina, Vranja to work; they travel by
helicopter or Mercedes. Meanwhile, Beograd citizens suffer like cattle in dilapidated city
transport. The federal government has not approved the import of buses from Berlin, a
present to this city. They hate Beogradani and they hate this city.'
As argued above, apart from leading the country into socio-economic disaster as
politicians, ruralites were perceived as being involved in lucrative wheeling and dealing
in mafia-like networks with other ruralites. All this was, of course, done at the expense
of those who lived in the city already and saw it as their rightful property. This was often
accompanied by the desperate outcry about Herzegovinians in Zagreb and about
Montenegrins in Beograd, that 'there were more of them in the city than where they
come from'.
Oni mrze Beograd
Oni do svojih Poar';aca.	 V:
sla. putuju hel KO err.:	 .	 c-:.m z:c:u
kao stoka uderutucm _dc :r. c:u. Sa'e::: vlac: iie
odobrilauvozautcusa .z	 :cJcr:i'. '.'cm
Oni me Bec acar.e i m- '.ai
Figure Two (Vreme 16/08/97)
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3. anti-nationalist narrations of rurality
3.1. blaming ruralites for nationalism
We have seen how the urban/rural dualism was incorporated in a variety of ways into
many nationalist discursive practices. On the whole, post-Yugoslav anti-nationalism
relied much more frequently and much more obviously on the urban/rural dichotomy. In
many anti-nationalist discursive practices, the village/city divide seemed to be
articulated into a crucial moment in both Zagreb and Beograd, albeit in a more
outspoken way in the latter. Interestingly, the previously mentioned extreme nationalist
representations of urban promiscuity versus rural purity were often not really
questioned. In many cases, however, their moral evaluation was inverted: purity was
reformulated into backwardness, narrow-mindedness and primitivism, whereas the
mixed character of the city was re-articulated into cosmopolitanism, civilisation and
tolerance. This pattern stood alongside strong differences between anti-nationalist
discourses in Zagreb and Beograd, many of which were closely related to the different
nature of the dominant nationalisms.
Anti-nationalist narratives often represented 'peasants' as patriarchal, gun-toting,
militaristic, uneducated, uncivilised, aggressive, primitive Others, and in that way
reproducing the generalised depictions of rural life which were circulating amongst self-
proclaimed urbanites. However, they expanded on this stereotypical image and argued
that, on top of all that, ruralites were prone to nationalism. In a significant number of
anti-nationalist narratives, a large part of the blame for nationalism and the war fell on
'peasants', and especially on those from the frontline zones. Of course, in line with the
views of the large majority of other post-Yugoslays, the first ones to be blamed were
politicians—but in this case it was often pointed out that these politicians were
peasants, or, at least, that their nationalism was a 'peasant' discourse. As we have
seen, this assertion was supported by electoral results, and many citizens of Zagreb
and Beograd were keen to point out that without the countrysideTuman and MiloeviO
wouldn't even be in power. At a party in Zagreb, a student, himself from a town which
had been under fire from Serbian artillery, told me that he believed that there were
good and bad people amongst Serbs just as amongst others. Only the crazy ones
made trouble, he stated, but they were not from the city—they were peasants who
'came into the cities and fucked things up'.
We have seen how in the cities ruralites in general, and ones from 'the frontline' in
particular, were often represented as invaders who took over power, riding the waves
of nationalist euphoria, war and the ensuing chaos. Many 'autochthons' 11 felt extreme
resentment towards them. They were seen as powerful (through connections), rich
(through corruption) and successful (through the former two and through ruthlessness).
This ruthlessness was then linked to another element particularly constitutive of the
perception of frontline ruralites: their depiction as primitive, backward and, above all,
uneducated. In the words of the dissident singer Dordè Balaeviá:
'The cleansing is not just ethnic, there is also a kind of mental terror through the TV
programme. There are many illiterates who gaze at their electronic box and believe
everything they see.'
(Globus 15/01/93:21)
Because of their lack of education, it was argued, peasants weren't hindered by
nuances or ambiguities, as 'they wouldn't understand such things anyway'.
11 
'Starosjedioc? or 'starosedeic? literally means 'residents from old times' or long-term settlers'. Despite its dubious
nature, I have decided to employ the term 'autochthons' because it is widely used, and this is how I heard it translated
in the post-Yugoslav states.
123
3.2. explaining nationalist success: no education for the nation
In anti-nationalist narratives, the rural successes of nationalism and of the ruling parties
were often linked to levels of schooling and literacy, which were much lower in the
countryside than in the cities. As I mentioned before, this contradicts classic accounts
of nationalism with their emphasis, for example, on standard education and a literary
language. However, for many post-Yugoslav critics of nationalism, survey results of
coinciding rural illiteracy and regime support merely confirmed what they already saw
as a crucial element explaining the rise of the nationalist leaders—the backwardness of
the rural areas. For example, Boris, a student from a longstanding and well-off city
family, took me on a walk through Beograd's old town where he almost exclusively
showed me landmarks of Serbia's history of European-ness and modernity. While
strolling through town, he incessantly commented on passers-by and complained that
the current situation was not so surprising if one took into account the fact that most
people in Serbia were virtually illiterate. And it must be said that, according to the latest
census, Yugoslavia did have a relatively high degree of illiteracy in comparison with
other states with similar economic profiles. This was especially the case in the
countryside, albeit with strong inter-republican differences. In 1991 6.65% of the
population of Serbia and Montenegro were registered as illiterate (excluding Kosovo,
where numbers were estimated to be much higher), and 3% in Croatia 12. Illiteracy was
three to four times higher in the Serbian countryside than in the cities (PeraziO &BeliO
1997:8). About half the population of Croatia, and more than half in Serbia, completed
primary school only, if even that, and a large majority of the illiterate population were
senior Yugoslays. It only took a small leap of imagination for anti-nationalists to
conclude that the rise of nationalism was explained by its appeal to old peasants
without schooling.
If lack of education was considered a key element in the rise of nationalism, this was
mirrored by the belief that schooling would also provide a way out.Jagoda, who studied
psychology in Beograd, was born and raised in a provincial town. I met her for coffee
after we had attended a human rights course together, and she argued that the
situation in Serbia was best understood as an identity crisis: people were disoriented
and therefore very easily taken in by nationalist ideas. The main problem, she stated,
was education. High degrees of illiteracy, especially in the provinces and amongst old
people, meant that media messages were blindly accepted.
Although it is not my intention here to consider whether the success of nationalism
really had to do with education or not, I would like to draw the attention to one element
which sheds an interesting light upon the above assertions. With regard to the
electorate, there was an obvious link between low educational levels and nationalist—
or pro-regime—voting behaviour. However, the regimes in both Croatia and Serbia
counted an unusually high number of well-educated intellectuals who lived in the city13.
Still, as we shall see, critics of the regimes both in Serbia and in Croatia would often
sneeringly refer to them as 'peasants' (Tjednik 02/01/98; Vreme 16/08/97).
3.3. anti-nationalist constructions of rural Others
Frequently, anti-nationalist narratives transcended the factual level of electoral results
or illiteracy rates and engaged in a culturally embedded anti-rural discourse. For
example, in Beograd I considered asking the help of a diplomat from the Belgian
12 lvanov 1995:371-372; Bolöiô 1995:49; Sfafistiöki Ijetopis Republike Hrvatske, 1997:84.
13 In 1997, the figures for Croatia were as follows: 6 out of 22 ministers held doctorates (24 out of 195 MFs), 5
ministers had Masters degrees (14 MP5), 9 ministers were university graduates (116 MPs) and only 2 ministers did
not have university education (41 MP5) (Statistiöki !jetopis RH 1997:57; Tjednik 02/01/98:27-29). The interesting thing
is that most of these data were provided in an article addressing the proportion of politicians with urban and rural
backgrounds, subtitled 'A Village Government' ['Seoska V/ada'] (Tjednik 02/01/98:27-29).
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embassy in my quest for a residence permit. A friend, an academic who was quitewell-
connected, warned me that the presence of a diplomat wouldn't make any difference.
According to her, the police were primitive peasants and the only way to impress them
was by knowing someone who was more powerful than they. Similarly, as we have
seen, much of the rural support for the regime and for nationalism was explained by
reference to the lack of education, authoritarianism and ultimately, plain stupidity. This
also allowed anti-nationalist narratives to formulate an explanation for the continuity in
the countryside. A popular view in Beograd stated that 'peasants' simply followed
whatever leader was calling them—the question of whether under a communist or a
nationalist flag was considered beyond them.
In this sense, it is not surprising that many people in cities all over former Yugoslavia
were very keen to point out the distinction between them and their rural co-nationals. I
met Milan, a young Beograd technician, in the Slovenian capital Ljubljana, where he
was attending a specialist computing course. Milan was orginally from Zagreb and,
intrigued by the fact that I was then living in the city where he grew up, he embarked on
a whole series of explanations about 'what people were like in this region'. Note that,
although Zagreb was only a couple of hours away by train, he could not possibly go
there without a long visa procedure, which might fail anyway. We had some drinks and
played cards, and one of the things he emphasised was the specificities of Serbs from
different regions: umadija Serbs, Kosovo Serbs, Vojvodina Serbs, Liöani, Bosnian
Serbs, Serbs from around Knin, Herzegovinian Serbs and so on. Each of them, Milan
said, claimed to be the biggest Serbs of all—apart from Beogradani and Novosadani
['citizens of Novi Sad'], who didn't play the same game.
Similarly, when talking about the Serbian revolt in Croatia in 1991, the studentBiljana,
herself a Serb who had fled to Beograd, often stressed the differences between her
own Zagreb background and that of many people (from Knin) in the refugee
organisation where she worked. She recalled the 1991 events in Krajina, where
Serbian nationalists had been waving flags on the barricades and stirring up trouble, as
a 'typical peasant thing to do'. This assertion of difference within the Serbian nation,
represented a real problem for Croatian nationalist discourses which, as we shall see,
relied on the strict dichotomy of Balkan Serbs and European Croats (Buden 1996:92).
The self-consciously urban Zagreb Serb distorted that clear dualism, especially when
juxtaposed with the stereotypical images of Herzegovinians. This was reflected with
amazing irony in graffiti that appeared in Zagreb only shortly after the war which had
pitted, let us not forget, Croats of all regions, including Herzegovina, against Serbs:
'Give us back our Serbs, you can have your Herzegovinians back'
['Vratite nam na.e Srbe, evo yam natrag va.i Hercegovci']
Hence, even so shortly after the war, the influx of Herzegovinians into Zagreb, and
particularly into regime positions, was seen as a bad development—so bad, that people
would rather see their Serbian co-citizens, yesterday's war enemies, return. Again,
frontline ruralites figured as prominent Others in many anti-nationalist narratives. This
should not surprise us, given the centrality of these groups in nationalism. Particularly
in more mainstream, influential, established and respectable assertions of anti-
nationalism, such as those articulated by many urban intellectuals and in a large part of
the independent press, the stereotypical depictions of frontline ruralites were often
reinforced. In the drive to minimise the importance of national/natural bonds of solidarity
with those populations, a number of these images became part and parcel of
discourses which were otherwise examples of tolerance. In this way, not only were the
dominant nationalist representations of 'frontline ruralites' in Serbia and in Croatia
strikingly alike, but so, too, were their dissident counterparts. That anti-nationalism
sometimes fitted in rather nicely with general urban discourses was not so surprising,
given the rural overtones of their opponents, and given the fact that most critiques of
nationalism were developed in the cities and most activists were city-based.
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3.4. urban elites, anti-nationalism and cultural capital
Not only were explicit articulations of anti-nationalist discursive practice strongly
concentrated in the cities, they also gave rise to a strikingly professional-looking
industry of publishing, education, conferences and so on. As a person with some
experience in the Belgian NGO movement, I was sometimes baffled by the up-to-
scratch technological infrastructure and the state-of-the-art office facilities of certain
post-Yugoslav organisations with a stake in anti-nationalism. It has to be said that this
was rarely matched by the private living conditions of those involved.
Although it is not my intention to analyse post-Yugoslav nationalism as a social
movement, I think it is important to make a little detour in order to explain the societal
position of many public advocates of anti-nationalism. In contrast to what was often
suggested by nationalists of different colours, they were not simply the former 'red
bourgeoisie' who bewailed their fall in the social hierarchy due to the break-up of
Yugoslavia. However, when we limit ourselves to the more established, respectable,
often intellectual critics of nationalism, a pattern emerged with regard to their status in
society. As we have seen in the discussion of generational aspects of anti-nationalism,
many of them were part of a layer of Yugoslav society which I would call the 'urban
cultural elite': middle-aged; highly educated; 'Western' oriented; well-travelled; often a-
political; and relatively well-off. This set them apart from the groups they perceived as
implicated most clearly in nationalism: ruling politicians, uneducated 'peasants' and
what they saw as the semi-intelligentsia, who glorified rurality. Some of the latter, of
course, were also part of the cultural elite—but they achieved positions close to the
regimes, relying precisely on a partial denial of the urbanity that much anti-nationalism
asserted (see the discussion of the notion of palanka in section 4.6).
For many individuals from the cultural elite, I would argue, moving into anti-nationalist
space, or creating such space, allowed them to pursue further certain life ambitions.
Paraphrasing a much more lucrative and much less ethical post-Yugoslav industry, this
was sometimes jokingly referred to by those in question as 'anti-war profiteering'. This
is not to say that private gain explains why these individuals engaged in anti-nationalist
critique, but it suggests that there was more to it than purely ideological disputes. Not
all life stops when a war breaks out, and for a small number of individuals engagement
in the subversion of nationalism had permitted them to obtain or sustain a position in
which to accumulate different kinds of capital. It sometimes provided a source of
income and economic security, but more importantly, it augmented one's cultural and
social capital through contacts, media attention, publication,travel and through the very
status of dissidence. The role of anti-nationalism in people's narrations of personal
continuity, which is one of the main themes of this study, was therefore not strictly
'psychological'.
The case of the Beograd-based Social Democratic Union, a marginal political party with
an explicitly anti-nationalist programme, illustrated this. The SDU had a very limited
budget and was housed in extremely poor conditions, but it relied heavily on its cultural
capital as a marginal but 'connected' party. Its conference guest list, for example,
boasted a host of colleague-politicians from major social-democratic parties in Western
Europe. In that sense, for people in urban surroundings the organisational vectors of
anti-nationalism, such as certain NGOs and publishing, political, educational and artistic
programmes, were simultaneously gateways for the fulfilment of personal ambitions
and discursive material for the construction of a cosmopolitan identity (Deviá 1997). In
the ocean of misery brought on by the war, it was argued, at least some good things
came about as well. In Beograd in particular, the relativity of economic capital was also
prevalent in the common references to recent emigrants as being on the winning side
with regard to money, but losing out on the status front. As we have seen before this
fed into a storyline which said those Yugoslays abroad were 'all washing dishes'.
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3.5. diverging anti-nationalist narratives and an alternative undercurrent
Although a large majority of anti-nationalist narratives in both Zagreb and Beograd
converged in their representation of ruralites, and especially the ones from the frontline,
as prone to nationalism, they didn't all agree on the nature of that nationalism. As we
have seen, some narratives, especially those prevalent amongst people who had little
direct interaction with the countryside, expanded the more or less general urban view of
rurality to include nationalism as a further expression of traditionalism, primitivism and
backwardness. Of course, people did this to differing degrees, and many, including
individuals who could be considered urban intellectuals themselves, disagreed with
anti-rural discourses (Ooloviô 1994b:31-32). Let us look at two alternative lines of
thought expressed in interviews by leading Beograd dissidents in their respective
offices. Both were academics with an outspoken independent reputation; one had come
from Central Serbia as a student; the other one hailed from Bosnia.
'There is a lot of talk about ruralisation of the city—about the influence of village
primitivism on the city and so on. I think that those ideas are a means for self-deception.
Like, "We would be citizens, we would be living well, if it weren't for these primitives from
the village". But if you look at today's Serbia [...] we should treat the village with a lot of
respect. Serbia has survived only thanks to the products of the village. So my attitude
towards the village is completely different, although I know that the pressure of people
from the village, the pressure of refugees on the city is very strong and a really great
problem. But to accuse the village, and those who moved from the village to the city, for
the character of the regime, that is an ideological illusion. A serious critic should not allow
him/herself to say things like that, because the regime has received much more support
from SANU [the Serbian Academy for Sciences and Arts] than from the villagers who
moved to the city.'
'All that urban/rural business is an ideological story. Nationalism draws upon the village,
often seen as 'in the mountains'. It represents the village as a site of purity, of an
uncontaminated, mythical, idyllic, true Serbian identity. Sadly, there is a movement in the
other direction as well, which sees all the evils coming from the village. The primitives,
they say, come from the mountains into the cities. They destroy multiculturalism, co-
existence, etc. I don't agree with that. I believe that the village is also the greatest victim
of the war. Ethnic cleansing took place there! Those people from the mountains were not
peasants. On those mountains, there were poets and teachers. There were Karad±iás
there. In Pale [war-time seat of Bosnian Serbian nationalist regime, Sf] there simply aren't
any seljaci ['peasants']! So I see all that talk about the urban being destroyed by the rural
as a myth, as not rational...'
The latter argument indicates something I have mentioned before—that it would be
extremely interesting, I think, to look at the role of 'semi-intellectuals' in the actual
rooting of nationalist discourse. Also, please note his argument of rationality at the end.
In more sympathetic portrayals, then, the perceived straightforwardness of rural
reasoning was linked in turn to an image of the peasant as victim. Refugees, in
particular, were seen as victims of aggression, war and, implicitly, of fast changes in
social reality, too fast for them to grasp. Still another set of narratives argued that they
were not just victims of violence by national Others, nor were they simply helplessly lost
in the face of sudden changes. Here it was emphasised that they had little access to
information and that they had been (and continued to be) subjected to a relentless flood
of nationalist propaganda and manipulation by their own government as well. Despite
its more benign character, this representation still related to the rural primarily as
inferior, not by ascribing evil agency to it ('nationalism is an ideology constructed by
primitive peasants'), but by denying it agency altogether ('peasants are manipulated
into nationalism by regime').
As a result of overwhelmingly straightforward electoral patterns, regional legacies of
WWII and beyond, and the traditional perception of a wide urban/rural gap confirmed by
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relative isolation, there was little public debate about these issues within anti-
nationalism. However, there were urban anti-nationalist discursive practices that
articulated rural experiences in alternative ways. Those with activist experience in war-
torn villages and those who worked with refugees from those villages tended to relate
more positively to people in rural areas. This alternative view was often less articulated,
certainly in public, where the urban-centric story was clearly dominant. Still, it
constituted an important undercurrent of anti-nationalism which refused to go along with
the anti-rural bias and, to an even greater degree, with the moral implications of such
dissident discourse. These narratives tended to emphasise the importance of the rural
war experience and the relative indifference, snobbishness or even hypocrisy of city-
based folk. Ela, an NGO activist and a Zagreb woman through and through, had
travelled quite a bit and had lived in a large Western European city for a while during
the war. She liked to display her knowledge of 'Western' ways and compare them to the
situation in her own city, which she found unbearably snobbish. Ela thought the best
example was the contrast between the make-up and the trendy clothes one saw on the
streets of Zagreb and the lousy quality of the underwear on the washing lines.
This critical view was often reinforced by a shift in the depiction of the peasants from
only victims to victims/survivors, reflecting a wider discourse in social work—especially
in feminism—which intends to do away with the paralysing effect of victim-centred
approaches by emphasising agency. Of course, that did not require a denial of the
overwhelming role of media manipulation, but it did imply a more detailed look at the
different circumstances under which urbanites and ruralites had to exercise their
agency. These narratives were often grounded in direct experience in the countryside
and sometimes, remarkably, in a familiarity with Western European NGO practice14.
4. war, (anti-)nationalism, urbanity, and the 'loss of the city'
4.1. faces and names
It must be clear by now that the stakes of the post-Yugoslav urban/rural divide could
not be pinned down topographically at the boundaries of urban agglomerations. Rather,
the discursive practices of many Zagrepãani and Beogradani represented it as a moral
or civilisational issue. The very terminology 'urbanity' and 'rurality' was omnipresent in
narratives throughout the whole post-Yugoslav region, and it was firmly anchored in
everyday vocabulary. 'Se/jaci' literally means 'villagers' (se/o=:village), but it was one of
the most frequently used pejorative terms with regard to people who were considered
primitive, uneducated, rude and everything else not urban. When translating it into
English, people almost always went for the term 'peasants', not 'villagers'. A whole
range of derogatory terms was available to refer to people from rural areas, and to
frontline ruralites in particular. 'Ljudi sa brda' ['people from the hills'] was still rather
innocent and soon gave way to 'primitivci' or 'div/jac? ['savages']. Anyway, the pejorative
power of village metaphors was so strong that in many contexts simply pointing out that
somebody was 'sa se/a' ['from the village'] was satisfactorily judgmental.
If 'seijaci' represented one side, on the other pole of the continuum there were 'gradani'.
'Gradani' (grad=city) referred to citizens not only as inhabitants of a city, but also as
citoyens—educated and civilised self-conscious political subject& 5. The term 'gradani'
was saturated with the desirable quality of 'urbanitet'. This notion functioned as the key
to a popular ideology of being civilised, evoking ideas and practices of civility, manners
and a sense of civic pride in a very similar way to 'civlltà' as explored in Silverman's
14 This resonates with the wider phenomenon, discussed in the chapter on Balkan orientalism, whereby certain things
that were considered 'primitive in the local context (e.g. 'ethnic dress or music) were made acceptable or even
desirable through Western European or North American channels of commodification.
15 For a discussion of the central role of urbanity in discursive practices of Serbian protest, see Jansen 2001.
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study of an Italian hill town (1975:1-11, 36-44). Despite the many overlaps between the
post-Yugoslav 1990s situation and Silverman's Umbrian 1960s context, particularly in
terms of an emphasis on formal cultural fluency, I have to point out one important
difference. In Umbrian 'civiltà', Silverman highlights a strong element of national pride, a
sharing in the glory of Italian civilisation and a loyalty to the Church (1975:5-6). In
contrast, due to the specific political context, post-Yugoslav notions of 'urbanity' were
precisely articulated with ant/-nationalism and included a much stronger belief in
modernity and progress.
During my fieldwork, the very term 'urban' (written in the same way as in English) was a
buzzword amongst all sorts of people wanting to set themselves apart from the
deterioration and chaos that surrounded them. For example, an alternative radio station
in Novi Sad was called 'Radio Urbans' [sic], an art festival in Beograd 'Urban
Provocations', and a subcultural Zagreb collective bore the subtitle 'Urban Guerrilla'.
But also in everyday language use, the word 'urban' frequently cropped up, as people
talked about an 'urban' party, an 'urban' person, an 'urban' piece of music or an 'urban'
bar. Whatever was referred to as 'urban' was thereby declared good—resonating with
all things fashionable, stylish, civilised, and 'Western'.
4.2. urbanity as a way of life: manners and mentality
The 'urbanity' discourse had existed before the war, but it emerged in an intensified
version with the dominance of 'rural' nationalism and with the effects of the violence.
Themes of rurality and urbanity provided important ammunition in discourses of
dissidence, and the language upon which they hinged constituted an important element
of the idiom in which this dissidence was phrased. Again I have to draw attention to a
pattern of differences between Zagreb and Beograd. In the former, manners and civility
were certainly considered urban qualities in contrast to 'peasant' behaviour, but they
were also articulated into a nationalist discourse of Central-European Croats versus
Balkan Serbs. In Beograd where nationalism claimed less affinity with 'the city', the
divide was more straighiforwardly constructed as an issue of urbanity and rurality.
In Beograd, then, patterns of city-centrism were prevalent both in urban everyday
narratives and in academic work, such as Vujovié's study which refers to the
'consequences of a mass presence of first generation immigrants from the village who
slowly and with difficulty accept the city way of life' (1992:62). Often, the 'civilisational
wall' dividing the city from the village was represented as insurmountable, and it was
argued that becoming a citizen was virtually impossible if one wasn't born and raised as
one. Many citizens took pride in the length of their urban status as a family, and even
within the city, certain parts were considered more truly urban than others. This
sometimes led to bizarre situations, as on one afternoon with Beograd student, Boris.
Through a haze of too much smoke and drink, and listening to the latest trendy tunes
from Britain on his stereo, Boris spent many hours lecturing me on the not-so-trendy-
subject of the Beograd pedigree of all four of his grandparents—not a topic I had ever
discussed under such lounging circumstances...
In Zagreb, this city-pride was sometimes expressed through self-assertion as a 'purger',
a notion related to the historical idea of free citizens. Nevertheless, a constant struggle
for definition took place here, as one's status in relation to those categories was always
contested and permanently unstable. I would argue that, in this way, many post-
Yugoslav 'grac7ani' gave 'urbanity' a definite Bourdieusian slant and represented the
urban/rural distinction in terms very similar to those of the embodiment of culture
captured by the notion of habitus (1 992a). In the discursive practices of post-Yugoslav
urbanity, even a doctoral degree and a house in the centre of the capital could not save
you from being brandished as a 'seijak' if you were seen as having a rural habitus.
Sometimes the portrayal of rural character went into semi-racist overdrive, such as in
an exposé by the same Boris, delivered to me on a walk through Beograd. Deploring
the changes in his Beograd, he blamed the loss of the 'urban spirit' ['urbani duh'] on the
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newcomers from rural areas who flooded the whole city. He argued that these people
were completely different with regard to culture, speech, behaviour, and even looks.
With regard to the latter, Boris assured me that his mates and he were blond and tall,
whereas the newcomers were small and dark.
The set of discursive practices on the urbanity/rurality continuum articulated elements
such as language, education, phenotype, clothing, body posture, residence, interests
and hobbies, hygiene, haircut and accent. On several occasions in Beograd I was
reprimanded for pronouncing words the wrong way. For example, when I put a wrong
stress in a certain word, I was benignly told off, not for being wrong, but 'because you
don't want to sound like a peasant, it sounds really nekulturan'. 'Culture' ('kultura') was
a crucial concept in this context, and urban folk in Serbia and Croatia generously
sprinkled their conversation with references to somebody or something being kulturan
or nekulturan.
On one of my trips to Bosnia I met Rahim, an artist in the town ofTuzla. His wife and he
lived in a beautiful if slightly neglected old house, filled to the roof with antique wooden
furniture. When my friend from a local NGO and I arrived,Rahim sat looking grumpy on
a little fence under a tree in front of the house with a half-empty bottle of rak(ja at his
side. His unkempt hair was greasy and he was in bad need of a shave. We moved
inside and, surrounded by his momumental pieces of visual art, Rahim mounted a litany
of complaints about his compatriots. He had spent the war years as a refugee in
Germany and upon return was near desperate at what he considered the horrendous
levels of barbarity in his native Bosnia. Before this conversation, my friend had told me
that Rahim was involved in various civil campaigns in Tuzla and that he shared most of
his political views with the town mayor, a leading proponent of anti-nationalism.
However, when I asked him about the latter, whom he had known personally for many
years, Rahim pulled his face in disgust. Fuelled by more rakUa, he argued that he
couldn't stand the man's 'primitivism' and called him the biggestseljaöina 16 he had ever
met. He underscored this statement by saying that the mayor didn't know how to dress
properly and couldn't even hold his cup and drink his coffee like a cultured man.
This reflects the crucial place of 'manners' in the construction of the rural Other.
Urbanity, then, was a matter of style and of performative competence 17 with a peculiar
moral dimension. It was not so much living in the city which set you apart from
'peasants', but, resonating with early sociological analyses of urban life (e.g. Wirth
1938), it meant displaying the right mentality and the correct way of life (see also Norris
1999:81-82; Silverman 1975). In a conversation about the rise of Miloevió, Nataa, a
Beograd adademic, argued that people had fallen for him because he was like them.
She added that people could identify with him, because [in English] 'they don't like
somebody who is polite here'. At her partner Aleksandar's birthday party, the large
majority of those present were academics and artists, many of whom were well-known
public figures. All of them considered themselves Beogradani, and the occasion had an
outspoken civil, 'urban' character in terms of manners, conversation and interaction.
Despite his extremely dire financial circumstances, Aleksandar had prepared an
impressive selection of food, buffet-style. When I complimented him on it, he explained
to me the set-up of the buffet: half the table was, he said jokingly, 'Serbian cuisine' (lots
of meat and typical staple foods such as proja and kajmak), whereas the other half
consisted mainly of seafood, a rare and expensive treat in Beograd (compare Bourdieu
1979; Mennell 1991:126-151). He then explained that he thought it was worth the
investment because when one has a certain group of people attending a party, people
who know how to appreciate things, then one wants to present them with something
appropriate...
16 Seljaöina is the augmentative form of seijak, and is therefore even more pejorative.
17 See Williams 1993 for a literary analysis of changing social patterns in relation to the country and the city in the
very different English context; see Ferguson (1992; 1999) for an elaboration of both urban ('cosmopolitan) and rural
(local') styles on the Zambian Copperbelt. See Herzfeld (1985) for a discussion of performative competence.
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Style is one element here, but I would argue that we are dealing with mentality as well.
'Urban' and 'urbanity' became polysemic terms which took on explicitly moral, or rather
moralistic, overtones in many contexts. Urbanity, according toVujoviá, refers to 'civility,
courteousness and decency, without which there can hardly be a democratic culture'
(1992:62; see Silverman 1975:3). At times this discourse resulted in outright city-
centrism. The same Vujovió, for instance, argued that 'all great cultures are born in
cities' and that 'world history is actually the history of urban people' (1992:62). Of
course, we have to see this in the specific socio-historical context: in a public climate of
extreme xenophobia, nationalist euphoria, chaos and war, urbanity came to stand for
the 'elementary urban behaviour of educated people based on tolerance' (ibid. :64). In
the process, education, intellect and self-consciousness were rather straightforwardly
conceptualised as urban, not rural, phenomena (ibid. :62). This intellectualism is pushed
further by PuiO, who quotes Hegel's definition of urbanity as 'the most noble urban
behaviour of educated people' and argues for 'a civil society with established standards
and norms of collective life in largely populated agglomerations' (1 995:567).
There is yet another twist to the story. Many Beograd urbanites looked down upon
Zagreb and portrayed it as a 'provincial town'. Zagrepöani opposed this in discourses of
urbanity which frequently centred upon the Habsburg past and a general Central-
European heritage. People would point to the architecture of the city, certain names of
places, historical continuity, as well as geographical proximity to Vienna, for example.
Sometimes this was even framed in a sort of Habsburg-nostalgia (Jutarnji List
04/07/98:27), particularly prevalent amongst the old, urban middle class, where lifestyle
habits and vocabulary (with Germanisms such as 'cajtung' ['newspaper'] and
'badecimer' [ ' bathroom']) resonated with those times.
4.3. civilisation and popular culture
It should be clear by now that the term 'urban', when used in the post-Yugoslavcontext,
was far removed from other phenomena that are often associated with it in other
locations. No notion here, as in the case of, say Manchester, Los Angeles, Mexico DF
or Marseille, of the 'other' side of urbanity: chaos, dirt, or crime. And, crucially, no
mention of Rodney King, Brixton riots or other outbursts of so-called ethnic violence.
When I mentioned this to a Beograd intellectual who played a prominent role in anti-
nationalism, he waved my argument away, saying that he referred to 'urban' in a
strongly historical European context.
Urbanity here was about Vienna, Baudelaire and Elias, and it was conceptualised in a
historicist way as a pattern and a process typical of 'Europe', conceptualised, of course,
in a particular way (Mu±ijeviô 1996; 1997; Prodanoviá 1997a). However, despite this
emphasis on civility and manners, there was a certain subcultural current of urbanity as
well. Many young people in Beograd and Zagreb liked to refer to themselves as
belonging to a 'gradska ekipa' ['urban scene'; 'urban crowd']. In my perception, many
young people in both cities paid an extraordinary amount of attention to dress, style and
presentation, even on sometimes very limited budgets. Also, in line with what I argued
earlier, considerable respect was accorded for cultural capital such as knowledge of
and conversational fluency in popular culture, for example 'quality' film, music, and
theatre.
In Beograd, where Zagreb was often considered 'the province', this was part of a
discourse of the city's past as a trendy hotspot of cosmopolitan culture (see alsoVelikiá
1992a:36-47; Arkzin 11/97:16-24). Time and again I was told that in the 1970s and
1 980s Beograd was on a par with many Western European metropolitan centres with
regard to high culture and youth cultural trends. People told me it used to be 'the Paris
of the East' or 'the second clubbing city in Europe after London'. They proudly referred
to graffiti and used lots of slang words and phrases which were considered typically
urban. This is the case, for example, in the documentary film Geto, where the narrator
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deplores the loss of an icon from the pre-war subcultural scene, the SKC (Student
Cultural Centre):
'They have destroyed the places where we used to meet. The worst case is the SKC. [...]
That place had to suffer. The Reds knew that there were at least ten generations of urban
posse ['gradska ekipa'l here. They also knew that rock'n'roll and exhibitions can teach
kids to say "no" tomorrow. [...] Instead of urban types ['urbane face'], now the main
positions are occupied by shepherds. [...] In that way, in a couple of months, SKC has
become a village cultural centre. The place is now filled with jokers, amateurs from Uice
[town in Southern Serbia] and dubious newsreaders, instead of Cave [Nick, singer], the
Brejkers [Partibrejkers, a rock band] and erbedzija [Rade, a famous Yugoslav actor]. Of
course, kids don't go there anymore, except for a piss.'
During my stay, when an 'urban underground' phenomenon emerged, it was often
packaged in an 'aesthetic' approach, and people consciously sought to associate
themselves with certain 'trendy' developments from Western Europe and North
America. This became particularly clear during the anti-regime demonstrations of 1996-
1997 (Jansen 2001). In this way, I would argue that this 'popular cultural urbanity' was
largely complementary to the above 'civilisational' understanding of urbanity, as they
simply shifted the emphasis away from civility and classical modernity towards
'Western' modernity, style, rebellion and popular culture. And here, as elsewhere, if
'rural' elements were incorporated, they were first translated into 'Western' currency—
often literally. I return to this point in the chapter on Balkan orientalism.
4.4. cities, villages and local modernisation theories
If the city and the countryside represented two opposites on a moral-civilisational
continuum, they did so by evoking a whole range of other oppositions associated with
them (see Norris 1999:163). Urbanity resonated with cosmopolitanism, with (Western)
Europe, with education, manners and civilisation, whereas rurality was associated with
provincialism, with 'Balkans', with underdevelopment, backwardness and primitivism (all
in inverted commas, of course). In these discourses of urbanity, the moral evaluation of
the city/village divide was an inversion of certain ruralist nationalist representations: the
city was seen as modern, and thus, open, civilised and civil, free, forward-looking and
so on (Vujovió 1992:62, 63; Ramet 1996b:71-72; Bogdanovié 1993:21-22, 36-37).
Heterogeneity and multiculturality were defined as positive qualities and contrasted with
the closed and unchanging backwardness of tradition in the village brought into the city
by immigrants. When I visited the campaigning office of a small anti-nationalist party
during the anti-regime demonstrations in Beograd, I had coffee with two political
activists. One of them was skimming newspaper reports and making two piles of press
cuttings. Pointing to each of them, he said that in Serbia there were those who were for
the future and those who were for the past.
In this way, the dualism between city and village was conceptualised within a paradigm
of evolution which I would describe, following Ferguson, as a local version of
modernisation theory (Ferguson 1999:83). Daa, a fashionably dressed young woman
who worked as a secretary in one of the more established NGOs, was just one of the
many people who implied this, when she said that in the countryside, Serbia was still 'in
the Stone Age'. As we have seen, there were enormous differences between the
villages and the cities, and these were often integrated into anti-nationalist explanations
of the wars and of the rise of nationalism. Some local intellectuals argued explicitly
along the lines of modernisation theory, such as Jasmina, a leading Beograd NGO
activist whom I interviewed in her office:
'I think you have to look at the whole crisis and the appeal of nationalism in relation to
modernisation and modernity. You must see it in the light of a failed transition to a
democracy, to certain Western standards and systems. People here just were not ready
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for that, and certainly now they are not. We moved a couple of steps back... Of course,
Yugoslavia was pretty much Western, and certainly more so then other communist
countries, but it went too fast. People just couldn't take it. Yugoslavia was a predominantly
rural country until recently. Especially in the South, for instance here in Serbia, it was
maybe 85 percent rural in 1945. And then in a very short time it became maybe 50
percent... It went too fast for people. Maybe it is a bit different in Slovenia and Croatia,
you must have noticed that. Services are better organised, everything is more rational.'
Similarly, a Zagreb NGO activist, a sociologist by profession, told me in an interview:
'The problem is not in the rural surroundings themselves. It's not an active factor I don't
think. The problem lies in the transition. People living in a village have a strong sense of
community, of solidarity. There's a lot of social control: everybody knows everything about
everybody else. But the community is local, not national. They have no idea about the
national one. They live locally. In urban areas that is very different. Even children who are
born in the city and whose parents are from the countryside are very different. Colder,
more private. In the last decades there was an enormous and a very fast transition in
Croatia and in the whole of Yugoslavia. People were moving to the cities, and in one
generation enormous changes took place. And that is where the problem lies. These
people were confronted with an initial loss of community, a crisis. They could not rely on
the local community anymore, so they looked for a new community. And then there was
the national one, perfectly fitting in...'
In an analysis of the difficult relationship between the Croatian and the US regimes,
Sarajevo-Zagreb publicist Jergovié argued that one of the crucial aspects in
understanding this was precisely the 'anti-urban' stance of the Tuman government,
which saw America
'as a goidmine, a source of money and a station whore whom you use but never take
home, nor mention in mass' (Jergoviô 1998:15)
Time and again, I was confronted with narratives which saw a direct equivalence
between development, modernisation, westernisation and urbanisation—and, it should
be clear by now, 'semi'-urbanisation was not good enough (Bogdanoviô 1995:231;
1996:25; Puió 1995). If this chapter seems to reinforce such a view, that is not a result
of a theoretical or political argument (quite the opposite), but rather a reflection of the
ethnographically overwhelming finding that it was an integral part of a very large
amount of urban discursive practice in the post-Yugoslav context (see Ferguson
1999:84-85, 91).
It is not surprising that the urban/rural divide was called upon to explain a wide variety
of phenomena, for it related to a representation of the whole society as a clash between
primitivism and modernity (see Ferguson 1999:86). In an attempt to explain the
success of the ruling HDZ party in the countryside, Zagreb weekly Tjednik described
urban people as 'younger, better educated, more tolerant, with a mind of their own,
better informed and intellectually curious'. Therefore, it was argued:
'A population with urban sensibility, an upbringing and the habits of a citizen's home—and
they do not only live in cities—will find it hard to live with the HDZ's decrees of Croathood
within the square hearth-cradle-bread-tamburica 18 and the medieval state-building
mystique. [
... J For those with the city in their heads it is not enough to have lunch and a
blanket, but they also want quality schooling, they want to live decently, do their job, listen
to classical music, jazz or rock and travel abroad.'
(Tjednik 25/04/97:28)
18 The tamburica is a musical instrument with strings, which is used widely in folk music, particularly in parts of
Croatia and in Vojvodina.
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As we have seen before, the rural was consequently robbed of most of its agency, as
the reason for the backwardness of the village was at least partly found outside that
village. 'The village is not to blame [...]', stated Tjednik, 'In those places, there's nothing
but HTV [Croatian state TV, sf1, and the screen announces every night what has to be
thought about what and about whom. News messages don't reach that far, and for
newspapers there's no money'. Therefore, and as a result of strong social control in
small-scale communities, it was argued, 'People are afraid of any dissonant decision.
They undergo authority more readily and have less trouble tolerating the taste of
compromise with their own inner persuasions'. As we have seen, these views were
often embedded in a strikingly evolutionist approach to the urban-rural divide: the
village is simply behind. 'All that which the city thinks today, the village will think in ten
or fifteen years, not before that. That is why HDZ loses the citiestoday, and makes up
for that loss in the provinces'19.
4.5. city-centrism and anti-nationalist narratives
4.5.1. the 'open city'
In the urban-centric discourses of certain anti-nationalist intellectuals, the cityper Se, by
its very nature, was a multicultural sediment of memories. Bogdan Bogdanoviô, a well-
known architect and ex-mayor of Beograd, now living in voluntary exile in Vienna,
argued in 1979 that 'We, citizens of Beograd, accept memories of the Celts, of Roman,
Hungarian and Turkish Beograd rightly as our own' (Bogdanoviá 1993:22). Why, if the
citizens of Beograd were prepared to adopt all these multicultural influences, had many
of them developed such a visceral dislike of rural Serbs!? Surely, the multicultural
influences of the past were only seen as an asset in as far as they were 'urban' in
character...
Despite the existence of alternative stories, many anti-nationalist narratives simply
seemed to elaborate on the more general 'urban' attitude towards rurality and
expanded it to include nationalism as a rural infliction upon the city. Some urban
intellectuals who were engaged in the development of anti-nationalist discourses went
a lot further and cherished the very notion of urbanity as the core of a civil, non-violent
discursive universe. I now have a closer look at some Beograd elaborations of these
strongly developed, self-consciously articulated versions of urbanity discourse20,
without losing sight of the fact that they served as an important device for identity
construction amongst a wider number of well-educated citizens of Beograd.
An example of urbanity as anti-nationalist opposition was provided by a cluster of
intellectuals, publicists and/or political activists around the Beograd periodical
Republika and the small political party Gradanski Savez Srb(je (GSS, 'Civil Alliance of
Serbia'). The periodical's subtitle read 'The voice of citizen's self-liberation—against the
elements of fear, hatred and violence', and in its statement of intent, readers were
reminded of the origins of its title as an affirmation of a concern for public welfare ('res
publica'). Republika argued that:
'Opposing the primitive forces of fear, hatred and violence [...] we take courage in the
conviction that REASON IS NOT HOPELESSLY ISOLATED, and that it can influence
events in society'
(Republika International, 1996, VllI:2, capitals in original)
19 Of course, the pro-regime press did not agree. Vjesnik gave statistical data on the national composition of Croatian
cities (Zagreb: 85% Croatian, Split 87%, Rijeka and Osijek 70%, and Pula 54%), and argued that the reason for HDZ
losses in those places was not due to the fact that citizens 'read newspapers or were more fluent in politics', but
'exclusively because "our" opposition received votes from voters who are not Croatian by nationality' [sic].
20 similar case was put forward in Zagreb by Kangrga (1997:119-129, 228-251).
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In a context where xenophobia and hate-speech were rife in most of the available
media, this publication provided a strikingly anti-nationalist alternative, relying on key-
words such as rationality, a return to normal life, democracy, tolerance, individualism,
responsibility and ... urbanity. Republika contained a regular section called 'urbanitet',
and periodic inserts under the name 'City and Citizen' addressing the situation in cities
throughout Serbia. Its articles covered a wide range of topics, providing a voice in the
Serbian media-scape which was critical in its analyses of both the MiIoevió regime and
of nationalism in general.
The explicitly anti-nationalist GSS party set what could loosely be termed a social-
liberal course and was strongly urban-based both in electoral and in programmatic
terms. Related to the anti-war movement, it increasingly presented itself as a party
which would give the city its self-respect back. In 1997, GSS ran a campaign In
Defence of Beograd, condemning destruction, neglect, mafia politics, the fall of living
standards and what was called 'destroyed urbanity'. As an alternative it proposed a
'partnership for the urban environment' (Republika 01-31/07/97:38).
4.5.2. Beograd once more - the barbarian and the city
Urban intellectual celebrations of the city, as well as wider discourses of urbanity
frequently described the city as being under threat from its enemies. In the view of
Bogdanoviá, this related to an age-old Manichean struggle between city lovers and city
haters (1993:54). These discourses of urbanity prevalent amongst a section of the
Beograd intelligentsia were also strongly reflected in the literature of the Serbian capital
(see Norris 1999:96-103, 119-135). Writers such as Borislav Pekié, Svetlana Velmar-
Jankoviá, Slobodan Seleniô, Dragan VelikiO and many others constructed novels
around metropolitan middle-class experiences, particularly focusing on the effect of the
communist take-over in 194521. In previous times, this kind of literature was carefully
dissident towards the Yugoslav regime from a self-consciously bourgeois perspective.
However, perversely mirroring Serbian nationalist claims of a revival of WWII fascism in
Croatia, after the demise of Titoism it became bon-ton in these circles to depict the rise
of MiIoevió as a virtual re-run of the Partisans taking control of Beograd in 1945 (see
for example Norris 1999:152; VelikiO 1992a:33-39; SeleniO 1996). In these literary
works, 1990s nationalism and post-WWII Titoism were brought together under the
mantle of rural primitivism threatening the very urbanity that characterises city life. As
we have seen before, many urban intellectuals in Yugoslavia argued that, despite their
urban rhetoric, Titoist communists were essentially enemies of the city: they carried out
a false urbanisation programme and got no further than importing high numbers of
ruralites into the city. Some even saw this as a strategic goal of the Partisans, in their
effort to crush middle-class opposition against the revolution (Velikiô 1993: 36ff). At
times this was accompanied by a certain nostalgia for the independent Serbia of
around 1900 and for the interwar Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
In such a context, it became opportune for those who wanted to tap into these city-
centric discourses to play down family involvement in the Partisan movement. For
example, when Boris, the Beograd student who felt strongly about his roots in the
Beograd bourgeoisie, took me to the military museum, we spent a lot of time in the pre-
WWII sections. When we finally reached the post-1941 exhibitions, he hurried me
through them and did not hide his contempt for what was on display there. He said it
was all propaganda and added as a fait divers that his grandfather had joined the
Partisans because of a woman. No politics or anything, Boris assured me, and all that
talk about fighting the Germans was a weak alibi for hanging out in the mountains and
talking a lot about how things would be after the war. His granddad occupied a position
in the post-war order but 'not for long'.
21 In English, see for example, Pekió's The Houses of Belgrade, and on the post-WWII bourgeoisie, Velmar-
Jankovió's Dungeon and Seleniô's Premedia fed Murder.
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Even many of those who did not necessarily see the Titoist regime as an anti-urban
force would argue that with the rise of nationalism in the late 1980s, the city had come
under serious threat. Defending it was 'the only valid moral paradigm for the future'
(Bogdanoviô 1993:66), and 'the only real distinction in modern times was:
peasant/citizen, or even better: cosmopolitan vs. provincial' 22 (Vujoviá 1992:62).
Following previously outlined views of the village as the place of backwardness and
illiteracy, the perceived hostility of the peasant was explained by his/her lack of
education. The city was under threat from those who didn't understand it. Peasant
attitudes towards the city, it was argued, were based on fear of the unknown
(Bogdanovié 1993:18, 23, 36). It was the incapability of dealing with the ambiguities
typical of the city, which made people hate it (BogdanoviO 1995:234). This led
Bogdanoviá, in an article published in Sarajevo 1992, to bewail the fact that Serbs
would be remembered as city destroyers, as 'latter-day Huns', after the world watched
on television how their armies destroyed cities such as Vukovar and Sarajevo, and
succeeded partly in doing the same with a world heritage centre such as Dubrovnik.
4.5.3. Sarajevo and Knin: contested cases of 'peasant threats' to urbanity
This discourse of urban multiculturalism was at least as outspoken amongst Sarajevo
intellectuals, illustrated in an open letter written by a number of former mayors of that
city. They referred to the aggressors as being driven by fear of the other and presenting
a 'threat to the citizens, our city and our civilisation'.
'We experienced the planned aggression of greater Serbian chauvinism with the objective
of liquidating the statehood of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its membership in the Western
world, as a form of aggression by Balkan primitivism against the achievements of urban
civilisation and multinational culture. [...] Sarajevo never experienced a Bartholomew or
Crystal Night, and precisely for that reason it had to be destroyed. Because as long as it
exists, it is an outspoken negation of the thesis of impossibility of co-existence.'
(Dana opsade, an open letter written by ex-mayors of Sarajevo on 10 April 1992, the
beginning of the siege)
The equation of urbanity with multiculturalism was solidly entrenched in language. As
we have seen, a whole repertoire of derogatory terms was available to represent
rurality, but the etymology of the word 'gradanin' ['citizen'] was equally biased. The term
'gradanski' is literally an adjective derived from 'grad' ['city'], but it had definite
overtones of both a civil and a civic nature, thereby immediately setting it apart from
primitivism and nationalism23 . When people spoke of the 'gradanska oporba', the 'civic
opposition', they meant the small, non-nationalist parties.
An interesting illustration of the contested nature of these definitions and of the
confusion surrounding the precise delimitation of the urban and the rural was provided
by a debate in the town of Knin, in Southern Croatia. Overwhelmingly Serbian
dominated before 1995, Knin's post-war population consisted of a majority of Bosnian
Croatian refugees, with Serbian returnees second, and local Croats a small minority. A
local opposition politician, belonging to the latter group, argued that 'Knin [was] losing
its centuries old urban identity of a Mediterranean town in exchange for a system of
values which displays mountain-tribal ['brdsko-plemenske'] customs and heavy petty
bourgeoisness amongst some inhabitants' (Piliã 1999:24). This was unmistakably an
attack on the Bosnian Croats, and his own colleague and member of the same party
retorted: 'It is true that a mountain-tribal mentality dominates inKnin [...], but that dates
back at least half a century, and is characteristic of all national groups who live inKnin.
In fact, it was the Serbs who first brought it with them, long before the war' (ibid.).
22 See also Prodanoviô 1997b; BogdanoviO 1993:37; Velikiã 1992a:33, 38-39.
23 This is maybe less obvious, but certainly also present in the English use of terms such as 'civic', 'civil', 'city' and
'citizen' (and in their Latin roots).
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In a later statement, the first speaker replied: 'With regard to my statement thatKnin
loses its Mediterranean mentality, i.e. that a set of values which are supported by
mountain-tribal customs and petit-bourgeoisness rules, I did not allude to one group of
inhabitants of Knin in particular. I referred to all those who lack the basic culture of living
in the city. I was thinking of people who throw their rubbish from the fifth floor, and of
those whose children address adults with "ti" [the informal second person singular]'
(ibid., 23). In response, a Croatian refugee from the Bosnian town ofZenica argued that
'What hurts us is not [his] statement but his distinction. We brought the purest and the
hardest Croathood into Croatia, and now we are labelled "Bosnians"!'. (ibid., 24).
Another one added: 'The Dalmatians think we are stupid and we start thinking that
about them. Say, that one who said that we are taking away Knin's urban identity. Well,
the two of us came from Zenica, which isn't a big city, but it has more than a hundred
thousand inhabitants, so for Knin that is a metropolis.' (ibid., 34).
4.5.4. urbanity as self-evident opposition
It must be clear by now that in Beograd, and to a lesser but still significant extent in
Zagreb, many people believed that by virtue of its heterogeneity and scale the city was,
per definition, politically oppositional and critical (Ratkovió 1998:60; VujoviO 1992:63). In
an elaboration on the case of Beograd, where the central boroughs of the city were all
opposition-controlled, Vujovió argued that this was because they were inhabited by
educated people, often intellectuals, and importantly, 'starosedelci' [people whose
family had lived there for generations]. These citizens ['graclani', and in this article this
term is reserved for them only] support policies of 'modernity, democracy and the
future' (ibid.). In Beograd's extended suburbs, says Vujoviô, we find 'workers, clerks,
non- or less educated, often half-illiterate do.Ijaci ['newcomers']. They vote MiloeviO or
eeIj' (ibid.).
Of course, the values of city life were incorporated into regime discourses as well,
especially in Croatia, but never as explicitly as in dissident ones. That the urbanity
theme was not simply a toy for intellectuals became clear once again when it emerged
as one of the central discursive elements in the 1996-1997 anti-regime (and only partly
anti-nationalist) demonstrations in Beograd. The whole event was drenched in a
peculiar blend of democracy and urbanity. The link between the two was continually
evoked and reinforced by the slogans, the chants and the stories in the crowds (see
Jansen 2000a; 2001). As explained by the writer Slavko, whom I interviewed on a
terrace in the centre of Beograd during the anti-Miloeviô demonstrations:
'The main quality of these protests is precisely this urbanity. Not national issues, not
it's against this palanka spirit which exists in such a specific way in our society [see
section 4.6, sj]. In that sense urbanity has to do with the political situation here... There
are not so many real urban people here. There is no long tradition of cities like for
instance in Holland. Only some 100 years or so. These protests are the very first time that
this urban middle class, this gradanski element in Yugoslavia comes out in public.'
The spirit of the city had risen, so it was frequently argued in those days, and a strong
sense of urban self-perception was dominant amongst many protestors. For them, the
street demonstrations pitted us, the urbanites, citizens of Beograd, against them, a
tyranny of mad primitives. The urban aspect became particularly clear in the frequent
and self-conscious assertions that 'this will finally show the world that Serbia does not
only consist of primitives!'.
In this context it became possible for people both in Beograd and, to a lesser extent, in
Zagreb to assert a strong sense of belonging to their city as an alternative to national
identification. Predrag was a Beograd intellectual with a career of dissidence spanning
both Tito's and Sloba's regimes and a 'character' on the oppositional scene. During an
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interview in his office, I asked how he responded when people asked 'Where are you
from?'. He said:
Predrag: 'From Beograd'.
Stef: 'But many people don't know where Beograd is...'
Predrag: 'It's not my problem if they don't know.'
Stef: 'What about the labels 'Yugoslav' or 'Serb'?'
Predrag: 'To me that doesn't really mean anything. Those are technical data, and for
some people you know them, and for others you don't.'
This primary identification with the city was not limited to intellectuals. For example,
during the demonstrations I walked down the streets with Ksenija, a Beograd
secondary school girl who was very active in an anti-nationalist youth project. Ksenija,
her wild hair cut unevenly and dressed in her grandfather's overcoat, could boast the
highest rate of Beograd slang words per sentence I have ever come across. Without
me asking anything about the issue, she confided to me that she really loved her city.
She would never call herself a Serb, she argued, sniffing contemptuously at the very
idea, but Beogradanka, yes, that was something different.
When later, in a dark and smoky youth club in the heart of the city, I quizzed a group of
her friends, Beograd teenagers who were active in international post-Yugoslav youth
camps, their answers were overwhelmingly urban-centric. I asked: 'When people
abroad ask you where you're from, what do you answer?' One person said 'From
Beograd', and the rest, in unison, joined in: 'Yes, from Beograd'. From there on the
conversation went as follows:
A: 'It seems to me that ..., well, I think that every Beogracfanin would have said that they
are from Beograd. That is the way it is. Beograd is simply a city on its own with its own
rules. [...]. Without regard to where you are from. I don't believe that anybody from
Beograd would say that they are from Serbia. I mean, there are some... you know,
those new ones, those nationalists, they are fervent nationalists, but... I suppose that
everybody would have said that they are from Beograd.'
B: 'I think that in Beograd there has always been mixing. It was the capital of Yugoslavia,
and people from all parts came here. [...] There are many mixed marriages, there are
many people of different nationalities, so that the majority don't see themselves as
Serbs, or don't see themselves as any nationality. They only see themselves as from
Beograd.'
A: 'Nationality: Beogradanin, you know, it is really like that.'
C: 'Here, it won't go wrong like.., it won't become like...'
A: 'That's right.'
0: 'Beograd is...'
C: '...the World. Beograd is the World. That is the best way, the best slogan. It can
describe our... our nationality. You know that slogan?'
A: 'It's from the demonstrations. You know, that's also something. Beograd was always
the most eventful place—Beograd and Zagreb were the happening places. And I think,
like us, people from Zagreb would say that they were ZagrepOani...'
Stef: 'Are there big differences between Beograd and other places?'
C: [al/laugh in unison] 'Enormous differences, very very big differences! Yes... yes.'
D: 'Beograd has..., you know, Beograd is a very free city. In Beograd there isn't,... people
are not like.., people are very social, very open towards all others. In other towns in
Serbia that is slightly different. Everyone would greet you with something like, oh
[sceptical], Beograc7anin, you know.... but here, whoever arrives, everybody accepts
them. Like 'oh, come round', you know, you're always welcome, like.'
C: 'It depends I think what you compare to... with the rest of Serbia, or... because I don't
know, when I came back from Germany, I felt that everyone was like, rude, how
should I say, ... there, people have different ways of relating to each other...'
B: '... but you came just after the war and all...'
C: 'That's got nothing to do with it.'
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B: 'Oh yes it has!'
C: 'No, it hasn't. We didn't have the ... we never had the habit of being nice to each other
in the trolleybus, for instance... You know, some general forms of human interaction
with people whom you don't know... you know, here, it is necessary, not only here in
Beograd, but everywhere in former Yugoslavia it is necessary to break a barrier in
order to get in contact with people at all...'
E: 'We have very bad education with regard to manners...'
C: 'Yes'
E: 'Thanks, please, sorry, .. you'll hear that very rarely here. People will push you and pull
you...'
C: 'But I think that in comparison with other towns, the main thing is then the size of the
city.'
D: 'You know, I go to the town where my brother and sister-in-law live, and they go "Ah!
You are from Beograd!'
C: 'Yes, but Beograd is ... it is something like, you now, an urban surrounding. In other
places in Serbia you can see tractors driving through the street, and so on... really!'
E: 'You can see that in Beograd as well [laughs]!'
F: 'Or a horse, you can see how a horse pulls a tractor... (laughs)!'
C: 'But I think that in all bigger cities, you know, in all sorts of urban milieus, that they
differ from smaller places... that's why we from Beograd and Zagreb
E: 'Yes... we had a meeting in the Netherlands not long ago. And there were people from
Vukovar, Osijek, Zagreb and Beograd. And it just happened to be like that: people
from Osijek and Vukovar got along very well, and those from Beograd and Zagreb as
well. And also, the Zagrepóani didn't like the Vukovarci very much, they had some
conflicts, from before,... It is simply because of... because it is about cities. When you
live in a bigger city, you simply, ... well, other things impress you. Conversations are
different, people are different, there are different themes... Somehow it's easier to
establish contact with similar people... We got along really great with the Zagrepäani. It
was really a great ekipa. I don't know, it was interesting, right from the first day. Simply
like that, simply a question of the size of the cities.'
A: 'Yes I think so too... I think that that is why Beograd... that is why we are all so proud to
be from Beograd, because it's the largest city in Serbia. And it is still the centre,
however small the thing it is the centre of... [laughs], it's still the centre of something.'
F: 'Even if it was a village, Beograd, it would always be a centre [laughs].'
[. .
C: 'And again, within Beograd, when you ask someone were they're from, people say for
instance: "From Dorëol'. So again, people divide themselves into Dorãolci, Zemunci, I
don't know, Autokomandosi, etc24 . [laughs].'
F: 'Dedinje! Dedinje!'[all laugh]'
C: 'When the war started you could see graffiti, like, "Banovo brdo republika!", or
"Rakovica do Terazije!" [all laugh]25, you know, like, every quarter wanted to secede,
you know, although it is not so important.'
Later, I had a similar conversation with Darko, a young refugee from Zagreb who was
part of the same crowd and invited me over to his place because he could not make it
that day. Referring to urban-rural differences, Darko told me:
'There is a lot of truth in that. Like Zagreb, Beograd, Sarajevo, Tuzla... they are more open
[...] It's simply not so important .... one lives better, one lives faster. And nationality is not
important. Some completely different things are important. [...] Whereas in villages people
are older, not educated, in a sense the roots of modernisation haven't realty gotten to
those places. They stick to some very deep, old roots.'
24 Dorôol is an old quarter of central Beograd. Zemun, a separate historical town, is now a suburb. Aufokomando is
simply a widely used name for a certain area near the motorway.
25 Dedinje is a residential area which houses many members of the ruling elite, including Miloeviô. Banovo brdo and
Rakovica are fairly recent workers' suburbs. 'Banovo brdo republika' reflects slogans such as the Albanian nationalist
ones from Kosovo ('Kosovo republic!'). 'Rakovica do Terazije' ['Rakovica up to Terazije'] is a parody on other
nationalist slogans referring to how far the (greater) motherland should stretch—Terazije is a central street in
Beograd.
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It must be clear from these examples that the city was often constructed as the self-
evident locus of opposition and critical thinking, especially in resistance to what was
considered a traditionalist, primitive ideology such as nationalism. Moreover, exclusive
identification with the capital city on a domestic basis was often tied up with an
attachment to 'European' or 'Western' patterns of meaning. In this way, dissident
identities were constructed simultaneously below and above the national level (see the
chapter on Balkan orientalism).
4.6. white socks: 'urban peasants' in city discourses
The discursive construct 'city' was thus deterritorialised; everyday narratives detached
the meaning of 'the city' from the actual urban locale. As a result, manyZagrepöani and
Beogradani who, as it were, claimed a right of civilisational property to the city, did not
necessarily perceive all their fellow-citizens as 'urban'. It was argued that, although the
'newcomers' might live in the city, they had actually brought the village with them.
Sometimes, this even destabilised certain national stereotypes, as illustrated in this
excerpt from an interview with Ivana, herself a Zagreb Serb who kept a low profile:
'There are a lot of radicals amongst the young Serbs here. Especially those from Bosnia.
They came here twenty years ago or so to work, and they still, after twenty years... or
their children, look exactly the same. They talk with a Bosnian accent, unintelligible...
They spit on the streets... You know, they haven't changed one thing in all those years.
They have brought the village with them. But you can't do that. If you leave a village and
you go to a city... you change! But, my God, they are so primitive, it's really unbelievable.
And then they complain that people don't like them because they are Serbs... but that is
nonsense. That's not because they are Serbs. It's because they are stupid and primitive!'
The mentality and the way of life of these people, I was assured time and again, was
still that of the villages they had left, and therefore, they were at best 'urbaniseljaci'
['urban peasants'J. Jn that sense, as we have seen, many peopie referred to certain
members of government as 'rural', even though they were highly educated and spent
most of their lives in the capital.
In classic structuralist anthropological terms, the 'urban peasants' could be seen as a
dangerous category, as a polluting element in the particular urban, post-Yugoslav
civilisational order of things (Douglas 1966; Turner 1969:97). As a result of the
deterritorialised nature of 'the city' as a discursive construct, they represented a
problematic category for the self-proclaimed 'urban' population not just because they
lived in the city, but because they tried to live the city life. In 'urban' narratives, they
were located between the modern and the backward, between the developed and the
primitive (see Ferguson 1999:84). Nevertheless, they could only be understood within
the context of the urban experience, even if they signified a vision of rurality to many
people (ibid.:83).
Interestingly, this phenomenon was elaborated into a stinging cultural critique of
Serbian society by a local intellectual long before the wars. Konstantinoviá (1981)
argued that his country was characterised by a 'market town philosophy' ['filozofj/a
palanke'] which he located between city and village. The sphere of the palanka, he
argued, was a continuation of traditionalism and authoritarianism, a siege mentality but
with added petit-bourgeois traits. In its extreme version, the author prophesised, this
would result in a form of Serbian fascism... (Konstantinovió 1981:366). In interviews
and in their writings, many intellectuals who engaged in the critique of nationalism in the
1 990s referred to this work (see for example Arkzin 04/98:56-57).
To the self-proclaimed urban post-Yugoslav, I would argue, the 'urban peasants'
represented the spirit of the palanka. Recent and less recent 'immigrants', and frontline
ruralites in particular, were represented as being 'in the city without being of it' (Epstein
quoted in Ferguson 1999:84). It seemed that their perceived status of aspiring citizens
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made them even more despicable in the eyes of the 'autochthons'. In the case of the
frontline ruralites, this was partly to do with the conspicuous consumption which
became part of their image in the city. We have seen how a representation arose of the
Herzegovinians in Zagreb and a similar one of Montenegrins in Beograd, as politically
and economically powerful through mafia-like connections. Those people, so I was
repeatedly told, were notoriously lazy, profited from other people's work and so on.
Especially in Zagreb, but also to a certain extent in Beograd, this was matched by a
stereotypical portrayal of the frontline ruralite as a hopeless 'eternal primitive' (Buden
1996:48). In the documentary film Geto this is phrased as follows:
'I notice that even the majority of my new co-citizens, originally from hills and mountains,
don't feel well either. Although they have succeeded to live well of the black market and
racketeering, they haven't succeeded in becoming citizens.'
Frontline ruralites were portrayed as always trying, but never succeeding, to be civilised
and stylish: according to urban narratives they simply lacked the cultural fluency
(Berdahl 1999:137). 'Even when wearing an expensive Italian suit', so the self-
proclaimed 'urbanites' would say, 'you can pick them out by their white socks'. This
stereotype was so strong that the very notion of white socks ['b((/jeleãarape'] came to
convey a whole set of meanings surrounding the frontline ruralites (see Buden
1996:47). In Zagreb urban-centric discourse, the ideal-typical Hercegovci were easily
recognisable through their style. Yes, they drove large Mercedes, wore expensive
clothes and frequented fancy restaurants. But his Armani suit was put into context by
the white socks, and her black leather Prada handbag was put in the shade by just that
little bit too much make-up. Hercegovci, it was argued, ate in expensive restaurants but
gave away their identity by ordering.. .pig on a spit. Even highly modern developments
such as new communication technologies were incorporated into this portrayal by
categorising them as gimmicks. In that way, the image of a Hercegovac was never
complete without a mobile phone: they were, it was argued, always on their mobile
phones—talking, of course, to other Hercegovci. In short, they went for style but never
made it past kitsch or tackiness.
4.7. citizen's negative self-definition vs. 'the (frontline) ruralite'
In this way, frontline ruralites were made recognisable to the self-proclaimed urban
citizen, and their style, or lack of it, stood for theiressentialised image as primitive, lazy,
patriarchal, rather stupid but cunning, uneducated and uncivilised. Not surprisingly,
'urban peasants' played a major role in jokes and denigrating stories. I would argue that
the crucial role of this stereotypical image did not lie so much with the targets of these
jokes themselves, but rather with the very 'urbanites' who revelled in them. The
Herzegovinian, or for that matter, the generalised 'peasant' in these jokes was mainly a
counterpoint in a process of urban negative self-definition. By painting a picture of the
'peasant' in the terms described above, a position was constructed of a self-conscious
'graclanin', an urban, educated, refined citizen of manners and civilisation (Buden
1996:10; van de Port 1994).
If the (frontline) peasant functioned mainly as a counterpoint to the desired self-
presentation of the 'gradanin', this should be seen in relation to the dominant nationalist
discourses. Surely the urban/rural divide existed before, but a decade of nationalism
and war elevated this discursively constructed conflict to new heights. Buden
convincingly argues that the Hercegovac and the Zagrepöanin were products of the
same Croatian nationalist logic (1996:48-49). He demonstrates how the same
discourse that brought the Herzegovinian to the centres of power and wealth in Zagreb
now made him the object of ridicule, and I would argue that a parallel process took
place with 'the peasant' in Beograd. Whereas the dominant discourses of nationalism
blamed all evil upon national Others and internal collaborators, in a similar move, the
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self-proclaimed citizen projected all negative characteristics on one part of his/her own
nation. Particularly in post-war Croatia, with most national Others (i.e. Serbs) removed
in one way or other, Hercegovci were portrayed as the root of all trouble (see Buden
1996:48).
Importantly, these negative stereotypes of (frontline) rural sections of one's own
nationality often simply existed alongside a continued demon isation of national Others.
Depending on the audience and the context, people relied on diverging narratives of
self-definition in which the desired constant was one's own position, not the negative
Other. In any case, different forms of village orientalism seemed to be part of an implicit
consensus amongst the large majority of city people in both Zagreb and Beograd. A
further level of consensual knowledge existed in urban areas, relying on some version
of the modernisation dogma. If we add up these two factors and place them in a socio-
historical context of late and never full-blooded urbanisation, then perhaps the 'urban
peasants' embodied the problematic of the city particularly well. In this sense, the
discomfort with the ambiguous status of the 'city' may reflect a deep unease amongst
self-proclaimed citizens. In a context of war and accompanying deterioration, it was just
one step too many in a process that reminded city people of their fear of 'still being
stuck in the mud'. Thus, the hierarchy of the more developed city and the primitive
village was part and parcel of many everyday narratives, and it was easily translated
into moral statements. In short, the village was, had to be, what they were not.
4.8. counterdiscourses of the village
The fieldwork for this study was carried out in Zagreb and Beograd, and although I did
work intensively in rural areas in Croatia and visited villages in the Serbian countryside,
the emphasis here is clearly on urban voices. As a result of this analytic choice I refrain
from trying to balance stories, although I am certainly not suggesting that urban
narratives of 'the village' were a correct representation of rural life. Elsewhere, I have
written about people's positionings with regard to nationalism in a set of villages in
Croatia (Jansen 200Db), but my interest in this chapter lies with the role of the
discursive construct 'village' in urban discourse and, particularly, in articulations of anti-
nationalism and urbanity. However, at this point I would like to draw attention briefly to
the existence of rural counterdiscourses (see also Ferguson 1999:110-122). First of all,
the representation of a large urban/rural divide was shared by many ruralites, and it
could easily be sustained by a lot of factual data and by experiential evidence. As we
have seen above, rurality played an important role in nationalist discourses, but the
modernisation paradigm was prevalent in the countryside as well. Having said this, I
was often struck by the different moral evaluation it received. One strand of rural
counterdiscourse both in the villages and amongst 'urban peasants' was constructed
around the notion of 'reality'. The village, it was argued, was where one lived life to the
limits; it was real, hard and unmediated, in contrast to the comfortable, mediated and
distant forms of city life.
To express this representation of rurality as the real thing, one often invoked the
metaphor of asphalt. Asphalt signified modern isation and was deployed to that effect by
the previous regime, with politicians opening new roads as part of its project for
Progress (Drakulió 1996:201-202). However, in the ruralist counterdiscourses it also
resonated with a perception of distance, of detachment from real life. I would argue that
asphalt was a particularly powerful metaphor because it could be seen as mediating the
human experience of the land. It is literally situated between one's feet and the mud
which constitutes the reality of that land. In this way, villagers would partly explain the
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urbanite's lack of knowledge, understanding or concern with reference to his/her
artificial life 'on asphalt'26.
4.9. the loss of the city
Many inhabitants of the city, often first generation urbanites themselves, relied on an
urban/rural discourse to deal with a sense of loss; they felt that their city had been
taken away from them. Davor, for example, was a young Zagrepãanin, a DJ who was
well-connected on the clubbing scene. We met in a trendy bar in the city centre—he
had his hair dyed and was donning fashionable clubwear, but he had no money. Davor
told me that Zagreb was a poisoned city. It was dead already, actually. He complained
of the lack of any kind of subcultural scene and deplored the rivalry amongst the few
people who were trying to do something original. Those 'freaks' [sic] were divided,
Davor said, as opposed to the masses of people coming in from the village, who stuck
together. And that changed the whole city. He didn't blame the newcomers, as he felt
that they probably had this big idea about being in Zagreb. However, in reality, he
added, they brought their lives with them, and they hung out together all the time.
Therefore, Davor bitterly concluded, it was the Zagrepcani who were to blame, because
they didn't stick together.
Davor's self-criticism was rather unusual because, as we have seen, in Zagreb
assertions of urbanity were often accompanied by an urban discourse of 'purger?.
Although often framed in strongly historical terms, this notion was also present in a
more 'modern', even half-subcultural way, as exemplified by the case of the
oppositional Zagreb Radio 101. This station was keen on representing itself as
rebellious and critical, but it often did so by reinforcing stereotypical images of others—
and of Hercegovci, in particular. When the government attempted to close the station
down in 1997, this gave rise to the biggest, and indeed the only massive anti-regime
street protest in Croatia during the 1990s. In an unusually critical article on Radio 101,
student journalist Dalibor PetroviO wrote:
'Radio 101 has become a "fortress" in the face of massive de-citification ['depurgerizac(/a']
of Zagreb [...]. The question is to what extent the struggle for 101 is a struggle for
liberation, and to what extent it is, in fact, a struggle for the right to further keep one's
head deep into the sand. This becomes clearest in the famous slogan "You can take
everything from us, but not 101l' ["Mo2ete nam uzeti sve, all Stojedinicu nel"], which
certainly must have pleased the ruling elite.' (PetroviO 1997:9)
Petroviá went on to say that the struggle for Radio 101 provided an excuse for people
not to worry about more important issues such as poverty and the creeping revival of
fascism in Croatia (see also Arkzin 02/98:36-37). Although the independent B92 station
in Beograd, called the 'saviour of the urban spirit of Beograd' in the documentary film
Geto, was much more explicitly political, it did sometimes rely on a similar defensive
urban-centric discourse.
Writing about Serbia, Ramet argues that the 'dominant mood in the countryside is one
of resentment' (1996b:81). I would add that feelings of resentment towards the
'newcomers' ['do.Ijaci were also widespread in the capitals: they were said to destroy
the 'urban spirit' of the city, and accused of 'ruralising' it. In the words of Vujoviô,
'Beograd is peasantified' ['Beogradje poseljaöio'] (1992:62; see also Velikiá 1992a:32;
1994:187). For example, one of the thorns in the flesh of Beograd's urbanity was the
explosive growth of the number of kiosks on the street, which led to a debate in the
independent press. An urban sociologist deplored the 'barbarisation' of parts of the city
through the chaotic implantation of hundreds of kiosks (Vreme 06/09/97, 25), while an
26 Conversely, the metaphor of 'asphalt' was deployed in urban discourses of rural unease with city life, as in
JergoviO' comments on a 'son of the village on asphalt' Cseljaoki sin na asfaltu'] (JergoviO 1998:15; see also Kangrga
1997:119-129).
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artist stated that the 'kioskizadlla' was 'privatisation in a Balkan way', dragging the city
further and further 'away from contemporary civilisation' (ProdanoviO 1998:13). The
discussion wasn't limited to the press either, as people complained in conversations
about the 'Istanbulisation' of the city.
Although it seems imperative that we see these issues in relation to the general
deterioration of socio-economic standards as well (Zirojevié 1997:13), city-centric
narratives mainly deplored the cultural aspects of the changes. Even before the wars,
this was illustrated in an interview with Velimir ViskoviO, a Croatian literary critic who
worked in both Beograd and Zagreb. He argued how the Serbian (then also Yugoslav)
capital was a truly cosmopolitan, open and exciting place in the 1970s and the early
1980s (Nedeljna Borba 20-21/05/89). However, he added, by the end of the 1980s,
Beograd underwent a wave of 'provincjaIizacja'. In the cultural sphere this meant an
increasing domination by intellectuals with 'an anachronistic, archaic orientation, based
on a quasi-folkloristic, populistic concept and so-called autochthonous rural roots'
(ibid.).
On a more mundane level, people jokingly spoke about the lack of hygienic habits
amongst 'the newcomers'. They would accuse them of keeping animals in their flats
and of being unable to use modern toilets. A crucial element in this discourse on the
loss of the city was a whole phenomenon centring upon the music styleturbofolk, which
I explore in the chapter on Balkan orientalism. But let me illustrate this discourse with a
lengthy quotation from an interview with Ivana, a Serbian girl, born and raised in
Zagreb.
Stef: 'What does this term mean to you: Hercegovci?'
Ivana: 'They came here in very large numbers during the war, and I don't like them, but
not because of the stereotype that exists about them. I don't care about their
nationality, but I don't like them purely because they have come into my city and
fucked it up. With their bad culture they have destroyed the old spirit of Zagreb.
Manners have been lost and some status symbols have changed completely. The
elite is not the intelligentsia anymore or a cuitured famiiy, but those who have Jarge
gold watches. And they have completely changed the way of thinking... For that
reason, I don't like them. But I have a friend, one of my best friends, who is a 'full-
blooded' [Iaughsj Herzegovinian, and that has nothing to do with it. It is not a reason
for me to not like somebody or to not talk to somebody. But in general, I don't like
them because they have fucked up my city, and true Zagrebians have been... they
are lost. This is not the same city anymore. Now primitivism rules here, and some
low culture, and... it's not the same anymore.'
Stef: 'Some people have talked to me about the great differences between cities and
villages. What do you think about that?'
Ivana: 'Well, that's not only the case for Hercegovci. I know plenty of people in my own
community, who came from Bosnia. They are very primitive. They are very dear to
me, but I abhor their way of thinking. And they don't have any wish to change a bit...
only as much as correcting their behaviour. In the sense that, when you're in the
village, that is one way of life, and when you come to the city, then you can't just
continue to live as seijaci, but you should try to live as a gradànin, as much as you
can. There are plenty of people who do their best, and they try to find the happy
medium. For instance, when they go to see their grandparents they're all like "Oh I
am a Bosnian", and they enjoy that etc... But when you are in Zagreb you can't just
like.., scream loudly, break glasses, and so on. And of course there are not only bad
things. They have also plenty of good things. But it's as if they have taken only the
worst things out of all that, and they now try to force that upon all of us. So... that's
not only Hercegovci. There are simply a large number of people who have come
here from very different environments and they don't want to change... they want to
change the others, us.'
'The city is not what it used to be', I was told over and over. A strongly developed but
not unusual example of city-centrism, loss and nostalgia was provided by the Beograd
documentary film Geto:
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'Ten years ago, when it all started, nobody understood what was going on. It left us
indifferent [
... J When things became clear, it was too late. The city was divided. On one
side there was them, and on the other us. [...] They have occupied all places, imagined
different kinds of enemies and pushed us all into hell. We were numerous enough to
oppose them in the beginning and it will never be clear why we collapsed. [...] Beograd
has been turned into a concentration camp. Since then, they rule, and we survive.'
The narrator later talks about the enormous flood of outmigration, particularly amongst
the young, urban and educated: 'The city that they left doesn't exist anymore, apart
from in their memories'. Towards the end of the film, he says 'I remember how I used to
love Beograd. And I realise how I wish things would change here, so that it would be
my city again. But I know there is no way back.'
5. 'the city' and the narrative break: nain and oaradox
In this chapter, I have unravelled a number of patterns in the articulation of post-
Yugoslav anti-nationalism and discourses on rurality and urbanity. First I sketched a
background in which, despite differences and ambiguities, assertions of Serbian and
Croatian nationalism were associated with rurality, both in their cultural content and in
their political appeal. Given a number of factors, such as the legacy of late and shallow
urbanisation in Yugoslavia, diverging educational standards and opposed patterns in
the ethnic composition of urban and rural areas, a discourse developed in which the
city came to be seen as a place of mixture, whereas the countryside represented purity.
We have moved here into the realm of discursive spaces, and the majority of both
nationalist and anti-nationalist narratives tended to converge on this dualistic depiction.
Their differences lay in the evaluation: rural purity was either seen as backwardness or
as authenticity, whereas urban mixture was perceived as either cultural richness or
promiscuity. In both cases there seemed to be a marked departure from classic
accounts of nationalism, although people in certain professions, those centred upon
cultural capital, still played an important role.
Building on these insights I looked at the specific place of frontline ruralites both in
nationalist discourses and in dissident representations, most of which resonate with
modernisation theories. Particular attention was paid to Zagreb and Beograd
discourses of the peasant threat to the city, constructed around notions such as
'invasions', 'primitivism' and 'openness'. Despite the existence of diverging
interpretations, I then argued, many anti-nationalist discourses reiterated such views of
rurality and urbanity, adding the danger of nationalism to a list of rural diseases. I
located these depictions against a background of war, deterioration and a struggle for
cultural capital in order to place their sometimes exclusivist tendencies in context.
A concept that I find particularly useful in understanding those discourses of rurality and
urbanity is that of a 'narrative break' (see Chapter Five). Both in Zagreb and in
Beograd, I encountered many people who felt a widespread sense of 'urban culture
lost', of an undesired cultural ruralisation of their city. For those who did not tap into the
dominant nationalist discourses, the narrative break caused by the post-Yugoslav wars
could be partly understood through the prism of urban/rural difference. In that way,
those self-proclaimed urbanites established a partial sense of continuity in their
personal narrative of self. When complaining that the city wasn't what it used to be,
people simultaneously expressed their feelings that life was not what it used to be.
By deploring the pernicious influence of peasants, and ones from the frontline in
particular, the gradanin effectively bewailed the loss of an ideal. It was not so important
whether their city of self-conscious, educated and civilised urbanites ever really existed
(Buden 1996:50). What counted was that, by deriding the ruralite, citizens of Beograd
or Zagreb could comment on the painful character of the present situation, which was
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not civilised, not rational, not modern, not stylish, not peaceful. The discursive construct
of 'the city' also allowed, as we have seen, for relating one's personal narrative to a
larger story, a story of cosmopolitanism, 'Western-ness', 'Europe', and so on. Moreover,
discourses of urbanity and feelings of loss and threat, expressed an anxiety to retain
some sense of normality in the face of barbarism. This often led to a partial retreat into
the private realm (Norris 1999:163; Novi List 19/05/98:24-25), and it provided a
welcome mechanism to distance oneself from contamination and responsibility. For
many in Beograd, and even to some extent in Zagreb, the war was kept at bay, as
expressed by a young Beograd man in a feature article on Serbian youth during the
Bosnian war:
'In my group of friends, I don't know anyone who's been a volunteer in Bosnia. Those
volunteers mainly come from the countryside. Here, we try to ignore the war.'
(De Morgen 31/07/95:10)
I would like to conclude this chapter with an insight into the highly ambiguous situation
produced by such discourses. In the specific case of anti-nationalist urban narratives,
people who preached and practiced a tolerant position towards other nationalities
(particularly towards the 'main' national Other: Serbs/Croats) held very 'politically
incorrect' views about their 'own' rural and frontline populations. As a result, in their
publications, broadcasts, interviews and especially in private conversations, you would
never hear a bad word about national Others at all. However, rather extreme culturalist
stereotyping, a form of internal orientalism, was reserved for everything 'peasant' and
even more for everything to do with frontline ruralites ('super-peasants'). Paradoxically,
therefore, many dissidents partially relied on 'ethnic' or 'sub-ethnic' labels (e.g.
Hercegovci) in order to explain the rise of nationalism and allocate responsibility for the
war. Moreover, the discourse of 'autochthons' versus 'newcomers' re-inscribed a
normative link between locality and culture, between territory and politics. This is
particularly contradictory in relation to the deterritorialisation of urbanity that was so
central to many anti-nationalist narratives: the use of the category 'urban peasants'
implied that living in the city did not make you a citizen, but apparently living in the city
for a long enough period did. In that way, it was possible for the previously mentioned
dissident Bogdanovió to rely on a primordialist argument in order to defend himself
against the accusation that he had no right to talk about Beograd, after having been
away for four years:
'After all, I am a born Beogradanin; my grandmothers and —fathers were Beogradáni. I
have a right to Beograd, in any case more so than eelj'
(Nedeljna Na.a Borba, 21-22/06/97)
Vojislav eelj is the leader of the ultra-nationalist Serbian Radical Party, advocate of
the most extreme forms of Greater-Serbianism and former paramilitary leader in Bosnia
and Croatia. Later, he became vice-president of Serbia, where he continued to add to
his reputation of a violent extremist, both in parliament and outside of it. eelj is a
Bosnian Serb. The presence of men like him in positions of power and their continuing
popularity remind us that the city-centrism, which characterised certain anti-nationalist
discourses was a reactive phenomenon. It was often tempered by a wider 'tolerant' and
'civil' attitude and remained far away from the aggressive nationalism and hate speech,
which was dominant in the post-Yugoslav context. Crucially, to my knowledge, these
dissident discourses never led to 'peasants' being attacked, harassed, raped, or killed;
they still presented a non-violent alternative to the war-mongering of the different
nationalisms.
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[chapter eight]
post-Yugoslav (anti)nationalism
and Balkan orientalism
'The difference between the Serbian and the Croatian pseudo-elites lies in the
style and the sophistication with regard to the political tasks. The Croats will,
let's say, wrap a lump of shit in a nice bit of foil, tie it up with a bow and say:
"This is a Sacher-Torte". The Serbs, on the other hand, will call that lump of
shit, "Sacher-Torte" without foil and ribbon. And if someone says that it is shit,
they will hit him on the head with a club until he admits that it is Sacher-Torte.
Moral of the story: both of us get shit, and the rest is a question of marketing.'
(Svetislav Basara, writer from Serbia
in Feral Tribune 22/03/99:48)
From the analysis in the last chapter, it is clear that the construction of urban/rural
dualisms was not a one-dimensional, homogeneous post-Yugoslav effort, nor could it
be understood in isolation from other discursive mechanisms. More specifically, the
emphasis on a generalised rural Other ('peasant') which I found in Beograd was only
partly matched in Zagreb, where urbanity was often formulated simultaneously in
opposition to 'peasants', Herzegovinians and Serbs. In order to understand this
multilayered pattern of negative self-definition, this chapter dissects the post-Yugoslav
discursive practices of Balkan orientalism and in this way builds a critical analysis of
the cultural constructs of 'Balkan' and 'Europe'. The point here is not so much the fact
that people essentialise those notions to a certain extent—something anthropologists
themselves practice fairly often (Carrier 1995:8)—but rather the way in which these
essentialisms function. I analyse how they work, how they constrain practice and how
they figure in strategic action.
I consider 'Balkan orientalism' as a discursive practice, or rather, as a set of discursive
practices that took shape around the notions of 'Balkan' and 'Europe'. Obviously, the
tension itself is crucial, and it would be begging the question if I were to try to distil
some 'true' meaning out of these concepts. As we shall see, I suggest their power was
situated exactly in their ingraspability, in the impossibility of pinning them down within
the vibrant universe of meanings they evoked. Therefore, the relevance of the Balkan
orientalist discourse lay in the role it played in different practices, by different people,
with different results. Even when using the term 'Balkan orientalism', we have to be
aware that this discourse is unstable and unfixed. Still, as a discourse of identification,
it produced some sense of fixity for post-Yugoslays who articulated it into their
understanding of themselves and of the world around them. For many, the notions of
'Balkan' and 'Europe' provided discursive material with which they could relate their
'small story' to the 'big story' of war and nationalism. In this sense, it helped to construct
some continuity in these people's narratives of self—even if only by paradoxically
emphasising discontinuity in the surrounding events. In this study, 'Balkan' and 'Europe'
are conceptualised as collectively sanctioned but contested cultural constructs which
could be incorporated in this process. It is my argument that many post-Yugoslav
narratives of self were shaped partly on the basis of certain compatibilities between
people's everyday life experience and possible variations on the Balkan orientalist
theme.
Conceiving of Balkan orientalism as a discursive practice also allows us to analyse how
it was articulated with a variety of other discourses, for example with ideas of
nationalism/cosmopolitanism, tradition/modernity, irrationality/rationality and urbanity!
rurality. It is through these articulations with other discourses that people could relate
Balkan orientalism to a rich set of practices, ranging from political decision-making to
the most mundane everyday life experiences.
Time for generalisations and apologies now. Whereas the urban/rural dualism was
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more prominent in Beograd, Balkan orientalism was much more strikingly present in
Zagreb. However, it is important to point out that the differential mechanisms of Balkan
orientalism in the Croatian/Serbian opposition were also intersected and undermined
by various other factors, such as regional differences and processes of stereotyping
within the republics. The chapter on representations of urbanity and rurality analyses
some examples of the ways in which the logic of Balkan orientalism was replicated on
these lower levels. Here I focus on the more overarching discourses that formed a
central axis in the constitutive relationship between certain processes of identification in
Beograd and Zagreb. Although I attempt to refrain in this study from comparative
frameworks which juxtapose Beograd and Zagreb patterns, in the case of discourses of
'Balkan' and 'Europe' such a structure seems mandatory. Therefore, after a general
introduction, I look at Balkan orientalism first in Beograd and then in Zagreb. This
means I have to disentangle a number of layers from the complex body of these
discourses, a process not unlike trying to fish out different vegetables from a cooked-
through pot of goulash. Of course, afterwards, it never tastes the same again.
1. 'Balkan' for beginners
1.1. what do we talk about when we talk about 'Balkan'1?
'The idea of losing one British life in this endless mess of foreign viciousness is ridiculous. The whole
lot of them, Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, Kosovans, commit acts of unspeakable bloodshed, one against
the other. The international community's presence there for many years has not made a blind bit of
difference... Let's get out of the Balkans.'
(Michael Winner in News of the World 24/01/99)
The column from which these lines are taken was written just before the NATO air
strikes on the FR Yugoslavia. Of course, it is easy and even cheap to start off a section
on the construction of Otherness with a quotation from a British tabloid paper renowned
for its jingoism. By presenting caricature versions of wider, less 'outrageous'
phenomena, such a quotation allows for an implicit positioning of oneself as somehow
more reasonable, tolerant and understanding. My only reason for including this is its
blatant cultural absolutism, associating 'the Balkans' with cultural variety, war,
destructive violence, innate hatred and backwardness. This is a pattern that recurred in
many different portrayals of the post-Yugoslav context, ranging from semi-racist to
highly sympathetic representations 2. In her wide-ranging work on imaginings of the
Balkans, Todorova (1994, 1997) demonstrates that this is nothing new; it reflects a
historical process of Othering and essentialising in travelogues, academic and
journalistic work, diplomacy and literature. Todorova argues that the region came to
symbolise the dark Other within 'Western' culture: 'With the rediscovery of the East and
orientalism as independent semantic values, the Balkans are left in Europe's thrall,
anti-civilisation, alter-ego, the dark side within' (1 994:482).
The wars in the former Yugoslav republics gave a new impetus to the use of the term
'Balkan', which was located at the shaky centre of an approach explaining those wars
as the expression of ancient hatreds. We shall see in this chapter that many people in
the post-Yugoslav states resented such a depiction of their recent past, sometimes
themselves turning to semi-racist language in the process ('You Westerners treat us
like African tribes!'). Paradoxically, however, the notion of 'Balkan' also provided
material for a counterdiscourse which deflected guilt and responsibility by conveniently
denying agency to those who were considered Balkanci. But more about this later. For
now, if, as Todorova argues, a Balkan Other was created within Europe, albeit on its
fringes (not geographical but cultural-historical), then what do we mean when we talk
about 'Balkan'? Most people would agree on its being somehow related to South-East
1 I have chosen to translate both the noun 'Balkan' and the adjective 'Balkanski' with the English 'Balkan'.
2 Examples of the latter could be found in the 1999 Channel Four documentary The Valley, or in the 1994 film Before
the Rain by Manchevski, for a critique see the interview with Slavoj Zi±ek in Feral Tribune (25/01/1999:40-42).
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Europe, but there is less agreement on where to draw the line. More importantly, a
geographical delineation simply doesn't seem to suffice: although many would agree
that Macedonia is a Balkan country, who would describe Alexander the Great as a
Balkan man? More than anything else, the term seems to refer to a set of real or
imagined social practices which hover around primitivism, variety, passion and,
crucially, violence. Others have analysed these external discourses on the Balkans
(see Todorova 1994, 1997; Norris 1999:5ff), but the focus of this chapter will be on the
theme of the Balkans within the post-Yugoslav context and on the ways it figures in
nationalist and anti-nationalist discourses of identification. What do we talk about, then,
when we talk about 'Balkan'?
1.2. cultural geographies of attributing primitivism
One important factor in any understanding of the use of term 'Balkan' in the post-
Yugoslav context is the enormous diversity that characterises the region. First of all,
former Yugoslavia was located on the boundaries of two empires, the Habsburg double
monarchy and the Ottoman empire. As well as being abundantly varied in landscapes,
it displayed enormous socio-economic differences between and within republics. The
majority of Yugosla ys had a cultural background in one of three major religions
(Catholic, Muslim, Orthodox), and even the most widely spoken language (then called
Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian) existed in two scripts, Latinic and Cyrillic.
This diversity was never one of equality. Many Yugosla ys experienced a civilisational-
developmental hierarchy within their country, where one scored lower the further one
descended to the South and to the East. As a popular expression said: 'The more
Southern, the sadder' ['.to ju2n(je sto tu2nUe; and even between the two more
'developed' republics, Slovenia and Croatia, many still perceived such a difference.
Shortly after my arrival in Croatia from Beograd, Zagreb journalist Velimir heard about
me through a friend and was keen to help me start fieldwork there. He took me out for
a couple of drinks and described some broad lines of difference between the post-
Yugoslav states. Velimir argued that one only had to look at the difference between the
roads in Slovenia and Croatia. He said that the Slovenes cared about these things, as
opposed to the Croats—adding that the roads were probably even worse in Serbia. A
young refugee in Beograd who'd grown up as a Zagreb city boy used more prosaic
examples. In an interview, he told me about a camp site where he spent a lot of his
holidays as a small child.
'There were plenty of Slovenes there. And... you know what... you really did notice certain
differences. Bloody hell, really! Let's say, the Slovenes were mostly on one side, while on
the other side there were mainly others, [laughs] "Ju2njaci" ["Southerners"]. And, you
know, thinking of it, it was really strange. I mean, this was Yugoslavia, and the Slovenes
were all on one side... I even remember [laughs] that we would go to the toilet on the
Slovenian side, because they were cleaner [laughs out loud, as does eveiybody present].
So you see, seriously now, it is really the case that out of all these Yugoslav peoples,
they were the most cultured. Let's say they were the nearest to the West, with Austria and
all. Somewhat colder with regard to character. And a bit more boring. Whereas in the rest
of Yugoslavia people were messing about, you know... [laughs]. Actually, I understand
that they wanted to secede, you know.'
However, the perceived civilisational gap applied most significantly to differences
between more 'advanced' Croatia and Slovenia on the one hand, and the rest of
Yugoslavia on the other. Despite widely diverging evaluations of this gap, many people
did agree on its existence. Jasmina, a Beograd NGO activist whose previous job had
taken her all over the former state and beyond, argued in an interview:
'It always was different in Slovenia and Croatia. Maybe it is the influence of Catholicism,
and of being part of the Austro-Hungarian empire. They are more in touch with the West.
It was always like that, you know, the Yugoslav conflict was also a conflict between North
and South... And now, within this new state, we have similar problems, with Vojvodina
being somewhat similar to Slovenia. I call that the Slovenian syndrome. Vojvodina was
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also part of the Austro-Hungarian empire, better organised, more rational, more modern.
And the South is very different.'
Bakié-Hayden and Hayden rightly point out that this way of representing differences
within Yugoslavia attributes a set of essential differences between Yugoslav peoples to
the influence of foreign rulers who dominated their countries ages ago (1992:5).
Jasmina's point of view was fairly uncontested, but her statement immediately points
out the further complexity of North/South divisions in former Yugoslavia. Certain
differences were reproduced within republics, mainly along urban/rural lines (see also
van de Port 1994, 1999:9), just as between them. Moreover, as this chapter will amply
illustrate, one could deploy the North/South gap in a strategic way in many different
situations. For example, during a human rights seminar in Beograd, one of the (local)
participants, a law student, asked for the floor and remarked that there should be a no
smoking policy in the seminar room. Angrily, he wondered why it was always so difficult
to organise clear working times and breaks in Serbia. With their love for endless
smoking and drinking coffee, he argued, the Serbs were really 'a Turkish people'. For
your information, his plea was not rewarded—participants were asked to smoke 'as
little as possible', which meant they sometimes briefly paused between cigarettes.
1.3. 'Balkan' and 'Europe' in terms of orientalism
Nisu krivci primitivci
	
The primitives who skimmed the cream
Sto su pokupili mast
	
Are not to blame
Korov nikne di god stigne
	
Weeds crop up wherever they get to
Ma svaka njima ãast 	 Well, all credit to them
Krivi smo ml..,	 We are to blame,,.
Otkud svi ti paraziti
	
Whence all those parasites
to su nam zagustili?
	
Who muddied the waters for us?
Nemoj stan mo]	 Don't say that, old pal
Krivi smo ml
	
We are to blame
Sto smo ih pustili
	
Because we let them
[...1
	
[.1
Putu], Evropo	 Travel, Europe
Nemoj vie ôekati na nas	 Don't wait any longer for us
Ne pita] mnogo	 Don't ask much
Dospeãe I ti [na] rdav glas? 	 Will you get a bad name too?
Putu], planeto	 Travel, planet
Super smo se dru2ili...	 It was great to hang out with you
Nama]e lepo	 We've got it good
Taman kako smo zaslu2ili... 	 Exactly what we deserved
Dorde Balaeviô - Putuj Evropo (1998:123-1 24)
What is at stake in these representations of 'Balkan' is not so much a geographical
definition but a set of meanings taken on through geographical metaphor. This has
implications for our approach to the notion of 'Balkan'. We can only understand the
manifold meanings of this cultural construct, and the ways in which it was used in the
post-Yugoslav context, when we see it in relation to another, equally polysemic term:
'Europe'. Both notions had an enormous variety of meanings and featured in people's
narratives in different ways. However, within this rich field of polysemy, a pattern arose
whereby the 'Balkan'/'Europe' interface functioned as a discourse based on two poles,
which, despite differing interpretations, almost always took on a thoroughly moral
meaning. As in the case of the urban/rural dualism, there was an unstable process
which constituted a clearly positive pole ('Europe', of course) and a clearly negative
one ('Balkan').
In his seminal work, Edward Said (1978) analysed 'orientalism' as a European
discourse which constructed and essentialised an 'Orient', allowing the former to
subjugate and manage the latter. Geographical borders and topography, he argued,
only entered this exercise in an entirely arbitrary way (1978:54). Orientalism was part of
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a general European project to domesticate the threatening Other (ibid.:58-59) and was
therefore a moral discourse, always constituting 'Europe' as the superior side (ibid.:7).
Importantly, Said went to lengths to argue that this process createdtwo positions: 'the
Orient' and 'Europe'. It is only in relation to a constructed Other that 'Europe' could
engage in building its own identity through negative self-definition (ibid.:3, 7).
The relevance of Said's analysis with regard to the post-Yugoslav context has been
pointed out by several authors (Bakió-Hayden 1992; Bakiô-Hayden & Hayden 1995;
Todorova 1994, 1997). It is from their work that I borrow the term 'Balkan orientalism'.
Working in Said's vein, these authors offer an interesting analysis of orientalist
tendencies in scholarly and literary discourses on the Balkans, adding recent political
statements to the material. Based on ethnographic fieldwork, I now try to go beyond
this and look at the ways in which Balkan orientalism functioned as a discursive
practice on the level of everyday lives.
2. Balkan orientalism in Beograd
2.1. Serbian nationalist discourses of 'Balkan'/'Europe'
Within dominant nationalist discourses in Serbia, the concept of 'Balkan' was not very
prominent. For most people, it seemed implicitly understood that Serbia was part of the
Balkan geographical area. However, the meaning of this 'Balkan' aspect of their
national identity was disputed and extremely ambiguous. On the one hand, it was
related to some sense of cultural pride, particularly related to Orthodox Christianity, and
to an image of ingrained rebellion against foreign oppression, resonating with the
preservation of Serbian-ness under Turkish rule. On the other hand, however, even
amongst those who felt no strong animosity towards the notion of 'Balkan', it had
negative connotations of low economic development, laziness, inefficiency, primitivism
and backwardness.
A further ambiguity could be found in the tension between this 'Balkan' notion and its
opposite pole, 'Europe'. Although many citizens of Serbia would argue, reluctantly or
proudly, that they had something of the 'Bajkan' in them, they woDki si)J enphasise
their European-ness as well. In fact, the notion of 'Europe' featured much more
prominently in the public sphere than the 'Balkan' idea, and certainly when talking in
terms of politics many Beogradàni expressed the desire and the need to move towards
a more 'European' Serbia. This term resonated with a better life, more freedom, less
corruption, in short: a democratic, well-off and less 'Balkan' situation.
However, beyond this vague semantic consensus lurked many contradictions, even if
we only look at the party political level. The MiIoeviô regime, while arguing for a re-
entry into Europe through the front door, had no reservations about playing the 'Balkan'
rebel-card when it seemed to reinforce its domestic legitimacy and regional position
(Jansen 2000a:308-309). In some nationalist variations, this was elaborated into a
discourse in which Serbs were actually quintessential Europeans, who for centuries
had defended Europe against the perceived onslaught of Islam. The low popularity
index of the Serbs in most other countries of Europe was, therefore, seen as the result
of screaming injustice, the demonisation of a heroic people who time and again stood
on the barricades for the Old Continent (see Jansen 2001; 2000a:300). In this view,
despite its numerous sacrifices and unspeakable sufferings done in the service of
Europe, the Serbian nation received only ingratitude from that self-same Europe3.
Many Serbian nationalist discourses, particularly those in opposition to Slobodan
Miloeviô, did not stop at decrying this situation. Although most people would
vehemently attack the perceived anti-Serbian feelings of almost the entire world, they
did not see it as entirely unreasonable that despite frenetic knocking on the European
door by the Serbian nation that door would remain closed. Oppositional nationalists,
3 See for example DukiO-Dojcinovió 2000. A parallel case of paradoxically anti-European pro-European discourses
existed amongst the Croatian extreme right. See further.
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including some voices from the church, suggested a simple explanation for this: the
Serbian nation had fallen prey to the wrong leader, a dictator of the un-European kind,
a communist. Miloeviá, they argued, falsely portrayed himself as a saviour of the
nation. He talked about national brotherhood, but oppressed his own people. He was
and would always be a communist. And for this reason, he had brought the Serbs to
their current predicament: a stigmatised, demonised nation drifting away from its
rightful place in Europe. Only without the communists, would Serbia be able to change
its course.
2.2. Beograd anti-nationalist articulations of 'Balkan'/'Europe'
In Beograd-based anti-nationalist discursive practice, a small minority phenomenon,
the concept of 'Balkan' was much more prominent and almost exclusively used in a
negative sense, particularly in the case of more established, well-articulated
alternatives. In these dissident narratives of self, people emphasised the 'European'
character of their identity and relied on its 'Balkan' counterpart strictly as a cultural
background which symbolised a number of deplorable phenomena in the past and the
present context. Again, 'Balkan' evoked a whole set of interrelated but sometimes
contradictory meanings, functioning as a sort of empty banner, as a discursive knot
which featured in a number of practices and wove them together in a complex and
inextricable pattern.
In his book 'Occidentalism', Chen Xiaomei (1996) argued that different groups in
Chinese society have relied on strategies and practices similar to those of Said's
orientalism in order to achieve certain political goals. The author defines occidentalism
as 'a discursive practice that, by constructing its Western Other, has allowed the Orient
to participate actively and with indigenous creativity in the process of self-appropriation,
even after being appropriated and constructed by Western Others' (Chen Xiaomei
1996:4-5). Variations on the occidentalist discourse have been developed as tools of
both oppression (by the regime) and emancipation (by dissidents). For the Maoist
government, the 'Western' Other was an enemy and an example of what shouldn't be;
but in dissident occidentalism, the 'West' had become a metaphor for liberation.
'This evocation of the West, as counterpart of nöigerious cinie, ias rnoie Thr OTt e\
in motion a kind of 'dialogic imagination' that in turn has become a dynamic and
dialectica! force in the making of modern Chinese history.'
(Chen Xiaomei 1996:9)
In his elaboration of this point through a study ofoccidentalism in literature and popular
culture, Chen Xiaomei warns against the danger of ethnocentric political correctness in
such circumstances. What might seem consumerist and uncritically compliant to
'Western' ears, he argues, can be politically oppositional in other contexts, where the
notion of 'the West' is the antithesis of the dominant discourse. I believe these are
important insights when analysing the Serbian case, where the regime waged a
relentless crusade against 'domestic traitors and foreign mercenaries'. After a decade
of Miloevió, pro-'European' discourses provided most of the material for opposition
and dissidence.
Parallel to the previously discussed discourses of urbanity and rurality, some of those
who advocated liberal-democratic alternatives would thereby include the authoritarian
excesses of Tito's communism as 'Balkan' phenomena. This view also existed amongst
nationalists who were in opposition to the current 'communist' in charge. However,
whereas the nationalist position would argue that Yugoslavia was an essentially anti-
Serbian construction, most civic opponents of the regime would judge the former
Yugoslav system much less harshly. Although some anti-nationalist representations of
the Yugoslav past labelled the former system as 'Balkanski', this view often led a low-
profile life in the shadow of the idea that Yugoslavia was, well... on its way to... yes,
'Europe'. NGO activist Jasmina, whom I interviewed in her organisation's office in the
centre of Beograd:
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'We were so close to Europe... If only they would have been reasonable and would have
sat down for a peaceful and rational solution—Yugoslavia could have joined the EU
within ten years! But no, they wanted war...'
Despite blaming the very latest Yugoslav leadership, dissident perspectives often
emphasised the relative qualities of the former system, that is, in terms of its
multicultural rather than ethnic basis. This is hardly surprising, particularly in light of the
wars and the nationalisms that tore their former country apart. However, when referring
to the present state of affairs in the post-Yugoslav context, the notion of 'Balkan' was a
key term in those dissident explanations: Miloeviá's reign was, then, depicted as a
morally despicable model of (un)civilisation. Amongst the ingredients that people
identified were low education, violence, primitivism, patriarchy, roughness, intolerance
and so on. All of these were, of course, negative stereotypes associated by many
urban post-Yugoslays with rurality.
A glimpse of the complex and multiple linkages between rurality and 'Balkan' can be
seen in this excerpt from an interview with two teenage NGO activists in Beograd:
Darko, a refugee from Zagreb, and Veljko, born and bred Beogra5anin. Darko had just
told me about the enormous differences between city-people and village-people, and
hewent on to say:
Darko: '... and, it's interesting, you know, usually when I think of Bosnia, I don't think of
Sarajevo or Tuzia, but I think of some mountains, where people live who are... who
are totally uneducated, and who are backward. Civilisation has not reached them. And
it's definitely true that the worst war has been there, in Bosnia, exactly where such
people lived.'
Veljko: 'But it would be the same in the South of Serbia, you know... The Southern
mentality - those who lived under the Turks are different from the ones who have a
Habsburg legacy.'
Darko: 'God forbid what it would be like in Kosovo. I mean - another war! When I think of
that... I don't mean anything with this, I don't have prejudices towards Albanians or
anything, but I really think that people there are incredibly uneducated and there is
terrible primitivism there...'
Veljko: 'On both sides!'
[. .
Darko: 'People still live in tribes there, you know.'
Ve!jko: 'Blood feuds and all.'
Stef: 'Have you been to Kosovo?'
Veljko: 'No I haven't. But my girlfriend is from Kosovo...'
Darko: [laughs] 'So she's really primitive!'
Veljko: '... but she is not in touch with them. She knows some Albanians from Kosovo
here in Beograd, but ... no, I have never been there. From her stories and even from
theirs... pfff. And, yes, Albanians and Serbs there are the same really in those terms.'
Darko: 'I never went there either. I asked an Albanian girl from Pritina on a peace camp.
She told me it wasn't really the way we think. But then she was from Pritina, which is
a city of course. She said that they also go out for drinks, they also sit with Serbs and
Albanians together and so on. It's not what you think from TV and all. But on the other
side, my dad, who was there for work, told me that there were shops where only
Albanians bought, and others where only Serbs bought. He said even that at some
point, Albanians walked on one side and Serbs on the other side of the street.
Imagine! The tension... Anyway, he told me there was terrible primitivism there. That
he was in some restaurant and that the waiter came towards him, and he was like,
dressed normally, but his shoes were all muddy, you know [laughs]. Terrible!'
In this way, anti-nationalist Balkan orientalism was intimately intertwined with the rise of
the current regime and with the wars4 . As we have seen in the analysis of discourses
A pattern further complicated by the Kosovo crisis and the NATO air strikes, when many people in Serbia
expressed incredulence at the 'West's' intervening on behalf of Kosovo Albanians, Incredulence because many of
them were Muslims (as opposed to the self-image of 'Christian Serbs'), but also, and I think more importantly,
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on urbanity and rurality, many anti-nationalist narratives centred upon an experience of
the violence and the intolerance as a relapse into primitivism, as a flight from
modernity. Like the label 'peasant', the 'Balkan' notion often served as a blanket term in
descriptions and explanations of this process (see van de Port 1994:103ff). In this view,
'Balkan' patterns had never completely been rooted out in Tito's Yugoslavia but had
always existed under the surface of a modernising, Europeanising discourse. Thus the
horrific violence and what was seen as the blind acceptance of nationalism by
majorities in all republics were understood as a step backwards: 'Balkan' had struck
back, with a vengeance. In an interview, a Beograd artist, who incidentally had an
interest in Byzantine art, explained to me:
'In a way this whole situation is very typical for this Balkan region. People are like in a
huge pub fight. They fight and fight, they break all the glass and destroy all the furniture.
And when everything is destroyed, you have a pile of broken glass. And then they sit on
top of it and they start crying: "Oh why did we do this?"
'Europe', on the other hand, was held up as an ideal and it provided important
discursive material for alternative identification amongst BeogracTani, very often in
combination with an outspoken 'urban' sense of sel. 'Europe', it was argued, was what
was lost in Serbian society during the last decade; it now had to be recovered from
under the ruins of the 'Balkan' hell. By frequently invoking their 'European' identity,
many urban, dissident citizens of Serbia found a way of securing some sort of
continuity in their own biography. The world around them might have gone 'Balkan', but
they had remained who they were. This would also explain the city-nostalgia mentioned
in the previous chapter: there was no end to the stories of what a cool city Beograd
was before.
In this vein, many civil society organisations in Beograd included the label 'European' in
their names and certainly in their programmes and publications. But as we have seen,
this was also the case amongst nationalist parties. As in many other postcommunist
states, being 'for Europe' was something you had to be—whatever it meant.
3. Balkan orientalism in Zagreb
Other than in Serbia, Balkan orientalism was at the very heart of Croatian nationalist
discourses of identity. This doesn't mean that the meaning of the concept was less
diffuse and contradictory in Zagreb. Quite on the contrary, 'Balkan' and 'Europe' were
amongst the most controversial terms in a broad struggle over the legitimacy of
naming, fought on many overlapping levels. This multilayered conflict over definition
took place within nationalist discourses, within anti-nationalist discourses and between
those two.
3.1. Tudman and HDZ: fear of 'Balkan'
Croatian nationalism in the 1990s, I would argue, could not be understood without
reference to the concept 'Balkan'. As a consequence of its position as the ultimate
negative Other, It was central to most variations on the Croatian nationalist theme.This
'Balkan' space was variably filled by different individuals, groups or phenomena. It
could be the Ottoman empire, Islam, or Bosniacs; it could be folk music, a sweaty
forehead, or óevapi; it could be a black moustache, a badly ironed shirt, or Slobodan
MiloeviO. However, by far the most common inhabitants of this space at the heart of
Croatian nationalism were 'the Serbs'.
Croatian nationalist expressions of Balkan orientalism were embedded in a wider
because they were considered 'Balkan peasants', as opposed to the 'European, urban' Beogradani, who were
bombed by their former allies (for a brief discussion see Jansen 2000a:300ff).
5 See Jansen 2001 for a discussion of how this articulation of European-ness and urbanity came about in the 1996-
1997 anti-regime protests.
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discourse of diverging imperial legacies, conflicting cultural heritages, clashing customs
and ideologies and ultimately, incompatible civilisations. In an interview in March 1991,
the Croatian president, Tudman, argued as follows:
'Croats belong to a different culture, a different civilisation from the Serbs. Croats are part
of Western Europe, part of the Mediterranean tradition. Long before Shakespeare and
Moliere, our writers were translated into European languages. The Serbs belong to the
East. They are Eastern peoples, like the Turks and Albanians. They belong to the
Byzantine culture... Despite similarities in language we cannot be together.'
(Cohen 1995:211)
As we saw in Chapter Four, in order to claim national independence on the basis of
irreconcilable cultural differences, Croatian nationalists saw themselves obliged to re-
interpret the nature of the former system drastically. Rather than a multinational state
based on brotherhood and unity, they argued, Tito's creation was an uneasy and
unfeasible attempt to force together a series of clashing cultures in one country. But
Croatian nationalism went further: the clash was uneven, since (at least) one of the
cultures in question was undemocratic and oppressive. Yugoslavia was then depicted
as an imposed regime, a Serbian-dominated conspiracy against the Croatian nation, in
which the Serbs and their allies succeeded in forcing tyranny upon the innocent and
freedom-loving Croats. As we have seen, they had only been able to do so by
employing internal enemies: Croats who were simply not Croatian enough, such as Tito
himself. Furthermore, this wasn't just any tyranny, it was 'Balkan' tyranny. Therefore, it
was un-'European', which by definition implies that it had to be un-Croatian.
Following from this self-identification as definitely not 'Balkan', there was a far-reaching
unwillingness on the part of the Croatian regime to engage in any kind of co-operation
process which was perceived as possibly leading to a 'Balkan' collectivity. In 1997, the
Croatian president proposed a legal amendment which would constitutionally
guarantee that his state would never enter any kind of federation with other South
Slays. Tudman argued that it was 'necessary not only to express politically, but also to
regulate constitutionally, what [was] the resolute and unanimous conclusion of the
struggle of the Croatian people for national freedom and state independence, and that
is: the Croatian people never again in any kind of South Slav community' (Novi List
4/11/97). Note that the same regime was very strongly in favour of joining the
European Union.
Within Croatian nationalism the notion of 'Balkan' referred to the dark times of Yugoslav
communism, but it also served as a label in other divisions (Christianity vs. 'Balkan'
Islam, Catholicism vs. 'Balkan' Orthodoxy, etc.). Obviously this often led to paradoxical
situations, for example in the depiction of 'Balkan' Serbs as atheists (Yugoslav
communists) and as Orthodox (Byzantine nationalists). As in the case of many other
authoritarian regimes, the legitimacy of the HDZ-state was at least partly based on the
idea of a threat, and, like in Serbia, this threat justified the limitation of freedoms. I
would argue that in 1990s Croatia, 'Balkan' functioned as a constant reminder of a
range of perceived threats to sovereignty: national Others (primarily Serbs and also
Bosniacs) and internal enemies.
This resulted in an endless flood of reminders of the 'European' character of the
Croatian nation but, even more prominently, in a generalised depiction of 'Balkan' as
'what we don't want to be'. That idea was condensed in the poignantly straightforward
HDZ electoral slogan 'Tudman, not Balkan' ['Tudman, a ne Balkan']. Few people were
as feverish exponents of the thesis that Croatian identity was absolutely removed from
'Balkan' influences as the president himself. He let no opportunity slip to express the
need for a permanent fear of anything 'Balkan'. On the occasion of one of the few
official visits by a major foreign head of state during the 1 990s—and irony has it that it
was the Turkish president Demirel—Tudman argued as follows:
Q: 'Mister president, Croatia is a Balkan country, but also a European country. How does
that geopolitical situation influence the foreign policy?'
A: 'First I will correct you. Croatia is not a Balkan country, but a Central-European and a
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Mediterranean country. By its civilisational achievements and history it has always
belonged to the Western European cultural circle, and as such it has always been an
integral part of Western Europe. That is the reason why Croatia wants to develop
integrational links with these countries. In relation to the Balkans and South-East
Europe, with whom Croatia borders, we wish to have normal good neighbourly
relations with the countries in the region and with other countries. However, we
emphasise the fact that—even though we agree with and support bilateral relations
and, if possible, common trade and similar projects—we are against any attempt to
integration within a Balkan or South-East European framework.'
(Novi List 22/09/97:9)
In this context, it is possible to understand why in September 1997 most of the regime-
minded media in Croatia virtually ignored the presidential elections in Serbia. When the
results of the first round became known, they only deserved a minor place in the TV
news and in the newspapers, despite their likely impact on the situation in Croatia. In
fact, one of the most successful candidates, Vojislav eelj, still argued for a Greater
Serbia, including large parts of Croatia. Significantly, the Polish elections on the same
day provided headline news. This is how far the state media went to prove that Croatia
belonged to former-communist, pro-'Western', Central Europe and not to the Balkans.
3.2. sweaty armpits and bad haircuts: politicising images of 'Balkan'
Let us now briefly look at two examples of politicised 'Balkan' imagery: a film and an
electoral poster. The first illustration dates from the beginning of 1999, when the long-
expected film Bogorodica ['Mother of God'] opened in Zagreb cinemas. This film about
the war in Croatia, with an impressive cast and ditto budget, painted a highly
dichotomised picture of the conflict, laden with heavy symbolism. Obviously, there was
the title itself, but here I would like to address only one aspect of the symbolic structure
of the film: its play with 'Balkan' images. Throughout the story there were two clear-cut
sides in a village, diametrically opposed to each other. Only at the outset there was a
conflict between two Croatian men about a woman. However, in the face of Serbian
aggression this was, of course, quickly forgotten, and from then on a national
dichotomy was central to the film. On the one hand we had the Croats: good-looking,
lively, Catholic, industrious, loving people who represented a peculiar mixture of idyllic
rurality (working in the sunlit fields together, laughing) and modern urbanity (dress,
haircut, drinking Coca-Cola). On the other hand there were the Serbs: loud, sweaty,
systematically unshaven, unfashionably dressed and drinking large amounts of rak(/a.
At one point, the clear-cut baddies/goodies structure was slightly ambiguated by a
'good' Serb: a fat, moustached, sweaty and badly shaven man who displayed warmth,
openness and humour. However, soon the audience was reminded that these
attractive 'Balkan' features were only seemingly acceptable and that Serbs were really
wolves in sheeps' clothing. In fact, this man turned out to be the worst of all Serbs: he
raped his (Croatian) former best friend's wife and killed her with her child in a symbolic
scene where she represented the Croatian Bogorodica.
Balkan images often overlapped with the spectre of communism as well. A poignant
illustration was provided by a Young HDZ billboard visible across Croatia during the
1997 electoral campaign (Figure Three). When it became clear that the social-
democratic successor party of the communists (SDP) was becoming the greatest
oppositional force, the HDZ aimed its campaign directly at depicting these rivals as
Greater-Serbianists, murderers, unreconstructed communists, etc. The poster in
question showed two former Yugoslav policemen arresting a young man. This was
accompanied by a text which questioned the main 1997 SOP slogan: 'Work and
respect? Think about it and remember'. Above the arrested man's shoulder one could
see a police truncheon. This picture resonated with memories of scenes at football
games in the late Yugoslav years, and the message seemed clear: the SDP-
'communists', the komunjare, were blamed for police arrests and violence in the former
state, therefore for communism, and therefore for the chains that kept the Croatian
nation enslaved in an authoritarian system.
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But there was much more to this poster; I would argue that there was 'Balkan' to it. First
of all, the picture was in black and white, apart from the red star on one of the officer's
caps. The red star emphasised the communist threat but the colour combination also
evoked the perceived backwardness and old-fashionedness which was considered
'typical' for the 'Eastern-European' conditions under which the Croats had been forced
to live. Moreover, the man who was being arrested was wearing a chequered shirt over
a turtleneck sweater, which symbolised his 'modern' look. His hair was also much fairer
than that of the police officers. All this confirmed the message of the poster, showing a
Croat being arrested by ruthless policemen who were, if not Serbian, at least Serb-
controlled.
Figure Three (HDZ Mlade Billboard 1997; photograph taken from Tjednik 11/04/97)
Furthermore, the officers were not just dressed in Yugoslav police uniforms, but they
were also obviously 'Balkan'. None of the two had bothered to button up their shirts,
and their uniforms could do with an iron. Both officers sported unsophisticated haircuts.
One looked away with a shifty look, appearing unhealthy; he had dark, bushy eyebrows
and thick lips. His colleague was not even wearing his cap and his hair, thinning on top,
was messy and sweaty. He hadn't shaved very well, and his face was to a large extent
covered by a thick dark moustache. He looked at the arrested guy with what I'm afraid I
can only describe as a typical arrogant policeman's look. All this meant that he fulfilled
the ultimate stereotype of a rural Serb—he simply was 'Balkan'.
This billboard was part of a HDZ campaign to depict the SDP as a communist 'Balkan'
threat, It recalled what had been triumphantly asserted immediately after their first
electoral victory, when the HDZ journal had said that the coming to power of the party
meant
'The inclusion in the states of Central Europe, the region to which it has always belonged,
except for the recent past when Balkanisms and forcibly self-proclaimed national
representatives have constantly subordinated the Croatian territory to an Asiatic form of
government'
(Bakiá-Hayden & Hayden 1992:9)
3.3. fighting fire with fire: Balkan orientalism vs. the regime
Although all the above illustrations refer to the Croatian regime, it was literally
everywhere in the public domain, and particularly in the media. I would argue that most
of those who were critical of the HDZ-regime, and that was a majority of the population
by the end of my fieldwork period, also subscribed strongly to the above anti-'Balkan'
identification. However, in this process of negative self-definition they added some
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more twists to the story. 'Balkan', it would then be argued, meant not only Yugoslavia,
Serbian domination and communism, but also included the HDZ party state (MatiO
1997:11; Arkzin 14/03/97:2-3). Oppositional narratives would refer to the authoritarian
president, the ongoing corruption, the ceremonial kitsch and, of course, the hard-line
Hercegovci around the president. Let me illustrate the bizarre paradoxes in the
responses to the cramped Balkan orientalism of the regime with two cases.
Firstly, the well-known oppositional columnist Vukov-Oolió (1 998:2) argued in favour of
determined action against Dinko akiO, a former camp commander of the Ustaa
concentration camp in Jasenovac who had recently been extradited by the Argentinian
government. Vukov-olió brought up a number of reasons. Clearly, there was justice to
be dealt with, but he also argued that making a clear stand against akiO would
undermine existing stereotypes about the fascist traits of Croats and lessen the
international pressure on the country. The author's trump card was, yet again, 'Europe':
dealing swiftly in the akiá case would speed up Croatia's much needed entry into
Europe. In this sense, he argued, the case presented an ultimate test for the regime to
choose between 'Europe' and 'Balkan'. Again, we find a variation on the Balkan
orientalist theme: even that most 'European' of crimes—the holocaust—was associated
with anti-'European' tendencies, and therefore, with 'Balkan'.
In a second example, oppositional voices pointed out the contradictory nature of
Tuman's Jugo- and Balkan-paranoia in practice. While anxious to prevent Croatia
from joining any kind of regional co-operation, the HDZ was negotiating a treaty with its
colleagues in the Croatian leadership in Bosnia-Herzegovina for 'special relations' (or
whatever came closest to the original idea of unification, see Novi List 06/11/97). In
Lovriô's words: 'If the president considers it necessary to prevent Croatia, even
constitutionally, from renewing any "Balkan" links, how can he then simultaneously
march bravely into those relations which lead Croatia straight to the Balkan?' (Lovriô
I 997a:2).
What is asserted in these oppositional discourses is a variation on the Balkan
orientalist theme. Yes, the Serbs were seen as 'Balkan'; yes, Croatia was part of
'Europe', but the 'Balkan' policies of HDZ were responsible for keeping Croats from
freeing their true 'European' selves. As in Serbia, we have to take into account that
almost all political parties and socio-political organisations—regime and opposition—
proclaimed to be in favour of 'Europe'.
Negative definition against 'Balkan' stereotypes was a dominant discursive practice in
Croatia, carried out through a systematic cleansing of the public sphere of anything
perceived as 'Balkan' and through heavy pressure to extend this approach to the
private space and to biographies. This was certainly not limited to the domain of party
politics and governmental decision-making. 'Balkan' came to be associated with former
Yugoslavia, with Serbia or simply with anything which was non-'European', non-
'Western', non-modern, non-urban or plainly undesirable. Almost too ethnographically
perfect to be true, the central Zagreb cinema 'Balkan' was renamed into 'Europe'—a
name change that reflected the much wider face-lift the city had undergone since 1990.
Espresso and cappuccino were widely available, whereas the Turkish coffee that most
people drank at home became hard to find in public places. Burek, öevapi and other
examples of 'Balkan' food were increasingly pushed off the main streets by burgers and
pizzas. They were even officially banned from a city festival during my fieldwork.
Narodnjaci, the ultimate 'Balkan' songs, were banned from the radio and from record
shops, and former Yugoslav TV series and films could not be shown. For months after
my arrival from Beograd, some friends of my housemates jokingly referred to me as
'Balkan spy', a reference to a famous Yugoslav film classic made in Beograd.
In an illustration of the omnipresence of the 'Balkan'/'Europe' dualism, Zagreb student
Gordan asked me once: 'Stef, what do people in your country think of Croatia? Do they
think it belongs to the Balkans or not?' (see Herzfeld 1995:21 8). His friend interrupted,
and probably hit the nail on the head, by saying that people there just don't know
anything about it at all. However, Gordan argued back: 'I just asked because here it is
such a big issue: everybody wants to be Europe Europe Europe. So I want to know...'.
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3.4. Zagreb anti-nationalist discourses of 'Balkan'/'Europe'
Like the nationalist discourses it aimed to subvert, Zagreb anti-nationalism was to a
large extent structured around alternative variations of Balkan orientalism. Particularly
established dissident narratives incorporated 'Balkan' as Other when articulating
alternative forms of identification. Often, in their view, 'Balkan' included Yugoslav
communist authoritarianism, but they would also refer to what they considered good
elements of the Yugoslav system. As in the case of Beograd anti-nationalism, this
alternative interpretation of the past took shape particularly in contrast to the war-
mongering, xenophobic and exclusionary present regime. But even when favourably
comparing the multiculturalism of the past with the current nationalism, the term
'Balkan' was often used to refer to the darker sides of Yugoslav times: stupidity,
primitivism, violence and 'lack of culture'—in short, its 'peasant' character.
As in the case of oppositional nationalists, the scope of 'Balkan' was widened to include
the HDZ state, the president, corruption and bribery, hard-line Hercegovci and so forth.
However, on top of this, as the ultimate expression of 'Balkan', these dissident
narratives would name nationalism and xenophobia. Through an articulation with
discourses of urbanity and rurality, this was again linked to primitivism, violence,
patriarchy and lack of education. Everyday life amongst those who developed anti-
nationalist discourses was full of indications of this replication of the regime's Balkan
orientalism, adding the extra layer of defining nationalism as 'Balkan'. For example, the
urban, trendy, oppositional radio station Radio 101 thrived on such jokes and puns.
Clothing amongst human rights monitors, NGO activists and independent journalists,
often reflected the general Zagreb preference for urban chic, and music tastes were
decidedly 'Western'.
In this way, many anti-nationalist narratives undermined the dominant nationalism by
relying upon a variation on the Balkan orientalist theme that was at the very centre of
the discourse they sought to undermine. Obviously, different meanings were evoked
through different discursive practices. For example, although 'Balkan' was a very
important factor in the explanation of nationalism (and therefore to be avoided) there
was much less resistance here to co-operation within a regional, transnational
framework, sometimes even referred to as 'Balkan'. However, their work in 'Balkan
Committees, in regional branches of international organisations and in groups of
former-Yugoslav representatives created networks with individuals from Serbia and
Bosnia who were decidedly non-'Balkan'. These people shared their largely pro-
'European' stance because 'Europe', again, was the ultimate positive pole—the largely
unexplained alternative.
Through a further twist in this carrousel of redefinition, dissidents who brought forward
anti-nationalist discourses were then charged by the dominant nationalism with the
most capital of capital offences in Croatia: Jugonostalg(ja (see Chapter Ten). And, the
irony seems never-ending: in the dominant nationalist discourses, Yugoslavia was of
course conflated with 'Balkan'.
4. Europa, Europa
4.1. the star of Bethlehem--but who's the baby?
Following Carrier (1 995:3) I want to avoid the piffalls of orientalism's counterpart, and
refrain from painting a simplified, essentialised picture of the 'West'. In the post-
Yugoslav context people amply referred to 'zapad' [the 'West'], but a more common
term used to evoke images of 'Western-ness' was 'Europe'. 'Eu(v)ropa', the other pole
of the orientalist dualism, was not much debated, as if it was assumed that everyone
knew what it was6 . Usually 'Europe' was associated with descriptions such as rational,
'Western', modern, organised, urban, developed, democratic, educated, peaceful,
6 Very recently, however, just before the fall of the Iron Curtain, this was different. See Matvejevió 1989.
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individualist, civilised, tolerant and so on. People would often refer to what they called
'world standards' or to 'the developed democracies of the West'. However, the term
'Europe' was more implicitly contested and took on different meanings at different
moments. As in the case of the notion of 'Balkan', there was a dissociation of culture
from geographical place: 'Europe' was a cultural construct evoking a range of desired
qualities, the eternal star of Bethlehem leading the way to the barn of the good life.
Of course, there were some associations with the actual geopolitical context. 'Europe'
often meant Western Europe, or the EU, which as a place certainly played an important
role, since many post-Yugoslays had lived and worked there as guest workers. This led
to numerous tensions and contradictions. 'Europe' was imbued with qualities such as
Reason and Organisation, but the actual European governments were perceived as
behaving entirely unreasonably towards their nation. In both Serbia and Croatia, a
strong nationalist discourse of disappointment prevailed: the EU was seen as favouring
the national Other, while ignoring the undeniable fact that their nation had historically
contributed enormously to that very Europe, and therefore doubtlessly deserved its
place in it (see Jansen 2000a:300).
'Europe' could also be used ironically. This was particularly clear in the discursive no-
man's-land of humour and derision between Serbia and Croatia. Let me first mention
here that most Serbs would admit that Croatia was more 'European' than Serbia, which
they would explain with reference to respective histories of foreign domination and to
physical distance. However, after this admission, there was merciless mockery
precisely of that 'European-ness'. In jokes, Zagrepöani were depicted as pitiable
.treberi ['wannabes'], frenetically aspiring to be more 'European' than Europe. Zagreb
was described as a snobbish, provincial hole that never outgrew its overrated petit-
bourgeois Habsburg legacy. In Serbia and Bosnia it was (also before) a popular sport
to poke such fun at Croatia, and particularly at its capital city Zagreb.
An example of the humour that this presumed snobbery evoked could be found in a
story that some Beograd friends told me. When, in the late 1980s, the multinational fast
food chain McDonalds opened its first branch in Yugoslavia, Zagrepöani were not
pleased with the fact that this was in Beograd. In the story as related to me, people
from Zagreb thought that it should be in their city, and they argued so along the lines of
Balkan orientalism: 'Zagreb is much more "European" and, therefore, has the right to
McDonalds before "Balkan" Beograd'. Soon after, the motorway sign in the Croatian
capital had been updated in the vein of the pre-existing mockery of Zagreb's cramped
'European-ness': instead of 'Beograd X km', it now read 'McDonalds X km'. I didn't see
the sign, and if it was there, I don't know how it was received by Zagrepöani. What is
important to my argument here is the way in which this story linked in with Balkan
orientalism. Moreover, it points to a paradoxical element in the use of the term 'Europe':
McDonalds, obviously, is not a European firm. It should be clear by now that neither
was 'Europe' in post-Yugoslav Balkan orientalism. 'Europe' was always something else.
In dissident, anti-nationalist discourses, 'Europe' was a central notion. Although its
meanings were contested, there was a broad consensus on its status as a metaphor
for a political and civilisational ideal. In the words of the singer Balaevié:
'Today I have the feeling that there are many people who think like me, who want to bring
this country back where it came from and where it wished to belong: Europe. I was born
in, and live in, Novi Sad, a city on the Danube, which also crosses Vienna and
Budapest—I want to belong to that Central Europe, where my ancestors and my family
belonged, and nobody can pull me over to the other side. [...] Novi Sad [is] on the other
side of the border between the Ottoman and the Habsburg empire. I have five hundred
years on my side.'
(Globus 15/01/93:21)
Further on, Balaeviô reinforced this feeling of forced alineation from 'Europe' when he
argued that 'It frightens me that we haven't been able to come to an agreement like
people in Europe, like the Czechs and the Slovaks.' Oppositional discourses frequently
evoked the 'European' example of peaceful co-existence and, particularly, the
supranational structure of the European Union.
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4.2. teaching Europe European-ness: how 'European' can you get?
At this point I would like to briefly throw a light on the debate about 'Europe' amongst
two groups of people in 1990s Croatia. In an exercise of extreme simplification, we
could say that, with regard to the issue of 'Europe', there were two main streams of
nationalist intellectuals in Croatia. One group consisted of explicitly 'Western'- or
'European'-oriented individuals, who saw the successful creation of a national Croatian
state as a completed task. It was now a question of transforming the country into a
liberal democracy. The others were so-called 'nation-building' ['ddavotvorni']
conservatives, explicit right-wingers of the moral majority (Saleci 1994a:20-37), who
argued along strongly nationalist lines. Both groups consisted of intellectuals who
occupied some parts of the public forum. However, importantly, the second group was
much more influential in the 1990s because these people were often very near to the
centres of power (and usually HDZ-members).
Interestingly, both groups attached a very important meaning to 'Europe', and both
emphasised Croatia's 'European-ness' in the face of the un-Croatian 'Balkan'. Both felt
that Croatia was misunderstood in the international community and wrongly blamed for
the sins of 'Balkan' Others. However, whereas the 'liberal-democrat nationalists' argued
that one should convince the EU of Croatia's non-Balkan identity through the further
development of a Western European type of democracy, the 'conservatives' referred
much more frequently to moral issues, to Christianity, and to Catholicism in particular.
Representatives of Croatia's hard right believed that their nation had no lessons
whatsoever to learn from the 'West' and framed the post-Yugoslav conflict in a general
civilisation vs. barbarism discourse.
We have seen before how many post-Yugoslays, in different ways, saw themselves as
somewhat imperfect 'Europeans' (see Herzfeld 1995:219), but with the Croatian
conservative right we have a case of a drastic reversal of such a discourse. Particularly
after the wars, when the 'West' was seen as having failed to help its supposedly natural
ally, Croatia, they felt that more decisive action should be taken. Croatia, they argued,
didn't need the EU, but the EU needed its most 'European' nation (Buden 1996:184-
185). There were lessons to be learned from the Croatian example of heroic liberation,
moral purity, national pride, piety etc. Croats had been sacrificing themselves for
'Europe' long enough now, and the time had come to take credit for this. As Zeljko
StipanoviO argued in 1998: 'Again, the Croatian nation has shed its blood, fighting not
only for its own freedom, but for democracy in the whole of Europe' (Feral Tribune
14/09/98:6). Others claimed that democracy had actually existed in Croatia before it
was introduced in Western Europe (Lovriô 1998). Croatia, it was then argued, was
'Europe' in its pure version—'Europe' as it should be—and therefore, far beyond the
civilisational realm of the current EU, with its decadence, secularisation, rock and roll,
drugs and, of course, multi-cultural promiscuity. 'Croatia is on the whole much more
European than many other Western European countries, with their multicultural Ali-
Baba's and the smell of
	
kebab' (Suniá 1998:47).
5. semi-inversions: Balkan orientalist counterdiscourses
Kunem yam Se, rahmetom ml dedinim
lake se u tu svirku ne razumijem ba
Da nikad niko n!je znao 'armoniku svirat
Kao ma/i lbro, Ibro Dirka na
Kada poãme dernek i kad on zasvira
Ne bi Stigo redi ni bismillah
Veó bi lupo glavom i/ernie bi ãae
Ved bite Ibro bacio u sevdah
Ar ubrzo za Ibru öue Ijudi sa estrade
/ poãee njukati p0 naoj mahali
I swear to you by my buried grandad
Although I don't know that much about such tunes
That nobody ever knew how to play accordion
Like little Ibro, our Ibro Dirka
When the party starts and he plays
You wouldn't manage to say 'In God's name!'
Already heads would bang and glasses shatter
Already, bra would have thrown you into sevdah
But soon showbiz people heard about Ibro
And they started prying our neighbourhood
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Svaki Ibri piôe plaóa
Svaki deset prsta lbrinih hvali
Ibro poãe priãati o parama, o s/a vi
Mi ga odgovarasmo Ibro ne budali
Ti si ne.to drugo
Ti 'armonikom IjeOi bol
Na estradi sve je /a±no
Na estradi sve je fol
And everyone of them paid Ibro drinks
And everyone of them praised Ibro's ten fingers
Ibro started talking about money and about fame
We tried to dissuade him "Ibro don't be stupid
You are something different
You heal pain with your accordion
In showbusiness everything is false
In showbusiness everything is fake"
Zabranjeno Puenje - Ibro Dirka
(from the album Dok öeka sabah sa ejtanom © 1985)
So far, this discussion has focused on the ways in which Balkan orientalism enabled
people with different values and opinions, from different perspectives, in different
contexts, both in Beograd and in Zagreb, to articulate discursive practices of
identification. A constant phenomenon up to this point has been that 'Balkan' was
thereby posited as a negative Other, and 'Europe', on the other hand, always evoked
the positive pole of the same discourse. Obviously, the meanings of these notions were
continually contested and re-evaluated through conflicting practices, but there was no
inversion of the final moral evaluation. Were there no alternative views? Were there no
instances whereby people engaged in what Herzfeld calls 'practical orientalism',
oscillating between what is 'wrong' but familiar, and what is 'right' but uneasy
(1995:220; 1996:96)?
Yes, there were. In this section I explore such cases whereby people evoked Balkan
orientalism in alternative ways. I also look at the possibility of the 'Balkan' theme to be
articulated into more or less subversive attempts to destabilise the discourse that held
up 'Europe' as its ideal. However much 'Balkan' evoked disapproval and rejection in
favour of 'moving towards Europe', there were strong indications that it also constituted
an ambiguous undercurrent in the different post-Yugoslav states (Bakiá-Hayden &
Hayden 1992:13; van de Port 1994, 1996, 1999).
5.1. 'Balkan' as passe-partout
A first, semi-inverted, everyday deployment of the 'Balkan' theme was its widespread
use as a short-cut answer. In many arguments the 'Balkan' factor figured as a passe-
partout, a master-key, fitting many different and potentially hazardous doors. Crucially,
it was used to close these doors rather than to open them and be vulnerable to
whatever was behind them. 'Balkan' as passe-partout was much less prominent in
Zagreb, since 'Balkan' was primarily used to refer to Serbs, but it was certainly present
in Croatia as well. A very basic example occurred when a journalist asked a number of
politicans what the average monthly salary was in Croatia. One HDZ official dismissed
the question by saying: 'That is a Balkan question. Nowhere in the cultured world would
people wonder how much they earn and what the average salary is.' (Slobodna
Dalmacija 11/07/98).
However, more frequently in everyday life, 'Balkan' could be thrown into a conversation
in order to exclude foreigners from the discussion and, particularly, from making a
judgement about events in the post-Yugoslav states (see van de Port 1999). Through
claiming a distinct identity from 'Europe', 'normal' standards would be automatically
suspended, and therefore, no further explanations were deemed necessary: 'It's a
Balkan thing, you wouldn't understand'. Similarly, this argument would be used to
actually explain certain events or behaviour without referring to individual responsibility
('after all, we are all Balkanci'). This was particularly common in relation to irrationality
and work attitudes, and it also allowed one to account for events without analysing
them. 'It's always been like this here,' people would say, 'that's the way our people are'.
This conveyed widespread cynicism about the wars and about the whole post-
Yugoslav situation. Repeatedly people rewrote history sweepingly and told me that
Serbs and Croats have always been fighting each other, thereby consolidating the
notion of the Balkans as the powder keg of Europe.
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In this way, the 'Balkan' element helped to dispel questions of guilt and responsibility.
This process caused many anxieties within anti-nationalist narratives, as illustrated by
the following rant by Dubravka, a Beograd artist whom I interviewed in the theatre
where she worked.
'All that Balkan stuff... I think that's nonsense. People have to find some kind of
explanation... to understand things. Of course, some things are related to the Balkans:
the intermingledness, many states in one space, a geopolitical situation... Certainly these
are real factors, but nothing can be explained all the way by that. You see, I think that it is
some sort of avoidance strategy, some escape. When I tell you I am from the Balkans,
that immediately supposes some kind of attitude. It frees me from some other
responsibilities. And at the same time, it reinforces a global explanation as well. I mean...
it is not Byzantium here in Beograd. Not all Serbs are Orthodox. Not all Croats are
Catholics. Cyrillic is not a sign of something—nor is Catholicism. Everything is so
interconnected... [... ] But the permanent emphasis on the East/West, maybe that is a
Cold War position. Maybe it is created through politics... There are many elements on
one side which are in a way also from the other side... And that space called Balkan... it
won't help a lot in explaining things. [...} The two main actors in the recent horror are two
political parties, SPS and HDZ. And they are primarily responsible. Now everyone wants
to explain this war with reference to some ethnic, religious, I don't know which other
reasons... But that war is really..., how can I say, those kinds of explanation are used by
people to liberate themselves from responsibility. But let me tell you one thing: if
everything here is so primitive, that doesn't account for what happened in Srebrenica!'
However, for most people the situation was less clear-cut. The tension between a
'European' identity and a 'Balkan' self-image had already been prevalent in former
Yugoslavia. Self-stereotyping was common, and Balkan orientalism reflected a
combination of what Herzfeld refers to as 'embarassment and rueful self-recognition',
expressed not just in individual terms, but also as a 'collective representation of
intimacy' (Herzfeld 1996:6). As such, I would follow Herzfeld (1996:28) in saying that
'National embarassment can become the ironic basis of intimacy and affection, a
fellowship of the flawed, within the private space of the national culture.'
On the one hand, most citizens of Yugoslavia had been extremely keen to point out the
differences between them, as a modern country, and the Eastern bloc. However,
simultaneously, there had been a perception that Yugoslavia did not really belong to
'Europe' (see Herzfeld 1996: 89-1 08). A popular former Yugoslav joke illustrated this:
Tito, Nixon and Brezhnev sit in a plane. They decide to bet who can recognise his country
by sticking his arm out of the window. The American president goes first, of course, and
says: 'We are now above the US. I can feel it: the air is clean, the atmosphere is healthy,
the smell of freedom'. After a while it's Brezhnev's turn: 'This must be the Soviet Union.
Clean air, healthy atmosphere, no oppression, everybody equal'. Tito patiently awaits his
turn, briefly sticks his arm out of the window, and immediately sits back again.
'Gentlemen', says the Marshall, 'we are now flying above Yugoslavia'. Nixon and
Brezhnev ask: 'How do you know?'. Says Tito: 'Because my watch has gone'.
The common thread in this field of opposing patterns of identification seemed to be
located precisely in the ambiguity, in the omnipresent tensions between them. On the
way home from a party, Nataa, a Beograd academic, explained her preference for a
certain film director in those terms. She contrasted his work with that of Sarajevan Emir
Kusturica, well-known for films such as 'Underground' and 'Time of the Gypsies', whom
she accused of portraying Yugosla ys as stupid, as wild Gypsies. Kusturica, she
argued, always gave Western European audiences what they wanted: wild and crazy
Balkan people. Interestingly, less than an hour before, I had witnessed the same
Nataa singing, dancing and enjoying herself on a party. The live music consisted of
folk songs from all over former Yugoslavia, including many Gypsy tunes, and while this
was not the case here, it was often Gypsies who performed these songs on such
occasions. I was informed by many different Serbs that their nation, as opposed to
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many Western European ones, was not racist at all. Time and again, this slightly
destabilising statement—certainly in a context of nationalist atrocities—was justified
with reference to the place of Gypsies in their society. Nowhere were the Cigani as
welcome, it was argued, and nowhere were they considered such a constitutive part of
a country as in Serbia.
5.2. Balkan orientalist cou nterdiscourses in Beograd
In Beograd, Balkan orientalist counterdiscourses were obviously present, and became
increasingly so during the NATO air strikes in 1999. Elsewhere I have analysed the
differential deployments of these counterdiscourses, evoking an image of victimised
and rebellious Serbian underdogs (Jansen 2000a). 'Balkan' then referred to a tradition
of defiance of all outside domination. This idea was cherished by all forms of Serbian
nationalism and constituted a central element in nationalist identification amongst many
layers of Serbian society. International sanctions against the FR Yugoslavia and the
widely held conviction that the whole world was against the Serbs only contributed to
this self-perception as defiantly 'Balkan'. In my experience, no words conveyed this so
well as the comment I heard from many people in Serbia, applying a saying widely
used throughout most of the former Yugoslav region to the so-called international
community: 'We tuck their international mother' ['Jebemo im majku meclunarodnu].
Seeking a way out through such a reaction expressed both their current relative
powerlessness and the defiance of any imposed authority that was presumably
characteristic of Serbs. And what could be more 'Balkan' than that?
This was also reflected in the different attitudes of Serbian and Croatian nationalists
towards the horrific violence in the war. In Serbian nationalist discourses, violence,
blood and wamordom were often glorifiecV (Velikió 1992:18). For example, referring to
a popular Yugoslav image of Serbs as lazy Balkanci, Miloevió addressed a crowd in
1991 as follows: 'If we don't know how to work, at least we know how to fight' (Silber &
Little 1995:129). Some rebellious satisfaction was taken from this self-image, although
it was simultaneously argued that Serbs could boast of a history of civilisation which
put any other nation to shame. This was illustrated by the storyline that Serbs already
ate with forks and knives when the rest of Europe still used their hands. In Croatia, the
situation was different: nationalists there fiercely denied the involvement of Croats in
any kind of 'barbaric' violence. Violence belonged to the Balkans, it was argued, an
attitude embedded in a strongly moralistic pro-European civilisational discourse.
Again, even in Serbia, this 'Balkan' self-designation was strongly ambiguous: while
celebrating it in certain contexts, more often people seemed to resent it, at least in the
presence of a foreigner such as myself. Just after my arrival, many people, themselves
Serbs, saw it as their duty to inform me of the pitiable mentality of 'the Serbs'.
Commenting on the socio-economic disaster scenario that Serbia was following, Stevo,
a Beograd student and a 'friend of the house' I shared, cynically remarked during one
of our numerous coffee sessions that Serbs were very different from Croats and
Slovenes. With a self-deprecating laugh he looked me in the eye and said: 'We are
very Turkish, my friend. One hundred percent Turkish!'.
The 'Turkishness' of the Serbs was also often referred to when explaining there
alleged, and often self-proclaimed, lazy work attitudes. 'You can't make Germans out of
Turks', I would be told (see Magid 1991:337). However, only a couple of days after
Stevo's remark, I was reminded of its ambiguous status. I was visiting a church in
central Beograd and a man in his twenties, a complete stranger who'd noticed I was a
foreigner, stormed up to me. Aggressively, he ordered me to have a good look around
so I would realise that 'the Serbs had culture', and that they were not such barbarians
'as claimed on CNN'.
The interesing thing is that these two statements could easily have come from the
same person. Later, well into my fieldwork, I discovered that there was a certain story
ors epIains tricw ths Image of pos fIve ml tar sm and desperate heroism' also existed in 19th century Western
Baukan oiit st repiesentatons of Serb a (1999 23-34).
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amongst many Beogradani, and certainly not only in anti-nationalist narratives, which
was reserved for certain contexts and which strongly opposed the modernisation
discourse of urbanity/civilisation/education (van de Port 1996, 1999). This undercurrent
was usually deployed in a mocking way, relativising other discourses, but it seemed to
serve as an important additional way of understanding and ordering the situation. This
discourse described the Serbian context as some sort of jungle, as a dangerous,
chaotic, violent, unpredictable land populated by wild folk. Stories in this vein often
cropped up when people talked about certain public issues, such as city transport, but
also sometimes in relation to certain traditions. For example, many people chuckled
that, although the Serbs currently proclaimed their Orthodox piety, they were actually
libertarian, even anti-authoritarian believers. After a concert by the Slovenian collective
Laibach, Dordè, himself a singer in a rock band, was very pleased with the speech their
spokesman had given. It had been full of love, Dore stated, and it showed that they
had really understood the Serbs. The point of the speech, he argued, was the same as
what the great spiritual leader Viadika Nikola had said: while the Germans could
perhaps do without God, because they had discipline, the Serbs could not. They
needed God, and they had thought they did not... However, more frequently, I was told
that, unlike the Croats and their Catholicism, Serbs had a mind of their own. They didn't
walk in line, not even in the case of their own national religion. Even Kosovo bishop
Artemije, himself, argued that 'There is no nation in the world which knows less about
its faith than the Serbs' (Republika 01-31/08/97:2).
Seldom in Beograd have I seen people laugh as hard as when they self-deprecatingly
indulged in 'Balkan' narratives. Goran, for example, told me that, when there were
important football matches, the buses, trolleys and trams worked on a different
schedule because all the drivers wanted to see the game. As a result, during half-time,
they raced from one terminal to another, in order to get a seat in front of the next TV
set for the second half. Elsewhere I have elaborated on the role of self-deprecating
humour in Serbian processes of identification, particularly in the outbursts of resistance
in 1996-1997 and 1999 (Jansen 2000a; 2001).
Self-identification of 'the Serbs' as wild, passionate, irrational, irresponsible, slightly
dangerous, not very serious, also implied that they often considered themselves warm,
loving, hospitable and thus likeable. In this way, these counterdiscourses constructed a
Serbian 'Balkan' identity as somehow less articifial, more authentic, more real than
'European-ness' and, crucially, more real than Croatian-ness. In the early days of the
post-Yugoslav conflict, that attitude had set them apart even more from the Slovenes,
who were considered the ultimate 'European' post-Yugosla ys: hardworking, tight with
money, organised, boring. All this, of course, as opposed to stereotypical Serbian self-
perception as lazy (translated into positive terms: 'cunning'), prone to spend ('share'),
unorganised ('nonchalant'), and exciting (parties and fights). With regard to the latter
factor, a joke circulated which said: 'Put two Serbs in a room and you'll have three
opinions'. Also, on several occasions when I had willingly or unwillingly demonstrated
my irrationality, I was approvingly told that 'Balkan' had taken hold of me.
Nevertheless, despite this partial reliance on images of 'Balkan' in a wide variety of
discursive practices of identification in Serbia, I found very few instances whereby
'Balkan' themes were used as a positive subversive tool in anti-nationalist narratives. In
fact, counterdiscourses of 'Balkan' were largely left out of attempts to destabilise the
present regime and Serbian nationalism. This could be partly explained as a result of
two interrelated factors: firstly, it would potentially contradict the centrality of a pro-
'European' discourse within critiques of nationalism and war; and secondly, 'Balkan'
was only a limited source of ammunition, as it simply wasn't such a sensitive issue for
Serbian nationalism at all.
5.3. Balkan orientalist counterdiscourses in Zagreb
We have seen how, in Zagreb, dominant nationalist discursive practice engaged in a
systematic cleansing of the public space of anything perceived as 'Balkan'. It was also
considered desirable to carry out a similar purge of the private sphere. Most
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oppositional discourses functioned along similar Balkan orientalist lines, and there were
few signs that a strong equivalent of the Balkan counterdiscourses in Serbia existed.
However, some 'Balkan' things simply proved irresistible for many Zagrepöani, and in
this sense I did find a web of ambiguous undercurrents in Zagreb. Many people in
Croatia, I believe, including many of those identifying along the lines of the dominant
nationalist discourse, missed 'Balkan' to a certain extent. This could be partly explained
with reference to what I would call the forbidden-fruit-effect: the more extreme the
regime's anti-'Balkan' tirades, the greater the temptation.
These 'Balkan' patterns were rarely prominent. In public, people would sip their
espressos and loudly proclaim their 'European' preferences, but in their own kitchens,
most stuck to their Turkish coffee. Foods considered 'Balkan', such as burek and
evapi, were still widely consumed, and Yugoslav and recent Serbian records and
videotapes circulated under the counters of otherwise 'nationally correct' shops.
Although some of those products, especially some Serbian films, carried messages
which were explicitly subversive of the Croatian nationalist doxa, we should not
necessarily read all those practices as signs of resistance. Often, it was simply a matter
of continuity: people got on with their lives and, particularly on the everyday level, they
continued doing things the way they had done them before anyway.
'Balkanisms' that slipped through the nets of 'Europeanisation' emerged particularly
frequently in pop culture. A poignant example was provided by the most popular song
and same-named album during my fieldwork period: Darko Rundek's Apokalipso.
Rundek was an icon of the 1980s YU-rock scene, a period which for some people,
particularly those in their late twenties and early thirties, represented the 'golden years'
(see the chapter on Jugonostalgija). I attended a gig by him in March 1998. The
audience consisted mainly of this generation, with most people singing along to all the
songs—both old and recent ones. Rundek, an explicit critic of nationalism, interspersed
his songs with cynical, black humour and presented the crowd with his subtly
subversive messages. His single Apokalipso, a best-selling record at the time,
incorporated undeniably 'Balkan' elements, which was extremely unusual in the Zagreb
context. 'Balkan' life was evoked both musically, through rhythms, wild violins and
trumpets, and textually, through tickling people's 'Balkan' imagination with references to
Gypsies, sweat, alcohol and noise.
When asked for his nationality, another Croatian YU-rock star, Branimir D±oni Stuliô
proclaimed that 'it [was] better to be the first Balkanac than to be the last Yugoslav'
(Arkzin 06-93:36). His old band was called Azra, a Bosnian girl's name and the title of
one of the most famous Bosnian sevdalinke (folksongs of love, sorrow and longing).
One of Azra's greatest 1980s hits was called ... Balkan, in which Doni sang: 'We are
Gypsy people' ['Mi smo Ijudi Cigan?]. This was the more remarkable, since the singer
could boast serious street credibility built on a rebellious political image and a rock'n'roll
all-inclusive lifestyle. The song's chorus went:
Balkane Ba/kane Ba/kane moj 	 [Balkan, Balkan, my Balkan]
Budi ml silan, I dobro ml stoji 	 [Be powerful to me, and suit me well]
In 1998, I attended a punk festival near the Istrian town of Pula, an alternative May Day
celebration. The scene was not unlike any other small music festival: improvised
barbecues everywhere, children playing, juggling, loud music and plenty of alcohol.
Unusually, one of the bands had come from Serbia, and a Zagreb punk approvingly
noted that they even used trumpets. In Croatia, he complained, they always tried to be
more European and ended up falling in between: not in Europe and not in the Balkans.
Croats always ended up with a sanitised version. Always too neat. Never the real thing.
Serbian bands, he said, just used these things to their advantage and they succeeded
so much better in getting the feel, the energy. The next day I met the same man again,
and he described his night in lyrical terms. There had been drumming everywhere.
Booze had been abundant and people had danced all night, freaking out. The noise
had never stopped, he said, now that had really been 'Balkan'!
In an interview I asked Ivana, a Serbian girl from Zagreb, what the notion of 'Balkan'
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meant to her. She first laughed, looking at me as if there was a catch in my question,
and then she said:
'For me Balkan is... it's one great piss-take ['zajebancjja']. When I think of Balkan, I think
of good food, and a lot of it. I think of a lot of drinking, dancing like mad and so on. That,
for me, is Balkan. It is great fun [super zabava']. One great joke. It's fabulous.'
In some cases, precisely because of the regime's paranoia with regard to non-
'European' elements in the country, those evocations of 'Balkan' were deployed in
explicitly subversive ways. This was a marginal phenomenon, which existed on the
alternative fringes of Croatian society, such as for example in the publication Arkzin
(see also Buden 1996:21, 46-51, 148).
5.4. 'Balkan' and bimbo's: the turbofolk factor(y)
5.4.1. narodnjaci and the post-Yugoslav roller coaster
To the sheer horror of some, and to the excitement of others, newly-composed folk
music ['novokomponovana narodna muzika'] became one of the defining factors of the
1990s post-Yugoslav popular culture scene. This controversial phenomenon, otherwise
known as narodnjaci or, in its faster varieties, turbo folk, revolved around a musical
style. However, it also constituted a whole universe of meanings which were intimately
related to the rise of nationalism and the wars and concentrated particularly in Serbia.
Turbofolk was heavily synthesised pop music, based on vaguely 'oriental' rhythms (see
Vidió-Rasmussen 1995; Dragievió-eiá 1994). Its stars ['folk zvezde'J were more
often than not, scarcely dressed, long-legged, heavily made up young women, and the
lyrics, limited as they were, mainly spoke about love lost and won. Just before the
disintegration of Yugoslavia, this music had been extremely popular in the different
republics and had constituted a cultural and commercial phenomenon on a federal
level (Ugreiá 1995;175-179).
However, during the wars, many narodnjaci addressed political themes ranging from
patriotism to national pride, plain hatred and violence. Although a nationally
reformulated version was developed in Croatia (Gall 1998c:51), turbofolk was much
more outspoken and powerful in Serbia. Folk circuses travelled around with nationalist
leaders and paramilitary warlords and accompanied them to the top of Serbian society.
Their incredibly popular music took over virtually the whole music industry, and folk
zvezde figured as a celebrity elite in Serbian society (De Volkskrant 19/11/94:7). The
most famous was a young woman called Ceca, who married paramilitary commander
and mafioso Arkan.
If turbofolk filled up venues, frontpages and record shelves all over Serbia—and more
covertly in other post-Yugoslav states—it also figured as the phenomenon that many
people loved to hate. The oppositional radio station B92 explicitly prided itself on never
ever playing one single narodnjak in its whole existence (Feral Tribune 29/04/98:38-39;
Novi List 08/11/97). Even before I knew what turbofolk was, several people drew my
attention to the fact that it did not figure in the otherwise very musical demonstrations
against Miloeviá in 1996-1997. As I have written elsewhere, the sound track to this
wave of dissent was a curious mixture of rock, techno and ... 'Balkan' brass Gypsy
music (Jansen 2001).
Also in everyday life, many Beogradani used every opportunity to distance themselves
from turbofolk as far as possible. This was particularly the case amongst urban,
opposition-minded people, who subscribed to non- or anti-nationalist ideas. Turbofolk
was so linked up with the developments of 1990s Serbia that for many critics it
provided a condensed version of 'all this shit'. No day went by without someone
deploring the popularity of turbofolk. People complained that its stars shamelessly
cashed in millions while the rest of Serbia was on the brink of starvation, that they were
not musicians but busines people exploiting a fashion for profit, that producers had
jumped on the bandwagon and pushed other music out of the market, and so on. More
importantly, Beogradani expressed their horror at its symbolism, its disgusting lyrics,
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its brainless tunes and its sexist images. In short, I would argue that turbofolk was an
extremely unwelcome reminder of 'Balkan' primitivism in the field of popular music,
which was considered 'modern' and 'Western' by many. This was expressed in a song
'Narodnjaci' by the well-known oppositional chansonnier Dore Balaeviá, which
deplored the rise of turbofolk (1998:100):
'Rapidno stasa hibridna klasa
na pola puta selo-grac!
BalaeviO later stated in an interview:
'A hybrid class rapidly coming of age
halfway between the city and the village'
'What does me in, fatally, is when I see kids from asphalt, urban kids who were born in a
metropolis, sing narodnjaci and turn to that primitive, oriental music which I abhorred all
those years.'
(Globus 15/01/93:21)
The turbofolk phenomenon, and particularly the role it played in anti-nationalist and
other critical narratives, brings us back to previously mentioned patterns of
(dis)continuity and loss. People would complain that due to their country's isolation they
had been unable to follow good music from abroad for many years now. They argued
that although in the 1980s YU-rock had been as good as any 'Western' music, now
musical taste in Serbia was going down the ditch. They assured me that ten years ago
nobody would be caught dead near this so-called music, but that it had become ultra-
popular as part of the war-mongering policies of the regime.
The meaning of turbofolk in terms of loss and discontinuity became particularly clear in
a conversation with Tatjana, who had left for Western Europe with her husband and
children just before the war—and never returned. Tatjana was from a Croatian Beograd
family, and her husband from a Serbian one, but they both thought of themselves
primarily as Yugoslays. She was a highly educated professional, but had been unable
to find a job at her level even a decade after emigrating. Tatjana was the first person
who told me about turbofolk, and every time I met her afterwards, she expressed her
aversion of narodnjaci and everything they stood for. To her, turbofolk and the
kafanska kultura she associated it with, provided a painful metaphor for things gone
wrong, both in her biography and on a larger level.
As a self-consciously urban, well-educated, well-travelled, ambitious, relatively well-off,
'cultured' woman, she felt spat out by the country where she had lived all her life.
Yugoslavia disappeared and Miloevió's Serbia could no longer function as a home to
her. Her old world abruptly came to an end, and turbofolk was the icon of the new
Serbia. It was xenophobic and violent, but also cheap, kitsch, loud, tasteless, vulgar—
nothing like her home as she wanted to remember it. Most importantly, it was blaring
out of speakers everywhere, and you could not possibly escape it. It was like an
infection, Tatjana said, sweeping through the country, all the way to its smallest
corners.
5.4.2. the strange life of narodnjaci in Zagreb
In the 1990s, travelling from Beograd to Zagreb was an interesting exercise in cultural
geography. In many ways it constituted a journey from an imagined 'Balkan' to an
imagined 'Europe'. In the buzzing, chaotic bus station of the Serbian capital packed
with Gypsy musicians looking for work, food stalls and a whole series of other kiosks,
two sounds were hard to escape. First of all, moneychangers approached travellers
whispering 'devize, devize', and secondly, competing tape sellers turned up the volume
of their stereos—almost always selling turbofolk. Once you'd boarded an old,
dilapidated bus 8 (if there was one), you could bet your money that the driver would tune
8 Ironically, this often led people to jokingly evoke a former Yugoslav film classic Ko to tamo peva?, in which a group
of people travel to Beograd in an old wreck of a bus. On numerous occasions in the 1990s I heard people refer to
buses as Krstid', the name of the transport firm in the film.
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in on a station that would play non-stop narodnjaci. At the border crossing, differences
became clear straight away: a basic shed on the Serbian side, a newly painted blue
construction on the Croatian one. New, seemingly freshly ironed Croatian flags
contrasted with ragged Yugoslav ones (and even more with hardly recognisable, faded
UN flags). The Serbian bus dropped you off in no-man's-land, and there would be a
Croatian one waiting for you. Now, as if this was all done on purpose, in my
experience, the coaches serving the line from the border to Zagreb were always the
most modern and comfortable ones in the whole of Croatia: no engine noises, air-
conditioned, clean, with a driver wearing a suit. And, to come back to the point of
music, never ever any turbofolk but usually some (dare I say, more German-Austrian
sounding?) domestic musical products of similar imagination and sophistication.
It won't come as a surprise that the Croatian nationalist discourse not only deemed
turbofolk entirely unacceptable, but also fought it as a virus far more dangerous than
HIV. Although before the disintegration of Yugoslavia narodnjaci were popular amongst
a wide audience all over the former state, the new regime of independent Croatia
waged a campaign to ban them from the media and from what was called 'Croatian
culture' in general. Musical qualities (or the lack of them) were not the major issue here,
since they were replaced by musical products of an equivalent sort. The reason for the
fear of turbofolk was the idea that it 'belong[ed] exclusively to the Serbian (un)cultural
identity. Serbs, and not Croats, worship narodnjaci, which [was] another proof of their
primitivism, their culturally less worthy national character, their Balkanism, etc.' (Buden
1997b:48). So, while turbofolk was sold in street markets and under the counter of
record shops and quite a number of people kept a selection of tapes in a drawer, the
public attitude in Zagreb was one of aversion.
However, the situation was changing during my stay, as illustrated in 1998 when Lepa
Brena, one of the first turbofolk stars, a Bosnian woman who'd since moved to
Beograd, visited Zagreb for the first time since the break-up of Yugoslavia. Whereas
official reactions by the regime and by the nationalist cultural elite were predictably
negative (Gall 1998c:51), others started interpreting it differently. A very unusual but
interesting voice came from Boris Buden, a cultural critic who'd moved to Vienna (of all
places) and who explicitly welcomed the return of narodnjaci. He described their re-
emergence in the Croatian context as a liberation of 'cultural vitality, dynamism,
expressive inventiveness, spontaneous eroticisation of the ideologically subliminal,
cultural anti-elitism, democratic elements, libertarian passion' (Buden 1997b:49). While
it seems hard to imagine someone like Buden himself as a great fan, his point
obviously needs to be contextualised politically. Narodnjaci had returned through the
backdoor, from the underground, from the fringes of an attempt to create a discrete
national Croatian culture. Buden went further, and optimistically argued that this meant
a possible reclaiming of 'Balkan' in a liberating way:
'The Balkan inn, liberated from the pressure of the elitist hypocrisy and self-pitying
culture-pessimistic outrage is shown here in its best light—as a positively charged
metaphor which suggests emancipation, and, even in the midst of Balkans, the female
one. Against this background of lively cultural identification which fully establishes the
continuity with the past and a connection with the future the ideologically motivated
project of a forceful division of national cultures comes as pitiful and base.'
(Buden I 997b:50)
5.4.3. 'Balkan' in Zagreb: from demon to exotic?
Throughout this study, I have argued that Croatian nationalism engaged in the
construction of a discrete national culture through the demonisation of its national
Other. Its Serbian counterpart embarked on a similar campaign but, due to its different
nature, in a far less outspoken and strongly ambiguous manner—particularly with
regard to the Yugoslav legacy. As we have seen, during and immediately after the war
in Croatia, both regime policies and many everyday narratives rested upon the banning
of everything perceived Serbian. Serbs and 'Serbian culture' were demonised, as were
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most phenomena deemed 'Yugoslav', because they were seen as Serbian-imposed.
From the hybrid Yugoslav configuration, everything not purely Croatian needed to be
surgically removed like a cancer.
This phenomenon has been amply analysed and commented upon by others (see for
example Drakuliá 1993a; Slapak 1993; Ugreiá 1993, 1995), but in this section I would
like to throw a critical light on a related pattern. Interestingly, the process of cultural
discretisation and demonisation of national Others opened a range of other
possibilities. This happened as follows. First, all evidence of hybridity and non-
discreteness needed to be removed; the absolute difference between Croats and
national Others needed to be sufficiently proven and materially established through
ethnic cleansing and a range of other policies. Once it was widely accepted as dogma
that Serbs (including the hundreds of thousands who'd lived in Croatia all their lives)
and Croats (including those who'd lived, for example, in Serbia) were essentially
different from each other and constituted two discrete nations, the first signs of a new
development emerged. I would refer to this process slowly and timidly arising in certain
sectors of Croatian society during my stay with the term 'exoticisation'.
I am certainly not suggesting that the dominant attitude towards 'Serbian culture' and
its presumed representatives had changed substantially since the war, but I do believe
that there were small signs of beginning patterns of exoticisation. For example, in 1998,
a large state-sponsored 'Music and Dance Festival of the Ethnic Minorities in Croatia'
was organised in Zagreb. The performing groups included Serbs, who displayed a
taste of their folklore in the presence of high HDZ representatives. Likewise, lvana, a
Serbian Zagrepöanka, told me in an interview that it became increasingly common for
people to walk into the Serbian Orthodox church in the city centre. They had a look
around 'as if it were a tourist attraction'. She also informed me:
'It seems that for some, listening to Serbian rock bands has become a fashion in Zagreb.
Only so they can be different from the rest, you know. When something is forbidden, it is
always more attractive. I have been to parties where nothing but Serbian bands were
played. Officially you can't buy them in the shops, but under the counter, you know... It's
funny but I often get the tapes from Croatian friends, who got them before me!'
Still, non-Croatian former Yugoslav or recent Serbian pop music seemed to remain
absent from the airwaves. Concerts in Croatia by Serbian bands were exceptional and
largely confined to the region of Istria—and even they caused major debates. But the
music industry found its way around this problem; and a small Slovenian town right on
the Croatian border unexpectedly became a Mecca for fans, as many gigs by Serbian
bands were organised there. Whereas some years before it would have been
unthinkable in Zagreb to see posters advertising those concerts, it was now becoming
quite common and tickets could be bought from private agencies in town. There was a
vehement reaction against this by the Young HDZ, but it seemed to have little effect.
The acceptability of 'Serbian culture' in other spheres was still channelled through the
nationalist prism of discreteness. I have mentioned before how in 1998 the first Serbian
film to be officially distributed in independent Croatia was released with Croatian
subtitles9 , as if to say 'we can watch their film, but it has to be made clear that it's
theirs!'. This confirmed a general trend whereby exoticised Serbian popular cultural
phenomena were slowly seeping through, whereas anything which could remind
people of the existence of a hybrid Yugoslav past was still prohibited (see Gall
1998d:51; Jergoviá 1999:51).
Hence, I would argue that, precisely because of the blurred hybrid nature of certain
domains of the Yugoslav cultural space, radical policies of discretisation were needed
to exorcise the Other out of the Croatian self. Of course, I do not wish to deny the
enormous role of the war and the pattern of events that it set in motion through sheer
performativity. However, I believe that the extreme nature of Croatian nationalist
See the section on language to understand the dimensions of absurdity we are talking about here, Most people
who were older than, say, 20 in 1998 had watched films from Beograd since their childhood—and nobody had ever
needed subtitles (by the way, Zagreb actors sometimes played major roles in them).
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exorcism should at least be partly understood in relation to the relative absence of self-
evident boundaries between 'them' and 'us' (and Serbian nationalism dealt with this in
its own, entirely contradictory way). Constructing a bounded national culture was never
going to be straightforward if nobody knew what exactly was 'ours' and what was
'theirs'. Therefore, demonisation had to preceed exorcism, but it also opened the
possibility of a slow, minor process of exoticisation. This did not mean a step back from
the discretisation programme but rather a further step in constructing different cultures
and establishing the boundaries between them10 . In this sense, these are semi-
subversions of Balkan orientalism. Not only are they partial and temporary, but most
importantly, for most people 'Balkan' does not lose its negative connotations in the
process. Rather, they are consolidated and exoticised.
5.4.4. 'Balkan' and the aesthetics of distancing in Beograd
I have argued before that, for a variety of reasons, the notion of 'Balkan' was rarely
taken up in an explicitly subversive manner as an anti-nationalist source. 'Europe' was
the label for the desirable. Flirting with anything 'Balkan' usually did not find a place in
anti-nationalist narratives, as it was simply considered incompatible with a critical and
civic attitude. There were some people who incorporated 'Balkan' in a more positive
way in their anti-nationalist discourses: they praised its variety, its intercultural mixture,
its colourful images. In some cases this was an accurate expression of their lives,
straddling the ambiguities of 'Balkan' and 'Europe'. A love/hate relationship seemed to
emerge which hovered between the warmth, passion and intensity of 'Balkan', and the
rationality, organisation and peace of 'Europe' (as illustrated by van de Port 1996,
1999). However, unlike what the latter's analysis seems to suggest, I hope to have
made clear that I do not see this as a typical Serbian thing. Rather than being part of
the essential character of 'the Serbs', I would argue that the tension between 'Balkan'
and 'Europe' functioned variably in discursive practice and sometimes in obviously
strategic and reflexive ways.
Of course, such tensions exist on a much wider human scale, and it is certainly not my
intention to argue that they can only emerge as a 'Balkan'/'Europe' modality. What I
want to get at here is something else: it struck me that the few people who were
involved in anti-nationalist dissidence and who would explicitly name 'Balkan' in
positive ways premised this understanding on a clear sense of distance. More often
than not, those people would be well-travelled, urban intellectuals and almost none of
them actually lived that 'Balkan' dimension. Rather, they would strategically weave
'Balkan' orientalist counterdiscourses into a critique of nationalism and thereby reclaim
some of its power, without being tainted by its negativity.
It is understandable, I would argue, that this position was more frequently occupied by
exiled post-Yugoslays and foreigners (Ugreió 1995:166-196; Rasza 1997a, 1997b).
To a certain extent, it was easy for them (should I say us!?) to incorporate positive
'Balkan' elements; there was no danger of being implicated in the process. Irony, while
it is not strictly limited to those in dominant positions (Rapport 1999), still oftenemerges
as a luxury of those who can distance themselves at will.
An illustration of this tension was provided in the Summer of 1997, when I decided to
go to the Guëa festival. This was a yearly event, bringing together the best trumpet
bands from all over Serbia for three days of ... well, 'Balkan'. Guëa was famous for its
loud and wild brass music, generously sprinkled with greasy food and loads of alcohol.
It was also a yearly outburst of Serbian nationalist euphoria and provided an insight
into some of the excesses of the war economy, with politicians, war profiteers and
mafiosi (find the differences) conspicuously spending a fortune on drink and music. Not
much for a thesis on anti-nationalism, then, but there was something else: it was also,
reputedly, great fun. An extract from my field notes situates my plan to attend this event
within an urban-civic context.
10 It is therefore not a coincidence, I believe, that signs of this process of exocisation were most outspoken in
Slovenia. See the chapter on Jugonosfalgija.
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When I tell them that Im going to the festival in Guëa, some people react very
negatively—as I expected. But the vehemence of their reactions is shocking. Sneana
called to invite me for a party during the weekend. I explained to her that I couldn't make
it because I was going to Guëa. Her voice shrieked as she reacted: 'No...! You are not
going to that festival, are you? That's such a terrible event!'. And later: 'Well.., anyway...
have a nice time there, although I am sure that won't be the case....'
Aleksandar reacted with similar disbelief. 'Guöa? Really? Are you serious?' I told him I
thought it sounded like great fun. 'Well I suppose it must be interesting when you're a
foreigner', he answered sceptically, 'and of course, it is a great case for an anthropologist.
It's pretty exotic. I must say it's a step I wouldn't make easily....'
Last night before Guëa! Had a drink with Aleksandar, Nataa, Tanja and Marko.
Repeatedly, they brought up the topic of my going to the festival. Everybody laughed,
shaking their heads in disbelief. Tanja said that eelj will be satisfied with my going
there and calls me the only true Serb in the company. Again, it was emphasised that I am
an anthropologist [whereas usually I was referred to as a sociologist]. No matter how
often I explained that I am going for fun—not for professional reasons at all—Aleksandar
argued that anthropology has become a matter of personal interest for me. Whatever, I
do want to go. I can't wait.
Everything I had heard about Guëa was true, and more. Anyway, the possibility for
foreigners or other relative outsiders to dip into 'Balkan' phenomena without being
contaminated was something that came up on other occasions as well. On a visit to
Novi Sad, I went out for drinks with a bunch of young people that I knew from a
Summer School. Ceca, a young woman who worked in a local NGO, told the group that
she knew a foreign girl who wanted to carry out an anthropological study of a village in
Vojvodina. 'Can you imagine?' she exclaimed as the whole party burst out laughing.
Even after she had told this anthropologist about the actual situation in those villages
('There's nothing there!'), Ceca said, the girl had still wanted to do it. This story led to
general hilarity and a new round of drinks.
On a number of occasions, I noticed how an interesting pattern arose whereby self-
proclaimed urbanites who cherished their modern 'European-ness' would allow 'Balkan'
phenomena to enter their everyday lives. This was rather unusual in these circles, and
a process of filtering was crucial to it. After having been othered into a distant, exotic
'Balkan' category, certain things would then be packaged as 'Western' and re-imported,
as it were (a peculiar case of Herzfeld's 'practical occidentalism' (1995:222)). In this
way, some people who were very much part of an urban cultural elite did actually listen
to certain kinds of music which were undoubtedly considered 'Balkan', such as
Macedonian folk songs or Gypsy tunes. However, most albums of this kind that made it
into their living rooms were produced and distributed by West European or North
American 'world music' labels. This resulted in a paradoxical situation whereby people
would scorn certain types of music from their own backyard until it was taken up by,
say, Peter Gabriel, brought out on a major label in Western Europe or North America
and re-imported through the front door.
A rather extreme example was provided by Dora, a Beograd woman who, like her
husband, was an artist and a self-proclaimed urban 'European'. Dora had lived in a
Western European city for many years and was enthousiastic about the
multiculturalism there. On my arrival, she complimented me on my 'ethnic' shirt, which
she could immediately place as made in Guatemala (although she didn't know it was
from a reject shop in Aniwerpen because some buttons were missing). Her large
record collection contained quite a lot of 'world music' and, although many of the
albums could be bought for about £1.50 in pirate CD stalls in Beograd, she had
carefully left the price tags on—in West European currencies. Let me spell out the
paradox: Dora had some albums on her CD-shelf with music she would despise if she
heard it at a wedding in Southern Serbia, a non-existing risk, because she would never
go there. The point is not that these albums were there, but that they had, via a West
European or North American record label, become an expression of her very
'Eu ropeaness' I
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6. Balkan orientalism, familiarity and strangeness
6.1. the stranger within oneself
In line with Said's understanding of orientalism, it is clear that we are dealing here with
the construction of a 'Balkan' other which allows for negative self-definition. Two
positions were constructed and essentialised through Balkan orientalism, which, like in
Said's work, should be seen as a thoroughly moral discourse. However, the situation
becomes more complicated if we take into account the fact that Balkan orientalist
discourse was enunciated from a position which did not equal the real, existing
'Europe'. Topographically, the Balkans are part of Europe, and every post-Yugoslav I
met saw her/himself very much as a 'European', even those who also thought of
themselves as Balkanci. Therefore, in the case of post-Yugoslav Balkan orientalism
'Europe' and 'Balkan' were inextricably linked and spilled over into each other (see
Herzfeld 1985; 1995:220).
Hence, while at times vigorously constructing themselves as different from 'Balkan',
many post-Yugoslays felt to a certain, variable extent part of this Other (Kristeva
1988:11, 150-151, 268). Perhaps Balkan orientalism sometimes took on such a
vehement, outspoken character, because the Other was somewhat more 'within',
because it could not be taken for granted that one was not 'Balkan'. This would also
partly explain why this discourse was most strongly developed in Croatia, and only
partly so in Serbia, mainly as part of anti-nationalism. An illustration could be found in
the Croatian reactions against the South-East European Co-operation Initiative (SECI)
in 1997. SECI was an American-sponsored programme for economic co-operation,
involving billions of investment dollars in a number of states. The HDZ-regime flatly
refused to join the initiative since it would mean a throwback to 'Balkan'. Note that apart
from Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Albania, Greece, Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria,
and Moldavia, SECI also comprised Hungary and Slovenia. Apparently, in those two
countries, which constituted exemplary Central-European states for many Croats, the
fear of 'Balkan' was less of an issue. The most interesting thing was that many of those
who argued in favour of joining SECI did so along equally Balkan orientalist
justifications: Croatia should join ASAP, in order to re-integrate into Europe. As one
commentator stated, 'its only alternatives are: isolation and Balkan' (JakovljeviO 1997).
If the 'Balkan' Other was located partly within, this can also help us to understand why
'Europe' was always constructed at least partly outside oneself. Both in Zagreb and in
Beograd I came across situations whereby 'Europe' was simultaneously located inside
and outside. An example came from Stevo, our Beograd friend-of-the-house who had
called the Serbs a Turkish people. He later accused the 'West' and, therefore
presumably, me (willy-filly the nearest representative of all things 'Western') of
imposing 'Balkan' stereotypes upon the Serbs and ignoring the obvious truth that they
were part of 'Europe'. A moment later, however, he told me he was going to buy a
certain book the next time he went 'in Europe'.
Not only was 'Europe' constructed partly within and partly outside, but it was also often
'purified'. An idealised image arose, clearly distinct from the real existing Europe, and
especially from the European Union. This relentless pro-'European' discourse did not
necessarily entail an idealisation of concrete European states, which were often seen
as unfair and unreasonable—unreasonable! How un-'European'! Clearly real existing
Europe didn't live up to its image. Again, this links in with the previously mentioned
superiority that many post-Yugosla ys felt towards the citizens of ex-Warsaw Pact
states. 'We can't be fooled into adoring "the West" by advertisements,' so the story
went, 'because, unlike them, we know and have always known what the real Europe is
like'.
However, in Balkan orientalism, by equating 'Europe' with a number of desirable
societal qualities and particularly individual characteristics, it was detached from its
planetary location and entered the world of metaphor. 'Europe' then became that
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dimension of one's self, of one's country, of one's culture, which was mainly
characterised by its difference from 'Balkan'.
6.2. 'Balkan' and 'Europe' on both sides of normality
I am not a psycho-analyst, and I certainly don't want to make any claims concerning,
say, the post-Yugoslav mentality11 . What I wish to do here is to relativise some of the
insights of this chapter. Unlike what one might conclude from the above, most people in
Serbia and Croatia did not feel uneasy with, let alone burdened by, the
'Balkan'/'Europe' dualism. In most cases it was something they were aware of, a part of
the place and the times they lived in, a more or less unimportant element in their
biography. Let me place this into context by referring to two unusual patterns.
First of all, I would like to mention the case of the ultra-nationalists, those who had
opted against 'Europe'. These people glorified militarism, war heroism and
traditionalism, all within the framework of a national culture. It was usually the Serbian
national culture because, as we have seen, extreme nationalists in Croatia tended to
construct a position for themselves as more 'European' than Europe. But Vojislav
eelj, for example, former paramilitary leader and then a member of the Serbian
coalition government, made his electoral success on the basis of celebrations of
irrationality and rebellious Otherness 12. He regularly renewed his Greater Serbian
pledges ('Serbia and Germany will border each other again'); he indulged in war-
mongering of the worst kind ('We'll scoop out the Croats' eyes with rusty forks'); and he
derided the West ('They don't let me in in Den Haag, because I would take the Tribunal
to pieces') (Nedeinji Telegraf 24/07/96). Mattijs van de Port developed this point in his
provocative work on 'obstinate otherness' (1996; 1999). 'In order to get attention for the
Serbian cause,' he argues, 'they had to embody the idOe recu about Serbs as
unpolished savages. To be recognised as European, they had to play the role of
barbarian' (1 996:35). This allowed people like eelj to simultaneously add a touch of
superiority: 'The rude Balkan-barbarian exposes the European as a degenerated and
debilitated weakling' (van de Port 1996:38; see also 1994:308-316). Clearly, these
examples represented exactly the worst excesses of 'Balkan' for many other people,
and particularly for those developing anti-nationalist alternatives.
A second unusual pattern existed amongst individuals in the post-Yugoslav states who
engaged explicitly in anti-nationalism without replicating the 'Balkan'/'Europe' moral
dualism. Rather, they recognised the tensions within 'Europe', through association with
an array of subcultures of resistance, such as youth subcultures, the Green movement,
pacifism, and feminism—undercurrents of West European modernity. Through their
alternative attitude, these people rejected the constitutive dualism of 'Europe'/'Balkan'
as equivalent to 'good'/'bad'. More specifically, they questioned the automatic equation
of 'rationalism' as 'good'. In their experience, some aspects of 'irrationality', and hence
of 'Balkan', were quite all right (music, ecstasy, emotionality, warmth, ...). So, while
accepting, to a certain extent, the association of 'Europe' with 'rational' and 'Balkan'
with 'irrational', this didn't take the form of a moral judgement in favour of 'Europe'.
Critical of modern ideas of Progress and Reason, they questioned both the post-
Yugoslav 'Europe' and the real existing Europe. Interestingly, they did so pretty much
along the same lines as their subcultural colleagues in other European countries, with
whom they were frequently in touch.
I gave these two examples in order to destabilise what might have been an overly fixed
picture until now. However, while explicitly politicised and prominently featured in
everyday conversations, the 'Europe'/'Balkan' theme also pervaded many silent
11 Nor the Balkan mentality, as proposed by Kitromilides in his historical study of a common Balkan mentality
amongst Orthodox-Christians in the European part of the Ottoman empire (1996).
12 Similar, but with a more direct sense of Balkan counterdiscourse, was Arkan's interview on BK TV with regard to
his possible extradibon to the Den Haag Tribunal. Asked whether he ever used violence in Bosnia, the paramilitary
leader who was generally held responsible for the worst excesses of ethnic cleansing argued he only ever smacked
his own soldiers, because 'Its tough to pull a Serb into line' (Republika 16-30/06/97:2 - see Jansen 2000a:306).
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aspects of post-Yugoslav life. Many people seemed to maintain a sort of unfinished
love/hate relationship with 'Balkan'. While wishing to cherish the 'good sides' (here,
people referred to hospitality, warmth, partying, music) and seeing this as part of
themselves, they abhorred the hatred, the violence, the machismo and so on (see
Herzfeld 1995:220; Ziek 1990:55-56). Let us look at two long quotations from
interviews:
Ivana: 'Before, 'Balkan' was a geographical notion, but now it got some more, like, a
cultural meaning. In Croatia everybody is very keen on denying that they belong to the
Balkans. For me it is actually something very positive. And I don't think we should be
ashamed of that. I like the Balkan type of culture very much; that laidbackness, that
special temperament, a certain warmth between people, hospitality. For me it is an
incredibly beautiful experience to go to, let's say Serbia, and to sleep at the place of some
completely unknown people. And nobody asks any questions. A certain openness you
know. That is not something to be ashamed of... For me that is purely a... a mentality.'
Tamara: '[laughs] Well, I don't know, there are a lot of people here who say we are not
Balkanci. But when I look at it, judging by the behaviour, and particularly by the behaviour
of the last couple of years, then I think we are! [laughs] No, when I hear 'Balkan' as an
idea—for me that is some kind of meeting point of civilisations. I think.., you know it is
here that Greek civilisation started and Macedonian... And somehow they are all messed
up... and a bit strange. Clever but full of emotions or something like that. I mean, I have
nothing against 'Balkan' at all. For me it's nothing ugly, nothing bad. For me it's something
rich, in terms of civilisation. But then of course, the behaviour.., that is such an outburst of
emotions and warriordom and... I don't know. It doesn't mean anything bad to me when
somebody says I am a Balkanica. I think it is a rich thing, a rich area with a rich history.
So it doesn't bother me.'
The first quotation is from Ivana, a SerbianZagrepãanka, who at other times tended to
blame ruralites for destroying her city. It is probably not a coincidence that the second
one is from Tamara, also a Serbian Zagreb girl. Being Serbian in Zagreb made it rather
likely that one would come up against the tensions of 'Balkan'/'Europe'. Tamara often
switched back and forth between affirming the violence 'typical' of Balkanci and
celebrating 'Balkan' as a boiling point of civilisation and history. This was a
phenomenon that emerged frequently: people had made the tension exemplified by the
'Europe'/'Balkan' dualism their own.
In this way, my discussion of Balkan orientalism resonates with Herzfeld's study of
Greek 'cultural intimacy', which he defines as:
'The recognition of those aspects of a cultural identity that are considered a source of
external embarassment but that nevertheless provide insiders with their assurance of
common sociality, the familiarity with the basis of power that may at one moment assure
the disenfranchised a degree of creative irreverence and at the next moment reinforce the
effectiveness of intimidation.'
(Herzfeld 1996:3)
Certain aspects of 'Balkan' were then taken up and cherished amongst insiders as
familiar and affectionate, whereas they were vehemently rejected in the presence of
outsiders. Following Herzfeld I would argue that, although this reflects collective self-
mockery rather than cultural alienation and it might be seen as ironic resistance, it is
always limited in its empowerment and does not really challenge the subordinate
position from which it is enunciated (1 996:53-54, 157).
Finally, let me place this in a larger context. Like everything else in this study, it would
be impossible to understand Balkan orientalism outside of the post-Yugoslav situation
of war, nationalism, chaos and poverty, Of course, the tension between, say, rationality
and irrationality is not an exclusively post-Yugoslav issue, and a case might be made
that most people have to deal with it in their lives. What I have attempted to analyse in
this chapter is the way in which many post-Yugosla ys relied partly on the discursive
dualism between 'Balkan' and 'Europe' in order to position themselves in this question.
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This is not to say that this demand for positioning is a necessary, let alone universal
phenomenon—in most situations people can just get on with their lives. Despite what I
was told by many of their inhabitants, the situation in the post-Yugoslav states in the
late 1990s cannot be explained simply with reference to 'Balkan'. So, there must be
other reasons why the tension became so important in these countries. I would argue
that in order to cope, precisely in order to get on with their lives, many post-Yugoslays
felt they had to position themselves with regard to these themes that dominated much
of the political scene.
We have seen how in a situation like the post-Yugoslav one, where war,
postcommunist chaos, and rampant nationalism set the parameters, many people felt
they did not have much choice. (Re)positioning had become something you had to do.
Add to this the extent to which Balkan orientalism was articulated with national
identification, and it is clear that this was an issue which many people in Beograd and
Zagreb could not fail to take on. While in many other cases people might have simply
ignored the 'Balkan' and 'Europe' themes altogether, in this particular time and place it
became a question that featured centrally.
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[chapter nine]
sister identities: (anti-)nationalism and feminism
their lives ran in circles so small
they thought they'd seen it all
so they couldn't make a place for
a girl who saw the ocean
Michelle Shocked - Memories of East Texas1
what will you do when the war is over, tender comrade
when we lay down our weary guns
when we return home to our wives and families
and look into the eyes of our sons
what will you say of the bond we had, tender comrade
will you say that we were brave
as the shells fell all around us
or that we wept and cried for our mothers
and cursed our fathers
for forgetting that metal men are brothers
Billy Bragg - Tender Comrade2
In this chapter I analyse the role of feminist discourses in the post-Yugoslav anti-
nationalist critique through an exploration of the meaning of feminism in women's
narratives of self and of society. After briefly explaining the ways in which nationalism
articulated with reasserted patriarchal gender discourses, I argue that this pattern was
mirrored by the articulation of a range of alternative, anti-nationalist discourses with
feminism. The interlocking of feminism and anti-nationalism is then located in relation
to the framework of narratives of continuity. For a number of women, and NGO-
activists in particular, feminism provided a source of discursive material for the
construction of a sense of continuity in coping with the narrative break of nationalism
and war. For these women activists, I argue, feminism represented a frame of
reference through which to understand the meaning of the events (Ziek & SalecI
1991:28). Discourses of women's rights and women's emancipation partly structured
the organisation of 'safe spaces' and by way of activism, particularly with
victims/survivors of violence, a focus on care of self and of others also allowed the
maintenance of 'normality' in biographies. Moreover, feminist networks provided a
vehicle for continuity of contacts throughout the Yugoslav space and, as a result of
feminism's appeal as a global strategy, beyond that.
Not only did feminism function as an important discourse for articulation with post-
Yugoslav anti-nationalism, women in general also constituted a large majority amongst
activists in anti-nationalist initiatives, amongst whom feminists were prominent. In the
light of these observations it might seem odd, and ethnographically dishonest, to
devote only a brief chapter to this issue. 'Should it not be a general theme throughout?,'
one might ask. In fact, some of my closest friends in both Zagreb and Beograd were
self-proclaimed feminists who worked in women's organisations. The reason why I do
not devote more attention to feminism is two-fold. First of all, I prefer to focus on the
role of feminist discourses only with regard to their articulation with anti-nationalism,
which is the central theme of this study. Secondly, the positions and the roles of
women in the post-Yugoslav context, and of feminists in particular, have already been
described and analysed in a plethora of publications, in Serbian/Croatian and other
1 Michelle Shocked, from the album Short Sharp Shocked © 1988 Mercury Records.
2 Billy Bragg, from the album Workers' Playtime © 1988 Go! Discs.
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languages3. Much of this was written by local feminist activists themselves and
provides fascinating examples of combined activism and academic endeavour. This
chapter is, therefore, restricted to a small set of specific feminist issues related to anti-
nationalism and narrative.
1. (post)communism and gender relations
Many scholars, usually from within the field of gender or women's studies, have looked
at the changes in gender relations that took place in East and Central Europe since the
fall of the real socialist regimes4. Most of these studies argue that, despite general
improvements in civil and political freedom, there were strong differences in the ways
that women and men were affected by the process that is often called 'transition to
democracy'. To put it bluntly: women generally got the worst deal. On the one hand, as
a result of crisis-ridden periods of economic restructuring, aimed more or less at the
introduction of a neoliberal market system, they lost certain acquired socio-economic
rights in comparison with the previous situation. On the other hand, a widespread
reassertion of moral conservativism changed patterns of expectations, gender roles
and ideological definitions of women's place in society.
In the post-Yugoslav context this was no different. The previous Titoist ideology had
pledged full equality between men and women. In a region characterised by strongly
patriarchal patterns (albeit with large internal differences), the Yugoslav regime had
favoured secular and modernised gender relations, leading to marked changes in a
number of domains of society5 . Women entered work outside the domestic sphere,
they were represented in the Party through quota and they played an active role in
other public domains. The contribution of women in the Partisan movement was
emphasised, and in many schools both boys and girls took 'defence' classes, in which
they received basic military instruction. On the level of reproductive rights, abortion, for
example, was legal and available to all. However, despite these policies directed
towards gender equality, Yugoslav feminists pointed out how many layers of society
were still permeated by machismo and patriarchal relations (Ugreió 1995:149-165;
Ramet 1991:197-211). Moreover, in many cases the level of rhetoric was not
transcended, and quota gave rise to the proliferation of 'token-women' without real
power. Still, it was clear that in a number of social practices traditional gender roles
were being questioned.
In the early 1990s, the move towards a multi-party system and some form of market
economy and their socio-economic and moral-political consequences resulted in rather
abrupt changes in gender relations. In the post-Yugoslav context, specifically, a related
phenomenon had the strongest resonance in terms of gender issues: the rise of the
different nationalisms as the legitimate discourses of identification. This was true for all
the post-Yugoslav republics, and it seemed to be one of the fields where the
differences between the new states were only causing minor variations on a theme.
2. post-Yugoslav nationalisms and gender
In the post-Yugoslav states, the so-called postcommunist 'transition' took shape
through the prism of competing nationalist discourses. In many ways, the radical
changes in what was politically thinkable, through nationalism's coup, represented a
reassertion of a morally conservative concept of community. Pre-existing and, as post-
Yugoslav feminists would point out, surviving patriarchal value patterns were
reformulated in a framework of overarching concern with the nation as an exclusive,
The literature referred to throughout this chapter is only a small sample of what is available.
' See for example Bridger eta! 1996; Einhorn 1993; Edmondson 1992; Funk and Muller 1993; Rai eta! 1992; Renne
(ed) 1997; Salecl 1994a.
5 See Miliô 1994; Drakuliã 1987; for a detailed historical analysis of the 'woman's question' in Serbia, see Boinoviô
1996.
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organic community. In order to propagate a return to traditionalist gender roles,
influential public figures drew on nationalism and on one of its major 'partners', if not
symptoms—a (re)discovered religiosity (Drakuliá 1993b; lvekoviO 1993a; Radio 1996;
Sofos 1996:77-80). In effect, a discourse of the 'moral majority' came to the forefront
(Salecl 1992; 1994a:24).
This had a series of effects in the public sphere, whereby the numbers of women-
politicians fell dramatically after the end of Yugoslavia 6 (MiliO 1993:117-118). Moreover,
politicians and clergymen formulated proposals for 'demographic renewal', sanctifying
women's role as child-bearers and mothers. This process varied across republics. In
Croatia it was mainly a question of politicians and church leaders arguing for a more
general revival of Catholic morality in national terms. This reflected Croatian
nationalism's self-identification as devoutly Catholic and morally impeccable, and was
only sometimes explicitly formulated in direct relation to national Others (usually
Bosniacs). In Serbia, although Christian and specifically Orthodox doctrine did play a
role, the focus seemed to be on more strictly national issues, to such an extent that
most of the demographic concerns of the Serbian moral right were formulated in direct
opposition to alleged threats of high Albanian fertility in KosovJ.
In this situation, many women found themselves caught 'in-between'. They faced the
contradiction that arose when a moral majority perspective argued for women to take
up their place near the hearth, while economic hardship forced them into a central
position in the daily struggle for survival (see Einhorn 1995:7). At the time of my
fieldwork, the latter seemed to be much more crucial in most women's lives than the
former. Although there certainly were indications of a reassertion of patriarchal values
and of moral-religious conservativism, all of which have been documented amply and
attacked systematically by local feminist activista6, the effect of these traditionalist
discourses on everyday lives were limited. Nationalist calls for an active 'demographic
renewal', arguing amongst other things for reproduction incentives and a ban on
abortion, had few consequences in terms of actual policies and even fewer with regard
to women's attitudes. If patterns of behaviour did change at all, it was more likely to be
in the opposite direction. The introduction of a sort of 'wild capitalism' forced a number
of women to engage in survival strategies such as street vending or even pornography
and prostitution.
3. aqe of extremes: ciender roles in times of nationalist war
3.1. gendered violence and nationalist war
The so-called transition to democracy and the rise of nationalism in the post-Yugoslav
states soon took the form of a series of ferocious wars, which in turn strongly
conditioned discourses on gender roles. War, in general, was considered men's
business, and men were expected to temporarily leave their role as breadwinners in
order to become soldiers for the national cause. Hundreds of thousands of men were
mobilised and/or pressurised to join the military efforts as national warriors, and to
engage in what was depicted on all sides as the defence of women and children
(Mostov 2000; Sofos, 1996:73). In a cultural climate where men lacking physical
strength and bravery were considered 'feminine' (OoloviO 1994a, 1994b, 1996; Sofos
1996:76; Mostov 2000:93-95), some joined the ranks enthusiastically as volunteers and
many others could not or would not resist mobilisation. Still others escaped military
6 In Serbia for example the female share fell from 23.5% in 1986 to 1.6% in 1991, in Croatia from 15.0% to 1.5%, in
Macedonia from 17.2% to 4.1%, in Montenegro from 11.5% to 3.2%. Only Slovenia had more than 10% women in
parliament, and even in this republic their share was halved (from 24.0% to 11.2%) (Cohen 1995:1 66).
It is not within the confines of this study to elaborate on these issues. Others have written extensively about the
articulation of traditionalist gender images and post-Yugoslav nationalisms: see for example Davidovió 1995;
Feminist Review 1993:39; Jones 1994; Koraö 1993, 1996:136ff; MiIiá 1993:112-115, 1994:121-168; Mostov,
1995:211-212, 2000; SalecI 1992, 1994a:24-30.
8 See for example DavidoviO 1995:135-136; Feministiãke sveske 1995:27-76; Kesiô 1995; Babe. 1995, 1996.
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service by emigrating or by going into hiding—or they deserted from the front (2ene u
crnom 1994b).
Women played a minor role in the army, but they were mobilised in different ways and
expected to take up the role of (national) carers as mothers and/or wives. This reflected
the reassertion of traditionalist roles in a patriarchal system: the carers were always in
a supportive position, they were never agents in their own right, Ideally, they
represented the admiring wife and the caring, fertile mother, weeping but keeping the
house in order for the returning warriors (Davidovió 1995; Mostov 2000:93ff). Crucially,
building on the reassertion of moral conservativism, if the family metonymically
represented the nation, women also became carers for that nation and the locus of its
reproduction. Another important element in women's national significance became their
status as powerful symbols of the nation's suffering. This again reinforced their
dependent status, which could partly explain why images of peasant women fleeing on
tractors were widely published, whereas you would hardly ever come across a picture
of a professional, urban woman who had been affected by the war.
Although women did not participate actively in most of the military operations, it is clear
that they were amongst the hardest hit victims of the wars9 : not only were they targeted
like men in ethnic cleansing campaigns, but they also constituted a large majority
amongst post-Yugoslav refugees. Women were also victimised by widespread abuse,
particularly rape, both as an instrument of war and through increased violence in the
domestic sphere (Davidoviá 1995:138; Feministiöke sveske 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997). It
is not my intention here to present an overview of female suffering in the post-Yugoslav
wars, but I briefly go into the widely publicised case of rape as an instrument of war.
3.2. war rape and nationalism
Rape became a central issue in discussions of the post-Yugoslav conflict for a number
of reasons: firstly, the sheer scale of sexual violence in these wars; secondly, its
symbolic use in nationalist discourses; and thirdly, its prominence in a host of local and
international controversies, including those between women's organisations. There was
clear evidence of widespread rape in Croatia, and particularly in Bosnia, including
cases of individual rape, rape as an instrument of ethnic cleansing, rape in forcibly
organised brothels for soldiers, and rape in concentration camps. The numbers were
always extremely unreliable because of the sensitivity of the matter. They could be
underestimated because of a reluctance to report on the women's part; or they could
be overestimated as a result of the nationalist regimes' practice of playing up numbers
in order to win moral support. However, it is certain that rape was widespread both by
individual men on their own initiative and by gangs of men as part of organised
violence with complicity from military commanders (SalecI 1994a; Sofos 1996:81-83).
There were cases of men being raped as well, but here I will focus on the much more
frequent phenomenon of rape of women by one or more med°.
A comprehensive publication on the use of rape as a war instrument in Bosnia was
edited by Stiglmayer (1994), although I would hasten to add that this book should be
seen in its context. It was written in 1992-1993, when Serbian forces were
overwhelmingly stronger than their opponents in Bosnia. Later the balance changed, as
did the strategies of violence by the other armies. This resulted in frequent reports of
war rapes by the other sides as well. However, foreign observers seem to concur on
the contention that, relatively, Serbian soldiers were the most numerous amongst the
perpetrators, and Bosniac girls/women the most frequent victims. Importantly, sexual
violence in the post-Yugoslav conflict became a pivotal factor in legal terms, with rape
being treated as a war crime for the first time.
See for example Beliô & Kesiã 1993; Centar za 2ene ±rtve rata 1994; Davidoviô 1995:144; NikoliO-RistanoviO of a!
1995.
10 For more discussion of rape as an instrument of war: Centar za ene ±rtve rata 1994:123-124; Davidoviô
1995:141-143; Gutman 1993:68-76; Mostov 1995:213-215; Nikoliô-Ristanoviô 1996:359-364; Kneeviô 1995a. See
also Seifert 1996.
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The articulation of sexual violence and nationalism that hit the front pages of global
media during the Bosnian war did not arise out of the blue. Even before the break-up of
Yugoslavia, Miloeviá's rise to power, built mainly on the Kosovo issue, included a
moral panic about the alleged rape of Serbian women by Albanians. In a heated
climate of allegations and hate speech, it was even proposed to establish different legal
procedures for intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic rape (Sofos 1996). With the outbreak of war
in Croatia, and particularly in Bosnia, it became clear that rape was used shamelessly
by the different nationalist regimes. On the one hand its perpetration had become an
instrument of war on the ground, and on the other hand reports of victimisation
functioned as a crucial weapon in order to foster public support at home and abroad.
Mostov (1995, 2000) argued that in post-Yugoslav nationalisms women represented
symbolic markers of the boundary of the nation, which had to be defended by men, just
as they were obliged to defend its territorial boundaries. Thus, losing the sexuality of
'your' women to the enemy through rape was like losing on the battlefield, because
these women symbolised the innocence, the vulnerability, the reproduction, the
continuity and, thus, the very life of the nation (Seifert 1994:57-66; Sofos 1996).
Sexually abusing a woman of the opposing nation was meant to humiliate the men of
the other side as much as the woman herself, and it stood for colonising the Other's
territory by breaking the sacred boundary of their community.
In this context, we can see that impregnation was sometimes an explicit goal. Not only
was it a traumatic experience for the woman and an intrusion into the enemy's terrain,
but it also had extended effects in time if the baby was born. In some rape camps
women were impregnated and held in the camp until it was too late for abortion. These
women were told they were going to give birth to a baby of the enemy, and in some
cases, buses with women seven months pregnant were sent over the frontline to their
'own' side, carrying messages on the sides about the babies that would be born.
Women were objectified as birth givers, as passers-on of male genetic material.
Once handed over to their respective 'sides', rape victims were abused once again, this
time by their own regimes exposing them in order to prove that the national enemies
were monsters attacking innocent victims. Public outcry followed, further consolidating
the widespread belief on all sides that the wars were purely defensive operations in
which men had to protect their wives and children. A poignant illustration of this abuse
for propaganda reasons was the fact that rape victims represented in the Croatian
media were almost always Bosniac women, even though there were, of course,
Croatian survivors as well. This underlined at once the bestiality of the Serbs and the
chastity of Croatian women—it was other women who were raped (Mostov 1995:215).
Official, state-supported women's organisations played a very important role in this
abuse of rape as a political instrument by publicising the issue in their own country and
abroad in order to foster support for what was considered their nation's legitimate
struggle. In such discourses, the rape issue was taken up exclusively in national terms:
sexual violence in the war was seen only through the perspective of a threat to the
nation. The suffering of women rape-survivors was then represented as a miniature
version of the national suffering and the danger of 'extinction'. Rape had become such
a sensitive and politically powerful issue that all regimes involved relentlessly tried to
use its victims to their advantage.
3.3. the outskirts of gender patterns in war
Rape was a very important issue in the post-Yugoslav wars, but it was certainly not the
only way in which gender affected the situation. Here, I would like to draw attention to
some of the less self-evident ways in which gender relations affected one's situation
during and after the war. It should be noted that on a local level the first victims of
nationalist conflict were often nationally 'mixed' individuals and households.
Take this case from a war-torn area in Croatia, which I have elaborated upon
elsewhere (Jansen 2000b). Bosnian-born Serb, Zoran, moved to a nationally mixed
village in Croatia as a teacher in the 1970s and married a local Croatian woman,
Vesna. 'Brotherhood and Unity in Bed', as he put it. In many ways Zoran fulfilled a
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bridging function, and despite being a Serb and a Party member, he was a popular
figure in this Croatian-dominated village. In 1991, before the fighting in the village
started, Vesna, Zoran and their two children were the first ones to be informed that they
should leave. They were about to move into a newly built house, but they decided to
flee and ended up in a Serbian-controlled part of Bosnia. This is a crucial point: why, as
a mixed couple, did they choose to go to that 'side'? Zoran explained that they were
facing a dilemma but opted for the Serbian side because they thought that as a man he
would be more capable of defending her from his own people than she would be to
protect him from hers.
This is a painful but significant indication of how nationalist conflicts urged unexpected
linkages between gender and nationality. In the immediate post-war period, patterns of
return to the ethnically cleansed areas in Croatia reconfirmed this: very few Serbs
returned to places where they would constitute a national minority, and elderly women
were over-represented amongst those who did. While the Tuman regime was
reluctant to allow any return at all, this pattern was also the consequence of the play of
gender: men might have been actively fighting their new-old neighbours and were,
therefore, unlikely to return. As a result, many elderly Serbian women returned on their
own since they were less likely to be seen as a threat to the new Croatian order.
However, this position exposed them to frequent abuse: verbal and other harassment,
and even rape, were frequent.
3.4. anti-nationalist responses to war rape
Non-regime women's organisations engaging in the development of anti-nationalist
alternatives found themselves in an extremely difficult position with regard to gendered
violence, and particularly to war rapes. Obviously, they were aware of the existence of
these crimes, and they knew that they were in many cases part of systematic
campaigns. In fact, they often knew this better than anyone else because many of them
worked with survivors who managed to escape. Although they aimed for discretion with
the women in question, focusing on psycho-social care and humanitarian aid, they also
wanted to raise protest on the issue without placing themselves on the same line as the
nationalist regimes. From an anti-nationalist perspective, however, they didn't want to
close their eyes to the violence perpetrated by soldiers of their 'own' armies, and they
certainly didn't want to allow their regime to abuse the suffering of war rape victims as
propaganda material for stepping up their own war efforts (Kne±evió 1995b; Kesió
1993:43-45).
In this way, an alternative representation of women who had been raped was
developed: in line with wider feminist discourse, they were then represented not just as
victims, but also as resisters and survivors. This did not mean stripping them of their
victimhood, but rather than portraying them as a symbol of the suffering of the nation
they were seen as victims of nationalist war. Rape survivors stood as symbols of the
cruelty of war, of extreme nationalist projects, of the policies of ethnic cleansing carried
out by the national Other, but also by their own people. This affected many different
individual women, it was argued, regardless of nationality.
However, in addition, especially in explicitly feminist circles, rape survivors were
represented as a collective category, albeit not a national one: they were identified as
women. In this way, drawing upon and reformulating feminist discourses, women
activists in Beograd and Zagreb built up a dissident understanding of war rapes. They
questioned the nationalist tendency to see rape as a relevant issue only when
perpetrated by a national Other11 , and they argued that rape should be seen as a
gender issue, as violence against women. Of course, this was argued to different
degrees and was a contested topic between women's organisations in different post-
Yugoslav republics. Some feminists took the argument to its extreme by suggesting
that war rapes should actually be seen exclusively as gender issues, as violence by
11 This reflects a wider myth about rape: the stereotype of the rapist as an outside threat, originating per definibon
outside the woman's private circle.
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men against women. They would argue that also in peace there are plenty of instances
of rape, and they would point to the fact that intra-national, domestic rape and abuse
increased enormously during these wars (Mlaenoviô et al 1993; MlaenoviO & Protió
1995:177-181). Others were more reluctant and they would argue that rape should be
seen as a gender and a national issue, because those acts of sexual violence by men
against women were systematically directed at particular women because of their
nationality.
4. what about feminism?
Post-Yugoslav nationalist discourses left little place for women in roles other than those
of mother, wife, caretaker, breeder and victim—all in the service of the family, the
nationalist metonymy for the nation. The officialTitoist line, as we have seen, had been
at least rhetorically emancipatory, but its long-term impact was limited. There had
been, however, a small feminist scene since the late 1970s, growing from local or
republican initiatives into an all-Yugoslav phenomenon (for a brief, general discussion
of feminism in Yugoslavia see Ramet 1991:197-211; see also BoinoviO 1996.;
DavidoviO 1995:136). Marginal as feminist action may have been before, the end of
Yugoslavia meant a further blow: in the urge to do away with everything considered
communist, and therefore old-fashioned and wrong, many labelled feminism or
anything to do with women's rights as a thing of the past.
In the mid-I 990s, in both Serbia and Croatia, the large majority of reactions to feminist
initiatives ranged from vehement disapproval to ridicule. My flatmate,Vesna, worked in
a Beograd centre for women survivors of abuse (both war and domestic violence). A
self-proclaimed anti-communist who felt no loyalty whatsoever to the former
Yugoslavia, she said that she knew that the situation was far from perfect in the 'West',
but that in Serbia women's rights were simply not taken seriously. They were ridiculed,
Vesna argued, and all 'progressive' ideas were now seen as communist—women's
rights amongst them. When I asked her whether she thought it had been better for
women before, she replied curtly: 'Of course it was better, much better.'
The equation of communism and women's rights was common amongst men and
women, and both in public discourse and in everyday life. In Serbia, this was reinforced
by the political activity of Mira Markoviô, wife of Miloevió and leader of the Yugoslav
Left (JUL), a party in the Serbian ruling coalition. Markovió called herself a feminist and
her party, widely seen as an interest coalition of mafiosi, represented a 'progressive'
line on women's issues—if only strictly rhetorically (Davidoviô 1995:147). Through
unreconstructed leftist discourse far removed from the actual practice of JUL,Markoviô
claimed continuity with the Titoist tradition of emancipation, exemplified in large state-
run women's organisations. This led to a situation whereby in Serbia there were two
competing International Women's Day celebrations in the 1990s. On 8 March 1997, for
example, the official one by the regime-minded successor organisation of the Titoist
women's alliance spoke out severely against the anti-Miloeviô demonstrations;
whereas an alternative celebration brought together a wide range of oppositional
feminists.
In Zagreb, divisions existed as well, but they took a different form. Due to the strongly
anti-communist stance of the HDZ regime, the Croatian successor of the communist
women's organisation, often still referred to by its old name Anti-Fascist Women's Front
(AF2), was strongly oppositional. Related to the reformed communists of the SDP, it
publicly emphasised the importance of women in the anti-fascist struggle and therefore
distanced itself from the anti-communist regime. Some other Croatian women's
organisations positioned themselves completely in line with the dominant nationalism
and confirmed the traditionalist 'moral majority' perspective. It must be clear, therefore,
that post-Yugoslav women's alliances were certainly not oppositional per definition
(Kne±evió I995b). To the disappointment of many dissident feminists, it turned out that
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the world of women's organisations was not unaffected by the impact of nationalism on
wider society12.
Rather than analysing these national divisions, I now mention one particularly poignant
illustration of the interlocking mechanisms they set in motion. In late 1991, with war
raging in Croatia, a group of mothers staged a protest in Sarajevo against the war and
the conscription of their sons into the Yugoslav arm 3 . One should note that, before,
parties would be held when a boy went off to do his military service, and it was often
seen as a reason for joy and pride. This time, however, there was war on the horizon,
and reason to worry. Soon after the Sarajevo demonstration, the mothers travelled to
Beograd, the Yugoslav capital, in order to hold a common protest with women from
Serbia and Croatia. They were prevented from entering the city, and the joint
demonstration did not materialise. Propaganda campaigns by the respective regimes
quickly spread a different message wherein mothers were proudly and joyfully sending
their sons off to the front in order to defend their nations. Less than a week after the
failed common demonstration, the 'mother's movements', as they became known, were
transformed into symbols of national unity and incorporated into the war-mongering
policies of the regimes.
Despite these divisions, there was a tendency to articulate a critique of patriarchy with
a critique of nationalism. This anti-nationalist feminist discourse relied on continuity with
former Yugoslav women's rights initiatives as well as on newly developed activities. In
what follows, I focus on this interrelation between feminism and anti-nationalism.
5. anti-nationalism, gender and feminism
5.1. protest and misogyny
As a starting point, we have to note that women constituted the backbone of the
critique of nationalism in both Serbia and Croatia. They formed a majority, in terms of
bodies, in most alternative anti-war and anti-nationalist movements. Of course, many
men were mobilised into the army and, apart from the risk of being sent to the front,
there was enormous pressure on them to be exemplary 'national warriors' in all
spheres of life. However, by the same patriarchal token, women were also subject to
strong pressures: they should be good caretakers and reproducers of the nation.
Nevertheless, they were much more active in oppositional activity than men. I do not
know why this was the case, and I don't see this as the right place to discuss the
impact of femininity or whether women are simply more peaceful, caring or critical then
men 14. Rather than going into the why, I would like to explore the how, because it
wasn't just the case that women constituted a majority in terms of bodies, but there was
also a strong input of ideas which argued along lines of gender identity and solidarity.
For example, in a reaction to the proposed traditionalist demographic renewal
programmes, a Beograd feminist wrote:
'It disturbs them that the birth rate in Kosovo is significantly higher than in Serbia proper.
They want to sustain the status-quo or maybe they wish to awaken "patriotism" in Serbian
women and entice them to show Albanian women that they can give birth to more
children than them. They know very well what they would do with those extra children: off
to war, or what did you think!'
(Oetkovió 1993:135)
12 See Duhaöek 1993:136; Kasiô 1997; Kneeviô, 1995a, 1995b:4-5; Koraô 1996:140ff; Mladenoviá et al 1993:217.
13 See Davicjoviã 1995:136-137; Drakulió 1993b:128-129; Nikolió-RistanoviO 1996:359-364; Salecl 1993:215; Ugreiô
1995:158-159.
14 For some starting points on this discussion, specifically relating to the post-Yugoslav case, see for example:
lvekovió 1995b, 1997; Jariô 1994; Papandreou 1997; Spasió 1997; Zene u crnom 1994a, 1996, 1997.
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The reaction by the nationalist elite was predictable, as illustrated by these words of a
church leader on the occasion of women protesting against the demand of the
Orthodox church to ban abortion:
'They are enemies of the Serbian people. Who pays them to dress up in these special
black uniforms? What is their goal in propagating, precisely in Beograd, that Serbian
mothers should kill their unborn children? These protesting women are not Orthodox
Serbian women, they don't have anything to do with the essence of the Serbian people.'
(Politika 27/03/93)
It should be noted that these controversies took place in an embargoed state during
full-scale armed conflicts in nearby Bosnia and Croatia. In the latter country, not long
before, a witch hunt had been opened on five women intellectuals who were known for
their public criticism of the nationalist regime15. When the weekly Globus published an
anonymous attack on them under the title 'Croatian feminists rape Croatia' (Globus
11/12/92), again nationalism and misogyny went hand in hand. The women in question
were rudely reprimanded for being out of place, nationally, politically and personally
(Kesió 1997).
Apart from these virulent attacks combining the venom of nationalist and sexist
discourses, women's anti-nationalism also attracted a wide range of milder criticism.
Even when representing certain initiatives in a positive light, there was often a
tendency to play down their 'feminist' character. For example, when the Zagreb Centre
for Women War Victims received the Muhammed Ali Prize 'World Healing Honour', the
headline of an article in an oppositional newspaper referred to it simply as 'Centre for
War Victims' (Novi List 11/10/97). Maybe this wasn't even the result of a conscious
decision by the editors, but knowing that this Centre only worked with women and
proliferated itself very much as a feminist organisation, they appeared at least
negligent.
5.2. divided loyalties: woman and/or national?
Through their engagement in dissident initiatives with people who, regardless of
nationality, were victimised by the nationalist war and/or wanted to make a stance
against it, women activists also positioned themselves in relation to the dominant
nationalism. As we have seen, these women might have had many different reasons to
wish to do so, and in many cases they did not see their gender identity as a defining
factor. In this sense, many women active in these initiatives didn't conceive of the
situation as one in which their female gender and their national identity were pitted
against each other. However, others, and in the case of post-Yugoslav anti-nationalist
activism this was a rather large portion, considered their identity as a woman an
important feature 16 . In a climate of homogenisation and accusations of betrayal, these
people often felt that they were being forced to choose between female or national
solidarity, and they had decided that the former was the more important one. However,
it wasn't always that straightforward, as illustrated in an interview with Monika, a
Zagreb-based feminist, who argued as follows:
'Before, what was important for the whole development of feminism in Yugoslavia were
the links between activists, women-intellectuals in Zagreb, Beograd and Ljubljana,
already from the end of the 1970s. That was very important. We emphasised our
common directions, our common theoretical perspectives, we had meetings [...].
However, at the beginning of the war, something very interesting happened. And that was
exactly because women who engaged in feminism felt unease with nationalism. In fact,
most were some sort of Marxist feminists and nationalism was simply not an issue [...].
Supposedly, we were a priori internationalists and therefore a priori anti-nationalists. This
led to unease, problems, confusion. So it seems to me that we never had an occasion for
a discussion on what nationalism is, what national identity is. We all considered
15 Elsewhere, I have elaborated on this case', particularly in terms of narrative constructions of 'home' (Jansen 1998).
16 See the brief discussion on embodied resistance by Women in Black in Chapter Two.
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ourselves, supposedly, anti-nationalists, unconditionally, without thinking about it. [...]
With the war, suddenly there was a problem. A question arose, in my view a false
question, which asked: am I a feminist or am I a Croat? [...] At that time, Croatia was
represented as a victim—as a state and as a nation. So women who dealt with violence
against women started from the position: if we, as women and as feminists, a priori
identify with victims, what do we do when Croatia is a symbolic victim? Our normal, as in
"normal" [gestures], position would be to identify with Croatia as a victim. So it came to
complete confusion, particularly with the war rapes and all...'
In this climate of polarisation, a split occurred in the women's movement, especially in
Croatia where after all the violence was taking place. Some decided to focus on issues
to do with Croatia as a state and as a nation, while others emphasised the dangers of
violence and xenophobia on all sides. For the latter group, their gender identity was
often an important source for alternative engagement. They would focus on women as
a target group, which was not the case amongst their male colleagues. For those
women, feminist discourses functioned as a reservoir from which to draw material for
the construction of alternative, non-violent, non-nationalist patterns of identification. It
should be clear that, as I have emphasised throughout this study, this was often
primarily a response to the spectre of nationalism.
6. feminism and the narrative break
6.1. feminism and its situated meanings
The question I would like to ask here is: would it be correct to label the women I refer to
in this chapter, 'feminists'? In my search for an answer, I found that the logical thing to
do was to ask them. And it must be said, the answers varied. Some certainly did see
themselves as feminists, whereas others were reluctant to do so, amongst other
reasons because of the 'communist' discrediting of the term. My Beograd flatmate
Vesna argued that many of her friends looked at her funny and often asked her why
she was working in a feminist organisation. Laughingly, she told me that they'd say
things like: 'You are my friend and apart from that you are normal. So why do you want
to be a feminist?'.
One thing should be clear here. It was amongst a number of self-proclaimed feminists
that I came across the most radical critique of war, nationalism and militarism; and it
was there that questions of guilt and responsibility were taken on with less scruples
than anywhere else (see for example MIaenoviá 1993; Centar za ±ene rtve rata
1996). For example, a significant moment in the post-Yugoslav peace movement was
the occasion on which a lesbian activist and a radical feminist from Beograd addressed
a war-time conference in Serbian-besieged Sarajevo. Unlike many others, she openly
talked about what was being done from the hills around them, and she did not attempt
to escape the uncomfortable fact that it was being done in her name.
However, as we have seen, many other women activists, who might or might not
explicitly locate themselves within feminist discourse, also considered their identity as a
woman an important issue in their work and in their lives in general. Feminist
discourses of identity and solidarity then functioned as reservoirs for the positioning of
self in a tumultuous situation (Andriá-Ru±iO 1997:25-27). I would argue that it is not so
important in this context what feminism 'really' is, obviously its meanings varied.
Because of these variations it could serve as raw material for narratives of self for
different women. In this way, 'feminist activism', in whatever form, provided a number of
elements which could be articulated into a more or less continuous story of self. This
need for some sense of continuity was a common feature in many women's narratives,
as it was in the wider phenomenon of anti-nationalism.
This is certainly not to say that there was a privileged form of narrating continuity, let
alone one and the same construction of continuity for all. Of course, women were
active in different ways: they engaged in work with refugees and/or rape victims; in
educational work; in counselling; and in raising public awareness through campaigns or
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dialogue projects. Others worked in independent media or in creative-artistic projects.
Like their male colleagues, many of those activists were motivated by a sense of care,
often accompanied by feelings of anger and indignation and sometimes by explicitly
political perspectives.
6.2. narratives of continuity I: care of self and others
Frequently, NGO-activists told me that they had started to work in an organisation
primarily out of a 'need to do something' (see also Kasió 1994:13; 2ene u crnom
1994a, 1995, 1997). Sabina, a young Zagreb activist, told me in an interview:
'I became an activist by complete coincidence, I reckon. You know, I knew what was
happening through television and newspapers, and it all seemed very far away. But when
I saw that first hand, I felt a need to help those people. I didn't think about what they were
or who they were. I felt obliged, I felt it as a duty—and I feel obliged to continue that work.
I love those people, and they love me. And in a weird way, it is a wonderful experience. I
don't know, it gives me great fulfilment. I feel that I do something useful, at least in a small
way. I try to work on a small part of all that ['svega toga']—as much as I can.'
Sabina and many others like her had only become active in a women's organisation, or
indeed in any kind of social initiative, because of the war in Croatia. This was a
common narrative: a sort of alarm had gone off when the violence erupted, giving rise
to a need to do something. Although this was the case for men as well, it seemed to be
more common amongst women. Again, this highlights the reactive nature of the whole
process, something which came home to me when many of these women told me they
were not even really interested in gender issues before the war.
Vesna told me that previously she would never have called herself a feminist. In the
early I 990s she had become interested in the legal side of issues of violence, domestic
and non-domestic. Also, it had been hard to find employment in her field (engineering),
and she had worked in a women's shelter on a semi-voluntary basis. During my
fieldwork, Vesna juggled two jobs. In addition to her full-time position as an engineer in
a state firm, she became increasingly active in the women's centre. In this way, her
interest in feminist issues grew, and she is now a self-employed NGO-activist with
special expertise in women's groups. Her motivation was strongly gendered: the only
reason why she had the energy to do this, she said, was because it was really
important to her as a woman. For other kinds of NGO work, Vesna argued, she simply
didn't have the energy, as it was hard enough to survive.
In contrast to Vesna, who came from a rather traditional Serbian, outspoken anti-
communist family, Martina was a Beograd academic with a strongly pro-Yugoslav
background. She said that, like many other women, she had become a feminist by
coincidence. Before, she hadn't been very much into women's issues, but it had
become important with nationalism and the war. It was something they could hold on
to, Martina said. Something we could hold on to. For many, the very need to engage in
acts of solidarity was embedded in a wider need for continuity (AndriO-Ru±ió 1997:7).
The narrative break represented by the war and rampant nationalism was partly
overcome precisely by tackling it head on. In that sense, continuity as a 'normal, caring
individual' was reconstructed. Throughout this process, feminism and one's identity as
woman became important for them.
However, unlike for Martina, for others feminism was an important part of strongly
developed, concrete lines of continuity with the pre-1991 situation. A whole series of
prominent women who had been active in alternative women's groups during the
former regime functioned as midwives to the anti-war movement. Not all of these
pioneers would call themselves feminists, but it was striking that many had a personal
history of engagement in the previous feminist movement. In the words of a Zagreb
core-activist:
'I remember the summer of 1991. The heat and the oppressive feeling of anxiety. I also
remember having this need to do something, a need that felt like a pain in my stomach.
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The space we worked in, we breathed in, the space we had been building for years,
began to dissolve, shrink, and disappear. During that humid summer it became
completely clear to me that all we had built by way of Green Movements and Women's
Groups was sinking from day to day. In 1991 we talked about war with disbelief. The word
war still had the taste of something that could not possibly happen. Even if a lot of blood
had already been shed [...]. Everything indicated that it would be a bloody war, but
somehow, we could not believe that it was going to happen to us. Us of all people. Like
with cancer. Why us, why now?
[. . .1
It was important for us to remain steadfast in protecting our values, in spite of pressures.
[...] It is important to preserve and to explore this different path and to save this life
experience of refusing violence [...]. It was important to promote human rights in times of
irrationality, because the idea that human rights were universal and indivisible must
always be promoted. [...] There were both women and men among us. There were,
however, more women. Maybe it was easier for us to choose non-violence. As the eternal
"other", we can better understand that problems cannot be solved with violence. We are
constantly beginning something, like endless housework. It is as if the routine of repeating
the ritual of cleaning is our direction. We are constantly glueing together pieces of broken
cups. We are eternally creating things from nothing, sometimes dinner, sometimes a
painting, and sometimes relationships and threads of communication within a locl
community.'
(Terelië 1997:19-21)
In dissident initiatives, often favouring a feminist framework, women found each other
in order to bridge the sudden narrative break between before and after which had
overcome them. This break, i.e. the wars and nationalism, was represented not only as
something that could have been prevented, as man-made, but also as made by men. If
the discontinuity was masculine/patriarchal, then strategies of continuity could be
constructed as feminine/feminist. Such self-positioning allowed for the individual
reconstruction of biographies and for a sense of solidarity, often including an emphasis
on bonds between women. By linking up their feelings, ideas and actions with women
around them, they engaged in a re-assertion of their own biography, which might not
have been possible otherwise.
6.3. narratives of continuity II: Yugoslav legacies and global strategies
Interestingly, the bonds between women activists often involved linkages which
transcended the frontlines between the post-Yugoslav states. More than most other
dissidents, women's organisations went to lengths in order to maintain networks of
solidarity on a pan-Yugoslav scale. Contacts were frequent and intensive, and many
personal friendships between feminists from different republics existed. At an
academic-activist gathering in Ljubljana, middle-aged Beograd feminist, Dura, used
her own example to clarify some of these issues. She said she had come to realise that
she and many of her friends didn't have a motherland anymore, and that they would
never have one again. Travelling all the way through Hungary to Ljubljana, a city that
she had visited so often before, had been like tracing her life story,Dura told us. She
had come to meet people who were feminists and pacifists, and she believed that their
feminism was immune to nationalism. On occasions like this, she argued, they created
a space to develop their identity as women.
Although a pan-Yugoslav network of feminist solidarity was prominent in the critique of
nationalism, not everybody felt comfortable with the overlapping of anti-nationalism and
identification along Yugoslav lines. In reaction to discourses of 'Former Sisters Unite'
(see Feministiãke sveske 1994; 1996:7-35; 1997:15-106), many feminists from Zagreb
felt that their colleagues from Beograd had it wrong. Relentlessly emphasising their
pan-Yugoslav sense of belonging, they argued, resulted in an idealised image of
Yugoslavia, replicating some of the vices of nationalist identification (Kne±evió
1995b:5-6; s.d.). Monika, a Zagreb feminist who had always identified as a Yugoslav
before, expressed it like this in an interview:
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'All other identifications became unacceptable. They caused unease. And Jugoslavenstvo
had become some empty thing but very powerful and manipulative, which allowed you to
hide from questions. Saying you were a Yugoslav, in those circles, meant you were a
priori against war, against violence, against.., you know. It became manipulative and
superior, falsely superior...'
Despite divisions over the status of Yugoslav identification, a tight network of women's
groups spanned the post-Yugoslav states. However, again it must be said that
continuity wasn't always that straightforward. Some contacts were maintained and
intensified from before the break-up of the former state, but many others only
originated after the start of the wars. In other words, for many feminist activists,
particularly younger ones, the creation of tight borders between the post-Yugoslav
states had the paradoxical effect of creating strong bonds between women of different
republics who did not previously know each other. This sometimes led people to
ironically appreciate that it was only thanks to the war that had they made so many
friends in the 'enemy' republic.
Again, continuity was not necessarily the maintenance of pre-existing networks of
friends and colleagues, but could also mean the creation of new ones. It allowed the
activists to engage with like-minded people and, as I was told so many times, 'to stay
normal'. For example, in an interview with a Beograd feminist, I asked whether she had
much contact with people in other post-Yugoslav republics. Her answer was immediate
and without a shred of doubt:
'Of course! Of course! God, I don't know what I would do without them. I even think I have
more contact now than before. I would go mad without them! It's the only way to stay
normal.'
For many women, gender identity and solidarity played a crucial role in these networks.
This was not only visible through the prominence of feminist discourse, but also by the
tangible presence of non-Yugoslav feminists. Feminism was then constructed as a
global discursive strategy, as became clear in this excerpt from an interview with Vera,
a long-standing Zagreb feminist:
'From the beginning of the war, a new world has opened for me. And it is amazing to see
how quickly I have actually forgotten about the things I felt I belonged to before. Now I
feel I am really part of an international women's movement. Some sort of [laughs]
"Feminist International". That is actually my only sense of belonging now: the civil and
women's scene in Croatia and on a global level.'
Reflecting this global approach, carrying banners with slogans like 'Albanian women
are our sisters', many Women in Black demonstrations would also refer to other, non-
Yugoslav issues. For example, they expressed support for Argentinian mothers of the
'desaparecidos' and for women in the Israel/Palestine conflict.
7. autobiography and safe spaces
One feature of the feminist critique of nationalism in the post-Yugoslav states was its
enormous output of written work. I have argued before that the I 990s could be seen as
a period of intensified narrativity for many people in Serbia and Croatia. Narrative
provided one possible means, an important one, to engage in the reconstruction of
one's biography. Positioning themselves as feminists, many women engaged in
speaking and writing about the interrelation of public and private issues in their lives,
and whole libraries could be filled with the publications that came out of this. Through
autobiographical statements, feminists rewrote both the official versions of the wars,
and the role of women under the nationalist regimes, whereby agency was recovered
from under the ashes of victimisation (Jansen 1998a).
In order to do so, they created 'safe spaces' where they were protected from war and
nationalism. In the words of a Zagreb activist again:
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'By promoting the values of non-violence and the protection of human rights, we were
building and expanding our civil space. A space in which we could breathe and work. A
space in which we could be ourselves and where we could create new relationships and
projects and live our lives defying the violent demands of the state. The energy of many
activists often goes into the mere preservation of space, and not into the widening of
circles, because the efforts of resistance are so great that sometimes we do not have the
strength to create and can keep a small light, just enough to keep it for some other, better
times.'
(Tereliã 1997:21)
Those spaces, which could be permanent (for example campaigning offices) or
temporary (for example on Summer meetings), were remarkably different from 'wider
society'. Here, the struggle against nationalism and war had brought people from
different nationalities together rather than divided them. Feelings of anxiety or fear
because of nationality were irrelevant or approached in a different way. Ironically, in
these circles, those present could temporarily let go of their sensitivity to issues of
hatred and discrimination, precisely because they were safe spaces. In the public
sphere it was considered so utterly normal to make exciusionist statements about
national Others, that activists would go to great lengths attempting to refrain from this.
But in those specific contexts it was okay, you could make a painful joke because you
knew that it wasn't meant offensively by anyone.
To some extent the creation of such safe spaces resulted in a certain ghettoisation of
the feminist movement (and of anti-nationalist initiatives in general). We are talking
here about a very small group of people, united in their critical stance towards the
nationalisms that were considered common sense in their countries. However, it was a
bizarre kind of ghettoisation, ranging well across borders and connecting people from
all over the post-Yugoslav area and beyond. This relative separation from the rest of
society was regretted because of the lack of effectiveness, but it was also seen as
necessary. There was a need for such spaces where 'you could be who you were' and
where the pressure was off for a while. Again, this allowed people to reconstruct their
biographies and to position themselves in the face of the narrative break they had been
confronted with by the wars.
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[chapter ten]
Jugonosta/ga
I know that I have lost so many things
I cannot count them,
and I know that, in fact,
those things are now what is mine.
Jorge Luis Borges
it's so hard to dance that way
when it's cold and there's no music
well your old hometown is so far away
but, inside your head there's a record
playing, a song called
hold on, hold on
you got to hold on
Tom Waits - Hold On1
Throughout this study I have explored the ways in which people deployed post-
Yugoslav anti-nationalist discursive practices in order to position themselves in relation
to the changes they experienced during the 1990s. In particular, I have uncovered
patterns in the ways in which individuals established a non-dominant sense of
continuity within their biographies in order to cope with what was experienced as a
defining narrative break. In a situation of heightened narrativity, this entailed a close
look at the contested discursive strategies of remembering and forgetting.
In this chapter, I analyse the mechanisms that structured narratives of self in relation to
memories of former Yugoslavia, particularly with regard to remembered Yugoslav
identification, the sense of a common Yugoslav 'home', and the role therein of popular
culture and everyday life memories. In relation to the critical reinterpretation of the
changing significance of national identities, this results in a re-appraisal of the
controversial notion of Jugonosta!g(/a: first questioning its conventionally assumed
political nature; then re-inscribing it with the possibility of another personal-political
meaning.
1. (anti-)nationalism and the politics of remembering and forgetting
If nationalism's rise to dominance in Croatia and Serbia could be represented as a
narrative break for most citizens, the evaluation of this break varied widely from person
to person. I have argued above how anti-nationalist practice was often articulated with
a general discourse of loss. Even when not directly affected by violence, many people
in the capitals felt they had lost out on the changes not only economically (through the
loss of jobs, income, material goods) and socially (through the loss of networks of
social influence, relations, friends), but also emotionally. It is this last aspect I wish to
turn to now, the sense of mourning that characterised much post-Yugoslav anti-
nationalism. Many people experienced the 1990s as a decade of loss: loss of security,
hope, beliefs, ideals and, in some cases, homeland.
By far the most common form of dealing with these losses was through a near-
complete withdrawal into the private sphere and a fierce resistance to its being tainted
1 Tom Waits, from the album Mule Variations © 1999 Anti/Epitaph.
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by 'politics'. Numerous people—young and old, highly educated and not, male and
female—emphasised time and again that they 'never watched the news nor read any
newspapers'2 . This was especially the case in Serbia, where even after the wars
propaganda and a siege rhetoric reached such improbable proportions that almost
noone could take the regime messages seriously anymore. The withdrawal from the
public realm was often rationalised by recourse to the language of health and illness:
people said they were 'trying to keep healthy'; they saw society as having been
'infested'; and they 'did not wish to be contaminated', Of course, excluding 'politics' and
all things 'national' from the private sphere was a practice only partially accessible to a
limited number of people, clearly more feasible for those in the capitals than for those,
say, in ethnically cleansed areas.
A small minority of people in Beograd and Zagreb engaged in organised counter-
intiatives such as NGO's, independent media or solidarity campaigns. In this way, some
of the losses were directly compensated for by new jobs (usually funded from abroad),
networks, travel opportunities and, importantly, new friendships with peoplewho had, in
their view, 'remained normal'. Some of these people resisted any sense of national
identification at all while others articulated alternative forms within the national canon,
infusing it with individualism, urbanity, feminism, European-ness, cultural capital and so
on. In this way, there was a repositioning in relation to a shift in the dominant discourse:
old issues required changing attitudes and new issues required new responses.
Memory played a crucial role here. We have seen how the dominant nationalisms put
forward a two-fold approach with regard to narratives of the past. On the one hand they
relied to varying extents on amnesia in relation to the Yugoslav era—albeit, in the
Serbian case, in an extremely ambiguous way. On the other hand they articulated
selective rememberings of the Yugoslav and pre-Yugoslav past, presented as
suppressed memories, in a discourse of resistance. This shift seemed to pose few
problems for many members of the former nomenklatura, who had converted to
nationalism almost overnight, or even for many 'little people'. In the words of writer and
critic Dubravka Ugreiô:
'Konvertitstvo ['being a convert', 'converting]' is not an ideological program, but a program
for survival—that's why it is so natural [...]. Nobody remembers anything [...]. People say,
shocked, 'Oh but he changed!'. Someone changing position elicits positive reactions: sin,
confession, sin, confession. Because only idiots ['budale'] don't change. Making an error
is human. In that way, on the level of everyday life, small substitutions take place for
what's missing on the collective plan: catharsis. We did everything; we destroyed
communism; we created a state; we got rid of the Serbs; 'our boys' are in power; we are
free in our own land rsvoj na svome']—but catharsis is missing...'
(Feral Tribune 05/10/98:38-39)
This attitude, for Ugreió, is a licence to escape responsibility and it feeds political
infantilisation because, in the end, the 'father' is always to blame, never the 'little
people' (ibid. :39).
'The (wo)man in the street', I would argue, responded to official amnesia and re-
interpretation in a variety of ways. Some people embraced the nationalist discourses
enthusiastically and engaged in the rewriting of their own biographies in relation to the
Yugoslav past. Others explicitly refused to re'inquish what they saw as their Iegitciiate
narrative of the past. A large middle ground of reluctant acceptance emerged: these
people went with the flow, tried to pick up some gains along the way, but expressed
private doubt and scepticism. Their criticism was not usually overt, but they did
articulate certain elements of anti-nationalist discourse, particularly those related to
socio-economic issues. I found this pattern amongst many people in their forties and
fifties: they had lived all their lives in Yugoslavia, grew up in it, were schooled in it, built
a career in it. Many jumped on the bandwagon of nationalism but felt ambivalent about
2 For a discussion of a similar pattern in a very different context, see Hazan 1980.
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it, and kept looking back over their shoulder, as jumping meant reinforcing the narrative
break in their biographies.
2. blaming nostalgia: regimes and anti-nationalist altérité
How then did post-Yugoslav anti-nationalist discursive practice articulate narratives of
the past? I have demonstrated that, although anti-nationalism argued for change at the
level of society, individual narratives tended to converge upon the opposite pole of
continuity. This was mainly due to the conditioning influence of its counterpoints,
Serbian and Croatian nationalism. With nationalism almost monopolising the discursive
material concerning change and renewal, dissident discursive practice turned to
mundane memories of personal experience and everyday practice in order to develop
resistance strategies. Such an attitude reflected the general critique of collectivist
discourses in post-Yugoslav anti-nationalism (Deviá 1997) and reinstated the possibility
of linear patterns of narration and personal responsibility counteracting what was seen
as nationalist conformism.
Stepping out of this conformism could be enacted in many different, minute ways, and it
is certainly not my intention to list them here. We have seen how certain issues,
declared undesirable by the new nationalist regimes, were still cherished as one's own.
Others began to be proclaimed one's own precisely as a result of having been
demonised. This resulted in an uncomfortable situation for anti-nationalist discursive
practice: intuitively, dissident memory was bound to recover positive rememberings of
Yugoslav times, but few people were willing to defend the authoritarian policies of the
former regime. It is in this context that I introduce the controversial notion of
JugonostaIga.
Etymologically, nostalgia derives from the Greek words nostos ['return'] and algos
['pain']. However, in both Serbia and Croatia, the term was used very frequently in
conjunction with the prefix 'Jugo-', virtually always as an insult. Deploying the term
Jugonostalgj/a had become a shortcut for nationalist discourse to denounce dissident
ideas and practices alike, regardless of whether or not they actually referred to Titoist
times in any nostalgic way. Labelling someone a JugonostalgiOar(ka) was a dominant
strategy that precluded any debate, for it discredited whatever argument might have
followed to the point of irrelevance. For example, the Zamir ['For Peace'] electronic
network, which formed a crucial link between anti-nationalist initiatives in different
republics during the wars, was regularly attacked on this basis. The Croatian regime
paper Vjesnik deplored its existence and denounced it as project of Jugonostalgicari
aiming for the recreation of the common state. Vjesnik expressed particular concern
about the fact that most of Zamir's activists were foreign-funded youngsters, rather than
'Partisan fossils' from whom such nonsense was to be expected (Arkzin 14/04/97:2).
For obvious reasons, the term Jugonostalg(/a was more frequently used in Croatia,
where a less ambiguous official amnesia reigned than in Serbia, at least rhetorically. In
fact, Jugonostalgiãar(ka) was one of the favourite collective labels thrown by Croatian
nationalism at anyone dissenting, since it acted as a cover-all for 'officer's kids', 'the red
bourgeoisie', 'mixed marriages' and 'leftists'. It is ironic that Franjo Tudman should have
been a main proponent of the practice of denouncing people asJugonostalöari(ke). He
himself had been a high ranking officer in the WWII Partisan Army, the director of a
communist historical institute and the president of one of the greatest symbols of
Yugoslavness, the army-run football club Partizan Beo grad. His children were clearly
'officer's kids' and he had several grandchildren born of a mixed marriage...
In any case, following the logic of so many instances of terminological power struggles,
the label JugonostaIg/a was quickly appropriated by those targeted. Always clouded in
polysemy and never adding up to a structured counterdiscourse, Jugonostalg(/a was
invested with some semantics of resistance. Most often it was used reflexively in an
ironic way. In what follows, I attempt to disentangle some layers of the term's meaning
and its subversive relevance as part of anti-nationalist discursive practice. Throughout
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this analysis it will become clear that JugonostaIga was not a monolithic notion but that
it consisted of patterns of strategic remembering deployed in many different ways.
3. disentangIig Yugoslav identity and some of its discontents
3.1. Yugoslav identity, the census and ambiguity
Although one might assume that one of the most straightforward ways to approach the
issue of Jugonostalg(ja would be through an analysis of people's ongoing adherence to
a Yugoslav identity, this seems to complicate matters even further. I have argued in
Chapter Three that the notion of a Yugoslav identity was complex and that it could not
be placed on the same level as strictly national labels. A major problem for any
retrospective analysis is that the information about the label of a Yugoslav identity relies
mainly on strictly declarative data such as census records. Organised every ten years,
the censuses allowed people to opt for the category 'Yugoslav, nationally
undetermined' (rather than, for example, 'Croatian' or 'Serbian'). This was a
contradictory Titoist attempt to allow for ambiguity while at the same time wanting to
contain it in a neatly demarcated box. Only a minority of citizens chose to declare
themselves in this way, but nevertheless, it accounted for more than a million people in
1981. It was generally assumed that certain social groups were overrepresented in this
category—for example, Party officials, professional soldiers, certain cultural and
academic professionals, children of 'mixed' marriages and members of their families
(Schopflin 1993:186-187)—but Yugoslav identification was certainly not restricted to
them (Drakulié 1993a:238).
In any case, I would argue that statistical records of those who declared themselves as
'Yugoslays' hold very little information about people's actual experiences. Firstly, in line
with the argument in Chapter Six, this label could mean a variety of things. What was a
mere administrative answer to an official question for one person could hold a sense of
territorial belonging for another. Moreover, the Yugoslav label could imply an
ideological stance or perhaps represent nothing more than a joke for others. Of course,
it could also evoke a combination of two or more of these possibilities. Secondly,
because the Titoist regime did not intend 'Yugoslav identity' to supersede national
identities such as 'Serbian' or 'Croatian', people saw these categories not necessarily
as exclusive, even if they were only allowed to tick one option. From the narratives
gathered during my fieldwork it appears that many people who had not officially
declared their primary identification as 'Yugoslav' in the census had not therefore
rejected it. Many had felt that Yugoslavness also formed part of their everyday lives,
like Croatian-ness or Serbian-ness, and a whole range of other positionings in relation
to discourses of belonging.
We have seen how after the end of Titoist Yugoslavia the notion of a Yugoslav identity
became even more complex, since the Miloevió regime articulated a discourse that
conflated Serbian nationalism and Yugoslavism. While the precise nature of the
resulting hybrid was never spelled out, this did not prevent the Beograd regime and its
satellites from forcing a campaign of radical disambiguation on those who were
supposed to belong to their own constituency (weeding out 'bad' Serbs) and, of course,
on national Others (ethnic cleansing). With the new, shrunken federation called
'Yugoslavia' and with MiloeviO claiming full successor rights to the former state, the
notion of 'Yugoslavness' featured in many struggles between regime discourse and
certain anti-nationalist forms of dissidence. A large number of Beograclani, including
many who were critical of nationalism, maintained that they had always been
Yugoslays in the former state and that they continued to be so after its break-up. The
Croatian situation was very different. The whole notion of Yugoslavness was
completely marginalised in Zagreb, although we shall see later that it did sometimes
play a different role on a submerged level within everyday lives.
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3.2. salvaging Yugoslav identity in Beograd
In an attempt to disentangle the ways in which notions of a Yugoslav identity were
articulated with anti-nationalism, let us first consider some self-proclaimed Yugoslav
Beogradani. Our point of entry is a set of narratives taken from interviews with
prominent Beograd dissidents.
Rajko was a middle-aged social scientist with an impressive range of critical
publications behind his name. Although he had recently focused increasingly on his
academic work, which was also strongly anti-nationalist, he had been one of the first
dissident intellectuals to go public in the early 1990s. Throughout the war years he had
become a key person in the contacts between Beograd dissidents and their Western
colleagues. Sharp, well-dressed and witty, Rajko received me in the flat he shared with
his West-European partner and thousands of books. The place was communist-style
on the outside and cultural elite-style on the inside. During the interview I asked him
how he introduced himself to foreigners when abroad. He replied:
'I am part of an endangered species. I am ... a Yugoslav, from Yugoslavia. But, you know,
I always have to explain more than that. Because I don't mean the present Yugoslavia:
My Yugoslav identity simply refers to my biography. I ..., you know, I grew up in that
country.'
Jasmina, who knew Rajko from anti-nationalist initiatives, was slightly younger than
him. For more than a decade she had worked for the Yugoslav administration in
Western Europe. Chic and equally witty and well-dressed, she was the main figure of a
Beograd human rights organisation, known for her biting pen. Jasmina was extremely
well-versed in dissidence and had the reputation of being a ferocious critic of
nationalism, even to the extent that she was disliked by some of her colleague-activists
for being negative and elitist. I met her in the professionally equipped offices of her
organisation and asked her the same question. As a person who was often publicly
accused of Jugonostalgija, she laughed at first and then answered:
'Well... well, that is... well, for me, I always say I am from Beograd. I am from Beograd,
from Serbia. Because I don't perceive this to be Yugoslavia; it's just a working title for ...
don't know for what... for Greater Serbia, or ... Miloeviô is just using it for political
reasons, he is playing a game with the name. That's because he is trying to avoid
responsibility, because he blames all the others for secession. But it is really unrealistic:
we are living in Serbia, and it is a... I myself sort of grew up as a Yugoslay . I worked in
Yugoslav institutions, and I really felt like a Yugosla y . I still feel like that but I don't say it
because it can be misjudged. Because when you're from Beograd, it can always be
equated with, you know, some hegemonic Serbs, or unitaristic Serbs, or... you know, it
always means Greater Serbia. So I need to explain my emotions relating to what I really
feel by being a Yugoslay . So I don't say it, I just say I am a citizen of ... eh... Serbia, or
"this country", or whatever, It is... eh... I don't deny it, I don't think that people who feel
Serb, Croat or anything else, that there is something wrong about it. It's only... it just
happened that I grew up as a Yugoslav [laughs]. This is eh... this is my identity, I really
felt that the whole country was the country in which I... which I belonged to and where I
came from.'
Yet another evocation of the same Yugoslavness came from Veljko, again a social
scientist. Amongst other things, Veljko was the organiser of a series of academic
conferences on issues of nationalism and its alternatives. He was an outspoken critical
intellectual. I interviewed him in his office, while his visiting daughter, who studied
abroad, hung about in the room. So, how did Veljko introduce himself to foreigners
when abroad?
'Listen, I always declared as a Yugoslay . I always wrote down "Yugoslav", and still today,
that is what I write. I am a Yugoslay. And I have no intention of distancing myself from
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that, although I know very well that the state in which I live now is not the state that
generations of people in the Balkans have dreamed about. However,.., seventy years
existence of a common state has left some traces as well. Maybe I feel a little bit now like
a man, like.., as if I were born in Vienna, lived my life in Vienna during the Austro-
Hungarian empire and then lived to see 1918. Probably they felt something similar to what
I feel now, or you know, probably, I feel the way they felt. I fall into that circle of so-called
Jugonostalgiãari, whom all ideologues of these new ex-Yugoslav states regard with great
suspicion as dinosaurs. But, you know, I think dinosaurs are not such terribly
unsympathetic animals and I have nothing against being one.'
As I have argued throughout this study, declarative acts of identification are not always
per definition the most relevant aspects of people's experience of self. Perhaps people
do not automatically engage with issues of national and other categorical identification
at all in their everyday lives. They might do so only when they see the context in which
they find themselves as one that demands such positioning. Of course, the situation in
the post-Yugoslav states was characterised by an almost undeniable pressure to define
oneself in national terms. If the violence and repression were directed precisely at
disambiguating social patterns in the region, it was to be expected that a large amount
of dissident energy was invested in a struggle to retain some ambiguity. Or, to put it in
Laclau and Mouffe's terms (1985): a struggle was waged to preserve certain elements
in their quality as elements in order to prevent their being articulated into nationalist
discourses of oppression as moments. Previous chapters have explored some
mechanisms of people's mundane attempts to preserve ambiguity, and I come back to
this issue later in this chapter.
However, the three narratives above indicate that by refusing to leave Yugoslavness in
the hands of the regime, these Beograd dissidents attempted to salvage what they
perceived as their legitimate sense of belonging in a rather categorical way. In
response to the official versions of past and present, they articulated the notion of a
Yugoslav identity into a counterdiscourse. In an interesting twist to the story, these
outspoken critics of the regime's nationalism seemed to be aware of the fact that they
recreated certain discursive elements which figured prominently in the nationalism they
opposed. Again, this has to do with everyday experience. On one evening in Beograd,
my flatmate Goran and I talked about his memories of life in former Yugoslavia. After a
brief silence, he suddenly turned to me and told me that, now that he thought about it,
maybe he was a Jugonostalgiöar. Apologetically, he added that he had simply grown
up 'in that country'. It had been part of everyday experience and one didn't really think
about it in those days. When I remarked that a large majority of people engaging in
Beograd NGO's were middle-aged, Goran's partner Vesna, herself a young activist,
said that this was not so surprising. Most of these people, she argued, had grown up
when Yugoslavia was looking pretty promising—when it had 'really existed'. In that time
they had considered it their country and for them, Vesna said, it had been a self-evident
way of life. When that country disappeared, they had suddenly found themselves left
with nothing. This was one of the reasons, she thought, why middle-aged people were
more involved in NGO's. As Veljko, one of the three Beograd intellectuals above,
declared:
'It was when I was a kid at school, asked to say what I was, that I realised that I am in fact
a Yugoslav, and that all these other designations—that I am a Bosnian, that I am a
Serb—that these things had no meaning to me whatsoever. And from then on I wrote
systematically that I was a Yugosla y . It's interesting that most of my colleagues and
friends did the same. That was the way it was felt. And when you look at the war of today,
it is said that there was genocide. Depending on the propaganda, some will say genocide
against the Serbs, some will say against the Croats, some will say against the Muslims.
And in all that there is some truth. However, there exists a big genocide nobody talks
about: the one against the Yugoslays. In Yugoslavia, there were 1 .6 million Yugoslays.
Today there is not one statistic which accounts for a single one of them. That means that
one took away the right to identity from 1 .6 million people in the Balkans. That's about the
196
same number as there are Slovenes. Imagine how it would have been if all Slovenes
were stripped of their identity... [...] This was done to all Yugosla ys, you know, to people
in mixed marriages, to children from these marriages and so on. They are completely...
they are condemned to be people without identity. And that is our... a part of our tragedy,
which of course at this moment, in relation to the scale of material damage, the number of
human victims, dead, wounded, displaced, refugees, is not paid much attention to. But it
will remain a part of the tragedy and the tragic consequences of this war.'
And, indeed, when scanning the narratives of Beograd 'Yugosla ys', I found it striking
how often they argued that their Yugoslavness was something 'simply there', something
beyond their control, something, well.., essential. The same pattern arose in other
interviews, for example with Dubravka.
'Where am I from? That is certainly a very complicated question; that question touches
upon remembering and opens a whole series of new questions. I say I am from Beograd,
and then I explain that that is in Yugoslavia. And because my biography is what it is, I
cannot deny that I am a Yugoslay . [...] All people here who are over ten years old were
born in Yugoslavia. Nowadays, that country doesn't exist anymore, definitively. And
probably it won't anymore... it won't exist anymore. Of course, there are people who have
memories and people who don't have them. [...] But that question is an emotional
question as well of course. I mean I will never be able to say "I am not a Yugoslav" and I
am not afraid of... that they may say that I am a JugonostalgiOarka. But that is not
Jugonostalg(/a, that is a way in which a person has lived for most of her life. I mean I
cannot just cease to attach value to something,... something which is a constitutive idea
of your biography. [...] But it is completely legitimate that I feel that way. You understand?'
(Dubravka, a leading dissident artist - interviewed in her theatre)
A similar comment came from Martina, a feminist and a critical intellectual. Previously,
she and her family had lived on the cultural-intellectual circuit spanning Beograd and
Zagreb. While she had settled in Beograd with the children, their father, a dissident of
Dalmatian Croatian background, permanently lived in Zagreb. Over coffee in one of the
city's more trendy jazz bars, Martina argued:
'I suppose what I am living now is a post-Yugoslav identity. That is my only identity; I have
nothing else. [...] But that does make you wonder about the future... Our children are
really fucked up. What will happen to them? Now they are small and they don't really
know what's going on. But when they start asking... I don't know what I'll do. The problem
is that I know I cannot take it myself. I cannot cope with it.'
Such narratives suggest that Yugoslav identity was something that could not be
avoided even if one wanted to. These people argued that they were Yugoslays, and
that they needed this identity. Yugoslavness, they implied, was a crucial orientation
point in their lives, for it related to the context in which they had become who they were.
Despite the confusion surrounding the notion during and after the wars those people
attempted to retain it as fixed point to cling onto in their personal narratives. Clearly,
such a discursive mechanism reflected certain patterns central to nationalist discourses
of identification and was often in conflict with the wider anti-nationalist emphasis on
individual freedom, voluntarism and responsibility3. Ironically, while these dissident
stories of Yugoslavness encapsulated an opposition to the horrors brought about by
nationalist essentialisms, they actually articulated a number of elements into moments
of a counterdiscourse of essential identification, not unlike those nationalisms.
In this sense, it is debatable whether all those people had felt so strongly about their
Yugoslav identity before. Parallel to what I have argued about the 'simply there' status
of national identification in many pre-war everyday lives (Chapter Six), I am not so sure
whether Yugoslavness had played such a prominent role. My doubt extends to those
We come back to this point later, when discussing the retrospective conflation of 'Yugoslavness' and Westerness in
many anti-nationalist narratives.
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who, when petitioned in the state census, declared their Yugoslav identity as the
primary one. The narratives above indicate that for some people, because of its
controversial position, the significance of the Yugoslav label had increased during the
last decade, in a similar way to that in which national labels had for others. Particularly
at the outset of the wars, this embracing of Yugoslav identification was prevalent
amongst Beograd dissidents and figured prominently in people's self-positioning
relating to the reigning nationalism. In the chapter on feminism, we have seen how this
sometimes led to irritation amongst dissidents in other republics, who felt that the label
'Yugoslav' evaded critical reflection by placing the individual in question on the moral
high ground. Those critics pointed out how, as a result of its own essentialism, the
assertion of Yugoslavness took on meanings that were not far removed from
nationalism, and therefore, had become 'Yugoslav nationalism'.
Although such a tendency was certainly present in some circles, qualification is needed
here. We should not forget that those 'Yugoslav' individuals were often rather lone and
outspoken critics of xenophobia and nationalism. They were marginalised by the new
regimes as traitors, fifth columnists and things much worse—particularly if they were
women. Moreover, since many were aware of the contradiction inherent in their
position, they were quick to deny its implications by disassociating Yugoslavness from
notions of ethnicity. In an interview in her office, Jasmina, the prominent human rights
activist, spelled it out for me:
'I lived too long in that country to change my identity now. There were many people in
Yugoslavia who felt Serbian or something but they were citizens of Yugoslavia. Well, in a
way, I... I felt like a Yugoslav national. But... you also have to distinguish that, you know,
there is a difference in the meaning of a being a national, in a... in France or the US,
where they're citizens of the nationality of France or of the US, whereas in this country
you are ethnically identified with a nation, nation equals ethnicity. [...] So it is not the
same: it's ethnic here.'
In this sense, the continuation of Yugoslav identification could be seen as an exercise
in 'strategic essentialism', in the way that it has been put forward, for example, by
feminists and Afro-American activists—perhaps most poignantly by feminist post-
colonial critics such as Spivak (1993:3-6).
3.3. strategies and labels of identification
The self-proclaimed Jugonosta!giöari described in the previous section were certainly
not the only people whose personal narratives of the past contained references to the
notion of Yugoslavness. However, many people approached this issue in different
ways. For example, for some, the rise of the respective nationalisms and the outbreak
of war had destroyed the relevance of their identification as Yugosla ys. In an interview
on a terrace opposite his flat, dissident writer and leading critic Slavko told me about
the current anti-Yugoslav climate and said:
'Of course there was something like a Yugoslav identity. And plenty of people attached a
strong meaning to that identity. But it was never really clear what it meant to people. [...]
At this moment I think it doesn't stand a chance. Maybe in ten or fifteen years; but now, no
way. You know, there is a name for people who like the idea of Yugoslav identity:
Jugonosta!giöari. That is what they call people who feel a kind of belonging to that idea.
Me, too, in some way. But it doesn't mean anything anymore.'
Others used the term 'Yugoslav' in a strategic way, in opposition to the MiIoevió
regime, while at other points employing the label 'Serbian' for similar reasons. When, in
an interview in her office, I asked Maja, a well-known human rights activist, how she
introduced herself to foreigners, she said:
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'At some point I used to say "I am from Serbia", and now I have come to say "from
Yugoslavia". But... well.., when Yugoslavia fell, I felt, let's say a kind of pain because it
fell, because everyone was leaving that Yugoslavia, it disintegrated. Anyway, only this
regime attempts to keep that name now, so I thought "I can't speak the same as this
regime". So I said "I am from Beograd, from Serbia". However, since last year, eh, what's
left, Serbia and Montenegro, they represent some, some very different Yugoslavia. [...]
Now, this "our" Yugoslavia, which is in fact Serbia and Montenegro, is nothing like the one
that existed. But maybe it is not bad that some trace remains, that there will remain some
people who call themselves Yugosla ys. For me personally... I like the fact that it is called
Yugoslavia, because... because the word Yugoslavia means that it is not Serbia, that it is
not a Serbian state, that it is not a country of one people, that... that..., you know, there is
no Yugoslav nation. And that... that is closer to sort of my expectation that others, for
example Kosovo Albanians will accept Yugoslavia. They will never accept Serbia,
meaning, the country Serbia [...], Serbia of the Serbian people. But Yugoslavia doesn't
have anything like that in its name; it doesn't have anything Serbian in its name.'
However, later Maja explained that:
'The first time I called myself a Serb, when somebody asked me, was in 1992, when the
war was on. It seemed to me that it was important, that the world knew, because it was all
seen under the sweep of nationality, also by the regime; ... so I thought it was important
that the world knew that Serbian-ness ['srpstvo'] is not something homogenous. That
there are differences within it. Before that, I never defined myself in terms of national
identity, because I always thought it was my private matter. What was it called again?
"Undetermined". That's what I said.'
On some occasions, such strategic deployment of identification labels was taken to
other levels, such as in the narrative of the eccentric middle-aged NGO activist Zarana.
I just walked in for a quick visit to the NGO where she worked, but she pinned me down
on a chair and lectured me for about an hour. Her argument would have caused fury
amongst most of her colleagues and certainly amongst those favouring more Serbian
or Croatian nationalist solutions.
'The biggest mistake in Yugoslavia was that there was no attempt to create a Yugoslav
national identity. The Americans did it—and that was a very, very smart move. I saw
these pictures of Americans carrying flags and wearing even trousers with the colours of
the flag. Now, of course, we couldn't do that. I mean... if we wore trousers with our flag
we would be fascists or so. But in the United States it is possible—and it could have been
the same here. [...] If they had only tried. They could have said "Okay, your origin is
Serbian or Croatian or whatever, but now you are a Yugoslav", like the Americans! [...] If I
were Tito—Tito was a totalitarian, wasn't he?—welI if I were a totalitarian, then I would do
what is expected from totalitarians: I would put them all in jail and I would say, "now you
all shut up about this nation and that nation [pulls faces], and about who had the biggest
empire in some ancient history, and about all these things". And I would say, "if you want
to be a Serb or a Croat or whatever, you can be that in your bedroom, but not out of it. As
soon as you come out, you're a Yugoslay . Because it will destroy the whole society..."
That's what I would do.'
However, that is not what Tito did, despite the allegations now made against him by
nationalists of different colours. His influence did, however, play a different role in some
forms of anti-nationalism—something we will turn to later.
In Zagreb, although to a much lesser extent, some dissident narratives were
constructed around similar strategic deployments of 'Yugoslav' and 'Croatian'.
However, the label 'Yugoslav' was much more thoroughly discredited in Croatia. After
all, more than a third of the republic had seceded and been ethnically cleansed with the
support of, and partly by, the 'Yugoslav' army. In the late 1990s, almost nobody with a
Croatian background ever declared a 'Yugoslav' identity, and the few people who I
heard explicitly do so in public were returning from life in exile. In contrast, amongst
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people with a Serbian or a nationally mixed background in Croatia, particularly middle-
aged people, the notion of a Yugoslav identity was fairly common. It is often forgotten
and conveniently ignored by the nationalist regimes that this had been the case before
the wars as well, with a large majority of Croatian citizens with a Serbian background
voting for the reformed Communist Party, not for the Greater Serbianists in the first
elections (Thompson 1992:129).
On the whole, it seemed to me that people with more or less unambiguous Croatian
backgrounds were very unlikely to assert their Yugoslav identity, even their former one,
as something 'self-evident'—as opposed to some of the Beograd narratives cited
above. Those who did recall how they used to think of themselves primarily as
Yugoslays often gave a more explicitly ideological reason. This is understandable given
the divergent relations between Yugoslavism on the one hand, and Serbian and
Croatian nationalism on the other. In the next section turn to such explicitly ideological
identifications with Yugoslavism. Later I demonstrate that more mundane memories
and recollections of Yugoslavness were not only present in Zagreb, but also used in the
articulation of anti-nationalist discourses—albeit in more submerged ways than in
Beograd. In fact, given the political constellation of 1990s Croatia, I would argue that
they provided more radical material for dissidence than in Serbia.
3.4. anti-fascism, ideology and the Yugoslav state
One of the frequent allegations levelled at self-proclaimed Jugonostalgiãari, and
generally against critics who continued to feel any sense of belonging to the notion of
Yugoslavness, was that they were simply disenfranchised members of the formerred
bourgeoisie. This was true for some, but in fact, many of the prominent activists against
the current nationalist regimes had been harassed, sacked or even jailed for dissident
activity under communism. They were keen to point this out, and by clearing the label
'Yugoslav' from stains of collaboration and accommodation with Titoist authoritarianism,
they reinforced both their position as critical outsiders and the status of Yugoslavness
as the possible core of a counterdiscourse. This is illustrated in this excerpt from the
interview with Veljko, a Beograd academic and long-standing dissident:
'You know, when they ask me what I am I answer that I am a Palestinian. And you'll say,
why a Palestinian in Europe? Because they took away the state from me in which I lived.
Eh, that was a state with a regime that I didn't agree with [before he had told me how he
was sacked from university for criticism of the regime, sj]. I absolutely do not yearn for
that regime, [...] but that state could have been a decent one. The fact that this wasn't the
case is due to the authoritarianism of both the first and the second Yugoslav regimes. [...]
I know a lot of people in all the new states of ex-Yugoslavia who didn't at all agree with
the war. Many of them are Yugoslays and maybe we didn't do enough to prevent the war,
but the question is whether we could do something to prevent it. But we know that we
haven't done anything that would provoke war or make it worse, and that we haven't in
any way taken part in the war propaganda or the war looting. At least that I know we
haven't done. It's not very much but it's also not little.'
Of course there were people whose attachment to Yugoslav identity could be explained
partly with reference to their previous status of privileged citizens. When we look at
those who engaged in the development of anti-nationalist alternatives, it is true that
many, though certainly not all, prominent figures came from families that had been
somehow privileged under the former regime. Interestingly, however, this was also the
case for many nationalist leaders, including high government officials: it seemed that
many of those who had belonged to the red bourgeoisie under the former regime, had
quickly acquired the cultural fluency to retain such positions in the new nationalist
order. My ethnographic material indicates that engagement in official institutions was
simply the way for ambitious individuals to get ahead in the former Yugoslav system. In
this engagement, ideological leanings were important for some, but only secondary for
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others, as illustrated by a set of life histories collected in Beograd during the last
decade of Yugoslavia (Magid 1991). Of course, dissidence existed in those days as
well; but it was limited, as was the possibility for any political action outside the realm of
the Party.
For a small and predominantly elderly minority, continuing adherence to an ideological
notion of Yugoslavness provided a nexus around which to construct an anti-nationalist
position. Of course, it could be argued that all the previous narratives in this chapter
contain such an element, but here I want to look briefly at those people whose
engagement with anti-nationalism was embedded in explicit rememberings of anti-
fascism. As we have seen, Titoist anti-fascism had been the touchstone of political
legitimacy in the former system to the extent that it functioned as an object of taboo. It
was precisely in the context shaped by this taboo that nationalist political programs
were considered not only undesirable, but also dangerous. After the wars, reference to
Titoist anti-fascism was very prominent in Bosnia, but in my fieldwork it was mostly
limited to elderly people, such as Branislav in Chapter Six. In order to illuminate the
danger of nationalism, he used terms resonant with Titoism. In this way, writer
Slavenka Drakuliô recounts how only after the end of Titoism did she feel closer to her
father, a Yugoslav communist who was now confronted with the 'futility of his life
frittered away by history' (1993a:73).
Again, in the late 1990s, this was much more common amongst people with Serbian
backgrounds, both in Beograd and in Zagreb, than amongst those with Croatian
backgrounds. In Beograd it was fairly self-evident for those Titoists who had resisted
Miloeviô's conflation of Serbian nationalism and Yugoslav communism to assert the
continuity of their Yugoslav identity. However, in Zagreb, again ambiguity crept in.
Many people who did align themselves explicitly with Titoist Yugoslavism did not
actually refer to themselves as Yugosla ys. Some had done so in the past, but
abandoned this practice with the wars; while others had never done so in the first place.
This was illustrated by Ankica, an eighty-plus year old anti-fascist activist. I visited her a
number of times in her flat in central Zagreb, and each time she would recall the
Partisan struggle and the idealism that had surrounded the building of the new
Yugoslavia. Ankica celebrated her Partisan past by continuing to use her nom de
guerre. She had always declared as a Croat and called herself a patriot. Ankica loved
her country and thought this was a duty of all of us. While she told me that she laughed,
because it was more common to hear such statements from her opponents, such as
leading HDZ figures. She recalled that when she went to Beograd for the first time,
immediately after the WWII victory, she was asked: 'Where are you from drugarica
['comrade (f)']?' And her answer had always been that she was a full-blooded
Dalmatian.
This statement came in the middle of a passionate plea for the relevance of Tito's
contribution. Ankica continued that despite the recent propaganda against the former
leader she had read in the paper that more than seventy thousand people had called in
to support Tito on a TV program, with only some twenty thousand against him. While
she admitted that the Marshall had made mistakes, she argued that he had contributed
many more positive things. Without Tito, Ankica claimed, they would never have gotten
Istra [region then contested by Italy, sf1 . When I pointed to a picture of Tito on the wall
and asked how people reacted to that nowadays, she laughed my question away.
People, even some from the HDZ, came around all the time and saw it.And whenever
someone would comment on it, she would proudly say: 'That is my war comrade'.
Ankica's story provided an example of the unproblematic compatibility of different
layers of national, supra-national and sub-national identification for many people in
former Yugoslavia: she defined herself as a Dalmatian and a Croat, and her whole
narrative was structured by her positioning as a YugoslavPartizanka. Interestingly, her
long exposés about the anti-fascist struggle and her participation in the Partisan war
effort permanently emphasised the patriotic meaning of this struggle. This patriotism
was felt in relation to Dalmatia, Croatia and Yugoslavia, depending on the enemy in
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question, for that was what almost every Titoist veteran brought home to me. For them
the Partisan struggle was about defending one's people and one's country (both on
different levels) against fascism.
This ideological sense of belonging to Yugoslavia had also been present amongst
younger people, often those born shortly after WWII. In Croatia and Serbia it surfaced
as a remembered discourse of identification in a range of anti-nationalist narratives that
articulated what could be called feminist and leftist concerns. I have mentioned some of
the resulting ambiguities in the previous chapter, particularly when analysing the
comments of activist intellectual Monika on feminism and internationalism. Vera was
another Zagreb feminist whom I met regularly on the NGO scene and on social
occasions. In a marathon interview in her flat, she elaborated on the relationship
between her political views and her remembered Yugoslav sense of belonging:
'Even before, when I identified with Yugoslavia, that wasn't like state identification. It was
a place of belonging but it was more an ideological identification.[. . 
.1 I mean, before that,
until I was about seventeen-eighteen, I was probably a Yugoslav patriot. I had a romantic
relation to the Yugoslav concept. Maybe because of my family background [her mother
had been a Partizanka, sj], maybe because what we learned at school, but also...
Mmmm, because I think that that Yugoslavia, at least in certain phases, was... you know
it was a, let's say an interesting concept. Those ideas were relevant and timely. I
mean... what does Europe want now? [laughs - Vera had a running joke with me being
'the man from the EU', sj] Well.., it wants what Yugoslavia was doing to a certain extent:
some multiculturalism, some real participation of the workers. I mean... there were some
good ideas there, like non-alignment and all... I did introduce myself in those days as a
Yugoslay . Of course, in sixty-eight I rationalised that and ... I relativised my patriotic
emotions. I mean... I wouldn't say that I am a citizen of the world, I don't know, that seems
banal and empty. But, you know... maybe I do feel as an... I don't know... as an apatrid.
In a certain way... I am an apatrid. So now I just say... "I am from Croatia"
It should be clear then that ideological Yugoslavness was not strictly related to territory.
In this way it is understandable that, in contrast to the suggestions within regime attacks
on so-called Jugonostalgiöari, very few people would argue for the resurrection of some
kind of Yugoslav state 4 . The remembering of 'Yugoslavness' did not include such an
argument: a resurrection of Yugoslavia was considered unrealistic, unfeasible and
undesirable by almost everyone. Even Ankica, the Partisan veteran, indicated this. She
had been through four different states (the first Yugoslavia, the Italian occupation in
Dalmatia, the second Yugoslavia and Croatia) and remained rather unphased by it. If
they didn't get along with the Serbs, she argued, then they had to split up. Okay, let's
have that independent Croatia, Ankica said, but there was no need to fight and kill and
burn because of it.
In a form of resignation similar to Ankica's, most self-proclaimed Jugonostalgiãari
agreed on the impossibility and undesirability of a renewed Yugoslav state. However,
they would often argue that a normalisation of relations between the new states was
important not just on the level of diplomacy, but also to them personally. Martina, the
feminist academic whom I interviewed in a café in Beograd, became very emotional
when she spoke about the changes in the last decade.
'I am definitely Jugonostalgiöarka. I'll tell you what ... you are now talking to ex-
Yugoslavia. That was the way I lived. Mind you, I am not nostalgic for the state. We could
have moved towards a loose customs union or something. To eight states or ten states, I
don't give a fuck. But ten states with weak borders, where I can easily travel from one
place to another. I mean, isn't that what they all want when they say they want to join
"This sheds a critical light on the Jugoparanoia of the Croatian government, which I touched upon in the chapter on
Balkan orientalism. The territoriality of former Yugoslavia did play an important role in a symbolic sense, as we shall
see in the next section.
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Europe? [vehemently] If that's what we wanted, we could have been there ages ago! All
this for nothing.., the whole war for nothing...!'
In a very experiential way, Martina, who used to commute between Beograd and
Zagreb had both her professional and her family life broken in two by the end of
Yugoslavia, which points to a spatial dimension which was present in many memories
of Yugoslavia (see Jansen 1998a; Paviôeviá 1994).
In what follows I take a closer look at some patterns of remembered Yugoslavness
which did not necessarily convey a continued assertion of a Yugoslav identity. Rather,
arguing that Yugoslav identification is only one possible way of connecting one's
personal narrative with a 'Yugoslav' discourse, I explore some everyday patterns of
Jugonostalg(ja in the widest meaning of the term. In a first movement, I look at the
appeal of a common Yugoslav cultural space that I have just touched upon. From there,
a second step takes us to the idea of Jugonostalg(ja as the assertion of mundane
memories of better days through processes of selective remembering. In a last
movement, I indicate that Jugonostalg(ja might derive much of its appeal not directly
from memories and narratives of the past, but from its role in a pervasive yearning for
the good life in the present. Throughout, I hope to demonstrate that, although we must
disassociate JugonostaIga from its alleged political ambitions to recreate a common
state, it does provide a range of discursive elements for political subversion on the
more mundane level, particularly through its articulation with anti-nationalist discursive
practice in popular culture and everyday life.
4. Jugonostalgija take one: 'at home' in a common Yugoslav cultural space-5
Most anti-nationalist narratives in Beograd and Zagreb contained references to the new
states and to former Yugoslavia in overlapping terms: at some points 'we' and 'here'
meant Croatia or Serbia, and at other points it referred to the whole Yugoslav area.
Even amongst people who did not feel any sympathy for the old Yugoslavia, there
would be a sort of concentric model with one's own state as the core, then the other
post-Yugoslav republics and only then 'abroad'. Record shops provide a good example.
In Serbia all music from the post-Yugoslav states was referred to as 'domaôa'
['domestic'] and in Croatia a similar situation existed, although Serbian music was
officially almost unavailable. In Slovenia, I visited a shop which had a 'domaôa'
['domestic'] shelf with Slovenian music and a 'bivsa domaóa' ['former domestic'] one
with Croatian, Bosnian, Macedonian and Serbian music. Generally when there were
foreigners present, the ex-Yugoslav collective category took front stage, and as I have
said before, I never heard anybody call citizens from other post-Yugoslav states
'foreigners', except ironically.
Even amongst a group of Beograd teenagers who had hardly experienced the common
state, 'foreigners' meant non-Yugoslays. They had been on a camp in 1994 bringing
together young people from all over Europe, and when I asked them about it they told
me that there had been problems because the post-Yugosla ys had been hanging out
too much with each other. They had constantly spoken in their own language, sang
their own songs and so on. The foreigners ['stranci'] had felt excluded. The post-
Yugoslav kids had realised that they wanted to continue socialising amongst
themselves, so the next year they had organised an exclusively post-Yugoslav camp.
Anybody who's been involved in organising such events knows that this was indeed a
problem with the post-Yugoslays sitting together, speaking 'their' language, listening to
'their' music and showing little interest in the 'foreigners'.
5 Elsewhere I have analysed the idea of the Yugoslav cultural space as 'home' in more detail, with special reference
to the work of a number of women writers during the wars (Jansen 1 998a).
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4.1. Yugoslav bodies in movement
Let us first look at the way in which many people experienced Yugoslavia as a common
cultural space through which they moved frequently and freely. This sense of 'being at
home' in a Yugoslav space did not exclude the simultaneous existence of other
discourses of belonging, as it might incorporate Serbian or Croatian national patterns or
be juxtaposed to those. Moreover, sometimes people positioned themselves in relation
to other cultural frameworks altogether, for example a local or a 'European' one. The
point is simply that people also, to a lesser or greater extent, drew on the Yugoslav
level: it was possible and attractive for many to imagine the federation as a cultural
space with a distinct Yugoslav character.
'Yugoslav culture was the common domain of different cultures and literary traditions
which interacted with each other. In practice, this meant that a Yugoslav writer had to
know both the Cyrillic and the Latinic alphabet; it meant you lived in Zagreb and had a
publisher in Beograd; it meant your books were printed in Sarajevo, and they were read in
Ljubljana, Skopje and Pritina. In practice, it meant you lived in different cultures and you
experienced them as part of yourself.'
(Ugreió 1995:51)
So, whether declaring their Yugoslavness or not, whether ideologically pro-regime or
not, whether nationally 'conscious' or not, many people simply felt 'at home' in
Yugoslavia (see for example Feral Tribune 14/12/98:4-7; Drakuliô 1993a:135).
This was partly reflected in actual bodily movement throughout the territory of the
former state. Many people from what could be called the urban middle classes owned a
house at the Dalmatian coast or in the mountains, often crossing (invisible) republican
borders to reach their property. Academics and professionals in the cultural sector, in
particular, occupied posts at universities or institutions in different republics. A
continuous flow of interrepublican information provided ways of creating audiences as
well as avoiding censorship; for example, government control in one republic could be
escaped by publishing in another (Slapak 1993:101). Likewise, students assessed
different application standards, strengths and weaknesses of institutions, and craftsmen
and traders ran businesses where market conditions seemed most favourable (ibid. :20-
21). Furthermore, in the world of sports and popular music, Yugoslavia functioned to a
certain extent as one market.
Amongst the people who feature in this study, those who had previously, in their words,
lived on the 'Zagreb-Beograd' or sometimes 'Ljubljana-Zagreb-Beograd' line6,
experienced this common Yugoslav 'home' most poignantly. I found this pattern
particularly amongst people who had been born shortly after WWII, often from families
with a Partisan background. Most of them were professionals in the cultural or
academic world and they would characterise their lifestyles as 'urban' and 'modern'.
Zagreb feminist Vera argued in an interview:
'Oh yes, Yugoslav culture existed for me. It existed... like, it existed in difference, in
diversity. You know, I lived in "contemporary" culture, if you want, not in what might be
called "traditional culture". [...] And, I always felt that I lived on the line Ljubljana-Zagreb-
Beograd. So that was a Yugoslav culture.'
Often, this experience of a common Yugoslav cultural space was mentioned as one of
the explanations for why the wars had been so horrific, because certain ties could only
be broken with extreme violence (see for example Nedeljna Na.a Borba 01-
02/03/97:VIll). In this way, memories of a Yugoslav 'home' became an element of a
political argument. The very act of asserting some sense of attachment to the Yugoslav
6 Again, this sheds a critical light on the tendency to retrospectively compare 'Croatian' and 'Serbian' experiences, an
exercise which would be unable to account for such 'hybrid' patterns.
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cultural space sometimes provided a mode of expressing opposition to the nationalist
regimes. For example, some Beograd-based human rights and civil society
organisations had adorned their offices with paraphernalia from different ex-Yugoslav
republics: a Zagreb number plate; a tourist board poster advertising Lake Bled in
Slovenia; a Macedonian flag and so on. You would certainly not find a Serb/an flag
here... However, as this chapter progresses, we shall see that more often the
remembered Yugoslav 'home' was not articulated in such an explicit way. Tamara, for
example, a Zagreb girl with Serbian background was only a child when the war started,
but in an interview she said:
'Then, when I was little, it was like.., my country was Yugoslavia. Because it was
completely normal for me that we spent a part of the summer at the coast, and another
part in Bosnia. That was completely normal to me. And we went there for Easter and
Christmas and so on... So it was... you know, for me that was simply the same country,
Bosnia and Croatia.'
A similar sense of broken-off self-evidence was expressed by two Beograd teenagers
in a double interview:
Darko: 'I think that the question is not really so much about whether a state has another
number of republics, like, less, and that, but simply that we suddenly are not
allowed to be in that other republic, that we have no way of... well we do, but... We
have to fill out forms for a visa and so on. And that was once your state, you simply
went to the seaside, it's not... it wasn't necessary to apply for a visa, to pay, to wait
and to see whether you would get it. And now you have to fill out what nationality
you are, which religion, which citizenship... You know, it is different when you
suddenly can't... ah, they are people who speak the same language, who have the
same songs...'
Veljko: '[interrupts].., they have the same names...'
Darko: '...the same names...'
In a similarly mundane way, Rade, who ran businesses that he never specified to me,
saw the former state as the background against which he had been travelling Europe
during at least two decades. I met Rade in the town of Pula, where he was helping a
friend to set up a bar-restaurant. We stayed up until late, and the conversation drifted to
'what it had been like', as it did so often in post-Yugoslav smoke- and bottle-filled
rooms. Born in Serbia with a Serbian background but living in Croatia, Rade spoke in
very sarcastic terms about Croatia. Fuelled by some alcohol, he fired of a tirade against
everything that had happened in the last decade. 'They wonder why I am a
Jugonosta!giöa?, he said and then went on to explain that he didn't miss the state but
yearned for good places and good times. Raising his voice, he said that he never got
drunk so brilliantly as in Novi Sad [in Vojvodina, Serbia, sj]. He just wanted them to
open up the borders, so he could go where he wanted.
With the end of Yugoslavia, on a practical level, travel became extremely difficult for
most inhabitants as legal obstacles and safety issues made border crossings
unfeasible. Administrative problems concerning state citizenship and residence status
affected large groups of people, particularly those with minority national backgrounds
and mixed ancestry. Many people expressed a certain yearning for the openness and
freedom to travel that had characterised the Yugoslav past—often while simultaneously
pointing out its authoritarian shortcomings. In this way, as we have seen, an important
part of anti-nationalist energy was invested in the maintenance, or even creation, of
links across the new post-Yugoslav borders.
Bodily movement between different centres in the former state was only one aspect of
the experience of a common Yugoslav cultural space, and maybe only a minor one on
the grand scale of things. As we have seen, it was crucially important to a number of
professionals in the cultural and academic sector many of whom left Yugoslavia during
the wars. For other people, particularly in Zagreb, its importance was relative given the
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fact that many only rarely left their republic, as opposed toBeograclani. This was mainly
to do with the fact that one of the central factors in the experience of a Yugoslav cultural
space, the Dalmatian coast, the great common Yugoslav summer 'home', was situated
mainly in Croatia. These three excerpts from interviews with Beogradanke from
different backgrounds indicate that:
'Yugoslavia was culturally very diverse. It was always on the margins of East and West,
on the border of great empires.., and it had a special flavour through that mixture. It really
functioned like that: Slovenia, the monasteries, Macedonia, Kosovo, and so on... And the
Dalmatian coast, in particular: a common piece of the country for most Yugoslays. So
many people spent their holidays there. We all spend two or three months on the coast
And especially students and young kids saw this as... You know, actually not many
people from Croatia came to Serbia, except maybe intellectuals. But most people went to
the coast. So this is really where most young generations met and made friendships and
so on. It was... that was maybe enough for building up some common identity or at least a
feeling of belonging to space. It is also a sense of identity that you belong to some sort of
a cultural space that you share with each other, that you exchange with each other. And,
of course it is very important to keep in mind that we understood each other, that the
language was the same.'
(Jasmina, a middle-aged human rights activist - interviewed in her office)
'I grew up in Beograd. I was born on the Montenegrin coast, then we came here and I
lived in Beograd most of my life. But I spent often whole summers on Istra. And then I
worked very often in other Yugoslav cities, and I travelled a lot around the country. My
father was a Yugoslav, and my mother was a Yugoslav, born in Split. My grandfather was
from Czechia. That kind of people are very common in Yugoslavia. But, you know ..., this
is also a question of, ... this is not only a genetic question, the national, but it is also a
question of belonging. That..., you know, that country was exceptionally beautiful. [...]
Maybe I had more contacts in other republics than most people, but... but at the same
time, in the common world, there were also very many contacts, I mean in a world which
was not professional... There were people whose life that was, you know. How many
mixed marriagesl How many people who have family in one part and in another part?
How many people who travelled? So many people... [...] I worked for instance in Split.
But I know a lot of Beogradani who spend their whole lives there. Simply... let's say all of
us went to the coast, we all went for summer holidays. Therefore I think.., there wouldn't
be such a long queue in front of the consulates. I was at the Croatian embassy a couple
of days ago. Thousands of people were there. If those contacts wouldn't have existed,
there wouldn't have been so many thousands there I don't think.'
(Dubravka, an artist - interviewed in her theatre)
'All that business about Yugoslavia never really having existed ... [abruptly] that is really
stupid. Of course it existed. I mean, of course it was like that. We all went to the coast for
the summer. So many people had a house on the coast... and many, many people still
have some relatives in Croatia for instance. [...] As for me... well, I have difficulty getting
used to the fact that Yugoslavia is not my country anymore... but, you know, now, so
many lines of communication have been broken, and still, so many people have relatives
in Croatia. So it's hard to realise it doesn't exist anymore. But of course, that is my
problem and I have to deal with it. That is my personal problem.'
(Zorica, an NGO activist with a Croatian background - interviewed on a terrace)
These narratives clearly point to the importance of the Dalmatian coast in the
experience of a Yugoslav 'home'. If we see them in conjunction with the previously
mentioned stories, it transpires that very few people actually travelled all over the
former state, which is, of course, not a typical Yugoslav phenomenon. Places like
Macedonia and Kosovo, in particular, were out of bounds for most people. Rather, at
least in those retrospective narratives, certain places seemed to play a crucial role in
evoking the remembered Yugoslav cultural space through embodied memories of
movement. These places had not just been imagined, but actually experienced: the
coast was one of them, as were cities such as Ljubljana, Zagreb, Beograd and
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Sarajevo. These places had become landmarks—in the memories of those people,
they marked a land that wasn't anymore. Later we shall consider other markers of
Yugoslavness which are less topographically fixable; language has been mentioned
before, and icons of popular culture will come to play an important role in the analysis.
4.2. Yugoslavia as diversity: nomadic aspects of Yugoslav belonging
If many people didn't visit other republics frequently, this did not necessarily prevent
them from feeling a similar sense of 'home' in Yugoslavia. 'Home', then, following
Dawson and Rapport, could be defined as 'where one best knows oneself (1998:9).
Partly, the discursive construction of a Yugoslav home was a conscious effort of the
Titoist regime: education and propaganda strongly encouraged the celebration of
'Yugoslav' unity and diversity. During my fieldwork, many people recalled bitter-sweetly
how they had been taught at school that their country was by far the most beautiful in
the world, uniting the most stunning diversity within its borders. Again, such nostalgia
was particularly common amongst middle-aged people in Beograd, and less so in
Zagreb. For example, when I went to interview a Beograd artist who asserted a fairly
strong sense of belonging to his Serbian-Orthodox background, was first introduced tO
his library and his collection of art works. He lived in a beautiful house in the old part of
Beograd. After deploring what he saw as the devaluation of the Byzantine legacy
because of recent events in the Balkans, he argued:
'I always learned about cultural traditions in the whole of Yugoslavia. It..., you know, it
was part of us. And thus, when they destroyed two or three of the most beautiful mosques
on the Balkans, I felt that they destroyed something of my country...'
More generally, during my first weeks in Serbia I attended a Slava in the beautiful
house of Vojislav, a middle-aged doctor from an old Beograd family. ASIava is a typical
Serbian celebration in honour of the family patron saint, which involves large amounts
of food and drink. Not only was the house a showcase of Beograd bourgeois style, with
its antique furniture, candle holders and a piano, but Vojislav also avidly collected
Byzantine and religious Serbian art. In this sanctuary of Serbian-ness, it took only an
hour or so before people were singing songs from all over the former state. The woman
next to me, whom I'd only just met, leaned back and sighed that I should understand
how these songs made them very sad. They made everyone think of when they had
been one country, she argued, and since most of them were about forty years old now,
it had really marked their lives. I remarked that she was still singing those songs, but
she quickly cut me off, saying that, while this might be the case, it felt like stealing now.
Others joined in and sighed with her, 'we had such a beautiful country!'
In the former system, multiculturalism, even though sometimes not transcending
folkloristic tourist board formats, was seen as an asset and promoted as such through
educational, political and cultural institutions. However, many people were quick to
point out that they had never been forced into feeling a sense of Yugoslavness. Rajko,
for example, a middle-aged intellectual who had grown up in a provincial town in
Serbia, argued in an interview in his flat:
'Yugoslav identity is a real identity, it wasn't just Tito's idea. It really existed for a lot of
people. We saw Yugoslavia as one country. The first football team that I supported was
Dinamo Zagreb, and many people in Serbia supported Hajduk [Split, sj]. And, you know, I
didn't support Dinamo because of any pressure or so; I just supported them because they
were a team in my country. [...] I mean, the best example is... if you ask people where the
border is between Serbia and Croatia and between Serbia and Bosnia, almost nobody
knows. I'm telling you... ask them and you'll see. They know it's somewhere to do with a
river, but they don't know where it is.'
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In a workshop on nostalgia, organised by the feminist anti-nationalist organisation
Women in Black, many of the stories told by women from all over the former state
contained references to this lack of pressure. In fact, it was often in the face of the
current nationalist pressure that Jugonostalgj/a was the strongest.
'I feel nostalg(ja every time I try to make a list of all the places and cities I used to visit,
where I had a deep feeling for the people as well as the landscape. How many friends I
have in those places! In my memories I often visit Ohrid, Prilep, Sombor, Osijek, Krsko,
Rijeka, Makarska, Mostar, ... Sometimes I visit Oaplje, where I used to spend my
holidays, sometimes Sarajevo or Jajce, where I was born, Titograd, Budva... When I think
about it I have a feeling of helplessness. I feel Yugonostalgic every time I feel my freedom
restricted.., in my movements as well as communication. Whenever I want to phone one
of my friends and I cannot, or when I want to visit them and I cannot. I miss old
Yugoslavia as a place where I could travel and feel free.'
(2ene u crnom 1995:275)
These narratives illustrate how the common Yugoslav cultural space functioned as a
two-fold narrative of 'home'. On the one hand, it was the meeting point of diverse
cultural patterns in relation to which people positioned themselves; and on the other
hand, this diverse context was experienced as part of oneself, of one's background. In
fact, the narratives in this chapter indicate that, often, imagining and experiencing of
Yugoslavia as a common cultural space was probably a more important factor than
actual travel. The Yugoslav 'home', then, was a self-evident background against which
everyday lives had unfolded and a reservoir of discursive material for the construction
of one's individual narrative 7 . Interestingly, many people referred to the diverse and
open character of Yugoslavia as that which made them feel at home in that context.
Tanja, a Beograd academic, whom I met up with again in the Slovenian capital of
Ljubljana, argued that for her Yugoslavia had been attractive because it had allowed for
diversity. That is why she had identified with it and felt at home in it. The diversity did
not force people in one way or another. But she never thought about that at the time,
she added, these things were only clear in retrospect.
Tanja's story makes clear that the sense of belonging to a Yugoslav common cultural
space was not always explicitly articulated before. Rather, it was simply the way things
were for some people, and only in retrospect did that seem special. In the previously
mentioned Women in Black workshop, one schoolteacher explained how she felt
Jugonostalga for the first time when she saw the new, ethnically cleansed
schoolbooks she was going to have to work with. She thought of the old Yugoslav
schoolbooks and 'began to feel a link with all those parts of the country, even with those
I have never visited or lived in, suddenly all the pictures returned, all the landscapes'
(ene u crnom 1995:276). In this sense, for a number of citizens, the notion of
'Yugoslavia' as a cultural space had allowed for the construction of a nomadic sense of
'home'. By not articulating all its differences into one strict discourse, the common
Yugoslav discursive framework had served as a background for movement precisely
because of its own diversity and in-between position. Again, the distinct Yugoslav
experience was often relativised, not so much in relation to Serbian or Croatian
patterns, but with regard to larger frameworks, particularly the 'West'. Some of those
people had lived abroad, and many had travelled to Western Europe or North America.
The nationalist wars that tore Yugoslavia apart had dramatic effects on this possibility
of a sense of Yugoslav nomadism. Through forced disambiguation, a result of
nationalist essentialism, those people were robbed of the cultural space that was
'home' to them. Many experienced this as a narrative break in their life story and ended
up with a feeling of homelessness at home, as it became very difficult to imagine the
The life histories of Beogradani, collected by Magid in 1983, suggest that almost all his informants, regardless of
political persuasion, considered Yugoslavia as the self-evident discursive background of their everyday lives (Magid
1991).
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Yugoslav cultural space as a 'home' 8 . In response to the shrinking of the Yugoslav
space, some people expanded their nomadic sense of belonging to a wider than
Yugoslav scale. Vera, for example, the Zagreb feminist who had previously 'lived on the
Ljubljana-Zagreb-Beograd line', now said in an interview:
'You know... I lost that extremely quickly, easily in a way. To my own surprise... I mean,
now I suppose that I live on the Zagreb-New York line.'
For many others, however, 'Yugoslavia' came to stand for a sense of yearning, which,
again, sheds a critical light on the territorial aspect of Jugonostalg(ja. If it was mainly the
coast and certain cities that had become 'landmarks', this indicates that the Yugoslav
cultural space was also, and maybe primarily so for many people, a discursive
background against which they had lived the good life. On one of our rare outings to a
bar, my friend and Beograd student Aleksandar explained to me that he considered
himself very lucky to belong to the last generation of young people in Yugoslavia who
had had the chance to travel in their country and abroad. He visited Dubrovnik, Istra
and the Montenegrin coast with his parents. In the late eighties, he went to Ljubljana,
Zagreb, Sarajevo, Firenze, Amsterdam and so on. People often emphasised that they
had been able to travel freely and that now it was almost impossible to get a visa, even
for transit. Before wages had been high, and people had lived good lives, Aleksandar
said, contrasting this with the current situation. This did not mean that Aleksandar
wished to see a re-united Yugoslavia. And here we catch a glimpse of the fact that this
wasn't just politically impossible, but it was also unimaginable, for it would involve 'not a
spatial but a temporal journey' (Pollock 1994:83). This conflation of dimensions of time
and place became strikingly clear in an interview with Dragica, a young Zagreb NGO
activist with a Serbian family background:
'Former Yugoslavia doesn't mean anything to me anymore. Not anymore. I think it is
completely normal that now all these republics have become states and ... you know, I
don't yearn for that. I mean it was great for me over there ['tamo'], it was super, but... you
know, things happened and... I don't know, maybe it's better that everyone has their own
state now. Probably it is. Everyone can mind their own business...'
Dragica, who grew up and always lived in Zagreb, actually referred to former
Yugoslavia as tamo ['over there'], which not only testifies to her dramatic experience of
'before' and 'after', but also gives a whole new twist to the oft-quoted idea that 'the past
is another country' (Lowenthal 1985).
This means that evoking Yugoslavia as a common cultural home through narratives of
the past resonated not just with the topography of the region but also with the
remembrance of better times. To put it straightforwardly, in stories ofJugonostaIga the
years of the past were first and foremost years of the past, and in many of the
narratives in this study, they featured as Yugoslav years. In the next section, I consider
this dimension of Jugonostalg(/a as memories of better days.
5. Jugonostalgija take two: remembering better days
As a starting point, let us look at two excerpts from interviews. The first one was with
Ivana, a Zagreb girl of mixed background who had lived in the Croatian capital all her
life, and who now identified as Serbian. The second one was with Vladimir, a Zagreb
human rights activist who felt as little loyalty to Croatia as he had to Yugoslavia before.
8 See Chapter Six. Much journalistic, autobiographical and essayistic work has been published, mainly by female
writers, on the minute ways this worked in peoples everyday lives. For examples, see David & Kovaá 1998; Drakulió
1993a, 1996; lvekoviô et al 1994; Lesiô 1995; Lukovió 1998; Mioãinoviô 1997; Nikolió 1996; Paviôevió 1994; Slapak
1993, 1994, 1997; Ugreió 1993, 1995.
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Stef: 'Can I ask you—do you know what nationality your parents declared themselves as?'
Ivana: 'They didn't declare themselves at all.'
Stef: 'And on official occasions, like the census?'
Ivana: 'Ah, the census [laughs]. My parents said they were Martians. They turned it into a
joke, and we don't like to talk about these things at all... Because there's always
somebody who's hurt or something, you're always on some side or other. So...
And, you know, dividing a family... you know, we avoid that theme, It can only lead
to bad things. So: we are a family, and there's no such thing as mama is such and
such, and daddy is such and such. They are just mom and dad. Bad or good, they
are just my parents.'
Stef: 'Does Jugonostalgj/a mean anything in your family?'
Ivana: 'Oooh... My parents are Jugonostalgiöari. Because,... you know, thanks to
Yugoslavia and that evil regime, they were able to get an education. Both of them
came from poor and troubled families, and if there wouldn't have been such a...
like, developed social system, they would probably have ended up like their
parents... But because they received the opportunity... they feel very grateful for
that. On the other hand, they have never been communists, and they have never
been in the Party either... They just... I don't know, they,... they just felt that that
brotherhood and unity was something very important in their life. So they yearn a
lot for those times. I think they would, alright, like.., they would be satisfied if
Croatia would be a state which cared about its people in that way. You know, if they
would know that their children would have the same chances as they had. Maybe
then there would be less Jugonostalg(ja. But the way it is now.., that is
Stef: 'So it is largely social... like, to do with social and economic things? Or are their
cultural factors as well?'
Ivana: 'You know... It's just... It's a memory of their times... When borders didn't exist.
When I hear them talk about what they did..., they could travel wherever they
wanted, without problems. They were not burdened with ninety percent of the
things that I am burdened with. So then I am sorry that I didn't live in that way... So
it is yearning for those better times...'
When I asked Vladimir, a Zagreb human rights activist, what JugonostaIga meant to
him, he said:
'Listen, I'll tell you a story from the late 1940s. Tito is travelling around the country,
meeting his people and assessing how they feel about the changes his new regime is
bringing about. When in Bosnia, he sees a farmer who's milking a cow. Tito walks up to
him and asks: "How are things, comrade?" And the man answers: "Well, alright, Comrade
Tito, not too bad". Tito, a little bit alarmed at such lack of enthusiasm, asks "Well, but
surely it is better than before, isn't it?" Says the farmer: "Well, no... it was better in those
times, actually". Tito stammers: "But...?". And the farmer says: "Well, in those days, I was
a young manl"
5.1. remembering the times before we were poor pariah's
In both Zagreb and Beograd, time and again people reminded me of the non-political
nature of their Jugonostalg(/a. It wasn't the regime they missed, nor the state borders, it
was the good times they had had. Very often, this was constructed around a fairly
straightforward, soclo-economic argument which referred to Yugoslav times as the
good old days. Obviously, it is not within the confines of this study to claim any 'hard'
economic analysis of before and after, but on a subjective level, almost all people I
worked with during my fieldwork were adamant about this: life had been good, and it
certainly had been better than now 9 . This was more outspokenly the case in the
Serbian capital, where socio-economic ravage was simply much more tangible. Often,
This feeling that things had been better went fairly unchallenged by the knowledge of 'bad things' of the past. In the
words of Julia Holdsworth, who spoke about nostalgia in Eastern Ukraine: "All things were good, apart from those
that weren't" (2000).
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like in Ivana's case, people mentioned the previous access to education and other
opportunities to 'get ahead'. Such narratives, particularly by people who were born in
poor families after WWII, resonated with the optimism and the belief in progress that
had characterised those times. And even when people were not explicitly positive about
living standards in the past, they would often say that at least it was not quite as bad as
now.
Once, when talking with a group of students about the wars, somebody argued that the
economic crisis of the 1980s was the main explanatory factor. I hadn't been in Beograd
long yet, and another person in the group interrupted the conversation to turn
specifically to me. She informed me: 'But Stef, ... it was really good here. Life was
really really good in Yugoslavia'. Her friend nodded and added: 'The 1970s and the
1980s were the golden years... You know, before the war we had it so good. I mean...
it was because of the war that we became so poor!' Then, a third person remarked:
'Yes... I mean, I am ashamed. Look at us... now, we are in the same category as
Rwanda!'. Such stories deploring the crisis situation they found themselves in were
common amongst young people, who felt they were missing out on the opportunities
that their parents' generation had been presented with.
As the mention of Rwanda indicated, many of these younger people referred to the
days before the wars in a psychological sense as well. 'Yugoslavia', they seemed to
argue, 'was when our country was something to be proud of.' It was the time before
shame.
Neven had come to Beograd from a provincial Serbian town for his studies. He was
now unemployed and bored with too much free time and too little money. In an
interview he summarised the general situation of his country:
'Life was good, you know... wages were a thousand, two thousand German Marks,
sometimes more. We had everything we needed. Okay, there was inflation in the eighties,
but not like the one of a couple of years ago. I mean I'm not saying there were no
problems, but Ante MarkoviO [then presiding over the federal government, sj] he wanted
to change things... And, it's almost impossible to imagine now, but then, if only we wanted
we would have been part of the European Union. There were talks and everything and it
would have been no problem. We only had to say yes... imagine that! That was almost 10
years ago... and now we are like 50 years back in time. [...] I mean... really,... look at
what we threw away...! I mean, when we were Yugoslavia, we were great in sports.
Imagine how they would be now... I mean, say you'd put together the best players of the
Croatian and Serbian and other teams in football, volleyball, basketball, waterpolo, etc...
What a team they'd make! They'd be invincible!'
Even amongst younger people such narratives were common. I interviewed the
teeangers Darko and his friend Veljko in the former's house. Darko was a refugee from
a well-to-do Zagreb family who lived in Beograd now.
'JugonostaIga... what does it mean...? I somewhat remember times when we lived
better, when my dad made 3000 German Marks a month, when we went on several
holiday trips a year, when... I don't know, when one of our sportsmen was a champion in
ski jump, he was a Slovene, when there were Olympic Games in Sarajevo, when the
basketball team of Yugoslavia was one of the strongest in the world with Serbs, Croats,
and so on. So... I mean, there was some sense of togetherness ['zajedni.tvo']. I was too
small to remember Tito's times, but I do remember some details and I remember that
there was respect and there weren't any traumas and so on. But... you know... if
somebody would ask me if I wanted to recreate a Yugoslavia over new, well, I don't think
that the war can be erased that easily. Terrible things have happened, years and years of
horrible things... and of course, we young people, from our experience, we are far away
from that blood and soil and all, but still we went through some kind of evil. I don't think it
would be so easy to forgive and forget. [silence] But I definitely am a Jugonostalgiöar.
You know, I think that at least in basket we would beat the Americans in the Olympic
Games [laughs]!'
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However, at this point his friend Veljko, slightly older and born and bred in Beograd,
interrupted:
'You know what, I don't know... Fuck it..., I don't actually believe.., you know
JugonostaIga irritates me. Okay, it was a brilliant period in which we lived and all, but I
think we idealise that time you know. I think we present it as much better than what it
actually was, and... you know, if it really was like that, if it really was so good, if there was
no nationalism in those times, then I don't believe it would have come to this war.
Because, you know, a war doesn't just start like that, now does it? It's not just foreign
powers that are meddling and so on. There is something in people as well. We live in
cities, you know, and in those urban environments maybe it wasn't felt that strongly, but I
believe that in the villages there was some of that... but don't get me wrong, it's a pity of
course, and I regret that those times, when we lived so well, have gone. But I don't
believe that... let's say... I often think about that, Jugonostalg(ja... and it's running in my
head, you know... But would it be a good idea to create a new Yugoslavia? I think that it
would not be a good idea, and maybe that is why I don't like that word.'
He then went on to do what many people did: add criticism of Yugoslavia's authoritarian
regime, its corruption, its lack of religious freedom and its inability to deal with
nationalism. However, as we have seen before, people who criticised the former
Yugoslav regime frequently hastened to add that their former state was nothing like the
countries of the Eastern Bloc. So did my flatmate Vesna, who had never been charmed
by Yugoslavia very much. When I added that many foreigners never saw Yugoslavia as
a real part of the Eastern Bloc, but always somewhere in-between, she replied that, no,
it hadn't even been in-between. She had really felt that she lived in a free country. Not
more or less, but really free. And she had thought it was like that for everyone.
Interestingly, always the same items were brought up to support this discourse of a
Yugoslavia which had nothing in common with other 'communist' countries (see also
Ugreiô 1995:21, 46; 1993:74; Drakulió I 993a:50). Top of the list was without a shadow
of a doubt the freedom to travel. Related to this, many people told me independently
from each other that the Yugoslav passport had been one of the most expensive ones
on the international black market. The lack of food shortages was sometimes invoked,
but more often the topic of consumption was approached from the positive side: a wide
range of consumer products was available and many people travelled to Italy or
elsewhere to buy durables. Another frequently invoked element was the idea that
developments in popular culture were on a par with the 'West', and therefore very
different from, say, neighbouring Romania or Bulgaria, where people 'never got to see
a Western film less than twenty years old'.
The fact that these examples came up frequently implies that, for many of its
inhabitants present in this study, Yugoslavia's specific character was its 'Westerness'.
This resonates with Deviã's exploration of what she calls an 'all-Yugoslav
communication space—a milieu in which two generations of people had been
socialised into a Yugoslav version of urban cosmopolitan lifestyles, and into which they
projected their cultural status' (Deviá 1997:131). Through rapid urbanisation,
secularisation and 'Westernisation', this space widened its reach from a small urban
elite to large parts of the Yugoslav population (ibid.:147). This sense of a common
'home' had been based on the anti-fascist victory, but it became a self-evident, de-
ideologised part of the everyday life experience of many 'little people'. The ethos that
pervaded this Yugoslav 'home' was staunchly individualist and a-political, and based
upon cultural and consumption patterns inspired by the 'West'. Paradoxically, then,
while the republican elites of the Communist Party increasingly asserted their interests
in national terms, those who felt a sense of belonging to a Yugoslav cultural space did
so in individualist, 'Westernised' terms.
This might partly explain why in the 1990s Jugonostalg(ja amongst such people was
more powerful in Serbia and Bosnia than in Croatia. Whereas in the latter country there
were slow but certain signs of increasing linkages with the 'West' since the wars,
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people in Serbia and Bosnia had little to show for this and therefore seemed to rely
more on a remembered 'Yugoslavia' as their access to the 'West'. However, as we
have seen in the chapter on Balkan orientalism, this was not always unambiguously the
case. For example, when Branka, a young Zagreb activist with a Serbian background,
had returned from a visit to Macedonia, she said that she had loved her trip. Branka
often complained about her life in Zagreb and she had repeatedly told me about her
plans for emigration. However, in Macedonia she had realised that she was in a way
attached to this space. In fact, she had realised that she loved it. This was also, she
reckoned, because there hadn't been a war in Macedonia and people had therefore
'remained normal', unlike in the other republics. Before she had always liked Bosnians
the most, but now she called them 'really tucked up'. In Macedonia, in contrast, people
had been warm and not so mean. And, she added, Tito's picture was hanging in so
many houses!
It seemed that, for Branka, who was only about fourteen when the war had started,
Macedonia had become an icon of Jugonostalgf/a. She had never been there before,
but her visit had presented her with something that, in a way, evoked an unspoilt, pure
expression of what used to be. Or maybe of what should have been: the good times,
'home'—the point where the familiar and the good met in the experience of Yugoslavia.
5.2. popular culture and memories of the good times in Yugoslavia
Many narratives of JugonostaIga were structured around the familiarity evoked by
landscape, smell, photographs, sound and so on. Talking about her feelings of
nostalgia, a feminist activist who came to Beograd as a refugee from Mostar, said:
'What I really miss is one river, one bridge which doesn't exist anymore. I miss the sea. I
miss the smell of the trees from my childhood. {...] I feel my nostalgia so much, that
everything that I loved, everything that was mine, everything that means so much to me—
is for me beautifuT, the most beautiful... faultless. Maybe such a feeling is not right, maybe
that is not the way to survive, but if I did not have my nostalgia, I don't know what I would
live on. Everything around me is just a waiting room, for what... I don't know.'
(2ene u crnom 1995:274)
Such narratives were very common amongst people who'd lost their homes and
hometowns. But even those who did continue to live in the same place were not free of
these feelings of loss. In the words of a feminist activist from Beograd:
'I feel nostalgia for my own city, even when I am in it. In the same way that some cities,
which have been destroyed, do not exist anymore, some subcultures have ceased to exist
in this city, but in a more subtle way, without bombs. Those familiar places do not exist
anymore. I often see my friends. All the people that get on my nerves have completely
different political views from me, but because they have a Beograd accent it is important
for me to meet them. The Beograd I used to know, has gone.'
(2ene u crnom 1995:276)
Tellingly, subculture and the city figure in the same narrative here. Further on, the same
person argued:
'I have never been a Yugoslav, but now I have become Yugonostalgic. I belonged to the
generation that read comic books and listened to rock music and was not interested in
other forms of culture. That part of the culture was Yugosla y . [...] That whole rock culture
was between Beograd-Zagreb. [...] I belonged to that urban culture and I have always
claimed that the people from Zagreb were in that sense closer to me than somebody who
came—from "Bela Palanka". That smalltown mentality is something I cannot stand. In the
whole former Yugoslavia, it was only in Beograd, Zagreb, Ljubljana and Rijeka that we
could escape it. One part of my Yugonostalgia is a voice against the killing of that urban
culture, because it allows people to be different, to be "crazy", to be eccentric. People
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have the right to be so. Actually, I have felt the frustration of the disappearance of
Yugoslavia quite unconsciously because some of the things I loved have just
disappeared. The stories, the songs, the theatre I loved so much have all disappeared. I
never used to have the feeling that these were the things which were very important or
Yugoslav as such, but that they were part of the culture I came from.'
(2ene u crnom 1995:284)
I have looked at the discourse of the lost city before, and I have also pointed out
Yugoslavia's remembered 'Westerness' as a defining characteristic in those narratives.
In this context, it is an interesting irony that much of the popular music, TV series and
films which now provided such a strong sense of a remembered common Yugoslav
'home' had also been instrumental in the critique of the former regime—not from a
nationalist perspective but from a 'modern', 'rock and roll' position. Most people seemed
to remember many of song lyrics, which points us to another important pattern: most of
what now represents Yugoslav popular music of the 1980s was made in the cities of
Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia, and in what used to be called Serbo-Croatian or Croato-
Serbian.
If, as I have argued above, we are dealing here mainly with memories of 'the good.
times we had', and if those times were experienced as Yugoslav times, at least in
retrospect, I believe that popular culture is a crucial factor. Surely the post-Yugoslav
situation was not the only one where people's narrations of memories of bliss and
happiness were also hinged upon remembered items of popular culture in everyday
life, such as songs, food or drink products, comic books, or sports and film heroes. I
now propose a look at some ways in which these elements of popular culture feature in
narratives of the Yugoslav past.
In the summer of 1997, the Croatian magazine Globus published a test under the title
'Are you a Jugonostalgiöar'?' as part of a Small Lexicon of Jugonostalg(/a. The article
offered this definition: 'Nostalgia for certain symbols from former Yugoslav everyday
life, particularly from Tito's time' (Globus 22IO8I97:819O) b0 . The nostalgia test referred
to a whole series of popular culture items from Yugoslav times: pop music, film, P1
series, a soft drink, comic books, magazines, certain food products, football, a car
model and even a brand of refrigerators. Interestingly, while writing this down, even
though I don't mention any names, I know for a fact that every person with a post-
Yugoslav background knows fairly accurately which precise products I am referring to.
There were very few Croatian products there, apart from some elements from the world
of popular arts, which were inextricably linked across republican borders anyway. The
reason lies in the specific politics of remembering which took shape in Croatian
nationalism. As I have argued before, this had first implied a process of demonisation of
memories of Yugoslavia, depicted as Serbian-imposed, and later a creeping
exoticisation of Yugoslav cultural elements—but still with an emphasis on their
presumed foreign character. Ironically, it was in the most North-Eastern republic, the
'least Yugoslav' part of Yugoslavia, that exoticisation seemed furthest developed and
most acceptable. In Ljubljana, there is a bar called Nosta!g(ja, which features political
kitsch, postcards and photographs from the old Yugoslav days, including items from
Serbia and Bosnia. It is in Slovenia that some people came up with the idea to start a
web page in honour of Tito (www.titoville.com), a parody on hagiographies of the
Marshall and an ironic testimony to the Yugoslav past. It was in Ljubljana on the man's
birthday that I met Tito, or a very good impersonator, waving from his limousine,
shaking hands, patting children's heads and addressing the amused crowds in typical
style and communist jargon.
Because of Croatia's 'fear of the past', as one journalist put it (Gall 1998b:51), this was
unthinkable in I 990s Croatia. Rather than relativise or parody the meaning of symbols
of Yugoslav times, Croatian nationalism was articulated around a belief in the power of
10 In its tabloid days, Globus itself had been in the forefront of nationalist attacks on any kind of dissidence,
denouncing people as Jugonosfalgiöari, and even claiming to have invented that label.
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these symbols (Periiô 1998). In Serbia, of course, the situation was different, since the
never-ending ambiguity of regime discourses hovered between endorsing Yugoslav
continuity and condemning it. Ironically, a common feature of post-Yugoslav politics
was the fact that, while nationalist politicians could meet on a regular basis and even
strike deals in American air bases, any kind of rapprochement on the level of sports or
the arts—let alone the family—was always subject to uproar...
However, it was precisely in the domains of everyday life and popular culture that
memories of Yugoslav times existed most profusely. In an interview in a small youth
club, interestingly with Croatian rock music playing on the stereo, a Beograd teenager
recalled his first youth camp with young people from other post-Yugoslav states:
'The first time there were some tensions. There were us and Croats, no Bosnians. And we
were simply waiting for the others, watching what they would do... Somehow we were all
waiting and looking: will they make the first move towards coming together or... And it
ended like.., the first night, the Croats took a guitar and started to sing a song of a singer
from Beograd, and then we joined in and like that... So it began. So maybe for ten hours
or so there was no contact, but then everything went normal.'
In Beograd, Yugoslav music from the 1980s was aired in all its varieties. For example,
one of the theme songs of the 1996-1997 demonstrations against Miloevió was a
remake of an old Croatian pop song. However, I remember exactly on which occasion I
heard Serbian Yugo-rock from the 1980s for the first time on a public occasion in
Zagreb. It was at a party attended mainly by twentysomethings, and the people I was
with, Zagrepãani from a variety of backgrounds, were as stunned as I was. This was
unheard of; for so many years they had listened to this music only in the privacy of their
flats and here we were, partying the night away on a long playlist of 1980s songs from
all over the former state. I must have been the only one there who didn't know at least
ninety percent of the lyrics. This music, evoking memories of the common Yugoslav
good times, is also being played on stereos worldwide—wherever youngish post-
Yugoslays have set up new lives.
The 1990s war has scattered hundreds of thousands of refugees and émigrés
(wherever the thin line between may lie) all over Western Europe, North America and
Australia. As in the case of those who stayed behind, there were at least as many post-
Yugoslav narrations of past and present as there were individual migrants: some had
joined established diaspora communities and some hadn't; some had articulated
extreme nationalism into their personal narratives; and others had developed dissident
stories of themselves and of the Yugoslav past and present. However, while these
differences existed, it should not surprise us that some of the strongest expressions of
Jugonostalgija were to be found in the diaspora. Many people narrated their personal
process of leaving the country precisely in terms of preserving some sense of individual
continuity11.
This is not a study of post-Yugosla ys abroad, but in my experience there were strong
indications that the symbolic effectiveness on a personal level of JugonostaIga was
actually much more developed in the diaspora. These people were further removed
from the day-to-day realities of post-Yugoslav national discretisation and internal
homogenisation. They were actually able to form social relations with other post-
Yugoslays of a different national background, which was much less feasible in the
respective 'homelands'. Through the narrative re-creation of a remembered Yugoslav
'home', they engaged in the construction of a post-Yugoslav sense of belonging. One
explicit and far-going example is the Cyber Yugoslavia web site (ww.juga.com ), which
reflects many of the previously mentioned tensions of Yugoslav identification and aims
to reintroduce some voluntaristic sense of Yugoslav belonging. The opening statement
on the web site reads as follows:
11 As in the interviews with well-known emigrants Ugreiá and Furlan in Feral Tribune (05/10/98:38-39; 14/12198:4-7)
or in the notes by another one (najder 1997:42).
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'This is Cyber Yugoslavia. Home of Cyber Yugoslays. We lost our country in 1991 and
became citizens of Atlantis. Since September 9, 1999 this is our home. We don't have a
physical land, but we do have a nationality, and we are giving CY citizenships and CY
passports [sic]. Because this is Atlantis, we are allowing double and triple citizenships. If
you feel Yugoslav, you are welcome to apply for CY citizenship, regardless of your
current nationality and citizenship, and you will be accepted. Please read our Constitution
for the details. If you are just curious, you are welcome to visit us as tourists.
This land will grow as our citizens wish. Neither faster, nor slower. Neither more, nor less.
So, this site will always be under construction. For a solid country to grow, even a virtual
one, it takes some time. When we have five million citizens, we plan to apply to the UN for
member status. When this happens, we will ask 20 square meters of land anywhere on
Earth to be our country. On this land, we'll keep our server.'
In May 2000, Cyber Yugoslavia counted over 12,000 virtual citizens. However, as in the
actual post-Yugoslav states, people in the diaspora narrated Jugonostalgija in a variety
of ways, articulating many of the elements of popular culture mentioned before: sports,
literature, comic books, seaside memories and, of course, pop music (Feral Tribune
05/10/98:38-39). Again, memories of the good times in Yugoslavia were articulated with
a deterritorialised yearning for a better life (Buden 1998b). And again, I believe, the
personal and political relevance of this Jugonostalgf/a lay not so much in its portrayals
of the past, as in its status of critical comments on the present.
Let us now briefly revisit something I have referred to in Chapter Eight: a Darko Rundek
concert that I attended in Zagreb. I explained before how the recent songs of this
Zagreb singer resonated with themes and styles associated with 'Balkan', and I argued
that this indicated the possibility to articulate some lines of a Balkan orientalist
counterdiscourse. I want to come back to this here, because I believe that his specific
counterdiscursive potential was related to his previous position and to more general
evocations of Jugonostalg(ja. Rundek, who moved to Paris during the war in Croatia,
was an icon of the 1980s YU-rock scene, popular all over the former state. Not only
was he a famous singer, he was also known as a critic of the previous regime, which
added to his credibility as a dissident voice during and after the war as well. The
Zagreb gig took place in a small club, with an urban, subcultural reputation spilling over
from the times of the former regime. It was packed, and the audience consisted largely
of people in their twenties and early thirties, i.e. the generation for whom 1980s YU-
rock was most likely to evoke memories of the 'golden years'. Even I was thrown back
to my teenage years, with the deejay before and after the concert almost exclusively
drawing on albums that have featured in my own record collection since those days.
The atmosphere was unlike that at any other gig I attended in Zagreb since Rundek's
pitch-black humorous songs resonated unashamedly with memories of the 'good times
we had'. And I would argue that precisely because his lyrics dealt with everyday
memories—with harmless, recognisable items of a past which happened to be a
Yugoslav one—Rundek deployed Jugonostalga in a subtle, but ultimately, subversive
way. Resonating with memories of everyday life before, his performance was a wildly
exciting, as well as a strongly gripping, event. As such, it represented a truly enjoyable
kick in the face of the official politics of amnesia.
In this way, 'Yugoslavia', was not so much a geopolitical configuration, but the context
in which personal memories of the everyday made sense. Certain items of Yugoslav
popular culture then served as metaphors which evoked the 'good life' from those days.
Even when it was Tito who was remembered, this was done largely through popular
culture and everyday life memories. And as we have seen before, 'good times' meant
memories of relative affluence, but particularly memories of days different from now.
Jugonostalg(ja, then, brought together memories of the times before the war, before the
chaos, before the poverty, It meant people 'remembered a time when they had a home,
peace, furniture, more or less developed social security; a time when war was an
abstract noun, and the word neighbour didn't mean enemy' (Stojió 1997:4).
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6. Jugonostalgija take three: yearning for a better life
Nostalgia, argue Chase and Shaw, becomes particularly prominent when the present is
experienced as difficult or unsatisfying and people retreat into the private sphere
because they feel they have little or no impact on public life (Chase & Shaw 1989:3). In
this sense, it could be argued, Jugonostaig(/a was an escapist strategy, allowing people
to forget about the reality around them through the construction of a rosy past. Now,
while this might contain more than a grain of truth in many cases, I would argue that in
the specific context of Beograd and particularly Zagreb in the late l99OsJugonostalg(/a
also provided a reservoir of material to be incorporated into critical comments on the
present situation. First of all, it brought with it a vocabulary and a style which was per
definition seen as oppositional by the regimes. Secondly, when articulated with anti-
nationalist discursive practice, it also provided a counterpoint to nationalist amnesia
and selective remembering through 'yearning'. Thirdly, this 'yearning' could then inform
practice. In the introduction to her collection of cultural criticism, bell hooks argues that
the notion of 'yearning' could function as a much-needed bridging mechanism between
the longings, the desires and the fantasies of everyday life, and the struggle for political
change. By conceptualising a shared space and sentiment of 'yearning', hooks
proposes, we can access a common ground where a host of different desires might
meet and be articulated into a potential dynamic of change (hooks 1991).
Making this leap into the unknown means a further step in the build-up of this chapter. I
began my analysis of Jugonostalg(/a by arguing that, in most cases, it was not the
memory of a state or a political system, but of a somehow nomadic sense of 'home' in a
common cultural space. Then I explained how this remembered 'home' was
reconstructed through everyday life memories of 'the good times we had', in opposition
to the 1990s situation, paying particular attention to the importance of popular culture in
those narratives. Finally, in a third step, I now argue that Jugonostalg(/a often contained
a large element of 'yearning' for a better life tout court. In other words, I believe that
many people did not or not exclusively experience nostalgia for a lost 'home' in the
golden years but rather a yearning for an anti-nationalist 'home' that didn't and doesn't
exist anywhere in reality—a 'home' in a better, utopian future at best, or in a parallel
universe at worst.
Particularly in anti-nationalist narratives Jugonostalg(/a evoked the times before the
hatred, before the violence, before the madness. Times less complicated, less
politically repulsive and not yet contaminated by nationalism and war. Times more
manageable. As I have argued in Chapter Six, this often led to the construction of what
I have called 'stories of innocence', narratives of what life was like 'before the fall'. In
StojiO's words: 'Yes, it's a fairy tale, but it's much more acceptable than this nightmare
around us, through which we slowly pull our tired bones, alone and no use to anyone.
Nostalgia is the only feeling in which we experience the fullness of our selves.' (1997:4;
see also Lowentahl 1989). We could then argue that, by referring to things 'Yugoslav',
people constructed themselves a 'home' which was not just based on the
overwhelmingly nationalist context around them, allowing them to create a fuller sense
of self. Now, as we have seen, such anti-nationalist discourses articulating
Jugonostalg(fa were predominantly formulated in terms of memories. Through
narratives of the past, people expressed a longing for certain patterns of continuity. In
the words of a Beograd artist, taken from an interview in a Croatian paper:
Q: 'Finally, tell me, what is really your political position today?'
A: 'If your really want to.., my political position could be called Yugoslav, although ... My
position is a position of continuity; of everything which is today compromised and
proclaimed "betrayal". Nationalists permanently talk about how they have preserved
something, and how they want to achieve something great in the name of the nation—
but in fact they haven't achieved anything at all.'
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Q: 'What do you understand under the concept of jugoslavenstvo?'
A: 'I think first of all of stopping racism, hatred and the ongoing mutual persecution. As
long as it doesn't come to that, it will be very difficult to live—be it in individual
countries or together.'
(Feral Tribune 05/10/98:48-49)
The words of this self-proclaimed Jugonostalgiöarka make clear that even for someone
who strongly identified with the notion of a past Yugoslav 'home', its relevance in 1998
lay just as much, if not more, in its oppositional potential to the present circumstances.
Throughout this chapter, most narratives have pointed to such a counterdiscursive
angle in Jugonostalg(/a, even when constructed around narratives of a past that has
been lost forever. In some cases, as we have seen, the sense of a 'Yugoslav' home
had not been important before at all, but only now this remembered discourse became
a badge of resistance because of the politics of remembering and forgetting enforced
by the regimes. Whether official policies relied mainly on amnesia (as in Croatia) or on
an ambiguous combination of amnesia and incorporation (as in vampire-Serbia),
JugonostaIga functioned as a dissident discourse for many people in many different.
ways.
Even amongst a generation of people who were too young to have more than vague
childhood memories of Yugoslavia, it could provide an imaginary point of reference.
This allows us to see the contours of a frightening and uncanny parallel. In the first half
of the 1990s, eighteen year-olds had taken up guns to shoot their neighbours,
constructing their narratives around memories of WWII, of which they had no individual
recollection. During the late 1990s, other youths partly relied on the imaginary past of a
common Yugoslav 'home' in order to formulate their dissident narratives of self and
society. Jugonostalg(ja allowed people, even those with few personal memories of the
Yugoslav past, to relate their individual narratives to a larger imagined context which
was not the current nationalist one. In this way they constructed a sense of continuity of
their personal story with a past that was officially 'forbidden' in the new state of affairs.
Therefore, the political relevance of Jugonostalgija for most people was not any real
longing to go back to anything, but rather, it lay in the light it shed on the present. The
political point, then, was not what it said about the Yugoslav past, but about the post-
Yugoslav present.
Importantly, Jugonostalg(ja did not just surface in bouts of miserable moaning about
loss and past glory. Quite the contrary, the memories of the Yugoslav 'home' provided
material for fun and humour, whether they referred to an individually remembered or
imagined past. Paraphrasing the official discourse of the Croatian regime, my Zagreb
friend used to laughingly refer to the Yugoslav past as 'the time of darkness and
abundance'. In another example, on a day-long walk with a mixed group of Zagreb
twentysomethings, two topics dominated the conversations: sex and Yugoslavia. I won't
go into examples of the first item, as this is surely beyond the scope of this study and
can hardly be said to be a post-Yugoslav exclusivity. Jugonostalg(/a was played out in
many different ways: pioneer stories; songs and references to what constituted a good
pioneer; dramatic recitals of socialist poetry; paraphrasings of the Partisan moralistic
ethos ('Children, always when it was difficult for the Partisans, they would sing a
song!'); and Tito, of course (who 'could be kissed by the first one to reach the top of the
hill'). The tone was always highly ironic, and the general line was that life under
totalitarianism had been hell for them. Some younger people passed us, and one
person in our group—himself a Bosnian in his late twenties who now lived in Austria—
shouted at them that they should enjoy life while they were stijl young. 'Ah son', he cried
pathetically, 'my youth was nothing like yours! It was destroyed by the communists! I
have never known freedom!' It is important to see this in context. The mass media
permanently brought testimonies from 'former dissidents' who supported their
allegiance to the Croatian nation by reference to their past sufferings. A parody like the
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one above, therefore, provided a comment on the present situation in Croatia, as well
as a plain bit of fun with memories of a common 'home' as one of its backgrounds.
A lot of the humour was hinged upon the legendary figure of Tito, particularly amongst
people who had still been children in 1980, the year of his death. People would talk
about him in many different ways: respectful, derogatory, favourabte or angry, but often
a combination of these. They would recall his public performances, their pioneer days,
the mourning on the day he died, certain lines they learned at school, songs to his
praise, the yearly all-Yugoslav relay-race in honour of his birthday and so on. The
authoritarian sides of the Titoist regime were not elaborated upon very often in anti-
nationalist discourse because their significance seemed to pale in the light of the
present situation. Joking about the past seemed to be yet another way of coping with
the extreme sense of discontinuity that most people were facing. A common feature in
many anti-nationalist narratives was an underlying sense of relativity and good
humour—a looking back in irony, rather than in anger. This reflected a characteristic of
almost all articulations of Jugonostalg(ja with anti-nationalism: a bitter-sweetness.
7. popular culture and everyday lives: the Balaevió phenomenon
In this section, which also functions as a sort of conclusion to the chapter, I focus on a
phenomenon surrounding one man: Dore Balaevió, or Dole (or sometimes Doko), as
he is affectionately known to his fans. In many ways, BalaeviC evoked a number of
discursive elements that I have explored in this study. This included a fierce resistance
against being categorised, a pronounced emphasis on 'European' and particularly
'urban' values, a matter-of-factly ironic attitude with regard to language and post-
Yugoslav differences, a hatred of turbofolk and, as I argue in this section, an
extraordinary preoccupation with continuity12.
'I belonged to another people, and I haven't found my people yet in all those divisions.'
(Balaeviô in Globus 15/01/93:21-22)
Balaevió was always and everywhere depicted as the ultimate icon of JugonostaIg/a,
and his music, particularly the lyrics, played an important role in the lives of many
people who would be charged guilty of Jugonostalgj/a by their nationalist regimes. It is
in this respect, and only in this one, that I would like to have a closer look at the Dole-
mania. I am not trying to understand his popularity in general, but I hope to shed a light
on how he became such a significant figure in many people's narrative constructions of
(dis)continuity with the Yugoslav past.
Partly, this had to do with continuity on a very straightforward level. A singer-songwriter
from Novi Sad, Vojvodina, a historically very mixed region in between Serbia proper
and Hungary, Balaevió was one of the most well-known artists in Yugoslav popular
culture before the wars. As such, he provided a channel of direct continuity with the
former Yugoslav cultural space. The man toured the whole of the former state and sold
high numbers of records in different republics. In songs, interviews and writings, he
always presented himself as a Yugoslav and did so until he argued that it had become
impossible because of the wars. Unlike many of his colleagues, he then distanced
himself from the rising tide of Serbian nationalism and became an outspoken critic of
war and the different nationalisms throughout.
In the 1990s, BaIaeviO still never performed for less than sold-out venues. He must
have been one of the best-selling artists on the black market in Croatia, and he was
12 Jl of this emerges from almost every interview or extracts from conversations with Balaeviá that I have come
across. For examples, see Buden 1998; Gall 1998a; G!obus 15/01/93; Jovanoviô 1998; JoviO 1996; Nacional
16/12/98; Nedeljna Borba s.d.; Senjanoviô; Slapak 1997:140-143; TataloviO 1998. For loads of info, lyrics,
correspondence, and a series of transcribed interviews (all in Serbian/Croatian/Bosnian), see his fan club's web site:
http://www.oaza.co.yu/muzika/djole/
219
probably one of the most popular singers amongst post-Yugoslav youth, both at home
and in the diaspora. He didn't play in Croatia, but his yearly Slovenian concerts were
always attended by thousands of people who'd come there from Croatia especially for
the occasion.
Although this explicit aspect of Yugoslavism and anti-nationalism certainly was
important, I would argue that it was only a secondary one. Yes, Dole's more recent
lyrics contained references to the old times and to the narrative break that
characterised so many lives. But although he sometimes relied on directly subversive
political discourse about the war and about nationalist madness, usually he preferred a
sort of popular-poetic language, rich in references to everyday life. In fact, as Balaeviá
himself liked to say, he was just a chansonnier, a troubadour who brought people
songs—often love songs, romantic ballads. So where did the Jugonostalg(ja factor
come about in his songs?
A first aspect, I would argue, was the very fact that he continued to perform and that
people continued to listen to a whole series of songs which he had been singing before
the break-up of the former state. Secondly, Balaeviá's lyrics, even when they did not
explicitly deal with things related to former Yugoslavia, were almost without exception
formulated in terms of memories. Memories of youth, of love won, but more often of
love lost and simply of mundane life in general, all phrased in strongly experiential
terms. In this way, for a large number of people from different backgrounds, Dole's
songs provided a sort of soundtrack to memories of everyday life. And again, that
everyday life, for those people (and for all citizens of the former state to a certain
extent), had unfolded against a 'Yugoslav' background—however this background
might have been evaluated. Therefore, in a highly stylised way, Balaeviá's work
seemed to evoke some elements of before, both to his numerous fans and his equally
numerous opponents (Gall 1998a:32).
However, reflecting the structure of this chapter, there was a further twist to the story
(see Buden 1998a:36-38). Dole's concerts were notoriously hysterical affairs, with
people travelling across borders to cry their hearts out on the sound of his simple love
songs. And, interestingly, this included young people, teenagers, who couldn't possibly
have a lot of individual memories of life in former Yugoslavia. Surely, those teenagers
were not seeking to travel back in time to a past that they never knew. Again, it is not
my intention here to explain Balaevió's success, as I believe that just the act of crying
their heart out might well be a crucial reason for people to attend a gig. However,
indirectly, the man's popularity amongst those younger fans also seemed to resonate
with a specific kind of Jugonostalg(ja, which allowed them to position themselves in
relation to an imagined 'Yugoslav' background. Having grown up in a situation of
dramatic discursive shifts, war, chaos and selective amnesia, they incorporated some
evocations of this imaginary background in an attempt to narrate their own personal,
emotional form of continuity with a past that was not theirs and that was 'forbidden'.
In this respect, the relevance of this Jugonostalg(ja evoked by BalaeviO lay in the ways
it made visible some patterns in the present reality. This was to a large extent a purely
emotional-imaginary phenomenon, and the regime's attempts to detect political
pamphleteering in these little songs about love lost were in vain. People attended his
concerts and played his songs endlessly on social and private occasions for emotional
reasons. Dole's job, so he and his fans knew, was to break their hearts, provide them
with a lump in their throat and make them whisk away a tear, not to engage them in a
political initiative. As a result, from certain anti-nationalist perspectives, he was
sometimes accused of encouraging passivity, victimology and fatalism. In a roundabout
way, these critics argued, BalaeviO was the ultimate pseudo-subject, as discussed at
the end of Chapter Six, a man who represented all the politically ineffective
characteristics of the palanka (Jovanovió 1998:32). While there probably were such
elements present, I would argue that precisely because of his non-political image there
was an extraordinary political significance in his popularity.
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In this context, the cultural critic Boris Buden argued that the primary political relevance
of Balaeviá's concerts was often not even located in the place where they were
actually held. For example, his legendary first concert in Sarajevo after the war, in the
spring of 1998, was a matter of great debate in the media in neighbouring Croatia.
Although the man was performing in Bosnia, Buden argued, this gig carried enormous
political significance in Croatia where the argument against him having concerts there
was that he came from 'the aggressor state'. In other words, while BalaeviO was
welcomed in Sarajevo, which had been under siege by Serbian artillery for three years,
in Croatia the wounds of the Serbian attack on the homeland, so the official line went,
were too fresh. They hadn't had the chance to heal yet, and it would be 'too painful to
see the Croatian youth singing along with a Serb about nostalgia for a fallen
Yugoslavia' (Buden 1998a:38).
'Balaeviô as a purely cultural phenomenon has opened new spaces of political freedom.
[...] Today, Oorde Balaeviô is the name of the greatest post-Yugoslav cultural-political
paradox: with him on stage autonomous modern culture is more political than politics
itselfl'
(Buden 1998a:38)
In Croatia, moreover, BalaeviO was deemed unacceptable because of his sheer
acceptability: this middle-aged softie in jeans and trainers could not possibly confirm
the stereotype of Serbs as, per definition, monstrous Oetnici. Whereas interviews with
Miloeviô's men or with other extremist Serbian nationalists were regularly published in
the state media, a man like Balaeviá couldn't feature as easily. This was because he
would remind people of 'the fact that some Serbs are normal, and that they were
normal before as well, and that they have a common "better past", and maybe even a
dream of a common better future' (Gall 1998a:47). However, the post-Yugoslav
regimes were fairly powerless in the face of his popularity. Even if they could attempt to
stamp out patterns of similarity, break off lines of communication and destroy
multicultural cities and villages, they could not wipe out everybody's identification with
his/her own everyday past, whether imaginary or not.
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[chapter eleven]
anti-nationalism and individual narratives
then again,
we can only meet ourselves
at an unexpected bend in the road
Eu gOne lonesco
wearing badges is not enough
in days like these
Billy Bragg - Days Like These1
In this brief concluding chapter, I take up some lines of thought that run through this
study but that haven't been spelled out in a systematic way. Particularly, I propose a
brief look at the role of individuality and the notion of 'personal identity' in relation to the
specific ethnographic material presented throughout. Rather than wanting to take on a
series of debates that have raged for at least a couple of centuries, I merely hope to
indicate how this study, a particular combination of theoretical concerns and
ethnographic rootedness, touches upon such issues. In doing so I bring together the
main themes of this text and thereby attempt to integrate some ideas into a more or
less coherent narrative. This is not to say that there are no other ways to do so, nor do
I want to close off other interpretations. Rather, I explicitly aim to leave a number of
loose ends, but I hope to provide the reader with a set of loose ends which are
interesting for further critical engagement.
1. is that all...? summing up some central themes
This study of post-Yugoslav anti-nationalism as a set of discursive practices has
constructed its own object, not in a surreptitious way, but purposively and explicitly.
The focus on anti-nationalism as a discursive practice, rather than on 'anti-nationalists'
allowed me to indicate how different citizens of the post-Yugoslav states deployed,
reinforced, modified or undermined those discursive practices to differing extents. Also,
have shown that they did so in a variety of ways, for a wide number of reasons and
with different goals, if any, in mind.
My choice to approach anti-nationalism as a discourse which provided subject-
positions for contextualised, dissident narratives of self is not, I hope, simply a result of
some fashion-conscious preference for post-structuralist vocabulary—although it would
be silly to assume that I could have written the same text, say, fifty years ago. The
discursive focus was partly the result of the nature of deterritorialised multi-sited
fieldwork. I have traced a range of cultural-political practices and flows of meaning
which could not be located in any particular place, although I have tried to demonstrate
their divergent relationships to places in the former Yugoslav states, and particularly to
Zagreb and Beograd. The choice to engage in such multi-sited research, however, was
also partly a result of my initial borrowing of insights from post-structuralist social
theory, in trying to analyse post-Yugoslav nationalisms as discursive practices.
Chapters One, Three and Four, in which I attempt to locate the altOrité of anti-
nationalism in relation to some central aspects of Serbian and Croatian nationalism
and in the light of Titoist nationality policies, bear clearly distinguishable imprints of this
attempt.
1 Billy Bragg, from The Peel Session Album © 1991 Strange Fruit Records.
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The bulk of this study looked at the 'resistance' side of the story, focusing on the
narrative mechanisms which people deployed in order to locate themselves in
opposition to the dominant nationalist discourses. This included an analysis of the
ways in which they more or less strategically positioned themselves in relation to a
number of related discourses that were particularly influential in the post-Yugoslav
context. In this way, I examined in detail the meanings surrounding the urbanity/rurality
dualism and the central place of the cultural construct 'the City' in the critique of
nationalism and war, with the latter often being understood in terms of rurality and
'peasant culture'. On another level, I explored anti-nationalist engagements with the
symbolic geography of Balkan orientalism and pro—European discourses. Both the
village/city and Balkan/Europe dualisms were critically analysed in terms of
counterdiscursive strategies of negative self-definition. Also, with women playing a
central role in anti-nationalism, I unravelled some of its articulations with feminism,
thereby attempting to include a sensitivity to the situated meanings of discourses of
women's rights and women's solidarity.
Throughout this study, I have relied predominantly on ethnographic material of a
narrative character. This is partly because of my personal affinity with the verbal, with
the power of words in all respects and because of my fascination with the subtleties of
different languages. However, I would certainly not argue that words exhaust human•
experience, and I would feel all the poorer myself if they did. Still, as I have argued,
there were certain reasons for the narrative emphasis of this study, which transcended
my personal obsessions. The matter of access in a situation of polarisation was one of
them, as was the particular character of some of the issues explored in this study, such
as people's positionings in relation to dominant discourses of identification. Most
importantly, however, the post-Yugoslav context was one of heightened narrativity,
forcing some people and enticing many others, who might have remained silent in
other situations, to 'speak out', to locate themselves explicitly in national terms. As a
result, paradoxically, my focus on narration also brought about a sharper sensitivity to
the role of silences and discursive 'black holes' (see also Jansen 2000b). Specifically, I
attempted to highlight the critical role of strategic non-narration in anti-nationalism.
Through the centrality of narrative, notions of (dis)continuity came to play an important
role in this study, with contested narrations of past and present taking shape both on
the level of the self and that of state and/or nation. In particular, I uncovered patterns in
the ways in which people, individually and in solidarity with others, established a non-
dominant sense of continuity within their biographies in order to cope with a defining
narrative break. When we see anti-nationalist discursive strategies of articulation and
inversion in this light, a closer look at the contested meanings of memory, of
remembering and forgetting, becomes necessary. Particularly, I analysed the
mechanisms that structured narratives of self in relation to individual memories of
everyday life and popular culture in former Yugoslavia. This resulted in a critical
analysis of the controversial notion of JugonostaIga, attempting to disentangle and re-
entangle some of its cultural-political potential.
Within the previously sketched theoretical framework, this implied a critical look at the
idea of national identity itself. There was a trap ready for me there. So many
approaches to the post-Yugoslav conflict state at the outset that national identities are
socially constructed and then disregard this insight in the remainder of their analysis,
turning a blind eye to the ways in which it problematises the use of such notions. In
contrast, I analyse anti-nationalist narratives of the meanings of national identitybefore
and after and explore how they (re)constructed its current status in relation to its
previous importance or lack of it. As a result, I referred to 'Serbs' and 'Croats' only
when this was a label deployed by the person in question or when addressing a
situation in which this label played a determining role in the experience of that person,
whether by choice or in spite of it. On other occasions, if using a collective category at
all, I have preferred to use the term 'citizens' orZagrepöani and Beogradani, reflecting
the emphasis on 'citizenship' and on 'urbanity' in many anti-nationalist narratives.
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2. 'a person as a person'
Throughout this study, I have demonstrated that a notion of individual continuity was a
central mechanism to many discursive practices of anti-nationalism. I argued that the
nationalist violence of the 1990s represented a defining break in a number of
narratives. Through divergent combinations of amnesia and selective remembering,
the dominant discourses attempted to establish a radical departure from the recent
Titoist past, while constructing continuity with a presumably more nationally correct
distant past. The citizens of the post-Yugoslav states coped with this situation in a
variety of contradictory ways, but in this study I have focused on the narratives that
some of them developed in direct opposition to the dominant nationalisms. Despite a
wide range of qualitative differences and diverging levels of intensity, I found that the
notion of 'personal' or 'individual' integrity was crucial to many of these stories of self. In
order to cope with a situation of extreme discontinuity, it seemed that anti-nationalist
discursive practice located its resistance overwhelmingly in continuity. And, with war
around the block, violence around the corner and xenophobia pervading virtually all
spheres of life, it seemed that more often than not this continuity was constructed on
the individual and inter-subjective level. For some this might have been a conscious
decision, whereas for others it was mainly a result of having been thrown back into that•
micro-sphere by circumstances.
Interestingly, many narratives on the collective level were not only defined by the
'grand' break of war and nationalism, but they also actively engaged in the
(re)construction of the process by which this discontinuity had taken place. Therefore,
this text contains so many narratives of 'how it used to be', resonating with a strong
sense of nostalgia. However, we are dealing here with a nostalgia that needs to be
contextualised in the problematic present from which it emerged. People didn't just
reminisce about the City that used to be—they did so in the experiential context of a
City that was not acceptable to them, and that they defined as ruralised. People didn't
just recall an almost European Yugoslav past—they did so in an experiential context
that was far removed from their European ideal, and that they defined as 'Balkan'. In
short, people didn't just yearn for peace and the good life—they did so while
experiencing the consequences of war, soclo-economic deterioration and generalised
xenophobia.
Again, we have to keep in mind that anti-nationalism was truly anti-nationalism, as in a
reaction against nationalism and often even a mechanism to cope with it. The
overwhelming reference to individual continuity was also part of this coping, as it pitted
these dissident stories against what was seen as the blind collectivism of nationalist
discourses. So without being a necessary response to nationalism, the centrality of
individual narratives becomes more understandable when we see it as a coping
strategy and a reaction against mass compliance and conformism. In this context, even
the references that people made to 'care for others' as one of their main driving forces,
was often part of a simultaneous, more or less conscious project of care for oneself.
Treating 'a person as a person' was a crucial point here, as illustrated in the interview
with Ivana, the girl from Zagreb who thought of herself as Serbian since the outbreak of
the war:
'I hope a way of thinking will prevail.., which makes people look at other people with
regard to their qualities. So I don't ask somebody I get to know what they are and who
they are, but I want to get to know them as a person. So looking at a person through their
opinions, their thoughts,... And not on the basis of which way s/he prays to God or which
church s/he goes to. So, absolutely, nations exist, I am far from denying that, and that
brings a feeling of belonging to a community, but that shouldn't be a key factor in all inter-
human relations.'
In Beograd, in a previously mentioned quotation, Zorica argued along similar lines,
simultaneously emphasising how her concern with individuality was embedded in
continuity. In our first conversation, long before she told me that she had grown up in a
Croatian family on the coast, she stated that for her there were 'just different people:
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good people and bad people... but it is not connected with nationality'. Coming from a
different angle but arriving at a similar conclusion, Beograd writer Slavko, argued in an
interview that nationality was just one of many factors shaping people's identity.
'I don't think a national sense of belonging is bad. To do with tradition, milieu, family,
language,... that is part of one's personality. The question of identity has, of course, to do
with one's birth in a certain surrounding, one's upbringing, one's language... Those things
do give shape to a certain identity, so that people perceive themselves in a certain way.
But..., that's not everything. Identity is not just these things—they don't amount to full
identity. It also takes shape through life, in interaction with other cultures, languages,
surroundings, people, etc. And this part is at least as important! So it is not just national
identity. All of them together constitute an identity. And that identity is not static, it is fluid,
it changes. But that was the way it became here; national identity became everything, the
whole idea of identity was occupied by national identity.'
As such, even many of the oppositional discourses that were articulated on a collective
level, such as those surrounding the 'City' and 'Europe', actually constructed those
notions as exemplifying the power of individuality. In combination with multiculturalism,
peace, tolerance and civilised decency, urban and European stories of 'Us' strongly
centred upon a sense of individual freedom and integrity, which was then contrasted•
with the compliance and sheep-mentality of rurality and 'Balkan'. In that sense, it
seemed, they proposed an intersubjective, freely chosen and 'rational' collectivity of
equal individuals, rather than what they saw as a collectivist, ascribed and 'irrational'
national group. As was to be expected, some youth subcultural discourses and
particularly feminist critiques of nationalism were less adamant in their emphasis on
individuality, but it was still an important element there as well.
3. responsibility and disobedience
A key-notion in this context was 'responsibility'. Most post-Yugoslav anti-nationalist
discourses relied to a certain extent on the difference between 'guilt' and
'responsibility', and they made this explicit in their approaches2. They argued that, while
not everyone was guilty of violence and xenophobia, everyone in whose name this had
taken place carried some responsibility. Therefore, they said, a situation in which
violence against national Others was considered normal and war-criminals were being
celebrated as national heroes was one of the occasions where silently sitting on the
sideline was simply not enough—action was required. And while this action was to take
shape preferably in solidarity with others, it was up to the individual to make the original
decision to join in.
I think it is important to see this in the highly homogenised post-Yugoslav context,
where nationalist policies and everyday practice not only suppressed national Others
but also forced people to 'speak out', as it were, in national(ist) terms. Simply not being
a national Other was only one part of the story—one had to actually prove oneself as a
true national. This could take many different forms, from fighting on the front, to voting
for the right party, to reproducing the right story lines in front of the neighbours. It was
always to the detriment of Others. Sadly, many citizens of the post-Yugoslav states
responded with great enthusiasm to this encouragement to establish oneself as a good
national at the expense of Others. They might have done so out of fear and confusion,
out of a deeply ingrained belief that it was the right thing to do, in the hope of reaping
benefits later, out of simple-mindedness or... Most probably they did so because of a
combination of some of those reasons and a variety of other ones, related to their own
personal experience. Throughout this text, I have attempted to make clear that I do not
believe that the success of nationalism was a 'Balkan' thing, nor that it was the result of
some exclusive cultural characteristic of Serbia and Croatia, which cannot be found in,
2 This was a major theme on meetings and seminars, as well as in publications (see for example Zajoviá 1997:33;
Buden 1996: 97-101; Erceg 1998: 16-17; Dufgran 1997:16; Helsinki Povelja 1997).
225
say, Belgium or Britain. However, I believe that in the particular circumstances of
1990s Serbia and Croatia, most of the citizens who belonged to whatPovrzanovió calls
the 'forgotten majority' (1997:153) complied with and conformed to the dominant
nationalist discourses.
We have seen how anti-nationalist narratives contained a whole range of explanations
of the appeal of nationalist discourses, many of which included the articulation of yet
another process of Othering. However, it was often emphasised that the majority of the
population simply went with the flow and kept quiet. And it was in response to this
relative absence of resistance that many anti-nationalist narratives evoked a sense of
continuity of self.
This might strike the reader as a paradox, for surely the Yugoslav past had also been
one of imposed collectivism. In fact, many anti-nationalist narratives did result in a
general critique of collectivism tout court, condemning both communism and
nationalism. However, there was a further 'but' to this story. In the previous chapter, I
elaborated on Devió's conception of the 'Yugoslav home' as a discursive space which
articulated highly individualist lifestyles into a loose whole (DeviO 1997). So, whereas
Titoism was a collectivist system, in most anti-nationalist narratives of the past it was
portrayed as leaving plenty of room for individual manoeuvre. In fact, as we have seen
in Chapter Six, many people had simply ignored 'politics' all together. However, while
one might explain the emphasis on individual stories in post-Yugoslav anti-nationalism
with reference to sheer envisaged continuity of lifestyle, this explanation seems only
partial to me. As we have seen, amongst a number of people there was a sense that
they 'should have known better then', with regard to their previous apathy. In this way,
it is possible that, for some, their post-Yugoslav anti-nationalism also included an
element of 'getting things right this time'.
In a number of cases, people's evocations of anti-nationalism in the 1990s were
embedded in a narrative of disobedience as a general approach to life. One of the
main slogans of Women in Black was 'Always Disloyal', and many of their leaflets or
texts included references to disobedience and disloyalty (ZajoviO 1995:161-1 62; ene
u crnom 1996:87-88). For some, this was a political choice made long ago and, as we
have seen, a number of dissidents emphasised that they had been in opposition to the
former regime as well as to the new ones, thereby setting themselves apart from 'born-
again nationalists' and protecting themselves from accusations of belonging to the
former red bourgeoisie. Similarty, particularly in Serbia, many people of varying
backgrounds stated their scepticism with regard to any kind of organised activity which
was beyond their everyday life experiences. Organisations, it was argued, whether
foreign or domestic, regime-minded or non-governmental, were not to be trusted, for
not one of them was ever considered independent enough to provide 'true'
information3.
4. individualism/collectivism: personal integrity and the lack of it?
Let us recall the words of one interviewee in Zagreb, who expressed his doubts about
the feasibility of my study upon hearing what I had set out to do. This academic, who
had been villified and lost his job because of his anti-nationalist stance, argued:
'It will be very hard or even impossible for you to find something in common between
those people, apart from resistance to nationalism. [...] Now, we have very little, if
anything, like a new collective identity. There are only individuals, like myself, who try and
preserve their little microcosm and who would do anything not to end up in a new
collective identity.'
Elsewhere I have briefly illustrated the consequences of such far-going scepticism with special reference to the
reception of media messages during the Kosovo crisis and the NATO air strikes (Jansen 2000a:294-296). Maybe,
this sheds a ciritical light on Nigel Rapport's writings on irony and individuality (1999), for it points to a number of
problems at the extreme end of such distancing and detachment from collective discourses.
226
In the context of the main ideas arising from this text, this kind of statement might strike
many people—including myself—as individualist to a rather problematic extent. When I
started this project, individualism in itself was certainly not something I was particularly
looking for. Quite the contrary, I was hoping to find subaltern forms of solidarity and
togetherness developed in response to an oppressive, dare I say, pathological excess
of collectivist discourse: nationalism. In this respect, given my own previous
engagements in social action of the 'alternative' kind in Western Europe in the 1980s-
1990s, I found myself in an extremely uncomfortable position. Whereas, in the former
context, 'dissidence' was associated with change and solidarity, in many strands of
post-Yugoslav anti-nationalism I found a strong preoccupation with continuity and
individuality, to the extent that, at times, it smacked more of aThatcherite-Reaganite
discourse than of anything remotely 'alternative'. Although this was not so much the
case in the economic sense, the role and the importance of the self-interested and
sovereign individual was sometimes privileged in almost evangelical terms. Also,
rationality and modernisation, particularly through education, were high on the agenda
for most of those whom I would call established dissidents, and even in many of the
more alternative critiques of nationalism.
This had to do with the fact that the success of nationalism was often explained with
reference to a lack of individuality on the side of those who had gone with the flow. As
we have seen, in its extremer versions, such anti-nationalist perspectives blamed most
of the violence on a combination of opportunistic politicians, media manipulation and
an easy audience of uneducated Balkan peasants. It is interesting that many people,
especially intellectuals in the cultural sector, pointed to the late Danilo Kit, a famous
Yugoslav literary figure, as a source of inspiration. In 1978, defending himself against a
witch-hunt which had been unleashed on him by the former regime and by colleagues
of the 'national realist' variety, Ki wrote:
'Nationalism is first and foremost paranoia, individual and collective paranoia. As
collective paranoia it is the product of envy and fear and primarily the result of a loss of
individual consciousness; it is thus nothing but a set of individual paranoias raised to the
degree of paroxysm. If an individual feels unable to "express himself" within the
framework of the social order either because it fails to encourage or stimulate him as an
individual or because it constrains him as an individual—in other words, stands in the way
of his self-fulfilment—and he feels obliged to seek fulfilment outside his identity or the
prevailing social structures, he joins a Masonic-like group dedicated (in appearance, at
least) to solving the problems of the age: keeping the nation alive, protecting its prestige,
upholding its tradition, safeguarding the national patrimony as represented by its folklore,
literature, philosophy, etc. Burdened with this secret, semi-public, or public mission, he
becomes a man of action, a tribune of the people, a pseudo-individual; reduced to this
dimension, his true dimension, he becomes an individual without individuality, a
nationalist, a Cousin Jules.'
(Kit 1996:15-16)
The mentioning of Cousin Jules is a reference to Sartre's work, whose existentialism
seems sometimes well in tune with the individualism of many post-Yugoslav anti-
nationalist narratives. Many times people reminded me of the crucial place of 'personal
integrity' in their work and lives. It was then argued, like in Kit' case, that persons with
little personal integrity easily turned to national identity, and even to nationalism in its
extreme forms, in order to establish some sense of security.
Hence, it is not a coincidence that the lyrics of singerDorde Balaeviô carried plenty of
references to the importance of individuality and the danger of collectivism and
conformism, such as in his songs Nevernik ['Non-Believer'], and in Slow Motion:
mo2da i nisam neki biser 	 [maybe I am not some kind of treasure
a/i sam barem svoj re2iser 	 but at least I'm my own director]
(Slow Motion - BalaeviO 1998:185)
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In the context of this study, this is slightly ironic on a theoretical level as well: having
started off with a conceptual framework strongly influenced by certain post-structuralist
insights, I ended up placing much emphasis on individuality, which would seem
contradictory at the very least (Rapport I 997a:7). However, as demonstrated in this
study, rather than postmodern critiques of the sovereign subject, I found a widespread
exercise to retain this notion and its political implications in debates about citizenship.
Here I had a sustained struggle by a wide range of people to reinforce the possibility of
what Nigel Rapport would call transcendent individuality (1997a, c). In an interview,
Ela, a prominent figure on the Beograd independent intellectual scene, argued:
'My family is from Krajina. Almost the whole of my family was killed during WWII. But I
was lucky that my father never used that in a sense as to generalise towards the present
period. So when we destroyed Vukovar I never thought, like a lot of people, that that was
some kind of retribution for what happened fifty years ago. [...] I think I belong to that
minority of, let's say, cosmopolitans. I think that the great majority, people who think their
national identity is so important to them, I think that they don't have a strong enough
sense of personal identity. I myself never had the need for a sense of belonging to a
people. Not even to my family. I don't need them to know where I stand.'
(Ela, Beograd)
The presence of such strong assertions of individuality in this study could be explained
partly by the focus on narrative in general and on stories of self and society in
particular, which might be likely to privilege individuality more than, say, an emphasis
on materiality. However, I would like to stress that I do not think it is only a result of my
approach. As we have seen throughout this study, for many people anti-nationalism
was constructed as part of a wider discourse of anti-collectivism, especially with
retrospective reference to Yugoslav communism. Several activists seemed to have
explicitly considered this, and maybe upon seeing my discomfort with their frequent
evocations of a very mainstream liberal discourse they argued that this was a strategic
choice. In fact, several people told me that, had they lived in Western Europe, they
would most probably sympathise with Red/Green or left-libertarian politics, but given
the situation in their own state, they felt theyhad to defend ' the individual' in ways that
would be considered conservative in the 'West'. In this sense, the liberal discourse that
was so dominant in anti-nationalism might have struck me as very mainstream, but
they conceived of it as a potential source of subversive material in an authoritarian and
collectivist context.
Their strategic individualism, then, could be seen in terms of what ChenXiaomei has
described in the Chinese context as 'Occidentalism'. We therefore have to take into
account the latter's warning that it is a frequent ethnocentric mistake of Western
European and North American 'leftists' to exclude the possibility that some discourses
that might support the status-quo in one state hold subversive power in another (Chen-
Xiaomei 1996:9; see also Zi±ek 1992).
5. the individual and the peculiarities of anti-nationalist resistance
The focus on the individual in many anti-nationalist narratives, then, must be
contextualised and seen in proportion. For many people, liberal notions of individuality
seemed to provide possible building bricks for a critique of both the current nationalism
and the previous communism. This was not just the case on an ideological level, but it
also had to do with a sense of real-politik. Not only did almost all organised anti-
nationalist initiatives survive thanks to funding from Western Europe and the United
States, bastions of exactly such liberalism, but in a quest for at least some domestic
legitimacy and effectiveness, they felt they had precious little else to turn to. While
individualism might be oppressive and exclusive in other contexts, in the post-Yugoslav
situation many dissidents found it liberating.
However, the frequent emphasis on rationality and individuality was perhaps one of the
reasons for the relative lack of success of anti-nationalist alternatives in the post-
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Yugoslav states. Its appeal was always limited and its focus was fairly strongly on
urban, educated and 'modern' individuals, and there was little effort to expand activities
to those who did not inhabit similar life worlds (although such efforts did exist).
However, I would immediately add that the marginality of anti-nationalism had more to
do with other factors, outside of the discourse, such as violence, self-interest,
manipulation and so on. Also, I believe that, while post-Yugoslav anti-nationalism might
not have succeeded to prevent war or to impinge greatly upon the discursive climate, it
did play a crucial role in the everyday lives of a range of individuals and their small
social circles. As we have seen, for them, anti-nationalism provided something to hold
on to: an alternative discursive practice, an attempt to construct a temporary 'home' in
a thoroughly unhomely context.
The reactive, anti-nationalist nature of the focus on individuality was illustrated, for
example, by Staa Zajovié, who stated:
'Ourda's obstinate refusal of the logic of categorisation: 'There are no Serbian women, no
Croatian women, there is only Staa from Belgrade, Biljana from Panëevo, that is, there
are women according to what they are and not according to their nationality." I recalled
her words every time they harassed me outside, rudely and aggressively, often asking
me: "And who are you: a Serb or a Croat or...?" I am what I choose to be. I am my own
individual creation, as Brodsky would say.'
(Zajoviô 1997:32-33)
I chose this example out of a wide range of such statements, because it comes from
one of the places where I least expected it: in the fairly radical anti-militarist, feminist
and pacifist organisation Women in Black, which had strong networks with, for
example, Western European peace and women's initiatives. More 'established', or
'mainstream' articulations of anti-nationalism contained very similar elements, both in
Serbia and Croatia.
Did this mean that post-Yugoslav anti-nationalism denied the importance of sociality
and solidarity? Most certainly not. In fact, the above extract was preceded by a sketch
of the centrality of Women in Blacks embodied protests on Beograd's Square of the
Republic and followed by references to the power of encounters, of friendship, of care,
love, tenderness and so on. Why then does this study seem to hold relatively few
evocations of practised emotion, passion and togetherness? Again, partly, this could
be explained by its focus on narratives of self and society, but a more crucial factor is
that anti-nationalism was a counterdiscourse, articulated as a counterweight against
what was seen as the surrounding barbaric madness of war-mongering nationalism.
As we have seen throughout this text, the public scene in 1990s Serbia and Croatia
was clearly dominated by collectivist discourses of nationalism. And here's the catch:
solidarity, community and love was precisely what nationalism was all about. I have
argued throughout this text that it would be a mistake to pin these discourses down to
hatred and aggression, because the language they depended on was one of defence,
love, pride and justice. Also, we should not forget that it was primarily the different
nationalisms which articulated notions of solidarity and resistance. Theirs was a story
of suppressed communities who had finally found the power to engage in solidarity and
collective rebellion; theirs was a discourse of subversion, equality, brotherhood and
change. Dissident representations, therefore, found themselves in an uncomfortable
situation, as much political discursive material which could be seen as subversive in
other situations was, for them, tainted and discredited.
In combination with nationalism's perceived colonisation of discourses of togetherness
and solidarity, there was the previously mentioned wider post-Yugoslav attitude
towards 'politics' as a dirty game. Political engagement was generally considered a
shady business, and attempts to impute the term with a positive content were
sometimes laughed away, as illustrated during a workshop I attended in Beograd. A
speaker, a British academic with an interest in the development of 'civil society', argued
that 'politics is about working out how six billion people can live together on this planet'.
A roar of sceptical laughter went up in the audience, and several people shouted: 'Oh
no... that's not what politics is about at all!'. In Serbia, as we have seen, the situation
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was extremely confusing, with the regime actually articulating both nationalist and
socialist/multiculturalist elements into an ambiguous whole.
If we consider those two factors together, maybe it becomes possible to see some of
the contours of the context in which we can understand the peculiar individual-centred
nature of most Beograd and Zagreb anti-nationalist narratives. People were very
reluctant to explicitly link up ideas of solidarity, bonds and friendship with political
action. Dissident rituals of community were also rare and there was little effort, it
seemed, to change this. In terms of anti-nationalism, many seemed to prefer to stay
somewhat on the level of individual motivation, rationality and interests. Thus, they
avoided the shark-infested waters of passion and togetherness, which had on the one
hand been colonised by the dominant nationalisms, and on the other hand reminded
them of the embarrassing slogans of Titoist communism.
6. anti-nationalist narratives of belonain
I have, of course, mentioned occasions in which people 'practiced community' (Heller
2000) and in which experiences of solidarity were paramount. Some post-Yugoslav
cross-border meetings of activists provided examples, as did certain demonstrations
and commemorations. A crucial element, in my experience, was humour and popular
culture, particularly music. This is precisely why I paid so much attention to the display
of emotion at the seemingly a-political concerts of Dore Balaeviô, where, I have
argued, Jugonostalgija was imbued with a new meaning, providing critical commentary
on the current situation. When thinking about such occasions, the small bit in me that
subscribes to optimism might say: yes, a recapturing of the discursive practice of
resistance-in-solidarity from the grabbing claws of nationalism! But on the whole, I
believe, people told jokes and sang songs and partied simply because that's what they
felt like doing. Which, in my view, does not prohibit it from having some relevance for
political critique, as I have attempted to argue throughout. If I have not written more
specifically about such experiences on more directly inter-personal levels, this has less
to do with its relevance than with my desperate attempts to shield certain experiences
from the (i.e., in the first place, my own) anthropological gaze. After all, I am not only
an anthropologist and anthropology is not the only thing that counts in my life.
Alternative narratives of self were not stories of self-sufficient individuals completely
detached from actual material place (Oliver, Jansen & Heller 2000). I have
demonstrated above how, for many, the city in which one lived provided a place to
belong to through its urban landscape. Similarly, the former Yugoslav territory,
exemplified in its cities and it coast, functioned as a 'home' for a number of people. We
have seen how this sometimes resulted in counter-exciusivism, for example, through
city-centrism. Interestingly, some of those narratives of 'alternative belonging to a
place' contained a strongly experiential and sensory element. No talk of homelands,
then, nor claims to historical righteousness, but evocations of the lived experience of
place. Let us have a look at a couple of such narratives—excerpts from interviews—in
a bit more detail:
'In a way I am also a regionalist. but not in the sense of [loud] "This is our land!" I mean,
the place where you live is like your bed. It's like.., there might be a certain smell in your
bed,... or in your garden, which is not the same anywhere else, because only in your
garden this combination of plants grow together.'
(Ela, editor and independent intellectual, Beograd - interviewed in her office)
'I always say I am from Zagreb, because I have lived here for most of my life. I sort of like
it here, and I feel at home, but I feel most at home in Dalmatia, where I grew up. You
know, those towns on the coast, they are really... I don't know, that is really something
special to me: the light, the air, the sea, the smells,... That will always be important to
me.'
(Stipe, literary critic and well-known dissident, Zagreb - interviewed in his office)
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These are narratives of non-exclusive belonging to a place, articulated through a
discourse of experience and partiality, as well as of some sense of familiarity with
different dimensions of a landscape. Now if we combine such stories with those that
conjure up images of webs of togetherness, for example through the recalling of 'sitting
on a terrace on the Dalmatian coast with so and so', or even through the ironic
nostalgia for 'singing pioneer songs with so and so', we can see that individuality never
exhausts these people's life experiences. Also, it points to the fact that there are not
just differences between individuals but also within individuals, both at one and the
same time and at different points in time.
Let us relate this point back to the insights of Paul Ricoeur, elaborated upon in Chapter
Two. Ricoeur argues that narration is an important tool by which people negotiate their
sense of self. While it allows an experience of one's self as unique within the constancy
of time, it also integrates a sense of self within a larger context; and, as this study has
illustrated, the two are inextricably linked. Many of the anti-nationalist narratives that I
analysed and reconstructed displayed a preoccupation with the telling and re-telling of
some sense of continuity. In a wider context of extreme confusion, violence and
oppression, the people I worked with permanently negotiated a story of themselves
that, even though ambiguous and multi-dimensional, made some sense to them. This
was retrospective work, and it took place in a context which was far beyond the control
of the person in question.
The individuality we encounter in these narratives is therefore the individuality of the
hero(ine), and of a narrator of a story, but never that of an author (Ricoeur 1991a:32-
33). However, by engaging in the critique of nationalism, by taking political action, by
opposing violence, by helping out a neighbour, by teaching their children to refrain from
nationalist generalisations, a range of citizens of Serbia and Croatia did engage in the
collective authorship of the discursive practice of anti-nationalism. I would argue with
Goldberg that:
'The discourse promoting resistance to racism must not prompt identification with and in
terms of categories fundamental to the discourse of oppression. Resistance must break
not only with practices of oppression, although its first task is to do that. Resistance must
oppose the language of oppression, including the categories in terms of which the
oppressor (or racist) represents the forms in which resistance is expressed.'
(Goldberg 1990:313-314)
Taking into account Balibar's insights on nationalism as differential racism (1991), it
doesn't require a great leap of the imagination to replace 'racism' with 'nationalism'. In
tandem with the brute force of military violence and war-mongering propaganda, the
practice of discretely and exclusively categorising in national terms, and the very
categories of 'Serbs' and 'Croats' themselves, constituted, I believe, one of the most
powerful tools of the post-Yugoslav nationalist discourses. If exclusive nationalism is to
be resisted as a discourse of oppression, then the overwhelming dominance of such
categorisations and the ensuing obliteration of other differences must be defused. We
shouldn't wait for those who are directly oppressed by them to do so.
231
[literature]
Ahearne J. 1995. Michel de Certeau: interpretation and its other. Cambridge: Polity.
Ahmed A.S. 1995. Ethnic cleansing; metaphor for our times?' Ethnic and Racial Studies 18, 1-25.
Allcock J. 1993. 'Involvement-detachment: Yugoslavia as object of scholarship' Journal of Area Studies 3, 144-160.
Alicock J. 1994. 'Legitimacy and the Yugoslav Crisis: three interpretations (review article)' Slavic and East European
Review 72:3, 477-482.
Anderson B. 1983. Imagined communities. London: Verso.
Andrió-Ruiá D. 1997. Women's self-organising in Bosnia: feminism from necessity, or necessity from feminism' In:
Kasiô B. (ed) Women and the politics of peace: contributions to a culture of women's resistance. Zagreb:
Centre for Women's Studies.
Arkzin 4, 06/93, 36-37. Interview with Doni Stuliô.
Arkzin 70/71, 02/08/96, 24-26. Tn kuna sreOe'.
Arkzin 86, 14/03/97, 2-3. Zadnja rupa na svirali'.
Arkzin 88, 14/04/97, 2, 'Was its Arkzin [24]'
Arkzin 3 (98-99), 11/97, 16-24. Interview with Duan Makavejev.
Arkzin 5 (102-103), 02/98, 36-37. Sluöaj Radio 101'.
Babe. 1995. Status of women in Croatia. Zagreb: Babe.
Babe. 1996. Croatian pro-lifers attacking women's rights. Zagreb: Babe.
BakiO-Hayden M. & Hayden R.M. 1992. 'Orientalist variations on the theme"Balkans": symbolic geography in recent
Yugoslav cultural politics' Slavic Review 51:1, 1-15.
Bakiô-Hayden M. 1995. 'Nesting orientalisms: the case of Former Yugoslavia Slavic Review54:4, 917-931.
BalaeviôD. 1998. DodirSvile. Zrenjanin: Gradksa narodna biblioteka 2arko Zrenjanin.
Balibar E. 1991 (1988). 'Is there a neo-racism?' In: Balibar E. & Wallerstein I. Race, nation, class: ambiguous
identifies. London: Verso.
Balibar E. & Wallerstein I. 1991 (1988) Race, nation, class: ambiguous identities. London: Verso.
Banac I. 1 992a. 'Origins and development of the concept Yugoslavia (to 1945)' Yearbook European Studies 5, 1-22.
Banac I. 1992b. 'Post-communism as Post-Yugoslavism: the Yugoslav non-revolutions of 1989-1990' In: Banac I.
(ed) 1992. Eastern Europe in Revolution. Ithaka: Cornell UP.
Banac I. 1995. 'The dissolution of Yugoslav histoniography' In: Ramet S.P. & Adamovich, U.S. (eds) Beyond
Yugoslavia.' politics, economics and culture in a shattered community. Boulder: Westview.
Bauman Z. 1987. Legislators and interpretors. Cambridge: Polity.
Bauman Z. 1991. Modernity and ambivalence. Cambridge: Polity.
Bauman Z. I 992a. Soil, blood and identity' Sociological Review 40:4, 675-701.
Bauman Z. 1992b. Intimations of post modern ity. London: Routledge.
Bauman Z. 2000. In a society of individuals. Hull University Seminar Sociology and Anthropology, February 2000.
Bax M. 1995. Medugorje: religion, politics and violence in rural Bosnia. Amsterdam: Vrije Universiteitspers.
Beliá M. & Kesió V. 1993. Centre for women war victims: interim report. Zagreb: C22R.
Bennett C. 1995. Yugoslavia's bloody collapse.' causes, course and consequences. London: Hurst and Co.
Berdahi D. 1999. Where the world ended.' re-unification and identity in the German Borderland. Berkeley: University
of California Press.
Bhabha H.K. 1990a. Interview: the third space' In: Rutherford J. (ed) 1990. Identity, community, culture, difference.
London: Lawrence & Wishart.
Bhabha H.K. 1990b. 'DissemiNation: time, narrative and the margins of the modern nation' In: Bhabha H.K. (ed)
Nation and narration. London: Routledge.
Bibiô A. 1993. 'The emergence of pluralism in Slovenia' Studies in Comparative Communism 26:4, 367-386.
BlagojeviO M. 1996. 'Iseljavanje sa Kosova' In: Popov N. (ed) Sprska strana rata.' trauma i katarza u istonjskom
pamOenju. Beograd: Republika.
BogdanoviC B. 1993. Die Stadt und der Todt. Klagenfurt: Wieser Verlag. [partly translated as in 'The city and death'
In: Labon J. (ed) 1994. Storm 6: Out of Yugoslavia. Manchester: Carcanet Press]
BogdanoviO B. 1995. 'Die Zukunft der Stadt' Beogradski Krug / Belgrade Circle No.1-2: Oisti Rat/Pure War, 228-235.
Bogdanoviá B. 1996. 'Srpska utopija: izmedu izgubljene Arkadije i nenadenog grada' Republika 17, 16-30/04/96, 1-7.
Bogosavljeviô S. 1996. 'Nerasvetljeni genocid' In: Popov N. (ed) Sprska sfrana rata.' trauma i katarza u istorijskom
pamdenju. Beograd: Republika.
BolãiO S. (ed) 1995. Drutvene promene i svakodnevni Zivof: Srba poöetkom devedesetih. Beograd: Institut za
socioloka istra±ivanja.
Bourdieu P. 1979. La distinction: critique sociale dujugement. Paris: Editions de Minuit.
Bourdieu P. 1982. Ce que parler veuf dire.' l'économie des echanges linguistiques. Paris: Fayard.
232
Bourdieu P. 1984. Questions de sociologie. Paris: Minuit.
Bourdieu P. 1991. Language and symbolic power. Cambridge: Polity.
Bourdieu P. 1992a. Opstellen over smaak, habitus en veldbegrip. Amsterdam: Van Gennep.
Bourdieu P. 1992b. Reponses (avecL.Wacquant). Paris: Seuil.
Bourdieu P. & Eagleton T. 1994. Doxa and common life: an interview In: Ziek S. (ed) Mapping ideology. London:
Verso.
Bowman G. 1994. 'Xenophobia, fantasy and the nation: the logic of ethnic violence in former Yugoslavia' Balkan
Forum 2:2, 135-164.
Boinoviô N. 1996. Zensko pitanje u Srb,Ji u XIV1XX veku. Beograd: Devedesetôetvrta / 2ene u crnom.
Bridger S. 1996. No more heroines? Russia, women, and the market. London: Routledge.
Bringa T. 1995. Being Muslim the Bosnian way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Browning C.R. 1992. Ordinary men: Reserve Police Batallion 101 and the final solution in Poland. New York:
Harperperennial.
Brunnbauer U. & Pichier R. 2000. 'Mountains as "lieux de mémoire": highland values and nation-building in the
Balkans' Paper presented on the Workshop Intersecting times: the work of memory in South-Eastern Europe,
Swansea, June 2000.
Buden B. 1996. Barikade. Zagreb: Bastard/Arkzin.
Buden B. 1997a. 'Mission: Impossible' Arkzin 83, 01/97, 2-3.
Buden B. 1997b. 'Kad budem ustaa i jugosloven' Arkzin 3(98-99), 11/97, 48-50.
Buden B. 1998a. 'BIud/aIaeviã: politiëki efekt plaeipibke' Arkzin 6 (1 04-1 05), 04/98, 36-38.
Buden B. 1998b. 'Babewatch: Sandra' Arkzin 7, 06/98, 82.
Burg S,L. 1983. Conflict and cohesion in socialist Yugoslavia. Princeton UP.
Butler J. 1990. Gender trouble: feminism and the subversion of identity. London: Routledge.
Oale-Feldman L., Prica l.& Senjkoviô R. (eds) 1993. Fear, death and resistance: an ethnography of war. Croatia
1991-1995. Zagreb: Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Research.
Campbell D. 1998. National deconstruction: identity, violence and justice in Bosnia. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP.
Carrier J.G. (ed) 1995. Occidentalism: images of the West. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Centar za ene Mve rata. 1994. Zbornik. Zagreb: C22R.
Centar za ene rtve rata. 1996. The Centre for Women War Victims: Our Stoiy 1993-1996. Zagreb: C22R.
Certeau M. de 1990 (1980). L'invention du quotidien: 1. arts de faire. Paris: Gallimard Folio Essais.
Oetkoviô N. 1993. 'Achtung! Achtung!' Zene za Zene, Special Issue SOS, 5, 135.
Chandler 0. 1999. Bosnia: faking democracy after Dayton. London: Pluto Press.
Chase M. & Shaw C. 1989. 'The dimensions of nostalgia' In: Shaw C. & Chase M. (eds) The imagined past: history
and nostalgia. Manchester UP.
Chen Xiaomei 1996. Occidentalism: a theory of counterdiscourse in post-Maoist China. Oxford UP.
Clifford J. 1986. 'Introduction: Partial truths' In: Clifford J. & Marcus G.E. (eds) Writing culture: the poetics and politics
of ethnography. Berkeley: California UP.
Clifford J. 1992, 'Traveling cultures' In: Grossberg L., Nelson C. & Treichler P. (eds) Cultural Studies. London:
Routledge.
Cockburn C. 1991. 'A women's political party for Yugoslavia' Feminist review 39, 156.
Cohen L.J. 1995. Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's disintegration and Balkan politics in transition (2nd ed). Boulder:
Westview.
Oolovió I. 1994a, Bordel ratnika: folklor, politika i rat. Beograd: XX Vek.
OoIoviO I. 1 994b. Pucanje od zdravlja. Beograd: Beogradski Krug.
Ooloviá I. 1996. 'Drutvo mrtvih ratnika' Republika 145-146, 08/96, l-IV.
oloviô I. & Mimica A. (eds) 1993. lntelektualciirat. Beograd: Beogradski Krug / Centar za antiratnu akciju.
Connerton P. 1989. How societies remember. Cambridge UP.
Csordas, T.J. (ed) 1994. Embodiment and experience: the existential ground of culture and self. Cambreidge UP.
Oupia O. (ed) 1998. Duh vedrine: kultura protesta - protest kulture. Beograd: Agora.
Curtis B. and Pajaczkowska C. 1994. 'Getting There: Travel, Time and Narrative' in G. Robertson et al. (eds)
Travellers' Tales: Narratives of Home and Displacement. London: Routledge.
Dana opsade. Open letter by ex-mayors of Sarajevo (10/04/92). [published, amongst other places, in: Odgovor 16,
17/04/97, 4-5]
David F. & Kovaö M. 1998. Knjiga pisama. Split: Feral Tribune.
Davidoviô M. 1995. 'Rat i alternativni enski pokret u Srbiji' Sociologija: öasopis za sociologiju, socijalnu psihologiju i
socijalnu antropologiju 37:2, 133-1 73.
Dawson A. & Rapport N. 1998. 'Introduction: the topic and the book' In: In: Dawson A. & Rapport N. (eds) Migrants of
identity: perceptions of 'home' in a world of movement. Oxford: Berg.
De Volkskrant 19/11/94:7. 'Leef snel, sterfjong'
233
Declaration against Genocide on the Serbian people. April 1997.
Declaration demanding that the Hague Tribunal criminal charges brought against dr Radovan Karad2iC, President of
Repulika Sprska be repealed. October 1997.
Dedijer V. 1994 (1987). Jasenovac: het Joe goslavische Auschwitz en het Vatikaan. Berchem: Epo.
Denich B. 1994. 'Dismembering Yugoslavia: nationalist ideologies and the symbolic revival of genocide' American
Ethnologist 21:2, 367-390.
Detrez R. 1992. De Balkan: van burenruzie tot Balkanoorlog. Brussel: Hadewych/BRTN/VAR.
Detrez R. 1996. De sloop van Joegoslavie: relaas van een boedelscheiding, Antwerpen/Baarn:
Hadewych/BRTN/ VAR.
Devió A. 1997. 'Anti-war initiatives and the un-making of civic identities in the Former Yugoslav Republics' Journal of
Historical Sociology 10:2, 127-1 56.
Dilas A. 1993. A profile of Slobodan MiloeviO' Foreign Affairs 72:3, 81-96.
Dordeviã M. 1996. 'Matija Beôkoviã - pesnik I propovednik' Republika 152, 16-30/1 1/96:1-VIII.
Douailler S., Poulain J. & Vermeren P. (eds) Hommage a Sarajevo: destruction de l'image, image de Ia destruction.
La Fonderie I L'Harmattan.
Douglas M. 1996. Purity and danger: an analysis of the concepts of pollution and taboo. London: Routledge.
DragieviO-eiô M. 1994. Neofolk kultura: publika I njene zvezde. Sremski Karlovci: lzdavaëka Kuáa Zorana
Stojanoviáa.
Drakuliô S. 1987. How we survived communism and even laughed. London: Virage.
Drakuliô S. 1993a. Balkan Express. London: Hutchinson.
Drakuliô S. 1993b. 'Women and the new democracy in the Former Yugoslavia' In: Funk N. & Muller M. (eds) 1993.
Gender politics and post-communism: reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. London:
Routledge.
Drakuliô S. 1996. Cafe Europa: life after communism. London: Abacus.
Dufgran U. 1997. 'Svi krivi, niko odgovoran' Republika 169-170, 01-31/08/97, 16.
Duhaëek D. 1993. 'Women's time in the Former Yugoslavia' In: Funk N. & Muller M. (eds) 1993. Gender politics and
post-communism: reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. London: Routledge.
Duijzings C. 1996. 'The exodus of Letnica: Croatian refugees from Kosovo in Western Slavonia. A chronicle' In:
JambreiO-Kirin R. & Povrzanovió M. (eds) War, exile, and everyday life: cultural perspectives. Zagreb:
Institute for Ethnology and Folklore Research.
Duijzings C. 2000. Religion and the politics of identity in Kosovo. London: C.Hurst.
DukiC-DojcinoviC V. 2000. 'Global and local identities' iNtergraph: journal of dialogic anthropology 1:2
[www.intergraphjournal.com ].
Edmondson L. (ed) 1992. Women and society in Russia and the Soviet Union. Cambridge UP.
Einhorn B. 1993. Cinderella goes to market: citizenship, gender and women's movements in East Central Europe.
London: Verso.
Epstein AL. 1967. 'Urbanisation and social change in Africa' Current Anthropology 8:4, 275-295.
Erceg H. 1998. 'Zloëin se ishlapi' Feral Tribune 654, 30/03/98, 16-17.
Erikson T.H. 1999. The grammar of identity politics: on the universalising of particularism. Public Lecture at Hul
University, 1 December 1999.
Ese 5. 1997. 'Glavni akter raspada Jugoslavije Slobodan Miloeviá'. Novi List 29/09/97, 15.
Fairciough N. 1992. Discourse and social change. Cambridge: Polity.
Feldman A. 1991. Formations of violence: narrative of the body and politicalterrorin Northern Ireland. Chicago UP.
Feldman A. 1994. 'On cultural anaesthesia: from Desert Storm to Rodney King' American Ethnologist 21:2, 404-418.
Feminist Review. 1991. Special Issue: Shifting territories: Feminism and Europe. No. 39.
Feministiöke sveske 2, 1994. Beograd: Autonomni ±enski centar.
Feministiöke sveske 3-4, 1995. Beograd: Autonomni enski centar.
Feministiöke sveske 5-6, 1996. Beograd: Autonomni enski centar.
Feministiãke sveske 7-8, 1997. Beograd: Autonomni ±enski centar.
Feral Tribune 432, 28/12/93, 1. 'Jesmo se za to borili?'
Feral Tribune 658, 29/04/98, 38-39. 'Beogradska radijacija'
Feral Tribune 678, 14/09/98, 6. Quote Zeljko Stipanoviô from Velebit.
Feral Tribune 681, 05/10/98, 38-39. Interview with Dubravka Ugreiã.
Feral Tribune 681, 05/10/98, 48-49. Interview with Borka Paviôevió.
Feral Tribune 691, 14/12/98, 4-7. Interview with Mira Furlan.
Feral Tribune 697, 25/01/1 999, 40-42. Interview with Slavoj 2iek.
Feral Tribune 705, 22/03/99, 48. Interview with Svetislav Basara,
Ferguson J. 1992. 'The country and the city on the copperbelt' Cultural Anthropology7:1, 80-92.
234
Ferguson J. 1999. Expectations of modernity. myths and meanings of urban life on the Zambian Copperbelt.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Foucault M. 1971 (1970). Lordre du discours. Paris: Gallimard.
Foucault M. 1975. Surieillir et punir. Paris: Tel Gallimard.
Foucault M. 1990 (1976). The history of sexuality: volume 1, introduction. Hammondsworth: Penguin.
Foucault M. 1994 (1969). The archeology of knowledge. London: Routledge.
Foucault M. & Gordon C. (ed) 1980. Power/Knowledge: selected interviews and other writings 1972-1977 by Michel
Foucault. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Foucault M. & Major-Poetzl P. 1983. Michel Foucault's archeology of Western culture. London: Harvester
Wheatsheaf.
Friedlander S. 1993. Memory, history and the extermination of the Jews of Europe. Bloomington: Indiana UP.
Funk N. & Muller M. (eds) 1993. Gender politics and post-communism: reflections from Eastern Europe and the
Former Soviet Union. London: Routledge.
Gall Z. 1998a. 'E moj drue novosadski' Feral Tribune 658 27/04/98, 46-47.
Gall Z. 1 998b. 'Hrvatski strah od proslosti' Feral Tribune 658, 27/04/98, 51.
Gall Z. 1998c 'Ljiga dentlmena: Lepa Brena se vraôa kuOl' Feral Tribune 665, 15/06/98, 51.
Gall Z. 1998d. 'Balkane moj: Hrvatski strah od Srpske kulture' Feral Tribune 685, 02111/98, 51.
Ganguly K. 1992. 'Migrant identities: personal memory and the construction of selfhood' Cultural Studies 6:1, 27-50.
Garde P. 1992. Vie et mort de Ia Yougoslavie. Paris:Fayard.
Geertz C. 1980. Negara: the theatre state in 19th century Bali. Princeton UP.
Geliner E. 1983. Nations and nationalism. London: Basil Blackwell.
Giddens A. 1991. Modernity and self-identity. Cambridge: Polity.
Gillis J. 1994. 'Memory and identity: the history of a relationship' In: Gillis J. (ed) Commemorations: the politics of
national identity. Princeton UP.
Glasnik 6, 07/02/97.
Gleason P. 1983. 'Idenbfying identity: a semantic history' In: Gleason P. Speaking of diversity. John Hopkins UP.
Glenny M. 1993. The fall of Yugoslavia: the third Balkan war. London: Penguin.
Glenny M. 1999. The Balkans: Nationalism, war and the great powers. London: Viking Books.
Globus 04/12/92, 16-17. 'Uvrtnjak iii zrakomlat?'
Globus, 11/1 2192, 41-2. 'Hrvatske Feministice siluju Hrvatsku'
Globus 15/01/93, 21-22. Interview with Dorde Balaeviô.
Globus 22/08/97, 81-90 'Globusov mall leksikon jugonostalgije'
Godina V.V. 1998. 'The outbreak of nationalism on former Yugoslav territory: a historical perspective on the problem
of supranational identity' Nations and Nationalism 4:3, 409-422.
Goldberg D. T. 1990. Anatomy of racism. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP.
Goldhagen D.J. 1996. Hitler's gewillige beulen. Antwerpen: Standaard.
GoluboviC Z. 1995. 'Social change in 1990's and social character (the case of Yugoslavia' Sociologa 37:4, 441-453.
Gow J. 1991. 'Deconstructing Yugoslavia' Suivival 33:4, 291-311.
Gow J. 1994. 'Serbian nationalism and the hiSSSSing snake in the international order: whose sovereignty? which
nation?' Slavonic and East European Review 72:3, 456-476.
Grmek M., Gjidara M. & Simac N. (eds) 1993. Le nettoyage ethnique: documents historique sur une ideologie serbe.
Paris: Fayard.
Gruden 2. 1998. Jednodnevni antifaizam' Feral Tribune 667, 29/06/98, 16.
Gutman R. 1993. A witness to genocide. Shaftesbury: Element.
Habermas J. 1984. The theory of communicative action. London: Heinemann.
Hajer M. 1995, The politics of ecological discourse. Cambridge: Clarendon Press.
Hall S. 1991. Hetminimale zelf en andere opstellen. Amsterdam: SUA.
Handler R. 1985. 'On dialogue and destructive analysis: problems in narrating nationalism and ethnicity' Journal of
Anthropological Research 41, 171-182.
Hannerz U. 1996. Transnational connections: culture, people, places. London: Routledge.
Haraway D. 1988. 'Situated Knowledges' Feminist Studies 14:3, 575-599.
Harrison S. 1999. 'Identity as a scarce resource' Social Anthropology 7:3, 239-251.
Hastrup K. 1992. 'Writing ethnography: state of the art' In: Okely J. & Callaway H. (eds) Anthropology and
autobiography. London: Routledge.
Hayden R.M. 1992. 'Constitutional nationalism in the Formerly Yugoslav republics' Slavic Review 51:4, 654-673.
Hayden R.M. 1994. 'Recounting the dead: the rediscovery and redefinition of wartime massacres in Late- and Post-
Communist Yugoslavia' In: Watson R.S. (ed) Memory, history and opposition under state socialism. Santa
Fe: School of American Research Press.
Hayden R.M. 1996a. 'Imagined Communities and real victims: self-determination and ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia'
American Ethnologist 23:4, 783-801.
235
Hayden R.M. 1996b. 'Schindler's fate: genocide, ethnic cleansing, population transfers' Slavic Review 55:4, 727-778.
Hazan H. 1980. The limbo people: a study of the constitution of the time universe among the aged. London:
Routledge.
Hebdige 0. 1979. Subculture: the meaning of style. London: Methuen.
Heller D. 2000. Go, Move, Shift: Resistance to eviction at Faslane Peace Camp' Anthropology in Action 7:3.
Helsinki Povelja. 1997. Posebni broj jun 1997: teret zloëina. Beograd: Helsinki odbor za ljudska prava U Srbiji.
Herzfeld M. 1985. The poetics of manhood: contest and identify in a Cretan mountain village. Princeton UP.
Herzfeld M. 1995. 'Hellenism and Occidentalism: the permutations of performance in Greek bourgeois identity' In:
Carrier J. (ed) 1995. Occidentalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Herzfeld M. 1996. Cultural Intimacy: Social poetics in the nation-state. London: Routledge.
Hobsbawm E.J. 1990. Nations and nationalism since 1780. Cambridge UP.
Hodson R., Sekulió D. & Massey G. 1994. 'National tolerance in Former Yugoslavia' American Journal of Sociology
99:6, 1334-1 358.
Hoffman- Axthelm D. 1992. 'Identity and reality: the end of the philosophical immigration officer' In: Lash S. &
Friedman J. (eds) Modernity and identity. Oxford: Blackwell.
Holdsworth J. 2000. 'Gulyat: walking and nostalgia for "community" in Donetsk' Paper presented at informal seminar
series, Hull, June 2000.
Holy L. 1996. The little Czech and the great Czech nation. Cambridge UP.
hooks b. 1991. Yearning: race, gender, and cultural politics. London: Turnaround.
Huntington S.P. 1996, The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. New York: Simon & Schuster.
lvanov J. 1995. 'Obrazovna struktura stanovniAstva Jugoslavije' Sociologija 37:3, 369-382.
lvekoviô R. 'Dekartova smrt: Radomir Konstantinovió (review)' Arkzin 6 (104-1 05), 04/98, 56-57.
lvekoviô R. 1994. 'La défait de Ia pensée' Beogradski Krug / Belgrade Circle No.0: Kritika Centrizma / The Critique of
Centrism, 195-199.
Ivekoviô R. 1995a. 'The new democracy - with women or without them?' In: Ramet S.P. & Adamovich Lj.S. (eds)
Beyond Yugoslavia: politics, economics, and culture in a shattered community. Boulder: Westview.
IvekoviO R. 1995b. '2ene, nacionalizam i rat: vodite Ijubav a ne rat' 2enske Studije 213, 9-23.
lvekoviô R. 1997. 'Women, politics and peace' In: Kasiô B. (ed) Women and the politics of peace: contributions to a
culture of women's resistance. Zagreb: Centre for Women's Studies.
Ivekoviô R., Jovanoviá B., Krese M. & Laziô R. 1994. Vjetaride na jug i obrCe se na sjever/ Vetergre, protipoldnevu
in se obraãa profipolnoi. Beograd: B92.
JakovljeviC I. 1997. 'Sad je ãas da i Hrvatska pristupi u SECI' Novi List 17/10/97.
Jambreiô-Kirin R. & Povrzanovió M. (eds) 1996. War, exile, and everyday life: cultural perspectives. Zagreb:
Institute for Ethnology and Folklore Research.
Jansen S. 1998a. 'Homeless at home: narrations of post-Yugoslav identities' In: Dawson A. & Rapport N. (eds)
Migrants of identity: perceptions of 'home' in a world of movement. Oxford: Berg.
Jansen 5. 1998b. 'Een Ander Kroatie: de nationalistische konsensus en stemmen in de marge' Oosteuropa
Verkenningen, June 1998, 69-82.
Jansen S. 1999a. 'Against cultural anaesthesia: identity, nationalism, and modernity in former Yugoslavia' In: Sfikas
T. & Williams C. (eds) Nationalism and ethnicity in Central/East Europe and in the Balkans. Ashgate Press.
Jansen S. 199 gb. 'Tales of the city: urban space and protest in Serbia' Paper presented at Dubrovnik Conference
Landscape, Modernity and Exclusion. September 2000.
Jansen S. 1999c. 'Identities, Memories and Ideologies' Social Anthropology 7:3, 327-334.
Jansen S. 2000a. 'Victims, rebels, underdogs: discursive pratices of resistance in Serbian protest' Critique of
Anthropology 20:3, 289-315.
Jansen 5. 2000b. 'The violence of memories: local narratives of the past after ethnic cleansing in Croatia' Paper
presented on the Workshop Intersecting times: the work of memory in South-Eastern Europe, Swansea, June
2000. [forthcoming in Rethinking History, 2002, 6:1]
Jansen 5. 2001. 'The Streets of Beograd: Urban Space and Protest Identities in Serbia' Political Geography, 20:1,
35-55.
Jansen S. & Spasio I. 2000. 'Belgrade after the bombings?' Introduction to Special Section in iNtergraph: journal of
dialogic anthropology 1:2 [www.intergraphjournaI.com ].
Jarió I. 1994. 'Vicious circle: image of the male and female' In: RosandiO R. & Pesiô V. (eds) Warfare, patriotism,
patriarchy. Beograd: Centre for Anti-War Action.
JergoviO M. 1998. 'Bei Yankee, gug ti bu pobegel' Feral Tribune 667, 29/05/98, 15.
JergoviO M. 1999. 'Partizani u obruëu' Feral Tribune 701, 15/03/99, 51.
Jones A. 1994. 'Gender and Ethnic conflict in Ex-Yugoslavia' Ethnic and Racial Studies 17:1, 115-134.
Jovanovió N. 1998. 'B(ud)alaeviá, politiãki efekt plaëipiöke II: sin palanke i prvaci pasivnosti' Arkzin 7 (106-107),
06/98, 31-32.
236
Joviô M. 1996. 'Oovek sa mesecom, a publika sa suzama u oëima' Arkzin 80/81, 20/12/96, 38-39.
Jut arnji List 23/06/98a. 'Dan antifaistiëke borbe: ariniã polo±io vijenac na Oltar domovine'
Jutarnji List 23/06/98b. 'TrusiC: tra±imo od Hrvatske drave odgovor tko je pobio ±rtve Jazovke'
Jutarnji List 23/06/98c. 'Kosovac: Tito stvorio temeije za uspostavu neoivsne Hrvatske'
Jutarnji List 04/07/98, 27. Interview with Viktor 2megae.
Kaldor M. 1993. 'Yugoslavia and the new nationalism' New Left Review, 197, 96-112.
Kangrga M. 1997. lzvan povijesnog dogadanja: dokumenti jednog vremena. Split: Feral Tribune.
Kasapovio M. 1996. 'lzbori - kontekst rezultati' Erasmus 18, 10/96, 14-20.
Kasiã B. (ed) 1997. Women and the politics of peace: contributions to a culture of women's resistance. Zagreb:
Centre for Women's Studies.
Kasiô B. 1994. 'Umjesto predgovora' In: Centar za ene Mve rata. Zbornik. Zagreb: C22R.
Kesiá V. 1994, '2ene su rtve rata' In: Centar za ene Mve rata. Zbornik. Zagreb: C22R.
Kesió V. 1995. 'Abortus kao antipatriotizam' Feministicke sveske 3-4:49-50.
KesiO V. 1997. 'Confessions of a "Yugo-nostalgic" witch' In: Renne T. (ed) Ana's land. Sisterhood in Eastern Europe.
Boulder: Westview.
Ki D. 1996 (1978). 'The Gingerheart Bread, or Nationalism (from The Anatomy Lesson). In: Ki D. Homo Poeticus:
essays and interviews. Manchester: Carcanet Press.
Kitromilides P. 1996. "Balkan mentality": history, legend, imagination' Nations and Nationalism 2:2, 163-191.
Kneeviô D. 1995a. 'Affective Nationalism' In: Scott J., Kaplan C. & Keates D. (eds) Transitions, environments,
translations. sI.
Kneeviá S. I 995b. 'Women from former Yugoslavia: three years after' si.
Kne±eviô S. s.d. 'Abused and misused: tragedy of women and its political exploitation' sI.
Koch K. 1992. 'Conflicting visions of society and state' Yearbook of European Studies 5, 187-202.
Koch K. 1996. 'Akkoorden van Dayton: breekpunt in of voortzetting van Joegosiavie-beleid van de internationale
gemeenschap?' Intern ationale Spectator 1:1, 63-35.
Koiar-Panov D. 1996. 'Video and the diasporic imagination of seithood: a case study of the Croatians in Australia'
Cultural Studies 10:2, 288-314.
Konstantinoviô R. 1981. Filozofija palanke. Beograd: Nolit.
Koraô M. 1993. 'Serbian nationalism' Feminist Review 45.
Koraö M. 1996. 'Understanding ethnic nationalism' Women Studies International Forum, 19:1-2, 133-143.
Kovaô M. 1988. 'The Slovene Spring' New Left Review, September! October 1988, 115-128.
Kristeva J. 1988. Etrangers a nous-mémes. Paris: Gallimard.
Kristo J. 1995. 'The catholic church in a time of crisis' In: Ramet S.P. & Adamovich Lj.S. (eds) Beyond Yugoslavia:
politics, economics, and culture in a shattered community. Boulder: Westview.
Krian M. 1992. 'Nationalismen in Jugosiawien: von postkommunistischer nationaier Emanzipation zum Krieg'
Osteuropa 42:2, 121-1 40.
Krian M. 1993. 'Het nationalisme en de oorlog' Oosteuropa Verkenningen 130, 63-70.
Krian M. 1994. 'New Serbian nationalism and the Third Balkan War' Studies in Eastern European Thought 46:1-2,
47-68.
Kundera M. 1996 (1978). The book of laughter and forgetting. London: Faber.
Laclau E. & Mouffe C. 1985. Hegemony and socialist strategy: towards a radical democratic politics. London: Verso.
Laclau E. (ed) 1994. New reflections on the revolution of ourtime. London: Verso.
Lampe J.R. 1994. 'The failure of the Yugosiav idea' Studies in Easern European Thought 46:1-2, 69-89.
Lendvai P. 1991. 'Yugoslavia without Yugoslays: the roots of the crisis' International Affairs 67:2, 251-262.
Lesiô Z. (ed) 1995. Children of Atlantis: voices from former Yugoslavia. Budapest: CEU Press.
Litrichin V. & Mladenoviô L. 1997. 'Belgrade feminists: separation, guilt, identity crisis' Renne T. (ed) Ana's land.
Sisterhood in Eastern Europe. Boulder: Westview.
Lovrió J. 1 997a. 'Jugo-paranoia' Novi List 08/11/97, 2.
Lovriá J. 1 997b. 'Kissingerovo pomilovanje za MiIoeviOa' Novi List 27/09/97, 2.
Lovrió M. 1998. 'Synodos Horouathon' Hrvatski knjievni list 13(32).
Lowentahl D. 1989. 'Nostalgia tells it like it wasn't' In: Shaw C. & Chase M. (eds) The imagined past: history and
nostalgia. Manchester: Manchester UP.
Lowenthal D. 1985. The past is a foreign country. Cambridge UP.
LukoviO P. 1998. Godine raspade. Split: Feral Tribune.
Maga B. 1993. The destruction of Yugoslavia. London: Verso.
Magid A. 1991. Private lives / public surfaces: grassroots perspectives and legitimacy questions in Yugoslav
socialism. Boulder: Westview East European Monographs
Malcolm N. 1994. Bosnia: a short history. London: McMiIIan.
237
Malkki L. 1992. National geographic: the rooting of peoples and the territorialisation of national identity among
scholars and refugees' Cultural Anthropology 7:1, 24-45.
Malkki L. 1994. 'Citizens of humanity: internationalisms and the imagined community of nations' Diaspora 3:1, 41-67.
Malkki L. 1 995a. Purity and exile: violence, memoiy and national cosmology amongst Hutu refugees in Tanzania.
Chicago UP.
Malkki L. 1995b. 'Refugees and exile: from refugee studies to the national order of things' Annual Review of
Anthropology 24, 49 5-523.
Marcus G.E. 1995. 'Ethnography in/of the world system: the emergence of multi-sited ethnography' Annual Review of
Anthropology 24, 95-117.
Marcus, G.E. 1998. Ethnography through thick and thin. Princeton UP.
Markotich S. 1994. 'Serbian intellectuals promote concept of Greater Serbia' Radio Free Europe! Radio Liberty
Research Reports 3:23 (1 0/06/94), 18-23.
Mastnak 1. 1990. 'Civil society in Slovenia: from opposition to power' Studies in Comparative Communism 23:3.
Mastnak T. 1992. 'Civil society in Slovenia: from opposition to power' In: Lewis P. (ed) Democracy and civil society in
Eastern Europe. London: McMilIan.
Mastnak T. 1994. 'The Slovene Story' Praxis International 13:4, 373-388.
Matiá B. 1997. 'Seven year itch: male Transilvanije velikih Drakula' Arkzin 85, 28/02/97, II,
Matiëeviã M. & Marka I. 1992. Geto. [Documentary Film, Beograd 1992]
Matvejeviã P. 1989. Central Europe seen from the East of Europe' In: Schöpflin G. (ed) In search of Central Europe.
Cambridge: Polity.
Melëiô D. 1994. 'Communication and national identity: Croatian and Serbian patterns' Praxis International 13:4, 354-
372.
Mennell 5. 1991. 'On the civilising of appetite' In: Featherstone M. etal. (eds) The Body. London: Sage.
MiIiôA. 1993. 'Women and nationalism in the Former Yugoslavia' In: Funk N. & Muller M. (eds) 1993. Gender politics
and post-communism: reflections from Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. London: Routledge.
Miliô A. 1994. 2ene, politika, porodica. Beograd: Institut za politiöke studije.
Milosavljeviá 0. 1996. 'Zloupotreba autoriteta nauke' In: Popov N. (ed) Sprska strana rata: trauma i katarza u
istonjskom pamóenju. Beograd: Republika.
Minh-ha T. 1994. Other than myself / my other self. In: Robertson G. et al. (eds) Travellers' Tales: Narratives of
Home and Displacement. London: Routledge.
Mioëinoviá M. 1997. Nemoô oãiglednog. Beograd: Beogradski Krug.
Mladenoviô L. & Protiô M. (eds) 1995, 2ene za Zivot bez nasilja. Beograd: SOS telefon za ±ene i decu ±rtve nasilja.
Mladenoviô L. et all 993. 'Belgrade feminists' Feminist Review 45:113-119.
Moënik R. 1984. 'Razum zmaguje / La Raison vaincra' In: Punk pod Slovenci. Ljubljana: Knjiznica Revolucionarne
Teorije.
Moönik R. 1992. 'Der 18. Brumaires des Ostlichen Fruhlings' Sandkorn et al (eds) Krieg in Europa: Analyse aus dem
ehemahligen Jugoslavien. Linz: Dipa-Verlag.
Moënik R. 1993. 'The power-mechanisms of transition' s.d., sI.
Modriô S. 1998. 'General i glumica' Tjednik 25/04/97, 28.
Mostov J. 1995. 'Our women / their women: symbolic boundaries, territorial markers and violence in the Balkans'
ProFemina 3, 21 0-21 7.
Mostov J. 2000. 'Sexing the nation/desexing the body: politics of national identity in the former Yugoslavia' In: Mayer
T. (ed) Gender ironies of nationalism: sexing the nation. London: Routledge.
Mu±ijeviO P. 1996. 'PribIiavanje Srbije i Zapadu' Republika 152, 16-30/11/96, 13-14.
MuijeviO P. 1997. 'Aspiracije - konvergencija I divergencija' Republika 157, 01-1 5/02/97, 27-28.
Myerhoff B. 1986 "Life not death in Venice": its second life' In: Turner V. & Bruner EM. (eds) The anthropology of
experience. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Nacional 16/12/98, 28-29. Interview with Dorde BaIaeviá.
Nedeljna	 Borba	 s.d.	 Interview	 with	 Dorde	 Balaeviô.	 [published	 on	 fanclub	 web	 site:
http://www.oaza.co.yu/muzika/djoIea
Nedeljna Borba 20-21/05/89, 5. Interview with Velimir Viskoviô.
Nedeljna Naa Borba 01-02/03/97, VIII. Most Radio Free Europe: 'Opstale veze koje su uvek postojale' Interview
with Borka PaviôeviO and Slobodan najder.
Nedeljnja Nasa Borba 24-25/05/97, pVlII.
Nede!jnja Nasa Borba, 31/05-01/06/97, p.XV.
Nedeljna Naa Borba 21-22/06/97. Interview with Bogdan Bogdanoviô.
Nedelnji Telegraf 24/07/96. 'eeIj: Ne putaju me u Hag, jer bih rasturio Tribunal'.
Neeven J. 1993. 'De koning en zijn opvolgers' Oosteuropa Verkenningen 130, 21-35.
Nikoliá D. 1996. Pisma iz dva Sarajeva. Beograd: Beogradski Krug.
238
Nikoliô-Ristanoviô V. 1996. Women, nationalism and mothers' Peace Review, 8:3, 359-364.
Nikoliá-RistanoviC V. et al (eds) 1995. Zene, nasilje i rat. Beograd: Institut za kriminoloka I socioloka istraivanja.
[Later revised and published in English as Nikoliô-Ristanovió V. (ed) 2000. Women, violence and war:
wartime victimisation of refugees in the Balkans. Budapest: CEU Press.]
Norris D. 1999. In the wake of the Balkan myth: questions of identityandmodernity. Basingstoke: MacMillan.
Norval A. 1994. 'Social ambiguity and the crisis of Apartheid' In: Laclau E. (ed) New reflections on the revolution of
our time. London: Verso.
Norval A. 1996. Deconstructing Apartheid discourse. London: Verso.
Novi List 22/09/97:9. Interview with Franjo Tudman.
NoVi List 01/10/97, 2-3. 'U izgradnji nae mlade drave ustrajatoemo na visokim moralnim naãelnima'
Novi List 03/10/97, 20-21. 'Novi pastir za treôe tisuóljeôe'
Novi List 11/10/97. 'Centru za rtve rata nagrada'
Novi List 27/10/97:4. 'Tudman: Hrvatska smetnja svjetskoj ideji o slobodnom drutvu'
Novi List 04/11/97 'Tudman: Balkanske dravne veze i ustavom zabraniti'
Novi List 06/11/97. 'Suradnja u interesu osiguranja trajnog mira'
Novi List 08/11/97. Ako nas maknu sa satelita obvavljivat ôemo na internetu'
Novi List 19/05/98, 24-25. Interview with Mani Gotovac.
Okely J. & Callaway H. (eds) 1992. Anthropology and autobiography. London: Routledge.
Okely J. 1996. 'Defiant moments: gender, resistance and individuals' In: Own or other culture. London: Routledge.
Okely J. 2000. 'Rootlessness against spatial fixing: Gypsies, border-intellectuals and "others" Key-note paper
presented at the Postgraduate Conference Identity and/in Movement, University of Hull, March 2000.
Oliver C., Jansen S. & Heller D. 2000. 'Up-routings: a critical engagement with identity and/in movement'
Anthropology in Action 7:3.
Papandreou M. 1997. 'Are women more peace-loving than men?' In: Kasiô B. (ed) Women and the politics of peace.
Zagreb: Centre for Women's Studies.
Paviôeviá B. 1994. Moda. Beograd: Beogradski Krug.
Pavkoviã A. 1994. 'The Serb national idea: a revival 1986-92' Slavonic and East European Review 72:3, 440-455.
PavkoviO A. 1995, 'Intellectual dissidence and the Serb national question' In: Pavkoviá A. et al (eds) Nationalism and
postcommunism. Hants: Dartmouth.
Pavlowitch 5K. 1988. The improbable survivor: Yugoslavia and its problems. Ohio State UP.
PekiO B. 1994 (1970). The houses of Belgrade. Evanston: Northwestern UP.
Peraziá 0. & BeliôJ. 1997. 'Pismenost u svetu i kod nas' Republika 161, 01-16/04/97, 7-8.
PeriiC R. 1998. 'Zaribane godine' Feral Tribune 18/05/98, 661, 46-47.
Peiá V. 1993. 'Nationalism, war and disintegration of communist federations: the Yugoslav case' In: Biserko S. (ed)
Yugoslavia, collapse, war, crimes. Beograd: Centre for Anti-War Action / Belgrade Circle.
Petretiá G. 1995. 'Svi smo mi izbjeglice. Dossier lzbjeglice, prognanici i etniëka ëisôenja.' Arkzin 46, 09/95, 11-13.
Petrovió 0. 1997. 'Zagrabi, bando, Zagrabi' Studentski List 6, 24/02/97, 9.
Petroviô R. 1985. Etnicki me.oviti brakovi u Jugoslaviji. Beograd: Institut za socioloka istraivanja.
Piliô D. 1999. 'Knin se kninom izbija' Feral Tribune 705, 22/03/99, 24-26.
Pipa A. 1990. 'Serbian Apologetics: Markoviô on Kosovo' Telos 83, 168-1 76.
Pletina 0. 1995. 'Democracy and nationalism in Croatia: the first three years' In: Ramet S.P. & Adamovich Lj.S.
(eds) Beyond Yugoslavia: politics, economics and culture in a shattered community. Boulder: Westview.
Pollock G. 1994. 'Territories of desire: reconsiderations of an African childhood' In: Robertson et al (eds) Travellers'
tales: narratives of home and displacement. London: Routledge.
Popov N. (ed) 1996. Sprska strana rata: trauma i katarza u istorijskom pamOenju. Beograd: Republika.
Popov N. 1994. 'Le populisme serbe' Les Temps Modernes 574, Mai 1994, 22-84.
Portelli A. 1981. 'The peculiarities of oral history' Histoiy Workshop 12, 96-107.
Portelli A. 1988. 'Uchronic dreams: working class memory and possible worlds' Oral Histoty Journal 16:2, 46-56.
Povrzanoviô M. 1997. 'Identities in war: embodiments of violence and places of belonging' Ethnologia Europaea 27,
153-162.
Povrzanoviã M. 2000. 'The imposed and the imagined as encountered by Croatian War Ethnographers' Current
Anthropology 41:2, 151-162.
Praso M. 1996. 'Demografske posljedice rata 1992.-i 995.' Erasmus 16, 04/96, 49-53.
Prica I. 1995. 'Between destruction and deconstruction: the preconditions of the Croatian ethnogrpahy of war'
Collegium Anthropologicum 19:1, 7-16.
Prodanoviã M. 1997a. 'Oslobadjanje gradova' Republika 157, 01-1 5/02/97, 25-26.
Prodanoviô M. 1997b. 'Nov pristup urbanitetu' Republika 161, 01-15/04/97, 9-10.
Prodanoviô M. 1998. 'Polemike oko kioskizacije Republika 179-180, 01 -31/01/98, 13.
Puiô U. 1995. 'The (im)possibility of urban society' Sociologija 37:4, 567-574.
239
Pusió V. 1994. Constitutional Politics in Croatia' Praxis International 13:4, 389-404.
Radio R. 1996. Crkva srpsko pitanje' In: Popov N. (ed) Srpska strana rata. Beograd: Republika.
Ral S. et al (eds) 1992. Women in the face of change. London: Routledge.
RajiC V. 1998. 'Seljaci prije gradjana' Tjednik 02/01/98, 27-29.
Ramet S.P. 1984. 'Religion and nationalism in Yugoslavia' In: Ramet S.P. (ed) Religion and nationalism in Soviet and
Eastern European politics. Durham DC: Duke UP.
Ramet S.P. 1991. Social currents in Eastern Europe. Durham: Duke U.P.
Ramet S.P. 1992. Nationalism and federalism in Yugoslavia 1962-1991. Bloomington: Indiana UP.
Ramet S.P. 1995a. 'Introduction: the roots of discord and the language of war' In: Ramet S.P. & Adamovich U.S.
(eds) Beyond Yugoslavia: politics, economics and culture in a shattered community. Boulder: Westview.
Ramet S.P. 1995b 'The Serbian Church and the Serbian nation' In: Ramet S.P. & Adamovich U.S. (eds) Beyond
Yugoslavia: politics, economics and culture in a shattered community. Boulder: Westview.
Ramet S.P. 1996a. Balkan babel: the disintegration of Yugoslavia from the death of Tito to ethnic war. Boulder:
Westview.
Ramet S.P. 1996b. 'Nationalism and the 'idiocy" of the countryside: the case of Serbia' Ethnic and Racial Studies
19:1, 70-87.
Rapport N. 1997a. 'Manifesto: towards a liberal and literary appreciation of the conscious and creative individual' In:
Rapport N. The transcendent individual: towards a literary and liberal anthropology. London: Routledge.
Rapport N. 1997b. 'Individual narratives: "writing" as a mode of thought which gives meaning to experience' In:
Rapport, N. The transcendent individual: towards a literary and liberal anthropology. London: Routledge.
Rapport N. 1997c, 'Individual morality: between liberalism, anthropology and biology' In: Rapport, N. The
transcendent individual: towards a literary and liberal anthropology. London: Routledge.
Rapport N. 1999. 'Post-cultural anthropology: the ironicization of values in a world of movement' Paper presented at
Special Seminar, Hull University, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, April 1999.
Rasmussen D. 1996. 'Rethinking Subjectivity: Narrative Identity and the Self In: Kearney R. (ed) Paul Ricoeur: The
Hermeneutics of Action. London: Sage.
Rasza M. 1997a. 'Balkan is beautiful' Arkzin 87, 28/03/97, 18-19.
Rasza M. 1997b. 'Crna (b)ruka na Filozofskom: Balkan is Beautiful Part II' Arkzin 2 (96/97), 9/10/97, 24-25.
RatkoviO I, 1998. 'Oslobodjenje grada' In: Ouplo O. (ed) Duh vedrine: kultura protesta / protest kulture. Beograd:
Agora.
Renne T. (ed) 1997. Ana's land. Sisterhood in Eastern Europe. Boulder: Westview.
Rennie Short J. 1991. Imagined country: society, culture and environment. London: Routledge.
Republika 169-170, 01-31/08/97, 2. Quote Artemije, Bishop Prizren-Racak.
Republika 166, 16-30/06/97, 2. Quote Arkan.
Republika 167-1 68, 01-31/0/97, 38. GSS open letter to the citizens of Beograd.
Ricoeur P. 1990. Soi-meme comme un autre. Paris: Editions du Soleil.
Ricoeur P. 1991a. 'Life in quest of narrative' In: Wood D. (ed) On Paul Ricoeur: narrative and interpretation. London:
Routledge.
Ricoeur P. 1991b. 'Narrative identity' In: Wood D. (ed) On Paul Ricoeur: narrative and interpretation. London:
Routledge.
Robertson G. et al. (eds) 1990. Travellers' Tales: Narratives of Home and Displacement. London: Routledge.
RoskandiO 0. 1995. 'Shifting responses: celebrations of uprisings in Croatia: 1945-1 991' East European Politics and
Societies 9:1, 256-271.
Routledge P. 1996. 'The third space as critical engagement' Antipode 28:4, 399-41 9.
Rushdie S. 1994. 'Bosnia on my mind' Beogradski Krug / Belgrade Circle, No.0: Kritika Centrizma / The Critique of
Cent rism, 21 7-220.
Rushdie S. 1999. The Ground beneath her Feet. London: Jonathan Cape.
Rusinow DI. 1977. The Yugoslav experiment: 1948-1974, University of California U.P.
Said E. 1985 (1978). Orientalism. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
SalecI R. 1992. 'Nationalism, anti-semitism, and anti-feminism in Eastern Europe' New German Critique 57:51-65.
SalecI R. 1993. 'The phantasy structure of nationalist discourse' Praxis International 13:3, 213-223.
SalecI R. 1994 The spoils of freedom: psychoanalysis and feminisim after the fall of socialism. London: Routledge.
Salecl R. 1994. 'The crisis of identity and the struggle for new hegemony in the Former Yugoslavia' In: Laclau E. (ed)
The making of political identities. London: Verso.
SaviO 0. & Gaspari M. 'Zato Oasopis Beogradski krug / Why the Belgrade Circle Journal?' Beogradski Krug /
Belgrade Circle Journal No. 0, 1994, 5-6.
Schöpflin G. 1993. 'The rise and fall of Yugoslavia' In: McGarry J. & O'Leary B. (eds) The politics of ethnic conflict
regulation. London: Routledge.
Scott J.C. 1985. Weapons of the weak: everyday forms of peasant resistance. New Haven: Yale UP.
240
Scott J.C. 1990. Domination and the arts of resistance: hidden transcripts. New Haven: Yale UP.
Seifert R. 1994 'War and rape: a preliminary analysis' In: Stiglmayer A. (ed) Mass rape: the war against women in
Bosnia-Hercegovina. Lincoln: U. Nebraska P.
Seifert R. 1996. 'The second front: the logic of sexual violence in wars' Women's Studies International Forum, vol 1.
SekuliO D., Hodson R. & Massey G. 1994. Who were the Yugosla ys? Failed sources of a common identity in the
former Yugoslavia' American Sociological Review 59:1, 83-97.
Seleniô S. 1996 (1993). Premediated murder. London: The Harvill Press.
Senjanoviá 0. 1997. '2ao mi je, nisam stigao!' Feral Tribune 638, 08/12/97, 34-35.
Sennett R. 1998. 'Disturbing memories' In: Fara P. & Patterson K. (eds) Memory. Cambridge UP.
Shoup P. 1992. 'Titoism and the national question in Yugoslavia' Yearbook of European Studies 5, 47-72.
Silber L. & Little A. 1995. The death of Yugoslavia. London: Penguin I BBC Books.
Silverman S. 1975. Three bells of civilization: the life of an Italian Hill Town. NY: Columbia UP.
Singleton F. 1976. Twentieth-century Yugoslavia. London: McMillan.
krbi Z. 1995. 'Long distance nationalism? Second generation Croatians and Slovenes in Australia' In: PavkoviO A.
et al a! (eds) Nationalism and postcommunism. Hants: Dartmouth.
krbi Z. 1999. Long-distance nationalism: diasporas, homelands and identities. Ashgate.
SIapak S. 1993. Joegoslavie we et je nog? Amsterdam: Jan Mets.
SIapak S. 1994. Ogledi o bezbrinosti. Beograd: B92 I Apatrid.
Slapak S. 1997. Ratnikandid. Beograd: B92 / Rat i Mir.
Slobodna Dalmacija 11/07/98. 'Primanja pribIiiti - ±ivotu'.
Smart B. 1986. 'The politics of truth and the problem of hegemony' In: Hoy D.C. (ed) Foucault: a critical reader.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Smith M.P. 1992. 'Postmodernism, urban ethnography and the new social space of ethnic identity' Theory and
society 21:4, 493-531.
Smits J. & Ultee W. 1996. Ethnisch gemengde huwelUken in het voormalige Joegoslavi'. Paper presented at
Zevende Sociaal-Wetenschappelijke Studiedagen, 'Van de Hoed en de Rand', Amsterdam, 11-12 April1996.
najder 5. 1997. 'Upostavljenje mostova' Identitet 14, 10/97, 42.
Sofos S. 1996. 'Inter-ethnic violence and gendered constructions of ethnicity in former Yugoslavia' Social Identities
2:1, 37-72.
Spasiô I. 1997. '2ena4rtva ena-gradanka: neka razmislilanja nad feministiëkom govorom o ratu' Paper presented
at Ljubljana Conference, Zenski diskurs ratni diskursi, 2-6 December 1997.
Spivak G.C. 1993. Outside in the teaching machine. London: Routledge.
Stallaerts R. 1992. Afscheid van Joegoslavie: achtergronden van de krisis. Leuven: Garant.
Stallaerts R. 1994. 'Het nationalititenprobleem in Joegoslavië' In: Detrez R. & Blommaert J. Nationalisme: kritische
opstellen. Berchem: Epo.
Stalls fiãki godinjak SFRJ 1983. Beograd.
Statistiöki ljetopis Republike Hrvatske 1997. Zagreb: Dravni zavod za statitistiku.
Stiglmayer A. (ed) 1994. Mass rape: war against women in Bosnia. U Nebraska P.
Stojió M. 1997. 'Nostalgija' Tjednik 18/04/97, 8:4.
Sunió T. 1998. 'Cool reflections' Matica 3/98:47.
TataloviO 5. 1998. 'Dal' je sve bib samo fol?' Arkzin 4 (100-101), 12/97-01/98, 2000-2001.
Teräebiö V. 1997. 'Expanding our civil space: women in peace initiatives' In: Kasiô B. (ed) Women and the politics of
peace. Zagreb: Centre for Women's Studies.
Thomas R. 1999. Serbia under Mio.eviC. London: C.Hurst & Co.
Thompson M. 1992. A paper house: the ending of Yugoslavia. Hutchinson Radius.
Tishkov V.A. 1992. 'Inventions and manifestations of ethnonationalism in and after the Soviet Union' In: Rupesinghe
K. et al (eds) Ethnicity and conflict in a post-communist world. London: St. Martin's Press.
Tima A. 1990 (1976). Het gebruik van de mens. Amsterdam: Meulenhof.
Todorova M. 1994. 'The Balkans: from discovery to invention' Slavic Review 53:2, 453-482.
Todorova M. 1997. Imagining the Balkans. Oxford UP.
Topham 5. 1993. 'De maarschalk en zijn partij' Oost Europa Verkenningen 130, 37-47.
Tromp-Vrkiô N. 1993. 'Tudman's Kroatië' Oost-Europa verkenningen 126, 3-14.
Turner V. 1969. The ritual process. London: Penguin.
Ugreiô D. 1993. Nationaliteit: geen -My American Fictionaiy. Amsterdam: Nijgh & Van Ditmar. [translated in 1994 as
Have a nice day: from the Balkan war to the American dream. London: Jonathan Cape]
Ugreiô 0. 1995. De kultuur van de leugens: anti-politieke essays. Amsterdam: Nijgh & Van Ditmar. [translated in
1998 as The culture of lies. Phoenix House]
Van Dartel G. 1991. 'Zelfbeschikking in Joegoslavië' Streven 59:3, 201-211.
241
van de Port M. 1994. Het einde van de wereld: beschaving, redeloosheid en zigeunercafes in Servie. Amsterdam:
Babylon I De Geus. [translated in 1999 as Gypsies, wars, and other instances of the wild. civilisation and its
discontents in a Serbian town. Amsterdam UP]
van de Port M. 1996. 'Europe is een oud wijf, de Balkan een jonge hengst' Filosofie Magazine 5:4, 34-39.
van de Port M. 1999. 'It takes a Serb to know a Serb: uncovering the roots of obstinate otherness in Serbia' Critique
of Anthropology 19:1, 7-30.
Veöernji List 2/5/98. Interview with the Dean of Mostar University.
Velikiô D. 1992a. Youtlantide. Rennes: UBACS.
VelikiO D. 1992b. 'Studio Istra' Delo 38:5-8, 34-39.
Velikiá D. 1994. 'My Dublin talk' Beogradski Krug/Belgrade Circle No.0: Kritika Centrizma / The Critique of Centrism,
182-1 89.
Velmar-JankoviO 5. 1996 (1990). Dungeon. Beograd: Dereta.
Vickers M. 1998. Between Serb and Albanian: a shorthistoiyofKosovo. London: C. Hurst.
VidiO-Rasmussen L. 1995. 'From source to commodity: newly-composed folk music of Yugoslavia' Popular Music
14:2, 241-256.
Voet C. 1993. Oor/og in Joegoslavie. Brussel: De Standaard.
Vreme 06/09/97, 24-26, Interview with Sreten Vujovió.
Vreme 16/08/97. 'Oni mrze Beograd'
VujoviC 5. 1992. Drugi Beograd' In: Mimica A. & OoloviO I. (eds) Druga Srbija. Beograd: Beogradski Krug.
VujoviC 5. 1996. 'Nelagoda ad grada' In: Popov N. (ed) Srpska strana rata: trauma i katarza u istonjskom pamOenju.
Beograd: Republika.
Vukov-OoliO D. 1998. 'Presudna kunja vratom' Novi List 10/04/98, 2.
Vulliamy E. 1994. Seasons in hell: understanding Bosnia's war. London: Simon & Schuster.
Waever 0. et al (eds) 1993. Identity, migration and the new security agenda in Europe. London: Pinter.
Wanner C. 1998. Burden of dreams: history and identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine. University Park: Penn State
University Press.
Williams R. 1993 (1973). The country and the city. London: The Hogarth Press.
Winland D. 1995. 'We are now an actual nation: impact of national independence on Croatian diaspora in Canada'
Diaspora 4:1, 3-29.
Wirth L. 1938. 'Urbanism as a way of life' American Journal of Sociology 44:1, 1-24.
Wolf C. 1983 (1976). A model childhood. London: Virago.
Woodward S.L. 1995. Balkan tragedy.' chaos and dissolution after the cold war. Wahington D.C.: Brookings
Institution.
ZajoviO S. 1995. 'I am disloyal' In: 2ene u crnom. Zene za mir. Beograd: kart.
Zajoviô S. 1997. 'In her own name (Cassandra's principle)' In: Kasiá B. (ed) 1997. Women and the politics of peace.'
-	 contributions to a culture of women's resistance. Zagreb: Centar za ±enske studije.
ZaniO I. 1995. 'The Curse of King Zvonimir and political discourse in embattled Croatia' East European Poltiics and
Societies 9:1, 90-122.
Zariô D. 2000. 'Genie in a bottle' Special Section 'Belgrade after the bombings' iNtergraph: journal for dialogic
anthropology 1:2 [www.intergraphjournaI.com ].
2ene u crnom. 1994a. Zene protiv rata. Beograd: 2ene u crnom.
Zene u crnom. 1994b. War deserters from the war in former Yugoslavia. Beograd: 2ene u crnom.
2ene u crnom. 1995. 2ene za mir. Beograd: 2ene u crnom. [translated as Women for peace]
Zene u crnom. 1996. 2ene za mir. Beograd: 2ene u crnom. [translated as Women for peace]
Zene u crnom. 1997. 2ene za mir. Beograd: 2ene u crnom. [translated as Women for peace]
Zirojeviô 0. 1996. 'Kosovo u kolektivnom pamOenju' In: Popov N. (ed) Sprska strana rafa: trauma i katarza u
istonjskom pamóenju. Beograd: Republika.
Zirojevió 0. 1997. 'Kiosk-nekada i sada' Republika 179-180, 01-31/01/98, 13.
2iek S. 1990. 'The Eastern Republics of Gilead' New Left Review 183, 50-62.
2iek S. 1991. For they know not what they do: enjoyment as a political factor. London: Versa.
2iek 5. 1992. 'East European Liberalism and its discontents' New German Critique 57, 25-49.
2iek S. & Salecl R. 1991. 'Lacan in Slovenia. Interview with 2iek and Saleci' Radical Philosophy 58, 25-31.
2unec 0. 1997. 'Socijetalne ratne stete u Bosni i Hercegovini: zato je narod ponovo izabrao patnju' Erasmus 20,
04/97, 19-36.
2421
